This book offers an analysis of how the Chemical and Biological Weapons (CBW) regime has responded in the immediate aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic. Coronavirus has highlighted the need to better protect modern societies from natural, accidental and deliberate disease affecting humans, animals and plants. Within that context preventing the deliberate hostile use of biological and chemical agents will be of increasing importance. Dando asks to what extent there has been a significant strengthening to the CBW non-proliferation regime in the immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic using an analysis focused on two proposals to strengthen the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which aim to constrain advances in science and technology developments that could be misused. On this basis he concludes that it would be hard to argue that to date there has been a significant strengthening of the CBW regime.

Biological Threats in the 21st Century offers a fresh understanding of contemporary biological threats to national security. Readers are introduced to the politics, people, science and historical roots of contemporary biological threats through up-to-date, rigorous and accessible chapters written by leading academics and supplemented by expert point-of-view contributions and interviews.The book provides inspiration and resources for students and researchers, as well as policy makers in government, the public policy sector and the wider community. It is particularly pertinent for those interested in biological disarmament, non-proliferation, counterterrorism and health security.

This book presents a blueprint for researchers in the area of nanotechnology for chemical defense, especially with regard to future research on detection and protection. It addresses the synthesis of complex nanomaterials with potential applications in a broad range of sensing systems. Above all, it discusses novel experimental and theoretical tools for characterizing and modeling nanostructures and their integration in complex systems. The book also includes electronic structure calculations exploring the atomic and quantum mechanical mechanisms behind molecular binding and identification, so as to provide readers with an in-depth understanding of the capabilities and limitations of various nanomaterial approaches. Gathering contributions by scientists with diverse backgrounds, the book offers a wealth of insightful information for all scientists whose work involves material science and its applications in sensing.

Factories of Death details the activities of the Japanese army scientists that conducted numerous horrifying experiments upon live human beings. It investigates who from the upper echelons of the Japanese military and political establishments knew of the experiments, also the question of whether or not Allied POWs were subjected to such tests, and the nature of the deal that was brokered with US authorities after the war. This new edition has been completely updated, and contains an entirely new chapter detailing the numerous revelations that have surfaced since the book's initial publication in 1994.

This book examines the politics of biological disarmament, focusing on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a treaty regime and the cornerstone of biological disarmament efforts. Biological weapons have long been banned, but the ban needs strengthening. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the cornerstone of this disarmament regime. After years of deadlock and disappointment its Sixth Review Conference in 2006 generated new hope that biological disarmament could be reinforced from within. This book studies the intricate diplomacy of the Sixth Review Conference as a key moment in the recovery of self-confidence by the treaty parties. It makes detailed proposals for developing an accountability framework and stronger institutions so that the treaty regime can work better. It examines alternative futures for the BWC and the trajectories to be avoided or encouraged in the short, medium and longer terms as its regime evolves. Controversially, by comparing treaty constraints on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons it restores the BWC firmly to the realm of disarmament rather than arms control and rescues it from misleading identifications with counterproliferation and counterterrorism models. This book will appeal to policy-makers, diplomats and students of biological weapons, weapons of mass destruction, international security and IR in general. Nicholas A. Sims is Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is author of four books on aspects of disarmament.

The implications of a major war in an increasingly industrial world would be far-reaching and incalculable. Releasing Dangerous Forces discusses the ramifications and places special emphasis on the fast growing potential for collateral effects: the release of dangerous forces from civil artifacts. The key issues at stake are not only the unprecedented loss of human life but also the threat to basic human life support systems, both economic and environmental, placing the future of all human existence in doubt.

Web of Prevention provides a timely contribution to the current debate about life science research and its implications for security. It is an informative guide for both experts and the public. It is a forward-looking contribution covering both ends of the equation and creates momentum for the current discussion on effective preventive measures and effective control measures. While there are no guarantees for preventing misuse, there are nonetheless crucial steps the world community can take towards the overarching goal of a global network for the life sciences. This book sheds light on concrete steps toward the achievement of this worthy goal.

"This book with its collection of essays provides an in-depth analysis of the various mutually reinforcing elements that together create and strengthen a web of prevention - or of assurance - that is vital to ensure that the advances in the life sciences are not misused to cause harm. All those engaged in the life sciences and in policy making in governments around the world should read this book so they can take steps to strengthen the web preventing biological weapons."
From the Foreword by Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations.

"Since September 11, 2001 in many countries renewed attention has been given to how research in the life sciences might inadvertently or intentionally facilitate the development of biological or chemical weapons. This state-of-the-art volume examines the full extent of the issues and debates. Coverage includes an overview of recent scientific achievements in virology, microbiology, immunology and genetic engineering with a view to asking how they might facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction by state, sub-state or terrorist organizations. Consideration is given to what we have and haven't learned from the past. Employing both academic analysis and reflections by practitioners, the book examines the security-inspired governance regimes for the life sciences that are under development. Ultimately the authors examine what is required to form a comprehensive and workable web of prevention and highlight the importance of encouraging discussions between scientists, policy makers and others regarding the governance of vital but potentially dangerous research."
Dr Graham S. Pearson, Visiting Professor of International Security, University of Bradford, UK and previously Director-General, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, UK

A DAILY TELEGRAPH BOOK OF THE YEAR.

'A compelling, authoritative insight into possibly the most controversial death in Britain this century' Observer.

'Masterful ... This book made me proud of my trade as a journalist' Daily Mail.

'This searing excavation of the mysterious death of Dr David Kelly is investigative journalism at its best. It is brave, relentless, dazzlingly revealing' Peter Oborne.

In March 2003 British forces invaded Iraq after Tony Blair said the country could deploy weapons of mass destruction at 45 minutes' notice. A few months later, government scientist Dr David Kelly was unmasked by Blair's officials as the assumed source of a BBC news report challenging this claim. Within days, Dr Kelly was found dead in a wood near his home. Blair immediately convened the controversial Hutton Inquiry, which concluded Dr Kelly committed suicide.

Yet key questions remain: could Dr Kelly really have taken his life in the manner declared? And why did Blair's government derail the coroner's inquest into Dr Kelly's death? In this meticulous account, award-winning journalist Miles Goslett shows why we should be sceptical of the official story of what happened in that desperate summer of 2003.

Biosecurity is the assessment and management of potentially dangerous infectious diseases, quarantined pests, invasive (alien) species, living modified organisms, and biological weapons. It is a holistic concept of direct relevance to the sustainability of agriculture, food safety, and the protection of human populations (including bio-terrorism), the environment, and biodiversity. Biosecurity is a relatively new concept that has become increasingly prevalent in academic, policy and media circles, and needs a more comprehensive and inter-disciplinary approach to take into account mobility, globalisation and climate change. In this introductory volume, biosecurity is presented as a governance approach to a set of concerns that span the protection of indigenous biological organisms, agricultural systems and human health, from invasive pests and diseases. It describes the ways in which biosecurity is understood and theorized in different subject disciplines, including anthropology, political theory, ecology, geography and environmental management. It examines the different scientific and knowledge practices connected to biosecurity governance, including legal regimes, ecology, risk management and alternative knowledges. The geopolitics of biosecurity is considered in terms of health, biopolitics and trade governance at the global scale. Finally, biosecurity as an approach to actively secure the future is assessed in the context of future risk and uncertainties, such as globalization and climate change.

Biosecurity is the assessment and management of potentially dangerous infectious diseases, quarantined pests, invasive (alien) species, living modified organisms, and biological weapons. It is a holistic concept of direct relevance to the sustainability of agriculture, food safety, and the protection of human populations (including bio-terrorism), the environment, and biodiversity. Biosecurity is a relatively new concept that has become increasingly prevalent in academic, policy and media circles, and needs a more comprehensive and inter-disciplinary approach to take into account mobility, globalisation and climate change. In this introductory volume, biosecurity is presented as a governance approach to a set of concerns that span the protection of indigenous biological organisms, agricultural systems and human health, from invasive pests and diseases. It describes the ways in which biosecurity is understood and theorized in different subject disciplines, including anthropology, political theory, ecology, geography and environmental management. It examines the different scientific and knowledge practices connected to biosecurity governance, including legal regimes, ecology, risk management and alternative knowledges. The geopolitics of biosecurity is considered in terms of health, biopolitics and trade governance at the global scale. Finally, biosecurity as an approach to actively secure the future is assessed in the context of future risk and uncertainties, such as globalization and climate change.

Chemical Warfare during the Vietnam War documents the use of antipersonnel chemical weapons throughout the Vietnam War, and explores their effectiveness under the wide variety of circumstances in which they were employed. The short, readable account follows the US program as it progressed from a focus on the humanitarian aspects of non-lethal weapons to their use as a means of augmenting and enhancing the lethality of traditional munitions. It also presents the efforts of the North Vietnamese to both counter US chemical operations and to develop a chemical capability of their own. Chemical Warfare during the Vietnam War is a comprehensive and thoroughly fascinating examination of riot-control agents during the Vietnam War.

Focusing on East Asia, this book sets out a framework for analyzing infectious disease threats in security terms. It covers the security significance of naturally occurring disease outbreak events such as SARS and avian influenza, the development and use of biological weapons by state and non-state actors, and the security risks associated with laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organisms.

Christian Enemark devises a conceptual framework for securitization that is useful for policy makers by using the overlaps and synergies between different infectious disease threats. The book draws heavily on material from public health and scientific literature to illustrate the cross-disciplinary requirements for addressing infectious diseases challenges in security terms. Fast-moving, naturally occurring disease threats are of increasing concern to governments and individuals, and it is therefore important to recognize their close relationship to the security challenges posed by Biological Weapons and pathogen research.

Disease and Security will be of much interest to students of international security, public health and Asian politics.

This book examines the politics of biological disarmament, focusing on the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a treaty regime and the cornerstone of biological disarmament efforts.

Biological weapons have long been banned, but the ban needs strengthening. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) is the cornerstone of this disarmament regime. After years of deadlock and disappointment its Sixth Review Conference in 2006 generated new hope that biological disarmament could be reinforced from within. This book studies the intricate diplomacy of the Sixth Review Conference as a key moment in the recovery of self-confidence by the treaty parties. It makes detailed proposals for developing an accountability framework and stronger institutions so that the treaty regime can work better. It examines alternative futures for the BWC and the trajectories to be avoided or encouraged in the short, medium and longer terms as its regime evolves. Controversially, by comparing treaty constraints on biological, chemical and nuclear weapons it restores the BWC firmly to the realm of disarmament rather than arms control and rescues it from misleading identifications with counterproliferation and counterterrorism models.

This book will appeal to policy-makers, diplomats and students of biological weapons, weapons of mass destruction, international security and IR in general.

Nicholas A. Sims is Reader in International Relations at the London School of Economics. He is author of four books on aspects of disarmament.

A Defence of Chemical Warfare J B S Haldane Originally published in 1925 "Mr Haldane's brilliant study." Times Leading Article "A book to be read by every intelligent adult." Spectator . This volume discusses the use of chemical weapons during the Second World War from the scientific viewpoint of the eminent bio-chemist, J B S Haldane and attempts to predict their use in conflicts of the future. 84pp Paris or the Future of War B H Liddell Hart Originally published in 1925. "...a gem of close-thinking and deduction." Observer Liddell Hart was one of the twentieth century's most respected military historians. In this volume he analyzes the causes of war, and the future of war, as well as examining the air, naval and army weapon and the evolution of "New Model Armies". 84pp. Janus: The Conquest of War A Psychological Inquiry William McDougall Originally published in 1927 "Among all the volumes in this series, none, I think is so weighty and impressive as this..." Evening Standard This volume covers lessons of the Great War, the Causes of War, Preventives of War, League to Enforce Peace, and International Air Force as a Prevention of War. 132pp Sinon Or the Future of Politics Edgar Ansel Mowrer Originally published in 1930 A striking analysis of politics and their future from a national and international standpoint. 86pp Typhoeus Or the Future of Socialism Arthur Shadwell Originally published in 1929 "Invaluable, a miracle of compression and illumination."Yorkshire Post This volume provides an analysis of the aims and prospects of Socialism, both in its political and economic aspects. 112pp

In the aftermath of 9/11, the potential terror of weapons of mass destruction--from nuclear, biological, and chemical to dirty bombs--preoccupies national security experts. In "Chemical Warfare," Frederic J. Brown, presents a cogent, innovative framework for understanding the historical forces that have restrained the use of WMD and how they continue to have relevance today. Analyzing both world wars, he argues that the restraints on use were complex and often unpredictable and ranged from the political to the technological.

The author offers a detailed examination of American chemical warfare policy as it was shaped by industry and public sentiment, as well as national and military leaders. The organization of the book into three parts reflects the importance of battlefield experiences during the First World War and of international political restraints as they evolved during the interwar years and culminated in "no first use" policies by major powers in World War II. Part I examines the use of chemical weapons in World War I as it influenced subsequent national policy decisions. Part II focuses on the evolution of political, military, economic, and psychological restraints from 1919 to 1939. Part III discusses World War II during two critical periods: 1939 to early 1942, when the environment of the war was being established largely without American influence; and during 1945, when the United States faced no credible threat of retaliation to deter its strategic and battlefield use of chemical weapons. Written at the height of controversy about the U.S. use of chemicals in Vietnam, "Chemical Warfare" offers a valuable historical perspective, as relevant now in its analysis of chemical and also nuclear policy as it was when first published.

Scourge provides a definitive account of the dramatic story of smallpox by a leading "expert on biological and chemical weapons" (The New York Times). Jonathan B. Tucker traces the history of the smallpox virus from its first recorded outbreak around 3700 b.c. through its use as the first biological warfare agent in human history, and draws some decisively important lessons for the future. In a timely debate, Tucker addresses the ever-growing concerns about the proliferation of the deadly smallpox virus and its use by terrorist organizations. Explaining how the eradication of the disease in the late 1970s encouraged military research and production of the virus, he exposes the failure of the Russian government to secure its remaining coldwar stockpiles, and evaluates the past and present measures undertaken by the United States to counter the existing dangers of a smallpox attack. Ultimately, he passionately argues for the strengthening of the existing legal ban on the development and possession of biological weapons. Impeccably researched, Scourge is as arresting as it is indispensable, and as William Beatty in Booklist raves, Tucker "has a sense of both the detail and the broad sweep of history that helps him make the story of smallpox as disease and as weapon fascinating and frightening."

Contents:
Preface Acknowledgements The Pacific Theatre, World War II Introduction Part I. Japanese Factories of Death 1. Manchuria 2. Ishii Shiro 3. The Beiyinhe Bacteria Factory 4. Phase 1. Building Ping Fan 5. Phase 2. Hell in Ping Fan 6. The Secret of Secrets: Human Experiments 7. The Death Factory in Changchun 8. The Death Factory in Nanking 9. Experiments on prisoners of War 10. Who Knew? Part II. American Cover-Up The American Biological Warfare Program 12. Discovery of the Secret of Secrets 13. Investigations 14. Scientists and the Cover-Up 15. The Military and the Cover-Up 16. Epilogue Notes Select Bibliography Index

Focusing on East Asia, this book sets out a framework for analyzing infectious disease threats in security terms. It covers the security significance of naturally occurring disease outbreak events such as SARS and avian influenza, the development and use of biological weapons by state and non-state actors, and the security risks associated with laboratory research on pathogenic micro-organisms.

Christian Enemark devises a conceptual framework for securitization that is useful for policy makers by using the overlaps and synergies between different infectious disease threats. The book draws heavily on material from public health and scientific literature to illustrate the cross-disciplinary requirements for addressing infectious diseases challenges in security terms. Fast-moving, naturally occurring disease threats are of increasing concern to governments and individuals, and it is therefore important to recognize their close relationship to the security challenges posed by Biological Weaponsand pathogen research.

Disease and Security will be of much interest to students of international security, public health and Asian politics.

Concerns about CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radioactive, Nuclear) weapons have featured prominently in both political debates and media reporting about the ongoing threat from al Qaeda since 9/11. This book provides a chronological account of al Qaeda's efforts to acquire a CBRN weapon capability, and the evolution of the al Qaeda leadership's approach to actually using CBRN weapons, set against the context of the politicisation of the threat of CBRN terrorism in US security debates. Ben Cole explores how the inherently political nature of terrorist CBRN threats has helped to shape al Qaeda's approach to CBRN weapons, and shows how the heightened political sensitivities surrounding the threat have enabled some governments to manipulate it in order to generate domestic and international support for controversial policies, particularly the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He assesses the relative success of the al Qaeda leadership's political approach to CBRN weapons, together with the relative success of efforts by the US, UK and Russian governments to exploit the al Qaeda CBRN threat for their wider political purposes. Shedding new light on al Qaeda's tactics and strategy, this book will be essential reading for scholars of terrorism and extremism studies.

The introduction of chemical warfare during the First World War was a major event in the history of military technology. It not only posed an unusual challenge to military thinking of the day, which was largely conventional and wholly unfamiliar with science; it also created a heated moral controversy surrounding the new weapon that did not discriminate between soldiers and civilians. This study, based on a previously unavailable range of archival material and statistical data, explores the military role of chemical warfare as well as its effects on people, industries and administration on both sides. The book also fully examines the complex issues raised by this new technology, which were debated endlessly between the wars and have led to recent agreements among the powers to curb their use of chemical or biological warfare. This study was planned in close cooperation with Sir Harold Hartley, who became head of British chemical warfare in 1918.

Bioviolence is the hostile infliction of disease: our most fundamental terror. Traitors to humanity could inflict vast tolls making everyone potentially vulnerable. Bioviolence is the most realistic way for humanity's traitors to raze the pillars of modern civilization. Too little is being done to prevent bioviolence. While bio-offenders are becoming more focused and organized, prevention policies are vague, gap-ridden, and unsupervised. No other threat presents such severe danger yet such a failure of leadership to reduce risks. The strategy for preventing bioviolence requires a broad international commitment to promote bioscience while understanding its inherent and unavoidable dangers. Bioviolence threats shrink our planet into an interdependent neighborhood. This book explores how global governance should evolve to address challenges of advancing science and technology.

Significant advances have been made in animal model development for biological research since the publication of the first edition of this volume, and the ramifications of the FDA s Animal Efficacy Rule have become better understood in the scientific community. With each chapter completely updated with the latest research findings, Biodefense Research Methodology and Animal Models, Second Edition spans the spectrum of coverage from basic research to advanced development of medical countermeasures.

Topics discussed in this volume include:

• A history of biological agents as weapons, from the use of corpses to contaminate water supplies to modern day anthrax attacks
• Concepts and strategies involved in biowarfare and bioterrorism
• The development, validation, and importance of animal models in biodefense research
• Infectious disease aerobiology
• Studies involving anthrax, glanders, plague, tularemia, Q fever, alphaviruses, orthopoxviruses, and a new chapter on brucellosis
• Animal models for viral hemorrhagic fevers
• Botulinum and Ricin toxins
• Staphylococcal and streptococcal superantigens

As the scientific community works diligently to protect the world s population from the misuse of infectious organisms and toxins, it is imperative that researchers stay abreast of the latest techniques for biodefense research. Exploring in vivo and in vitro assays, this volume brings researchers up to date on the latest information on bacterial and viral infectious agents and biological toxins considered to pose the greatest threats to public safety. In addition, the contributors take a step toward minimizing the use of animals in further experiments by presenting documented findings that can be built upon.

Treating nuclear, biological, and chemical agent exposures presents a unique set of challenges. These scenarios usually involve multiple exposures, sometimes even mass exposures, from a single, often poorly-defined, event. Early symptoms are not distinct and can often be variable. Laboratory analyses may be required from environmental, often nonbiological, specimens. Scene evaluation and pre-hospital decontamination may turn out to be the most important intervention. Hospital resource utilization must be a consideration. Even the pathologist performing autopsies needs adequate preparation. It is with these considerations in mind that the Handbook of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Agent Exposures was created. Taking a concise yet comprehensive, clinical approach to the treatment of these exposures, the authors provide concise information on radiation substances, biological agents, chemical toxins, laboratory tests, and antidotes. The book includes essays on topics such as Field Identification and Decontamination of Toxins, Bioterrorism and the Skin, and Mass Exposures Involving the Pediatric Population. A quick review of the contents will tell you that this book contains the tools you need when facing the formidable tasks of diagnosing and treating nuclear, biological, and chemical agent exposures.

In Behind the Gas Mask, Thomas Faith offers an institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service, the department tasked with improving the Army's ability to use and defend against chemical weapons during and after World War One. Taking the CWS's story from the trenches to peacetime, he explores how the CWS's work on chemical warfare continued through the 1920s despite deep opposition to the weapons in both military and civilian circles.
As Faith shows, the believers in chemical weapons staffing the CWS allied with supporters in the military, government, and private industry to lobby to add chemical warfare to the country's permanent arsenal. Their argument: poison gas represented an advanced and even humane tool in modern war, while its applications for pest control and crowd control made a chemical capacity relevant in peacetime. But conflict with those aligned against chemical warfare forced the CWS to fight for its institutional life--and ultimately led to the U.S. military's rejection of battlefield chemical weapons.

Prominent experts in biodefense research-many from the US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases-authoritatively delineate the universe of scientific, medical, and legal issues facing the biodefense research community. Regarding medical countermeasures and decontamination, the authors describe the treatment and pathogenesis of a variety of established pathogens (anthrax, plague, smallpox, Brucellosis, Glanders, and Coxiella burnettii) and review what is known about the aerosol route of infection and decontamination processes. They also examine how to discover the presence of these agents, or other previously unknown biological weapons, and detail the ongoing efforts to counter these agents, including proteomic and genomic analysis as a gateway to better diagnostics, therapeutics, vaccinations, genotyping, and forensics. Additional chapters discuss the development and use technology to identify and characterize these infectious organisms, emerging threats, and the development of countermeasures.