Japan is only one of many industrialized economies to suffer a
financial crisis in the past 15 years, but it has suffered the most
from its crisis -- as measured in lost output and investment
opportunities, and in the direct costs of clean-up. Comparing the
response of Japanese policy in the 1990s to that of US monetary and
financial policy to the American Savings and Loan Crisis of the
late 1980s sheds light on the reasons for this outcome. This volume
was created by bringing together several leading academics from the
United States and Japan -- plus former senior policymakers from
both countries -- to discuss the challenges to Japanese financial
and monetary policy in the 1990s. The papers address in turn both
the monetary and financial aspects of the crisis, and the
discussants bring together broad themes across the two countries'
experiences.
As the papers in this Special Report demonstrate, while the
Japanese government's policy response to its banking crisis in the
1990s was slow in comparison to that of the US government a decade
earlier, the underlying dynamics were similar. A combination of
mismanaged partial deregulation and regulatory forbearance gave
rise to the crisis and allowed it to deepen, and only the closure
of some banks and injection of new capital into others began the
resolution. The Bank of Japan's monetary policy from the late 1980s
onward, however, was increasingly out of step with US or other
developed country norms. In particular, the Bank of Japan's limited
response to deflation after being granted independence in 1998
stands out as a dangerous and unusual stance.
General
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