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Hard Luck - How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Hardcover) Loot Price: R2,052
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Hard Luck - How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Hardcover): Neil Levy

Hard Luck - How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Hardcover)

Neil Levy

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Was R2,191 Loot Price R2,052 Discovery Miles 20 520 | Repayment Terms: R192 pm x 12* You Save R139 (6%)

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The concept of luck has played an important role in debates concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is. Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But compatibilist accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck objection: historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck; non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties with the epistemic condition on control over action. Levy argues that because epistemic conditions on control are so demanding that they are rarely satisfied, agents are not blameworthy for performing actions that they take to be best in a given situation. It follows that if there are any actions for which agents are responsible, they are akratic actions; but even these are unacceptably subject to luck. Levy goes on to discuss recent non-historical compatibilisms, and argues that they do not offer a viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. He suggests that luck undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter whether determinism is true or not.

General

Imprint: Oxford UniversityPress
Country of origin: United Kingdom
Release date: June 2011
First published: September 2011
Authors: Neil Levy
Dimensions: 218 x 139 x 20mm (L x W x T)
Format: Hardcover
Pages: 238
ISBN-13: 978-0-19-960138-7
Categories: Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Metaphysics & ontology
Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Epistemology, theory of knowledge
Books > Humanities > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Ethics & moral philosophy > General
Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Epistemology, theory of knowledge
Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Ethics & moral philosophy > General
Books > Philosophy > Topics in philosophy > Metaphysics & ontology
LSN: 0-19-960138-0
Barcode: 9780199601387

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