In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national
security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient
motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can
produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers
to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this
perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult,
protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected
results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are
based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and
Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of
archival data and other historical documents related to various
state and terrorist bioweapons programs.
Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are
sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and
therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater
premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that
lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the
greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates
theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science,
organization, and management with her empirical research. The
resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and
success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its
ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and
technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial,
social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success
are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the
need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational
conditions that conflict with knowledge production.
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