The Poisoners is a history of four devastating chapters in the making of the region, seen through the disturbing use of toxins and accusations of poisoning circulated by soldiers, spies, and politicians in Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Imraan Coovadia’s fascinating new book exposes the secret use of poisons and diseases in the Rhodesian bush war and independent Zimbabwe, and the apparent connection to the 2001 anthrax attacks in the United States; the enquiry into the chemical and biological warfare programme in South Africa known as Project Coast, discovered through the arrest and failed prosecution of Dr Wouter Basson; the use of toxic compounds such as Virodene to treat patients at the height of the Aids epidemic in South Africa, and the insistence of the government that proven therapies like Nevirapine, which could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, were in fact poisons; and the history of poisoning and accusations of poisoning in the modern history of the African National Congress, from its guerrilla camps in Angola to Jacob Zuma’s suggestion that his fourth wife collaborated with a foreign intelligence agency to have him murdered.

But The Poisoners is not merely a book of history. It is also a meditation, by a most perceptive commentator, on the meaning of race, on the unhappy history of black and white in southern Africa, and on the nature of good and evil.

Nerve agents are the world's deadliest means of chemical warfare. Nazi Germany developed the first military-grade nerve agents and massive industry for their manufacture-yet, strangely, the Third Reich never used them. At the end of the Second World War, the Allies were stunned to discover this advanced and extensive programme. The Soviets and Western powers embarked on a new arms race, amassing huge chemical arsenals. From their Nazi invention to the 2018 Novichok attack in Britain, Dan Kaszeta uncovers nerve agents' gradual spread across the world, despite international arms control efforts. They've been deployed in the Iran-Iraq War, by terrorists in Japan, in the Syrian Civil War, and by assassins in Malaysia and Salisbury-always with bitter consequences. 'Toxic' recounts the grisly history of these weapons of mass destruction: a deadly suite of invisible, odourless killers.

From 1932 to 1945, in a headlong quest to develop germ warfare capability for the military of Imperial Japan, hundreds of Japanese doctors, nurses and research scientists willingly participated in what was referred to at the time as 'the secret of secrets' - horrifying experiments conducted on live human beings, in this case innocent Chinese men, women, and children. This was the work of an elite group known as Unit 731, led by Japan's answer to Joseph Mengele, Dr Shiro Ishii.

Under their initiative, thousands of individuals were held captive and infected with virulent strains of anthrax, plague, cholera, and other epidemic and viral diseases. Soon entire Chinese villages were being hit with biological bombs. Even American POWs were targeted. All told, more than 250,000 people were infected, and the vast majority died. Yet, after the war, US occupation forces under General Douglas MacArthur struck a deal with these doctors that shielded them from accountability.

Provocative, alarming and utterly compelling, "A Plague Upon Humanity" draws on important original research to expose one of the most shameful chapters in human history.

Focuses on key information needed during an emergency response Provides updated toxicology, exposure hazards, physical-chemical data, and best practices with regard to the treatment of casualties Presents updated protective action distances, decontamination, and remediation information

Originally published in 1985, this book is the result of an exploration of the state papers of the United Kingdom undertaken with the aim of discovering information about the past use of chemical warfare. This information may serve as a point of historical reference in speculation upon the possible nature and consequences of large-scale chemical warfare recurring in Europe. Part I of the monograph concentrates primarily on material documenting the use of chemical weapons in the First and Second World Wars, the impact of this use on the civilian populations of France and Belgium, casualties incurred in the production, research, development, training and deployment of chemical warfare agents, and the attempts made to incorporate chemical weapons into military doctrine and war-preparedness. Part II supplements the citation of documents in Part I. It comprises an ordered bibliography listing not only the location of the records found to be of primary concern to this study, but also the location of other records not cited in Part I which appear to form much of the remainder of the official record of the British CW effort. A list of some of the papers which have not been released comprises the concluding section.

The effects of weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained, either spatially or temporally, are unpredictable, discriminate poorly between combatants and civilians, and are highly disruptive of ecosystems. This book, first published in 1977, examines several WMD and analyses the extent and duration of environmental damage to be expected from them. Chapters are devoted to the ecological impacts of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and geophysical and environmental weapons.

Based on results previously restricted for military use and inaccessible to the public, this practice-oriented handbook introduces the use of enzymes for fast and efficient decontamination of B/C weapons in various scenarios, including terrorist attacks. It draws on the internationally recognized technological leadership of the German armed forces, whose anti-B/C technology is among the most advanced worldwide. The text is rounded off with a look at future perspectives.

This book investigates the way that the molecular sciences are shaping contemporary security practices in relation to the governance of biological threats. In response to biological threats, such as pandemics and bioterrorism, governments around the world have developed a range of new security technologies, called medical countermeasures, to protect their populations. This book argues that the molecular sciences' influence has been so great that security practices have been molecularised. Focusing on the actions of international organisations and governments in the past two decades, this book identifies two contrasting conceptions of the nature or inherent workings of molecular life as driving this turn. On the one hand, political notions of insecurity have been shaped by the contingent or random nature of molecular life. On the other, the identification of molecular life's constant biological dynamics supports and makes possible the development and stockpiling of effective medical countermeasures. This study is one of the few to take seriously the conceptual implications that the detailed empirical workings of biotechnology have on security practices today. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, bio-politics, life sciences, global governance, and International Relations in general.

The effects of weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained, either spatially or temporally, are unpredictable, discriminate poorly between combatants and civilians, and are highly disruptive of ecosystems. This book, first published in 1977, examines several WMD and analyses the extent and duration of environmental damage to be expected from them. Chapters are devoted to the ecological impacts of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and geophysical and environmental weapons.

Contents:
Preface Acknowledgements The Pacific Theatre, World War II Introduction Part I. Japanese Factories of Death 1. Manchuria 2. Ishii Shiro 3. The Beiyinhe Bacteria Factory 4. Phase 1. Building Ping Fan 5. Phase 2. Hell in Ping Fan 6. The Secret of Secrets: Human Experiments 7. The Death Factory in Changchun 8. The Death Factory in Nanking 9. Experiments on prisoners of War 10. Who Knew? Part II. American Cover-Up The American Biological Warfare Program 12. Discovery of the Secret of Secrets 13. Investigations 14. Scientists and the Cover-Up 15. The Military and the Cover-Up 16. Epilogue Notes Select Bibliography Index

Since the first edition of this handbook, written in 1999, the awareness of threat scenarios-and the technical knowledge and capabilities from toxicological and medical treatment perspective-have only advanced and, largely, improved. The Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Third Edition, Two Volume Set is structured to provide rapid access to key data needed by response professionals and decision-makers on a broad range of agents and pathogens that have been developed by the military, used or threatened to be used by terrorists, or industrial materials determined to be of significant concern. The body of information in this new edition exceeds a size that can comfortably be handled in a single volume. As such, Volume 1 contains those classes of military chemical agents that were developed for their lethal effects as, well as toxic industrial materials that are considered a potential threat for use as improvised agents. Volume 2 contains chemicals that were developed for their potential as non-lethal agents, as well as all classes of biological and mid-spectrum agents. Chapters are formatted to offer rapid access to key information required by early in a response, without overwhelming them with inessential details. The information presented for every class detailed in this edition has been updated and expanded, containing more information on health effects and on the chemical, physical and biological properties of individual agents. There has been a significant increase in the number of individual agents described, as well as in the number of components, precursors, and decomposition products detailed. This edition also contains chapters on bioregulators and non-vector entomological agents, two new classes of agents not previously addressed Key Features: Focuses on the key information needed during an emergency response Provides updated toxicology, exposure hazards, physical-chemical data, and treatment of casualties for all chemical agents Profiles the presentation of diseases in people, animals, or plants Presents updated protective action distances, decontamination, and remediation information The information provided is a compilation gathered from numerous sources and arranged into the current, easy-to-access format. In order to ensure accuracy, all data has been cross-checked over the widest variety of military, scientific, and medical sources available. The Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Third Edition remains the gold-standard reference detailing the widest variety of military, scientific, and medical sources available

Stalin's Secret Weapon is a gripping account of the early history of the globally significant Soviet biological weapons programme, including its key scientists, its secret experimental bases and the role of intelligence specialists, establishing beyond doubt that the infrastructure created by Stalin continues to form the core of Russia's current biological defence network. Anthony Rimmington has enjoyed privileged access to an array of newly available sources and materials, including declassified British Secret Intelligence Service reports. The evidence contained therein has led him to conclude that the programme, with its network of dedicated facilities and proving grounds, was far more extensive than previously considered, easily outstripping those of the major Western powers. As Rimmington reveals, many of the USSR's leading infectious disease scientists, including those focused on pneumonic plague, were recruited by the Soviet military and intelligence services. At the dark heart of this bacteriological archipelago lay Stalin, and his involvement is everywhere to be seen, from the promotion of favoured researchers to the political repression and execution of the lead biological warfare specialist, Ivan Mikhailovich Velikanov.

Mutant Ecologies traces the spinning of new synthetic threads into the web of life. It is a critical cartography of the shifting landscapes of capital accumulation conjured by recent developments in genomic science, genome editing and the biotech industry. CRISPR crops, fast-growing salmons, heat-resistant Slick (TM) cows, Friendly (TM) Mosquitoes, humanised mice, pigs growing human organs - these are but a few of the dazzling new life-forms that have recently emerged from corporate and university laboratories around the world, all promising to lubricate the circuits of capital accumulation in distinct ways. The deliberate induction of genetic mutations is increasingly central to business operations in a number of sectors, from agriculture to pharmaceuticals. While the Nobel Committee recently proclaimed the life sciences to have entered 'a new epoch', the authors show how these technological innovations continue to operate within a socio-historical context defined by the iron rules of capitalist competition and exploitation. Capital no longer contents itself with simply appropriating the living bodies of plants and animals. It purposefully designs their internal metabolism, and in that way it redesigns the countless living vectors that constitute the global biosphere. It is driving a biological revolution, which will ripple through the everyday lives of people everywhere.

Factories of Death details the activities of the Japanese army scientists that conducted numerous horrifying experiments upon live human beings. It investigates who from the upper echelons of the Japanese military and political establishments knew of the experiments, also the question of whether or not Allied POWs were subjected to such tests, and the nature of the deal that was brokered with US authorities after the war. This new edition has been completely updated, and contains an entirely new chapter detailing the numerous revelations that have surfaced since the book's initial publication in 1994.

This book examines the politics of biological disarmament, focusing on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a treaty regime and the cornerstone of biological disarmament efforts. Biological weapons have long been banned, but the ban needs strengthening. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the cornerstone of this disarmament regime. After years of deadlock and disappointment its Sixth Review Conference in 2006 generated new hope that biological disarmament could be reinforced from within. This book studies the intricate diplomacy of the Sixth Review Conference as a key moment in the recovery of self-confidence by the treaty parties. It makes detailed proposals for developing an accountability framework and stronger institutions so that the treaty regime can work better. It examines alternative futures for the BWC and the trajectories to be avoided or encouraged in the short, medium and longer terms as its regime evolves. Controversially, by comparing treaty constraints on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons it restores the BWC firmly to the realm of disarmament rather than arms control and rescues it from misleading identifications with counterproliferation and counterterrorism models. This book will appeal to policy-makers, diplomats and students of biological weapons, weapons of mass destruction, international security and IR in general. Nicholas A. Sims is Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is author of four books on aspects of disarmament.

Web of Prevention provides a timely contribution to the current debate about life science research and its implications for security. It is an informative guide for both experts and the public. It is a forward-looking contribution covering both ends of the equation and creates momentum for the current discussion on effective preventive measures and effective control measures. While there are no guarantees for preventing misuse, there are nonetheless crucial steps the world community can take towards the overarching goal of a global network for the life sciences. This book sheds light on concrete steps toward the achievement of this worthy goal.

"This book with its collection of essays provides an in-depth analysis of the various mutually reinforcing elements that together create and strengthen a web of prevention - or of assurance - that is vital to ensure that the advances in the life sciences are not misused to cause harm. All those engaged in the life sciences and in policy making in governments around the world should read this book so they can take steps to strengthen the web preventing biological weapons."
From the Foreword by Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations.

"Since September 11, 2001 in many countries renewed attention has been given to how research in the life sciences might inadvertently or intentionally facilitate the development of biological or chemical weapons. This state-of-the-art volume examines the full extent of the issues and debates. Coverage includes an overview of recent scientific achievements in virology, microbiology, immunology and genetic engineering with a view to asking how they might facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction by state, sub-state or terrorist organizations. Consideration is given to what we have and haven't learned from the past. Employing both academic analysis and reflections by practitioners, the book examines the security-inspired governance regimes for the life sciences that are under development. Ultimately the authors examine what is required to form a comprehensive and workable web of prevention and highlight the importance of encouraging discussions between scientists, policy makers and others regarding the governance of vital but potentially dangerous research."
Dr Graham S. Pearson, Visiting Professor of International Security, University of Bradford, UK and previously Director-General, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, UK

Biosecurity is the assessment and management of potentially dangerous infectious diseases, quarantined pests, invasive (alien) species, living modified organisms, and biological weapons. It is a holistic concept of direct relevance to the sustainability of agriculture, food safety, and the protection of human populations (including bio-terrorism), the environment, and biodiversity. Biosecurity is a relatively new concept that has become increasingly prevalent in academic, policy and media circles, and needs a more comprehensive and inter-disciplinary approach to take into account mobility, globalisation and climate change. In this introductory volume, biosecurity is presented as a governance approach to a set of concerns that span the protection of indigenous biological organisms, agricultural systems and human health, from invasive pests and diseases. It describes the ways in which biosecurity is understood and theorized in different subject disciplines, including anthropology, political theory, ecology, geography and environmental management. It examines the different scientific and knowledge practices connected to biosecurity governance, including legal regimes, ecology, risk management and alternative knowledges. The geopolitics of biosecurity is considered in terms of health, biopolitics and trade governance at the global scale. Finally, biosecurity as an approach to actively secure the future is assessed in the context of future risk and uncertainties, such as globalization and climate change.

Chemical Warfare during the Vietnam War documents the use of antipersonnel chemical weapons throughout the Vietnam War, and explores their effectiveness under the wide variety of circumstances in which they were employed. The short, readable account follows the US program as it progressed from a focus on the humanitarian aspects of non-lethal weapons to their use as a means of augmenting and enhancing the lethality of traditional munitions. It also presents the efforts of the North Vietnamese to both counter US chemical operations and to develop a chemical capability of their own. Chemical Warfare during the Vietnam War is a comprehensive and thoroughly fascinating examination of riot-control agents during the Vietnam War.

Focusing on East Asia, this book sets out a framework for analyzing infectious disease threats in security terms. It covers the security significance of naturally occurring disease outbreak events such as SARS and avian influenza, the development and use of biological weapons by state and non-state actors, and the security risks associated with laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organisms.

Christian Enemark devises a conceptual framework for securitization that is useful for policy makers by using the overlaps and synergies between different infectious disease threats. The book draws heavily on material from public health and scientific literature to illustrate the cross-disciplinary requirements for addressing infectious diseases challenges in security terms. Fast-moving, naturally occurring disease threats are of increasing concern to governments and individuals, and it is therefore important to recognize their close relationship to the security challenges posed by Biological Weapons and pathogen research.

Disease and Security will be of much interest to students of international security, public health and Asian politics.

This book examines the politics of biological disarmament, focusing on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a treaty regime and the cornerstone of biological disarmament efforts.

Biological weapons have long been banned, but the ban needs strengthening. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the cornerstone of this disarmament regime. After years of deadlock and disappointment its Sixth Review Conference in 2006 generated new hope that biological disarmament could be reinforced from within. This book studies the intricate diplomacy of the Sixth Review Conference as a key moment in the recovery of self-confidence by the treaty parties. It makes detailed proposals for developing an accountability framework and stronger institutions so that the treaty regime can work better. It examines alternative futures for the BWC and the trajectories to be avoided or encouraged in the short, medium and longer terms as its regime evolves. Controversially, by comparing treaty constraints on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons it restores the BWC firmly to the realm of disarmament rather than arms control and rescues it from misleading identifications with counterproliferation and counterterrorism models.

This book will appeal to policy-makers, diplomats and students of biological weapons, weapons of mass destruction, international security and IR in general.

Nicholas A. Sims is Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is author of four books on aspects of disarmament.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the potential terror of weapons of mass destruction--from nuclear, biological, and chemical to dirty bombs--preoccupies national security experts. In "Chemical Warfare," Frederic J. Brown, presents a cogent, innovative framework for understanding the historical forces that have restrained the use of WMD and how they continue to have relevance today. Analyzing both world wars, he argues that the restraints on use were complex and often unpredictable and ranged from the political to the technological.

The author offers a detailed examination of American chemical warfare policy as it was shaped by industry and public sentiment, as well as national and military leaders. The organization of the book into three parts reflects the importance of battlefield experiences during the First World War and of international political restraints as they evolved during the interwar years and culminated in "no first use" policies by major powers in World War II. Part I examines the use of chemical weapons in World War I as it influenced subsequent national policy decisions. Part II focuses on the evolution of political, military, economic, and psychological restraints from 1919 to 1939. Part III discusses World War II during two critical periods: 1939 to early 1942, when the environment of the war was being established largely without American influence; and during 1945, when the United States faced no credible threat of retaliation to deter its strategic and battlefield use of chemical weapons. Written at the height of controversy about the U.S. use of chemicals in Vietnam, "Chemical Warfare" offers a valuable historical perspective, as relevant now in its analysis of chemical and also nuclear policy as it was when first published.

The compelling story of Lord Dundonald's secret war plans, rejected by the Admiralty in 1811 as ungentlemanly, kept secret for almost a century, only to disappear in 1914. What were the secrets and did they lead to the German useof poison gas in 1915? The 10th Earl of Dundonald (1775-1860) had as Lord Cochrane been a dashing and highly successful naval captain (he forms the model for Patrick O'Brian's fictional hero Jack Aubrey); he was also an inventor. In 1811 he presented details of his secret war plans to the Admiralty, who thought them likely to be highly effective, but uncivilised, and did not take them up; they remained secret. From time to time throughout the rest of his life Lord Dundonald lobbied again on behalf of his plans, without success. In 1914 the, supposedly, German butler of the then Lord Dundonald allegedly stole the secret documents and passed them to his government, to the subsequent consternation of the Dundonald family, who feared that German use of poison gas in 1915 was the result of this alleged theft. Just what were the secrets? And did the theft lead to the use of poison gas in 1915? Charles Stephenson, who has been bracketed amongst "the world's leading maritime historians", unravels the details of this interesting and intriguing story.

Biosecurity is the assessment and management of potentially dangerous infectious diseases, quarantined pests, invasive (alien) species, living modified organisms, and biological weapons. It is a holistic concept of direct relevance to the sustainability of agriculture, food safety, and the protection of human populations (including bio-terrorism), the environment, and biodiversity. Biosecurity is a relatively new concept that has become increasingly prevalent in academic, policy and media circles, and needs a more comprehensive and inter-disciplinary approach to take into account mobility, globalisation and climate change. In this introductory volume, biosecurity is presented as a governance approach to a set of concerns that span the protection of indigenous biological organisms, agricultural systems and human health, from invasive pests and diseases. It describes the ways in which biosecurity is understood and theorized in different subject disciplines, including anthropology, political theory, ecology, geography and environmental management. It examines the different scientific and knowledge practices connected to biosecurity governance, including legal regimes, ecology, risk management and alternative knowledges. The geopolitics of biosecurity is considered in terms of health, biopolitics and trade governance at the global scale. Finally, biosecurity as an approach to actively secure the future is assessed in the context of future risk and uncertainties, such as globalization and climate change.