In out post-9/11 world of shoe bombers and cyber-terrorism, a crude nuclear device no larger than a small ball could devastate a major city. As we live in fear of attacks of unknown proportion, why does the public remain confused and complacent in the face of potential disaster? Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. believes that a tide of misinformation has led to the public's lack of understanding of the vital issues. Here, in a straightforward and comprehensible style, Graham concisely provides the background necessary to understand the news and opinions surrounding WMDs. facts on: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism chemical and biological weapons; In out post-9/11 world of shoe bombers and cyber-terrorism, a crude nuclear device no larger than a small ball could devastate a major city. As we live in fear of attacks of unknown proportion, why does the public remain confused and complacent in the face of potential disaster? Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. believes that a tide of misinformation has led to the public's lack of understanding of the vital issues. Here, in a straightforward and comprehensible style, Graham concisely provides the background necessary to understand the news and opinions surrounding WMDs. facts on: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; chemical and biological weapons; land mines and small arms; missile defence and WMDs in outer space; WMDs in the Middle East and Asia; Thomas Graham Jr. served for several decades as general counsel and then acting director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was also President Clinton's special ambassador for nuclear disarmament issues. Graham's work culminated in the 1995 agreement to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

A Higher Form of Killing opens with the first devastating battlefield use of lethal gas in World War I, and then investigates the stockpiling of biological weapons during World War II and in the decades afterward as well as the inhuman experiments con-ducted to test their effectiveness. This updated edition includes a new Introduction and a new final chapter exposing frightening developments in recent years, including the black market that emerged in chemical and biological weapons following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the acquisition of these weapons by various Third World states, the attempts of countries such as Iraq to build up arsenals, and--particularly and most recently--the use of these weapons in terrorist attacks.

This new work offers a clear and thorough account of the threats posed by bioterrorism from the perspective of biologists. The authors examine thirteen disease-causing agents, including those responsible for anthrax, the plague, smallpox, influenza, and SARS. Each chapter considers a particular pathogen from the standpoint of its history, molecular biology, pathology, clinical presentation, diagnosis, weaponization, and defenses. The book also examines strategies for making vaccines and protecting the population in a bioterror attack.

In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs.

Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.

Mustard gas is typically associated with the horrors of World War I battlefields and trenches, where chemical weapons were responsible for tens of thousands of deaths. Few realize, however, that mustard gas had a resurgence during the Second World War, when its uses and effects were widespread and insidious. Toxic Exposures tells the shocking story of how the United States and its allies intentionally subjected thousands of their own servicemen to poison gas as part of their preparation for chemical warfare. In addition, it reveals the racialized dimension of these mustard gas experiments, as scientists tested whether the effects of toxic exposure might vary between Asian, Hispanic, black, and white Americans. Drawing from once-classified American and Canadian government records, military reports, scientists' papers, and veterans' testimony, historian Susan L. Smith explores not only the human cost of this research, but also the environmental degradation caused by ocean dumping of unwanted mustard gas. As she assesses the poisonous legacy of these chemical warfare experiments, Smith also considers their surprising impact on the origins of chemotherapy as cancer treatment and the development of veterans' rights movements. Toxic Exposures thus traces the scars left when the interests of national security and scientific curiosity battled with medical ethics and human rights.

In Behind the Gas Mask, Thomas Faith offers an institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service, the department tasked with improving the Army's ability to use and defend against chemical weapons during and after World War One. Taking the CWS's story from the trenches to peacetime, he explores how the CWS's work on chemical warfare continued through the 1920s despite deep opposition to the weapons in both military and civilian circles.
As Faith shows, the believers in chemical weapons staffing the CWS allied with supporters in the military, government, and private industry to lobby to add chemical warfare to the country's permanent arsenal. Their argument: poison gas represented an advanced and even humane tool in modern war, while its applications for pest control and crowd control made a chemical capacity relevant in peacetime. But conflict with those aligned against chemical warfare forced the CWS to fight for its institutional life--and ultimately led to the U.S. military's rejection of battlefield chemical weapons.

Recovering amphibious forces can be complicated if ashore forces come under attack from enemy weapons, particularly chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. This report assesses current policies and capabilities pertaining to the recovery and decontamination of ashore forces and identifies policy options the Navy could pursue to better perform this mission.

A Web of Prevention provides a timely contribution to the current debate about life science research and its implications for security. It is an informative guide for both experts and the public. It is a forward-looking contribution covering both ends of the equation and creates momentum for the current discussion on effective preventive measures and effective control measures. While there are no guarantees for preventing misuse, there are nonetheless crucial steps the world community can take towards the overarching goal of a global network for the life sciences. This book sheds light on concrete steps toward the achievement of this worthy goal. From the Foreword by Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. This book with its collection of essays provides an in-depth analysis of the various mutually reinforcing elements that together create and strengthen a web of prevention - or of assurance - that is vital to ensure that the advances in the life sciences are not misused to cause harm. All those engaged in the life sciences and in policy making in governments around the world should read this book so they can take steps to strengthen the web preventing biological weapons. Dr Graham S. Pearson, Visiting Professor of International Security, University of Bradford, UK and previously Director-General, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, UK Since September 11, 2001 in many countries renewed attention has been given to how research in the life sciences might inadvertently or intentionally facilitate the development of biological or chemical weapons. This state-of-the-art volume examines the full extent of the issues and debates. Coverage includes an overview of recent scientific achievements in virology, microbiology, immunology and genetic engineering with a view to asking how they might facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction by state, sub-state or terrorist organizations. Consideration is given to what we have and haven't learned from the past. Employing both academic analysis and reflections by practitioners, the book examines the security-inspired governance regimes for the life sciences that are under development. Ultimately the authors examine what is required to form a comprehensive and workable web of prevention and highlight the importance of encouraging discussions between scientists, policy makers and others regarding the governance of vital but potentially dangerous research.

Focusing on East Asia, this book sets out a framework for analyzing infectious disease threats in security terms. It covers the security significance of naturally occurring disease outbreak events such as SARS and avian influenza, the development and use of biological weapons by state and non-state actors, and the security risks associated with laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organisms.

Christian Enemark devises a conceptual framework for securitization that is useful for policy makers by using the overlaps and synergies between different infectious disease threats. The book draws heavily on material from public health and scientific literature to illustrate the cross-disciplinary requirements for addressing infectious diseases challenges in security terms. Fast-moving, naturally occurring disease threats are of increasing concern to governments and individuals, and it is therefore important to recognize their close relationship to the security challenges posed by Biological Weaponsand pathogen research.

Disease and Security will be of much interest to students of international security, public health and Asian politics.

Of late, bioterrorism has been a subject of great concern and some misunderstanding. With these fears and uncertainties in mind, the authors in Agents of Bioterrorism offer a clear and thorough account of the threats posed by bioterrorism and how to prepare for and respond to an attack. The contributors consider thirteen disease-causing agents, including those responsible for anthrax, encephalitis, botulism, ebola, tularemia, salmonella, the plague, smallpox, influenza, and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS). Each chapter considers a particular pathogen from the standpoint of its history, molecular biology, pathology, clinical presentation, diagnosis, weaponization, and defenses. Four appendices cover rapid drug discovery, strategies for making vaccines, protection of the population in a bioterror attack, and sources of information on bioterrorism.

Scientific advances have resulted in a greater understanding of how pathogens produce their toxins and how they can be used to produce a wide range of bioweapons. These advances have also led to new defenses against disease-causing agents. The contributors demonstrate that by understanding the pathogens used in bioterrorism, scientists can help minimize fear and encourage constructive responses to this threat.

A lethal germ is unleashed in the U.S. mail. A chain of letters spreads terror from Florida to Washington, D.C., from New York to Connecticut, from the halls of Congress to the assembly lines of the U.S. Postal Service. Five people die, and ten thousand more line up for antibiotics to protect against exposure. The government, already outsmarted by the terrorist hijackers of 9/11, leaves its workers vulnerable and a diabolical killer on the loose.

Based on hundreds of hours of interviews and a review of thousands of pages of government documents, "The Killer Strain is the definitive account of the year in which bioterrorism became a reality in the United States. Revealing the little-known victims and unsung heroes in the anthrax debacle, investigative reporter Marilyn Thompson also examines the FBI's slow-paced investigation of the crimes and the unprecedented scientific challenges posed by the case.

"The Killer Strain, more than just a thrilling read, is also a clarion wake-up call. It shows how billions of dollars and a decade of elaborate bioterror dress rehearsals meant nothing in the face of a real attack -- and how we may still be at risk.

Assesses the vulnerabilities of the agricultural sector and the food chain to a deliberate act of biological terrorism and explores the likely outcomes of a successful attack. Over the past decade, the United States has endeavoured to increase its ability to detect, prevent and respond to terrorist threats and incidents. The agriculture sector and the food industry in general, however, have received comparatively little attention with respect to protection against terrorist incidents. This study aims to expand the current debate on domestic homeland security by assessing the vulnerabilities of the agricultural sector and the food chain to a deliberate act of biological terrorism and exploring the likely outcomes of a successful attack.

"DON'T TELL ME ABOUT THE LAW. THE LAW IS ANYTHING I WRITE ON A SCRAP OF PAPER." -- SADDAM HUSSEIN

In a white-knuckle thriller, Khidhir Hamza, who spent twenty years developing Iraq's atomic weapon, recounts his life in Saddam Hussein's inner circle and his daring flight to the West.

Taking readers into the darkest corners of a regime ruled by a volatile, brutal leader, Dr. Hamza, the only defector who has lived to write a firsthand portrait of Iraq, also presents an unprecedented portrait of Saddam -- his drunken rages, his women, his cold-blooded murder of underlings, and his unrivaled power. If pushed to the wall, Saddam will use the bomb that Dr. Hamza helped create.

From the relentless dangers Dr. Hamza endured in Iraq to his harrowing flight across three continents and his first encounter with skeptical CIA agents who turned him away, Saddam's Bombmaker is a true-to-life thriller as rich in danger, intrigue, and personal courage as a well-crafted spy novel.

This source book presents the essential technical, political, legal, and historical background needed for informed judgments about the recent expansion of military interest in the life sciences - particularly in the weapons potential of the new biotechnology. Preventing a Biological Arms Race develops the case for strengthening national and international commitments to biological disarmament and proposes courses of action to achieve this goal."In theory," Susan Wright observes, "the menace of biological warfare should no longer be with us." Developing, producing, and stockpiling biological weapons are unconditionally banned by international treaty. East-West military rivalry and confrontations in the Middle East have eroded confidence in the treaty regime, however. The advent of genetic engineering and other new biotechnologies has revived military interest in biological weaponry, generating concern about the potential weapons applications of biological research.The 15 contributions by experts from a wide range of disciplines include a history of U.S. biological warfare policy, analyses of the ethical issues posed by defensive biological warfare research, case studies of alleged violations of the international legal regime prohibiting biological weapons, reviews of that regime, and proposals for strengthening the barriers to biological warfare. A series of 14 appendixes collect important data and documents related to biological weapons."Contributors: Barton J. Bernstein, Gordon Burck, Leonard A. Cole, Richard Falk, Jeanne Guillemin, John Isaacs, Stuart Ketcham, Jonathan King, Marc Lappe, Matthew Meselson, Richard Novick, Charles Piller, Julian Perry Robinson, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Seth Shulman, Nicholas A. Sims, Robert L. Sinsheimer, Harlee Strauss, Susan Wright, Keith R. Yamamoto."

Mustard gas is typically associated with the horrors of World War I battlefields and trenches, where chemical weapons were responsible for tens of thousands of deaths. Few realize, however, that mustard gas had a resurgence during the Second World War, when its uses and effects were widespread and insidious. Toxic Exposures tells the shocking story of how the United States and its allies intentionally subjected thousands of their own servicemen to poison gas as part of their preparation for chemical warfare. In addition, it reveals the racialized dimension of these mustard gas experiments, as scientists tested whether the effects of toxic exposure might vary between Asian, Hispanic, black, and white Americans. Drawing from once-classified American and Canadian government records, military reports, scientists' papers, and veterans' testimony, historian Susan L. Smith explores not only the human cost of this research, but also the environmental degradation caused by ocean dumping of unwanted mustard gas. As she assesses the poisonous legacy of these chemical warfare experiments, Smith also considers their surprising impact on the origins of chemotherapy as cancer treatment and the development of veterans' rights movements. Toxic Exposures thus traces the scars left when the interests of national security and scientific curiosity battled with medical ethics and human rights.

This book analyses the Syria crisis and the role of chemical weapons in relation to US foreign policy. The Syrian government's use of such weapons and their subsequent elimination has dominated the US response to the conflict, where these are viewed as particularly horrific arms - a repulsion known as the chemical taboo. On the surface, this would seem to be an appropriate reaction: these are nasty weapons and eradicating them would ostensibly comprise a 'good' move. But this book reveals two new aspects of the taboo that challenge this prevailing view. First, actors use the taboo strategically to advance their own self-interested policy objectives. Second, that applying the taboo to Syria has actually exacerbated the crisis. As such, this book not only provides a timely analysis of Syria, but also a major and original rethink of the chemical taboo, as well as international norms more widely. -- .

A framework for assessing the security risks of emerging dual-use technologies and devising tailored governance strategies is proposed and applied to contemporary case studies. Recent advances in disciplines such as biotechnology, nanotechnology, and neuropharmacology entail a "dual-use dilemma" because they promise benefits for human health and welfare yet pose the risk of misuse for hostile purposes. The emerging field of synthetic genomics, for example, can produce custom DNA molecules for life-saving drugs but also makes possible the creation of deadly viral agents for biological warfare or terrorism. The challenge for policymakers is to prevent the misuse of these new technologies without forgoing their benefits. Innovation, Dual Use, and Security offers a systematic approach for managing the dual-use dilemma. The book presents a "decision framework" for assessing the security risks of emerging technologies and fashioning governance strategies to manage those risks. This framework is applied to fourteen contemporary case studies, including synthetic genomics, DNA shuffling and directed evolution, combinatorial chemistry, protein engineering, immunological modulation, and aerosol vaccines. The book also draws useful lessons from two historical cases: the development of the V-series nerve agents in Britain and the use and misuse of LSD by the U.S. Army and the CIA. Innovation, Dual Use, and Security offers a comprehensive, multifaceted introduction to the challenges of governing dual-use technologies in an era of rapid innovation. The book will be of interest to government officials and other practitioners as well as to students and scholars in security studies, science and technology studies, biology, and chemistry.

In the wake of the 2003 Iraq War, the term 'intelligence failure' became synonymous with the Blair Government and how it had used intelligence to construct a case for war. This book examines British secret intelligence over the thirty years preceding its very public failings. From the Soviet Union to South Africa and Libya, Mark Wilkinson provides a detailed analysis and vivid account of the development and functioning of Britain's intelligence agencies in the struggle against the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Based on archival research and interviews with key players in the intelligence establishment, he shows how a handful of chemical and biological weapons experts battled to make their voices heard. They had evidence that illegal weapons development was taking place but were continually rebuffed by adversaries in Whitehall. Fascinating, surprising and sometimes shocking, Before Intelligence Failed is a compelling account of what was known about chemical and biological weapons proliferation before the Iraq War.

A science-based text, New Developments in Biological and Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures presents research that addresses the growing threat of chemical and biological terrorism as well as the need for improvements in the implementation of countermeasures. This new textbook building upon Advances in Biological and Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures is the product of more than a decade of synthesizing newly acquired information through extensive research and development supported by the United States Army through Texas Tech University's Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr. National Program for Countermeasures to Biological and Chemical Threats. The book describes and expands upon threats, vulnerabilities, and pathogenic and toxic effects associated with agents used in biological and chemical terrorism. Among the discussions of agents is an exceptionally thorough examination of ricin history, toxicity, adsorption, and mobility. It also gives an overview of protective gear and in-depth perspectives on future research needs, including identifying challenges and paths forward in predicting risks. Effective countermeasures to biological and chemical threats are becoming increasingly necessary. New Developments in Biological and Chemical Terrorism Countermeasures provides a cutting-edge source addressing and advancing this need. It offers strategies and expert viewpoints toward improving defenses against threats in the United States as well as other nations.