The first comprehensive account of China policy during the
Kennedy years, this study profiles John F. Kennedy as a man whose
inner struggles and disparate characteristics made for an
unpredictable foreign policy. While he was often a hostage to the
Cold War, to constrictive perceptions of the domestic climate, and
to the image of a predatory China, Kennedy recognized Washington's
finite capacity to shape events on the China Mainland. With the
possible exception of a preventive strike against China's nuclear
installations, he was also reluctant to run the risk of a military
confrontation with Beijing. On the eve of his assassination,
Kennedy may have even contemplated a China policy departure during
his second term.
A calm appraisal of China's capabilities and intentions
constituted the distinguishing feature of revisionist thinking
during the Kennedy years. The disjointed revisionist effort
settled, in late 1963, on a pedagogic course, which still implied a
search for American primacy. The revisionist approach did
ultimately facilitate the transformation of bilateral relations in
the early 1970s. From a shorter-range perspective, however, the
Kennedy era only added fuel to the fire of Sino-American
confrontation. The Limited Test Ban Treaty accentuated the sense of
encirclement and vulnerability in Beijing's psyche, and clouds
gathered ominously over Vietnam. Kennedy does bear some
responsibility for the bilateral impasse, as he personified a
decisionmaker so obsessed with the objective of deterrence as to
overlook the security dilemma: nonetheless, Mao's preference for a
radical course, independent of Kennedy's conduct, contributed as
well. Neither side was yet ready for a breakthrough.
General
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