The Poisoners is a history of four devastating chapters in the making of the region, seen through the disturbing use of toxins and accusations of poisoning circulated by soldiers, spies, and politicians in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Imraan Coovadia’s fascinating new book exposes the secret use of poisons and diseases in the Rhodesian bush war and independent Zimbabwe, and the apparent connection to the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States; the enquiry into the chemical and biological warfare programme in South Africa known as Project Coast, discovered through the arrest and failed prosecution of Dr Wouter Basson; the use of toxic compounds such as Virodene to treat patients at the height of the Aids epidemic in South Africa, and the insistence of the government that proven therapies like Nevirapine, which could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, were in fact poisons; and the history of poisoning and accusations of poisoning in the modern history of the African National Congress, from its guerrilla camps in Angola to Jacob Zuma’s suggestion that his fourth wife collaborated with a foreign intelligence agency to have him murdered.

But The Poisoners is not merely a book of history. It is also a meditation, by a most perceptive commentator, on the meaning of race, on the unhappy history of black and white in southern Africa, and on the nature of good and evil.

This Meticulously researched book unearths a sixty year secret. As the Japanese swept south towards Australia in late 1941, they carried chemical weapons, already used with deadly effect in China. Forced to counter the chemical warfare threat, Australia covertly imported 1,000,000 chemical weapons - including 16 types of mustard gas - and hid them in tunnels and other sites around the country. This book tells the story of the importation, storage and 'live trials' of the deadly weapons. It reveals details of the chemical warfare agents themselves, Australia's retaliatory plans, the involvement of the USA, the lack of training of the weapons handlers and, finally, the dangerous disposal of the volatile agents. Most of all, this is the story of the men who lived with the deadly weapons on a daily basis, handling them constantly despite the immense risks and suffering as a consequence. They were the Chemical Warfare Armourers and almost every armourer suffered physically and often mentally from the effects of the weapons and the terrible burden of maintaining secrecy. This remarkable book contains over 300 photographs - many taken surreptitiously - that illustrate all too starkly the conditions and the danger to which these men were exposed. This is an unprecedented visual history. This book is published in association with the Army History Unit and is a volume in the Australian Army History Collection.

Fear and ignorance have colored the perception of chemical and biological (CB) warfare both in the public and military spheres. Media coverage following the alleged gassing of sheep at Dugway Proving Ground in 1968 has led most people to believe that CB warfare is an unstoppable doomsday weapon of mass destruction. Yet, in 1972, General Creighton Abrams, the Army Chief of Staff, attempted to disestablish the Chemical Corps because he saw no need for it. Had that decision not been reversed in 1976, there would not have been any chemical defense specialists or equipment available for Operation Desert Storm in 1990.

This study tracks events relating to the Department of Defense's CB warfare program between 1968 and 1990, as it evolved up to the Gulf War. It also details how the military develops and procures CB defense equipment to protect today's soldiers. Mauroni draws parallels between the development of binary chemical weapons, the chemical demilitarization program, and the DoD CB terrorism response efforts, as each has very similar issues and solutions. He seeks to educate leading officials and the general public about the facts behind CB warfare and the options for coping with it in the future. With proper training and equipment, the challenge of CB warfare can be met and dealt with on the modern battlefield.

This edited collection considers the future of nuclear weapons in world politics in terms of security issues that are important for U.S. and other policy makers. The spread of nuclear weapons also is related to the equally dangerous proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, and of ballistic missiles of medium and longer ranges.

Cold War studies of nuclear weapons emphasized the U.S.-Soviet relationship, deterrence, and bilateral arms control. A less structured post-Cold War world will require more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of roles that nuclear weapons might play in the hands of new nuclear states or non-state actors. As the essays suggest as well, the possibility of terrorism by means of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction introduces other uncertainties into military and policy planning. An important analysis for scholars, students, and researchers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

In 2002 the Group of Eight industrialized nations - in which Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the UK, the USA and representatives of the European Union participate - formed the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The G8 pledged to raise up to $20 billion to carry out the Global Partnership projects over a 10-year period, initially in Russia but with the intention to expand the scope of projects to include other countries. These projects will help to specify the quantities and locations of weapons and materials and ensure that stocks are held under safe and secure custody to prevent diversion to unauthorized users or inappropriate uses. If the weapons or materials are not required, this practical assistance can also help to eliminate the surplus.
The G8 initiative is only one of a number of activities sharing the same basic features: tailor-made measures jointly implemented on the territory of one state by a coalition including states, international organizations, local and regional governments, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.
This report reviews the current cooperative threat reduction activities with a particular focus on projects and approaches engaging European partners. It examines the organizing principles for cooperative threat reduction and the lessons learned from past project implementation. Finally, it examines how European countries might organize their cooperative threat reduction activities to increase their coherence and effectiveness.

The immense impact of technology on both warfare and security has been clearly demonstrated and has heightened concerns relating to the proliferation of military technology and misuse by irresponsible actors. Technology control regimes are a vital component of national security strategies. This report presents evidence of the increasing relevance of technology in the 21st century and a brief review of the control regimes, as well as the perspectives of progressive developing nations. It highlights the need for a new approach to the management of technology and security issues. Meeting future challenges to arms control and non-proliferation will require wider cooperation among nations in a rapidly changing and interdependent world in which some of the new technologies will further accentuate security sensitivities. The report advocates the abandonment of cold war mindsets and makes a case for a broader cooperative approach to the management of technology controls. International cooperation will be vital for achieving the objectives of non-proliferation, disarmament and global socio-economic progress and will facilitate steps towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the dangers posed by terrorism, thereby fostering enhanced international peace and stability.

During the last century, advances in the life sciences were used in the development of biological and chemical weapons in large-scale state offensive programmes, many of which targeted the nervous system. This study questions whether the development of novel biological and chemical neuroweapons can be prevented as neuroscience progresses.

When Major Michael Donnelly was instructing his U.S. Air Force student pilots, he used to tell them three things: Timing is everything; it's nice to be lucky; and there is no justice. Highly decorated fighter pilot, proud young patriot, loyal friend with a mischievous sense of humor, loving husband and father of two, he could not have imagined the tragic meaning those words would assume just a few years after his tour of duty in Desert Storm. In 1996 Major Donnelly was diagnosed with ALS, Lou Gehrig's Disease, at the unusually young age of 35; the onset of this illness marked the beginning of a kind of torture beyond the scope of even the most rigorous military survival training. Betrayed by his body, eventually paralyzed and confined to a wheelchair, he experienced another betrayal perhaps even more difficult to comprehend--betrayal by his country. For despite the fact that over 110,000 Desert Storm veterans are sick, many dying of mysterious cancers and neurological diseases, including more than ten times the normal incidence of ALS--and despite all evidence pointing to U.S. troops having been dosed by low levels of Iraqi nerve agents and exposed to chemical weapons' fallout--the Pentagon adamantly denies any connection between their illnesses and their service in the Gulf War. "Falcon's Cry: A Desert Storm Memoir," Michael Donnelly's unforgettable story, is his courageous attempt to unearth the truth and force an acknowledgment of that truth by the government he and his fellow veterans defended with their lives.

Flying 44 fighter jet combat missions in a war fought on an all-or-nothing scale was thrilling for Michael Donnelly. When the war was won, he and his country rejoiced in the knowledge that, unlike in Vietnam, America had gotten it right in the Persian Gulf. Less than a decade later, the world is learning what veterans and their families have known since Desert Storm--we did not get it right at all. Saddam Hussein is still terrorizing a large portion of the globe. Moreover, we did not learn the lesson of Agent Orange which the Department of Defense denied for decades was the cause of early deaths and birth defects among Vietnam veterans and their families. Yet, thanks largely to the testimony of the author before the House of Representatives in 1997, a first step has been taken toward justice for the tens of thousands of Desert Storm veterans who are suffering virtually in isolation, many without any medical or disability benefits. Major Donnelly believes the truth about Gulf War Illnesses will be uncovered by studies funded in the recently passed Omnibus Appropriations bill, as well as through stories like his own, and he fervently hopes that America can, at last, get it right.

This groundbreaking book covers every aspect of deadly toxic chemicals used as weapons of mass destruction and employed in conflicts, warfare and terrorism. Including findings from experimental as well as clinical studies, this one-of-a-kind handbook is prepared in a very user- friendly format that can easily be followed by students, teachers and researchers, as well as lay people. Stand-alone chapters on individual chemicals and major topics allow the reader to easily access required information without searching through the entire book.
This is the first book that offers in-depth coverage of individual toxicants, target organ toxicity, major incidents, toxic effects in humans, animals and wildlife, biosensors, biomarkers, on-site and laboratory analytical methods, decontamination and detoxification procedures, prophylactic, therapeutic and countermeasures, and the role of homeland security.
Presents a comprehensive look at all aspects of chemical warfare toxicology in one reference work. This saves researchers time in quickly accessing the very latest definitive details on toxicity of specific agents used in chemical warfare as opposed to searching through thousands of journal articles. Will include the most agent-specific information on the market.
Includes detailed coverage of the most exhaustive list of agents possibly used as chemical warfare agents in one source. Section 4: Agents That Can Be Used as Weapons of Mass Destruction ? 25 chapters long. Other books on the market only include a sample selection of specific agents. Offering all possible agents detailed under one cover makes this appealing to a wider audience and saves researchers time.

The Forward will be written by Dr. Tetsuo Satoh, Chiba University, Japan. He is one of the most respected, recognizable authorities on chemical warfare agents which will set the authoritative tone for the book.

Covers risk to humans, animals and the environment equally. Researchers involved in assessing the risks involved with a possible chemical warfare attack and those who are developing response plans to such attacks must look at not only the risks to human health but to our wildlife and environment as well. The holistic approach taken in this book ensures that the researchers have ready access to the details no matter which aspect of the effects of CWA's they might be concerned with.

"Hospital Preparation for Bioterror" provides an extremely timely guide to improving the readiness of hospitals or healthcare organizations to manage mass casualties as a result of bioterrorism, biological warfare, and natural disasters. Contributions from leading law enforcement agencies, hospital administrators, clinical engineers, surgeons and terror-prevention professionals provide the most comprehensive, well-rounded source for this valuable information. Chapters on logistics and protecting the infrastructure help personnel distinguish the specific risks and vulnerabilities of each unique institution and assists in identifying specific solutions for disaster and bioterrorism preparedness.
-Principles and techniques discussed are applicable to all disasters, both large and small, not just bioterrorism
-Technical aspects such as hospital power and telecommunications are covered, in addition to patient care, response to mass casualties, large-scale drills, and surge capacity.
-Organized along functional lines, patient flow, medical specialty, and infrastructure
-A complimentary website with supplementary materials, check-lists, and references enhances the text and provides additional resources for preparedness.

This book represents a first considered attempt to study the factors that conditioned industrial chemistry for war in 1914-18. Taking a comparative perspective, it reflects on the experience of France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Britain, Italy and Russia, and points to significant similarities and differences. It looks at changing patterns in the organisation of industry, and at the emerging symbiosis between science, industry and the military.

Incidents of bioterrorism and biowarfare are likely to recur, leading to increased public concern and government action. The deficiencies of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are in urgent need of attention: the BTWC is the central international agreement to prevent the proliferation of biological warfare programmes.

Uniquely, this book is written by diplomats involved in the decade-long effort (1991-2001) in which State Parties to the BTWC tried to agree a Protocol to the Convention with legally binding measures to strengthen its effectiveness, and academics concerned with the negotiations. Just before negotiations foundered, when the Chairman's proposed text was virtually complete, the problems and proposed solutions were examined thoroughly, leading to this book.

The book is wide-ranging in its review of the history of biological warfare, the reasons why the current biological revolution is of such concern, and the main features of the BTWC itself. The core of the book examines the key elements of the proposed protocol - declarations, visits, challenge-type investigations, and enhanced international cooperation - and the implications for government, industry and biodefence, giving us all a better understanding of what still remains to be done to avert a biowarfare catastrophe.

Until now little attention has been paid to the development of military capabilities designed to target food crops with biological warfare agents. This book represents the first substantive study of state-run activities in this field. It shows that all biological warfare programs have included a component concerned with the development of anti-crop agents and munitions. Current concern over the proliferation of biological weapons is placed in the context of the initiative to strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. The author concludes that the risks posed by this form of warfare can be minimized by implementation of regimes concerning the peaceful use and control of plant pathogens that pose a risk to human health and the environment.

Scientific and technological change in the life sciences is currently transforming the problem of preventing biological warfare and biological terrorism. This transformation will demand a radical and rigorous new approach to biochemical arms control, for which the existing prohibition regimes for chemical and biological weapons are necessary but insufficient building blocks. Examples from the areas of immunology, the neurosciences, and the neuroendocrine-immune system are used to show the magnitude of the problem. The final section of the book will then outline additional measures required to control biochemical weapons in the 21st century.

What were the important developments in the military sector in 1988, and what effect did they have on peace and security? What progress was made in the attempts to control military activity and to reduce tension and the chances of war? In short, what are the prospects for a more stable international order? This twentieth edition of the SIPRI Yearbook presents detailed information on arms and arms control issues in a format that is both concise and standardized for ease of use. The Yearbooks attract world-wide attention and are used by governments, arms control negotiators, United Nations delegations, parliaments, scholars, students, the media and citizens as unique and indispensable reference works. The SIPRI Yearbook 1989 continues SIPRI`s review of the latest developments in nuclear weapons, nuclear explosions, world military expenditure, the international arms trade, chemical and biological weapons, the military use of outer space, ongoing armed conflicts and European arms control, and presents the unique annual calendar of military activities required by the Stockholm Document. Efforts to control the arms race - in nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, and space weapons - are described, and the status of negotiations and agreements is analysed. In addition to these regular features and statistics, this latest SIPRI Yearbook contains special studies on the arms trade regulations of seven weapon-exporting countries, on ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World, and on the enhanced role of the United Nations in regional conflict resolution. Its comprehensive coverage makes it an invaluable sourcebook for anyone seeking authoritative, factual information on issues of armaments and disarmament and thus to anyone interested in strategic studies, war studies, peace studies and international relations.

The Gulf War has been the only conflict in the last half-century that featured the possible use of chemical-biological weapons against U.S. forces. Vulnerability to such an attack spurred the Department of Defense to action from the first hint of trouble in August 1990 through the end of hostilities in March 1991. Nearly disbanded in 1972, the U.S. Army Chemical Corps would be the prime force in ensuring that U.S. forces could both survive and sustain combat operations under chemical-biological warfare conditions. Focussing on the work of senior Army officials, this account assesses the degree of readiness achieved by the ground war's initiation and the lessons learned since the conflict.

For an appropriately trained and equipped military force, chemical weapons pose not the danger of mass destruction but the threat of mass disruption, no more deadly than smart munitions or B-52 air strikes. This book will reveal a coordinated response to train and equip U.S. forces did take place prior to the feared Iraqi chemical and biological attacks. Undocumented in any other book, it details the plans that rushed sixty Fox reconnaissance vehicles to the Gulf, the worldwide call for protective suits and masks, and the successful placement of biological agent detectors prior to the air offensive. In addition, the work addresses what really happened at Khamisiyah. Were troops exposed to chemical weapons and what is behind the mysterious Gulf War Syndrome?

This book explores the origins, interpretations and meanings of the term biosecurity. It brings together contributors on issues relating to the perceptions of the threat of biological weapons and how states are responding, or not, to the challenges posed by the potential of the products of the life sciences to be used for destructive purposes.

The armaments of chemical and biological warfare (CBW), as Eric Coddy shows in this introduction for the concerned layman, are now widely held not just by nation-states, but by terrorist and criminal enterprises. The weapons themselves are relatively inexpensive and very easy to hide, and organizations of just a few dozen people are capable of deploying potentially devastating attacks with them. While in the twentieth century most of our arms-control effort focused, rightly, on nuclear arsenals, in the twenty-first century CBW will almost certainly require just as much attention. This book defines the basics of CBW for the concerned citizen, including non-alarmist scientific descriptions of the weapons and their antidotes, methods of deployment and defensive response, and the likelihood in the current global political climate of additional proliferation.