Chronicling the horrific story of the Agent Orange experiments near Oromocto, New Brunswick, this shocking history reveals the tragic accounts of numerous families who lost loved ones due to military testing. Depicting the initial spraying of the deadly defoliant near Gagetown, this document portrays how the United States military, searching for a terrain similar to Vietnam, began conducting tests in this area. Although the Americans discontinued their trials in the late 1960s, this record uncovers more than an additional decade's worth of continued use by Canadian forces, who discovered it was cheaper to clear brush and kill trees with a dangerous chemical than to hire workers to perform the task. As this astonishing study demonstrates, what they did not know at the time was that Agent Orange also killed people. Hundreds of locals suffered and died, and cancer and other diseases ran rampant among military personnel and civilians who worked on the base. This stunning recollection investigates the stories of those who didn't survive as well as their relatives' daunting struggle to obtain compensation for their suffering and loss, exposing countless years of government complicity.

The United States and Biological Warfare] is a major contribution to our understanding of the past involvement by the US and Japanese governments with BW, with important, crucial implications for the future.... Pieces of this story, including the Korean War allegations, have been told before, but never so authoritatively, and with such a convincing foundation in historical research.... This is a brave and significant scholarly contribution on a matter of great importance to the future of humanity.
Richard Falk, Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University

The United States and Biological Warfare argues persuasively that the United States experimented with and deployed biological weapons during the Korean War. Endicott and Hagerman explore the political and moral dimensions of this issue, asking what restraints were applied or forgotten in those years of ideological and political passion and military crisis.

For the first time, there is hard evidence that the United States lied both to Congress and the American public in saying that the American biological warfare program was purely defensive and for retaliation only. The truth is that a large and sophisticated biological weapons system was developed as an offensive weapon of opportunity in the post-World War II years. From newly declassified American, Canadian, and British documents, and with the cooperation of the Chinese Central Archives in giving the authors the first access by foreigners to relevant classified documents, Endicott and Hagerman have been able to tell the previously hidden story of the extension of the limits of modern war to include the use of medical science, the most morally laden of sciences with respect to the sanctity of human life. They show how the germ warfare program developed collaboratively by Great Britain, Canada, and the United States during the Second World War, together with information gathered from the Japanese at the end of World War II about their biological warfare technology, was incorporated into an ongoing development program in the United States. Startling evidence from both Chinese and American sources is presented to make the case.

An important book for anyone interested in the history and morality of modern warfare."

Dual-use applications for chemical manufacturing equipment have been recognized as a concern for many years, and export-control regulations worldwide are in place as a result. These regulations, in conjunction with the verification and inspection requirements of Article VI of the Chemical Weapons Convention, are designed to support non-proliferation of manufacturing equipment suitable for production of chemical warfare agents. In recent years, globalization has changed the distribution of chemical manufacturing facilities around the world. This has increased the burden on current inspection regimes, and increased the amount of manufacturing equipment available around the world. Movement of that equipment, both domestically and as part of international trade, has increased to accommodate these market shifts. To better understand the movement and tracking of chemical manufacturing equipment of dual-use concern, the Project on Advanced Systems and Concepts for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction at the Naval Postgraduate School contracted with the Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology of the National Research Council to hold a workshop on the global movement and tracking of chemical manufacturing equipment. The workshop, held in May 2014, looked at key concerns regarding the availability and movement of equipment for chemical manufacturing, particularly used and decommissioned equipment that is of potential dual-use concern. The workshop examined today's industrial, security, and political contexts in which these materials are being produced, regulated, and transferred. The workshop also facilitated discussions about current practices, including consideration of their congruence with current technologies and security threats in the global chemical industrial system. The Global Movement and Tracking of Chemical Manufacturing Equipment summarizes the presentations and discussion of the event. Table of Contents Front Matter 1 Introduction and Overview 2 The Changing Global Landscape 3 The Lifetime of Manufacturing Equipment 4 The Security Dimension 5 The Internet as a Secondary Market 6 Final Group Discussion Appendix A: Statement of Task Appendix B: Workshop Agenda Appendix C: Biographical Sketches of Workshop Speakers and Organizing Committee Members Appendix D: Workshop Attendees Appendix E: The Board on Chemical Sciences and Technology

The Pueblo Chemical Depot (PCD) in Colorado is one of two sites that features U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons that need to be destroyed. The PCD features about 2,600 tons of mustard-including agent. The PCD also features a pilot plant, the Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant (PCAPP), which has been set up to destroy the agent and munition bodies using novel processes. The chemical neutralization or hydrolysis of the mustard agent produces a Schedule 2 compound called thiodiglycol (TDG) that must be destroyed. The PCAPP uses a combined water recovery system (WRS) and brine reduction system (BRS) to destroy TDG and make the water used in the chemical neutralization well water again. Since the PCAPP is using a novel process, the program executive officer for the Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives (ACWA) program asked the National Research Council (NRC) to initiate a study to review the PCAPP WRS-BRS that was already installed at PCAPP. 5 months into the study in October, 2012, the NRC was asked to also review the Biotreatment area (BTA). The Committee on Review of Biotreatment, Water Recovery, and Brine Reduction Systems for the Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant was thus tasked with evaluating the operability, life-expectancy, working quality, results of Biotreatment studies carried out prior to 1999 and 1999-2004, and the current design, systemization approached, and planned operation conditions for the Biotreatment process. Review of Biotreatment, Water Recovery, and Brine Reduction Systems for the Pueblo Chemical Agent Destruction Pilot Plant is the result of the committee's investigation. The report includes diagrams of the Biotreatment area, the BRS, and WRS; a table of materials of construction, the various recommendations made by the committee; and more. Table of Contents Front Matter Summary 1 Background 2 The PCAPP Biotreatment System 3 The Water Recovery and Brine Reduction Systems 4 Materials of Construction Review Appendix A: Table of Materials of Construction Appendix B: Corrosion-Monitoring Guides and Testing Materials Suppliers Appendix C: Biographical Sketches of Committee Members Appendix D: Committee Meetings

This report examines the proposed testing methodology and facility that the Department of Defense (DOD) will use to test and evaluate the effectiveness of its detection system against biological warfare agents?an issue that impacts battlefield missions as well as homeland security missions. The report assesses a proposal to construct a whole system live agent testing facility at West Center Test Center, Dugway Proving Ground in Utah for testing the Joint Biological Point Detection System (JBPDS). Because of scientific and schedule-related risks, the report recommends an alternate approach that focuses test and evaluation efforts on leveraging existing data, improving simulated biological agents for use in testing, testing in conditions that more closely resemble the actual field conditions where the JBPDS would be deployed, and modeling for predicted performance against actual biological agents. The report concludes that an integrated testing and evaluation plan encompassing all of these factors will be needed. Table of Contents Front Matter Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 Overview and High-Level Recommendations 3 Evaluation of the WSLAT Feasibility Study 4 Recommended Evaluation Strategies Appendix Statement of Work

'We thought we had lived through the terror of a nuclear war, but some thing far more ominous was brewing in the Soviet Union - a biological Armageddon from which no one would escape. Dr Alibek has emerged from the world's deadliest labs to tell a story that is as important as it is chilling. Sometimes the truth is far worse than fiction.

No one can afford not to read this book. ' Robin Cook

'As the top scientist in the Soviet Union's biowarfare program and the inventor of the world's most powerful anthrax, Dr Ken Alibek has stunned the highest levels of the U.S. government with his revelations. Now, in a calm, compelling, utterly convincing voice, he tells the world what he knows. Modern biology is producing weapons that in killing power may exceed the hydrogen bomb. Ken Alibek describes them with the intimate knowledge of a top weaponeer. ' Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone

Mustard gas is typically associated with the horrors of World War I battlefields and trenches, where chemical weapons were responsible for tens of thousands of deaths. Few realize, however, that mustard gas had a resurgence during the Second World War, when its uses and effects were widespread and insidious. Toxic Exposures tells the shocking story of how the United States and its allies intentionally subjected thousands of their own servicemen to poison gas as part of their preparation for chemical warfare. In addition, it reveals the racialized dimension of these mustard gas experiments, as scientists tested whether the effects of toxic exposure might vary between Asian, Hispanic, black, and white Americans. Drawing from once-classified American and Canadian government records, military reports, scientists' papers, and veterans' testimony, historian Susan L. Smith explores not only the human cost of this research, but also the environmental degradation caused by ocean dumping of unwanted mustard gas. As she assesses the poisonous legacy of these chemical warfare experiments, Smith also considers their surprising impact on the origins of chemotherapy as cancer treatment and the development of veterans' rights movements. Toxic Exposures thus traces the scars left when the interests of national security and scientific curiosity battled with medical ethics and human rights.

Concerns about CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear) weapons have featured prominently in both political debates and media reporting about the ongoing threat from al Qaeda since 9/11. This book provides a chronological account of al Qaeda's efforts to acquire a CBRN weapon capability, and the evolution of the al Qaeda leadership's approach to actually using CBRN weapons, set against the context of the politicisation of the threat of CBRN terrorism in US security debates. Ben Cole explores how the inherently political nature of terrorist CBRN threats has helped to shape al Qaeda's approach to CBRN weapons, and shows how the heightened political sensitivities surrounding the threat have enabled some governments to manipulate it in order to generate domestic and international support for controversial policies, particularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He assesses the relative success of the al Qaeda leadership's political approach to CBRN weapons, together with the relative success of efforts by the US, UK and Russian governments to exploit the al Qaeda CBRN threat for their wider political purposes. Shedding new light on al Qaeda's tactics and strategy, this book will be essential reading for scholars of terrorism and extremism studies.

This new work offers a clear and thorough account of the threats posed by bioterrorism from the perspective of biologists. The authors examine thirteen disease-causing agents, including those responsible for anthrax, the plague, smallpox, influenza, and SARS. Each chapter considers a particular pathogen from the standpoint of its history, molecular biology, pathology, clinical presentation, diagnosis, weaponization, and defenses. The book also examines strategies for making vaccines and protecting the population in a bioterror attack.

Despite ongoing efforts to prohibit the production, storage and use of chemical warfare agents recent world events highlight the enduring threat to the population from these agents. Research efforts in various countries have resulted in novel insights into chemical warfare toxicology that has enabled the development of new approaches for the diagnosis and treatment of chemical warfare poisoning. This two-volume set provides an up-to-date treatise on the ongoing research into the toxicology of chemical warfare agents, the diagnosis and verification of exposure, and the pre- and post-exposure treatment of poisoning. Focussing on the most important representative nerve and blistering agents, whilst also covering other potential chemical warfare agents, these books will give the reader a comprehensive overview of the many different aspects of chemical warfare agent toxicology. The texts will appeal to toxicologists, biochemists and weapons specialists working in industry and academia, and anyone with an interest in chemical warfare toxicology or exposure.

As the result of disposal practices from the early to mid-twentieth century, approximately 250 sites in 40 states, the District of Columbia, and 3 territories are known or suspected to have buried chemical warfare materiel (CWM). Much of this CWM is likely to occur in the form of small finds that necessitate the continuation of the Army's capability to transport treatment systems to disposal locations for destruction. Of greatest concern for the future are sites in residential areas and large sites on legacy military installations.
The Army mission regarding the remediation of recovered chemical warfare materiel (RCWM) is turning into a program much larger than the existing munition and hazardous substance cleanup programs. The Army asked the Nation Research Council (NRC) to examine this evolving mission in part because this change is significant and becoming even more prominent as the stockpile destruction is nearing completion. One focus in this report is the current and future status of the Non-Stockpile Chemical Material Project (NSCMP), which now plays a central role in the remediation of recovered chemical warfare materiel and which reports to the Chemical Materials Agency.
Remediation of Buried Chemical Warfare Materiel also reviews current supporting technologies for cleanup of CWM sites and surveys organizations involved with remediation of suspected CWM disposal sites to determine current practices and coordination. In this report, potential deficiencies in operational areas based on the review of current supporting technologies for cleanup of CWM sites and develop options for targeted research and development efforts to mitigate potential problem areas are identified.

During the last decade, national and international scientific organizations have become increasingly engaged in considering how to respond to the biosecurity implications of developments in the life sciences and in assessing trends in science and technology (S&T) relevant to biological and chemical weapons nonproliferation. The latest example is an international workshop, Trends in Science and Technology Relevant to the Biological Weapons Convention, held October 31 - November 3, 2010 at the Institute of Biophysics of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing. Life Sciences and Related Fields summarizes the workshop, plenary, and breakout discussion sessions held during this convention. Given the immense diversity of current research and development, the report is only able to provide an overview of the areas of science and technology the committee believes are potentially relevant to the future of the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention (BWC), although there is an effort to identify areas that seemed particularly ripe for further exploration and analysis. The report offers findings and conclusions organized around three fundamental and frequently cited trends in S&T that affect the scope and operation of the convention: The rapid pace of change in the life sciences and related fields; The increasing diffusion of life sciences research capacity and its applications, both internationally and beyond traditional research institutions; and The extent to which additional scientific and technical disciplines beyond biology are increasingly involved in life sciences research. The report does not make recommendations about policy options to respond to the implications of the identified trends. The choice of such responses rests with the 164 States Parties to the Convention, who must take into account multiple factors beyond the project's focus on the state of the science. Table of Contents Front Matter Summary 1 Introduction 2 The Pace of Developments in the Life Sciences 3 Diffusion of Life Sciences Research Capacity and Applications 4 Integration of Multiple Disciplines in Life Sciences Research 5 Monitoring and Assessing Trends in Science and Technology References Appendix A: Committee Member Biographies Appendix B: National and International Scientific Organizations Relevant to the BWC Appendix C: Workshop Agenda and Participants

"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb, ' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes." from Living Weapons

Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare.

Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments.

Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened."

Richard M. Price asks why, among all the ominous technologies of weaponry throughout the history of warfare, chemical weapons carry a special moral stigma. Something more seems to be at work than the predictable resistance people have expressed to any new weaponry, from the crossbow to nuclear bombs. Perceptions of chemical warfare as particularly abhorrent have been successfully institutionalized in international proscriptions and, Price suggests, understanding the sources of this success might shed light on other efforts at arms control.To explore the origins and meaning of the chemical weapons taboo, Price presents a series of case studies from World War I through the Gulf War of 1990 1991. He traces the moral arguments against gas warfare from the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century through negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. From the Italian invasion of Ethiopia to the war between Iran and Iraq, chemical weapons have been condemned as the "poor man's bomb." Drawing upon insights from Michel Foucault to explain the role of moral norms in an international arena rarely sensitive to such pressures, he focuses on the construction of and mutations in the refusal to condone chemical weapons."

In out post-9/11 world of shoe bombers and cyber-terrorism, a crude nuclear device no larger than a small ball could devastate a major city. As we live in fear of attacks of unknown proportion, why does the public remain confused and complacent in the face of potential disaster? Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. believes that a tide of misinformation has led to the public's lack of understanding of the vital issues. Here, in a straightforward and comprehensible style, Graham concisely provides the background necessary to understand the news and opinions surrounding WMDs. facts on: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism chemical and biological weapons; In out post-9/11 world of shoe bombers and cyber-terrorism, a crude nuclear device no larger than a small ball could devastate a major city. As we live in fear of attacks of unknown proportion, why does the public remain confused and complacent in the face of potential disaster? Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. believes that a tide of misinformation has led to the public's lack of understanding of the vital issues. Here, in a straightforward and comprehensible style, Graham concisely provides the background necessary to understand the news and opinions surrounding WMDs. facts on: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; chemical and biological weapons; land mines and small arms; missile defence and WMDs in outer space; WMDs in the Middle East and Asia; Thomas Graham Jr. served for several decades as general counsel and then acting director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was also President Clinton's special ambassador for nuclear disarmament issues. Graham's work culminated in the 1995 agreement to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

A Higher Form of Killing opens with the first devastating battlefield use of lethal gas in World War I, and then investigates the stockpiling of biological weapons during World War II and in the decades afterward as well as the inhuman experiments con-ducted to test their effectiveness. This updated edition includes a new Introduction and a new final chapter exposing frightening developments in recent years, including the black market that emerged in chemical and biological weapons following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the acquisition of these weapons by various Third World states, the attempts of countries such as Iraq to build up arsenals, and--particularly and most recently--the use of these weapons in terrorist attacks.

The threat of domestic terrorism today looms larger than ever. Bombings at the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City's Federal Building, as well as nerve gas attacks in Japan, have made it tragically obvious that American civilians must be ready for terrorist attacks. What do we need to know to help emergency and medical personnel prepare for these attacks? Chemical and Biological Terrorism identifies the R&D efforts needed to implement recommendations in key areas: pre-incident intelligence, detection and identification of chemical and biological agents, protective clothing and equipment, early recognition that a population has been covertly exposed to a pathogen, mass casualty decontamination and triage, use of vaccines and pharmaceuticals, and the psychological effects of terror. Specific objectives for computer software development are also identified. The book addresses the differences between a biological and chemical attack, the distinct challenges to the military and civilian medical communities, and other broader issues. This book will be of critical interest to anyone involved in civilian preparedness for terrorist attack: planners, administrators, responders, medical professionals, public health and emergency personnel, and technology designers and engineers. Table of Contents Front Matter Executive Summary 1 Introduction 2 Pre-Incident Communication and Intelligence: Linking the Intelligence and Medical Communities 3 Personal Protective Equipment 4 Detection and Measurement of Chemical Agents 5 Recognizing Covert Exposure in a Population 6 Detection and Measurement of Biological Agents 7 Patient Decontamination and Mass Triage 8 Availability, Safety, and Efficacy of Drugs and Other Therapies 9 Prevention, Assessment, and Treatment of Psychological Effects 10 Computer-Related Tools for Training and Operations 11 Conclusions and Recommendations References Appendix A: Committee and Staff Biographies Appendix B: Inventory of Chemical and Biological Defense Technology, with Gap and Overlap Analysis Appendix C: Lethal and Incapacitating Chemical Weapons Appendix D: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention List of Restricted Agents Index

To explore the origins and meaning of the chemical weapons taboo, Richard Price presents a series of case studies from World War I through the Gulf War of 1990-91. He traces the moral arguments against gas warfare from the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century through negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. From the Italian invasion of Ethiopia to the war between Iran and Iraq, chemical weapons have been condemned as the 'poor man's bomb.' Drawing upon insights from Michel Foucault to explain the role of moral norms in an international arena rarely sensitive to such pressures, he focuses on the construction of and mutations in the refusal to condone chemical weapons.

Nuked recounts the long-term effects of radiological exposure in St. Louis, Missouri-the city that refined uranium for the first self- sustaining nuclear reaction and the first atomic bomb. As part of the top-secret Manhattan Project during World War II, the refining created an enormous amount of radioactive waste that increased as more nuclear weapons were produced and stockpiled for the Cold War. Unfortunately, government officials deposited the waste on open land next to the municipal airport. An adjacent creek transported radionuclides downstream to the Missouri River, thereby contaminating St. Louis's northern suburbs. Amid official assurances of safety, residents were unaware of the risks. The resulting public health crisis continues today with cleanup operations expected to last through the year 2238. Morice attributes the crisis to several factors. They include a minimal concern for land pollution; cutting corners to win the war; new homebuilding practices that spread radioactive dirt; insufficient reporting mechanisms for cancer; and a fragmented government that failed to respond to regional problems.

Nuked recounts the long-term effects of radiological exposure in St. Louis, Missouri-the city that refined uranium for the first self- sustaining nuclear reaction and the first atomic bomb. As part of the top-secret Manhattan Project during World War II, the refining created an enormous amount of radioactive waste that increased as more nuclear weapons were produced and stockpiled for the Cold War. Unfortunately, government officials deposited the waste on open land next to the municipal airport. An adjacent creek transported radionuclides downstream to the Missouri River, thereby contaminating St. Louis's northern suburbs. Amid official assurances of safety, residents were unaware of the risks. The resulting public health crisis continues today with cleanup operations expected to last through the year 2238. Morice attributes the crisis to several factors. They include a minimal concern for land pollution; cutting corners to win the war; new homebuilding practices that spread radioactive dirt; insufficient reporting mechanisms for cancer; and a fragmented government that failed to respond to regional problems.

India is prone to many natural and manmade disasters. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) emergencies occur as a result of occupational exposure, fire, industrial explosions, release of toxicants and wastes. CBRN Terrorism is showing its head in many parts of the world and India is at risk too. High visibility events like large public rallies, major sporting events, religious festivals and cultural extravaganzas are all highly vulnerable to CBRN terror strikes. There is an urgent need to educate and train all concerned stakeholders in CBRN risks and threats and to adopt risk mitigation measures. The book brings forth the author's views on CBRN Incident Management in India, especially regarding CBRN governance, response mechanism, special event and critical infrastructure security, CBRN security culture and use of new technologies for effective CBRN risk mitigation. The book intends to acknowledge and extol our strides in this direction and urge all responsible stakeholders to take note and act on the gaps post haste.

Mustard gas is typically associated with the horrors of World War I battlefields and trenches, where chemical weapons were responsible for tens of thousands of deaths. Few realize, however, that mustard gas had a resurgence during the Second World War, when its uses and effects were widespread and insidious. Toxic Exposures tells the shocking story of how the United States and its allies intentionally subjected thousands of their own servicemen to poison gas as part of their preparation for chemical warfare. In addition, it reveals the racialized dimension of these mustard gas experiments, as scientists tested whether the effects of toxic exposure might vary between Asian, Hispanic, black, and white Americans. Drawing from once-classified American and Canadian government records, military reports, scientists' papers, and veterans' testimony, historian Susan L. Smith explores not only the human cost of this research, but also the environmental degradation caused by ocean dumping of unwanted mustard gas. As she assesses the poisonous legacy of these chemical warfare experiments, Smith also considers their surprising impact on the origins of chemotherapy as cancer treatment and the development of veterans' rights movements. Toxic Exposures thus traces the scars left when the interests of national security and scientific curiosity battled with medical ethics and human rights.