Peacekeeping in the late 1990s is a complex and diverse task, in
which civilian and military personnel are working together to a
greater degree than ever before. However, when an international
body such as the UN takes strategic decisions, it does so with
inadequate input from the military; in the field, there are clashes
of culture, confusion over command and control arrangements and
insufficient operational coordination. These issues also affect
regional organisations such as NATO. The awkward management of
operations and their uneven level of achievement have contributed
to a decline in the number of UN peacekeeping operations since
1994. This paper argues that the balance between civilian and
military expertise and advice at all levels of a peacekeeping
mission - strategic, tactical and operational - needs to be
reappraised. At the strategic level: * mandates must be clear, and
must respond both to the needs of the situation and to the
resources available * there must be regular dialogue between all
the principal players, military and civilian; the military-staff
capacity at UN headquarters should be made more effective, and
should be responsible to the Security Council * major
troop-contributing countries should be systematically involved in
determining mandates, as well as in reviewing operational plans *
senior military officers from all large troop-contributing
countries should be based at a mission's field headquarters. At the
operational level: * the office of the Special Representative of
the Secretary-General - the head of a UN peacekeeping mission -
should be strengthened. In non-UN operations, the authority of the
High Representative needs to be increased * a cadre of civilian
officials with peacekeeping experience needs to be developed;
standard operating procedures for the civilian head of a mission to
follow when dealing with the military need to be developed *
greater emphasis should be placed on the 'softer' aspects of
military science - managing resources, civilian control and human
rights * the reluctance of civilians and non-governmental
organisations to engage with the military should be addressed. Much
experience has been gained from the peacekeeping operations of the
1990s, but both military and civilian participants must make
considerably more progress before they can be said to have forged a
partnership that makes them an effective intervention force
General
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