Radical skepticism endorses the extreme claim that large swaths of
our ordinary beliefs, such as those produced by perception or
memory, are irrational. The best arguments for such skepticism are,
in their essentials, as familiar as a popular science fiction movie
and yet even seasoned epistemologists continue to find them
strangely seductive. Moreover, although most contemporary
philosophers dismiss radical skepticism, they cannot agree on how
best to respond to the challenge it presents. In the tradition of
the 18th century Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid, Radical
Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition joins this discussion by taking
up four main tasks. First, it identifies the strongest arguments
for radical skepticism, namely, underdetermination arguments, which
emphasize the gap between our evidence and our ordinary beliefs
based on that evidence. Second, it rejects all inferential or
argument-based responses to radical skepticism, which aim to lay
out good noncircular reasoning from the evidence on which we base
our ordinary beliefs to the conclusion that those beliefs are
probably true. Third, it develops a commonsense noninferential
response to radical skepticism with two distinctive features: (a)
it consciously and extensively relies on epistemic intuitions,
which are seemings about epistemic goods, such as knowledge and
rationality, and (b) it can be endorsed without difficulty by both
internalists and externalists in epistemology. Fourth, and finally,
it defends this commonsense epistemic-intuition-based response to
radical skepticism against a variety of objections, including those
connected with underdetermination worries, epistemic circularity,
disagreement problems, experimental philosophy, and concerns about
whether it engages skepticism in a sufficiently serious way.
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