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Hard Luck - How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Hardcover)
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Hard Luck - How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Hardcover)
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The concept of luck has played an important role in debates
concerning free will and moral responsibility, yet participants in
these debates have relied upon an intuitive notion of what luck is.
Neil Levy develops an account of luck, which is then applied to the
free will debate. He argues that the standard luck objection
succeeds against common accounts of libertarian free will, but that
it is possible to amend libertarian accounts so that they are no
more vulnerable to luck than is compatibilism. But compatibilist
accounts of luck are themselves vulnerable to a powerful luck
objection: historical compatibilisms cannot satisfactorily explain
how agents can take responsibility for their constitutive luck;
non-historical compatibilisms run into insurmountable difficulties
with the epistemic condition on control over action. Levy argues
that because epistemic conditions on control are so demanding that
they are rarely satisfied, agents are not blameworthy for
performing actions that they take to be best in a given situation.
It follows that if there are any actions for which agents are
responsible, they are akratic actions; but even these are
unacceptably subject to luck. Levy goes on to discuss recent
non-historical compatibilisms, and argues that they do not offer a
viable alternative to control-based compatibilisms. He suggests
that luck undermines our freedom and moral responsibility no matter
whether determinism is true or not.
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