In warfare, civil unrest, and political protest, chemicals have served as means of coercion, suppression, and manipulation. This book examines how chemical agents have been justified, utilised and resisted as means of control. Through attending to how, when, and for whom bodies become rendered as sites of intervention, Chemical Bodies demonstrates the inter-relations between geopolitical transformations and the technological, spatial and social components of local events. The chapters draw out some of the insidious ways in which chemical technologies are damaging, and re-open discussion regarding their justification, role and regulation. In doing so the contributors illustrate how certain instances of force gain prominence (or fade into obscurity), how some individuals speak and others get spoken for, how definitions of what counts as 'success' and 'failure' are advanced, and how the rights and wrongs of violence are contested.

India is prone to many natural and manmade disasters. Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) emergencies occur as a result of occupational exposure, fire, industrial explosions, release of toxicants and wastes. CBRN Terrorism is showing its head in many parts of the world and India is at risk too. High visibility events like large public rallies, major sporting events, religious festivals and cultural extravaganzas are all highly vulnerable to CBRN terror strikes. There is an urgent need to educate and train all concerned stakeholders in CBRN risks and threats and to adopt risk mitigation measures. The book brings forth the author's views on CBRN Incident Management in India, especially regarding CBRN governance, response mechanism, special event and critical infrastructure security, CBRN security culture and use of new technologies for effective CBRN risk mitigation. The book intends to acknowledge and extol our strides in this direction and urge all responsible stakeholders to take note and act on the gaps post haste.

From the early 1990s, allegations that servicemen had been duped into taking part in trials with toxic agents at top-secret Allied research facilities throughout the twentieth century featured with ever greater frequency in the media. In Britain, a whole army of over 21,000 soldiers had participated in secret experiments between 1939 and 1989. Some remembered their stay as harmless, but there were many for whom the experience had been all but pleasant, sometimes harmful, and in isolated cases deadly. Secret Science traces, for the first time, the history of chemical and biological weapons research by the former Allied powers, particularly in Britain, the United States, and Canada. It charts the ethical trajectory and culture of military science, from its initial development in response to Germany's first use of chemical weapons in the First World War to the ongoing attempts by the international community to ban these types of weapons once and for all. It asks whether Allied and especially British warfare trials were ethical, safe, and justified within the prevailing conditions and values of the time. By doing so, it helps to explain the complex dynamics in top-secret Allied research establishments: the desire and ability of the chemical and biological warfare corps, largely comprised of military officials, scientists, and expert civil servants, to construct and identify a never-ending stream of national security threats which served as flexible justification strategies for the allocation of enormous resources to conducting experimental research with some of the most deadly agents known to man. Secret Science offers a nuanced, non-judgemental analysis of the contributions made by servicemen, scientists, and civil servants to military research in Britain and elsewhere, not as passive, helpless victims 'without voices', or as laboratory and desk perpetrators 'without a conscience', but as history's actors and agents of their own destiny. As such it also makes an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on the history and culture of memory.

The author examines the productivity of the Department of Defense's biodefense research program over the course of more than 35 years, coupled with changes in the global research environment since the events of September 11, 2001. Where the deployment of a biologic agent of mass destruction is largely an unpredictable risk, the outcome certainly could be catastrophic for an unprotected population. An urgent moral imperative is cast upon the federal government, then, to objectively assess the application and management of its biodefense research resources.

Pathogens for War explores how Canada and its allies have attempted to deal with the threat of germ warfare, one of the most fearful weapons of mass destruction, since the Second World War. In addressing this subject, distinguished historian Donald Avery investigates the relationship between bioweapons, poison gas, and nuclear devices, as well as the connection between bioattacks and natural disease pandemics. Avery emphasizes the crucially important activities of Canadian biodefence scientists -- beginning with Nobel Laureate Frederick Banting -- at both the national level and through cooperative projects within the framework of an elaborate alliance system.Delving into history through a rich collection of declassified documents, Pathogens for War also devotes several chapters to the contemporary challenges of bioterrorism and disease pandemics from both national and international perspectives. As such, readers will not only learn about Canada's secret involvement with biological warfare, but will also gain new insights into current debates about the peril of bioweapons -- one of today's greatest threats to world peace.

Famines. Diseases. Natural catastrophes. In 1945, scientists imagined these as the future faces of war. The United States and its allies prepared for a global struggle against the Soviet Union by using science to extend "total war" ideas to the natural environment. Biological and radiological weapons, crop destruction, massive fires, artificial earthquakes and tsunamis, ocean current manipulation, sea level tinkering, weather control, and even climate change-all these became avenues of research at the height of the Cold War. By the 1960s, a new phrase had emerged: environmental warfare. The same science-in fact, many of the same people-also led the way in understanding the earth's vulnerability during the environmental crisis of the 1970s. The first reports on human-induced climate change came from scientists who had advised NATO about how to protect the western allies from Soviet attack. Leading ecologists at Oxford also had helped Britain wage a war against crops in Malaya-and the Americans followed suit in Vietnam. The first predictions of environmental doomsday in the early 1970s came from the intellectual pioneers of global conflict resolution, and some had designed America's missile defense systems. President Nixon's advisors on environmental quality had learned how to think globally by imagining Mother Nature as an armed combatant. Knowledge of environmental threats followed from military preparations throughout the Cold War, from nuclear winter to the AIDS epidemic. How much of our catastrophic thinking about today's environmental crises do we owe to the plans for World War Three?

An investigation into the 2001 U.S. anthrax attacks leads to the realization that a new and terrible arms race may soon be upon us, one that spans the globe and is driven by an array of forces working with deadly microorganisms. Penetrating what they regard as an international  bioweapons mafia," Bob Coen and Eric Nadler encounter scientists, capitalists, politicians, and assassins  all playing with the world's most dangerous germs.Coen and Nadler pursue leads across four continents in an attempt to illuminate the secret world of international biological weapons research. They probe the mysterious deaths of some of the world's leading germ war scientists, including the death of Bruce Ivins  the man the FBI controversially insists is the lone perpetrator of the anthrax attacks. They also examine the suspicious suicide of British scientist and weapons inspector David Kelly, who was found dead in the woods the same week U.K. officials killed an investigation into illegal human experimentation at the top-secret facility where he once worked.As the plot darkens, it becomes clear that the 2001 anthrax attacks are a portal into a new and lucrative  biomilitary-industrial complex," and one of the most frightening stories of our time.

Despite the vital importance of the emerging area of biotechnology and its role in defense planning and policymaking, no definitive book has been written on the topic for the defense policymaker, the military student, and the private-sector bioscientist interested in the "emerging opportunities market" of national security. This edited volume is intended to help close this gap and provide the necessary backdrop for thinking strategically about biology in defense planning and policymaking. This volume is about applications of the biological sciences, here called "biologically inspired innovations," to the military. Rather than treating biology as a series of threats to be dealt with, such innovations generally approach the biological sciences as a set of opportunities for the military to gain strategic advantage over adversaries. These opportunities rangefrom looking at everything from genes to brains, from enhancing human performance to creating renewable energy, from sensing the environment around us to harnessing its power.

As the public increasingly questioned the war in Vietnam, a group of American scientists deeply concerned about the use of Agent Orange and other herbicides started a movement to ban what they called "ecocide."

David Zierler traces this movement, starting in the 1940s, when weed killer was developed in agricultural circles and theories of counterinsurgency were studied by the military. These two trajectories converged in 1961 with Operation Ranch Hand, the joint U.S.-South Vietnamese mission to use herbicidal warfare as a means to defoliate large areas of enemy territory.

Driven by the idea that humans were altering the world's ecology for the worse, a group of scientists relentlessly challenged Pentagon assurances of safety, citing possible long-term environmental and health effects. It wasn't until 1970 that the scientists gained access to sprayed zones confirming that a major ecological disaster had occurred. Their findings convinced the U.S. government to renounce first use of herbicides in future wars and, Zierler argues, fundamentally reoriented thinking about warfare and environmental security in the next forty years.

Incorporating in-depth interviews, unique archival collections, and recently declassified national security documents, Zierler examines the movement to ban ecocide as it played out amid the rise of a global environmental consciousness and growing disillusionment with the containment policies of the cold war era.

Until the events of September 11 and the anthrax attacks of 2001, biological weapons had never been a major public concern in the United States. Today, the possibility of their use by terrorists against Western states looms large as an international security concern. In "Biological Weapons," Jeanne Guillemin provides a highly accessible and compelling account of the circumstances under which scientists, soldiers, and statesmen were able to mobilize resources for extensive biological weapons programs and also analyzes why such weapons, targeted against civilians, were never used in a major conflict.

This book is essential for understanding the relevance of the historical restraints placed on the use of biological weapons for today's world. It serves as an excellent introduction to the problems biological weapons pose for contemporary policymakers and public officials, particularly in the United States. How can we best deter the use of such weapons? What are the resulting policies of the Department of Homeland Security? How can we constrain proliferation? Jeanne Guillemin wisely points out that these are vitally important questions for all Americans to consider and investigate -- all the more so because the development of these weapons has been carried out under a veil of secrecy, with their frightening potential open to exploitation by the media and government. Public awareness through education can help calm fears in today's tension-filled climate and promote constructive political action to reduce the risks of a biological weapons catastrophe.

"Biological Weapons" is required reading for every concerned citizen, government policymaker, public health official, and national security analyst who wants to understand this complex and timely issue.