Between 1981 and 1995, a top-secret chemical and biological warfare programme titled Project Coast was established and maintained by South Africa’s apartheid government. Under the leadership of Wouter Basson, Project Coast scientists were involved in a number of dubious activities, including the mass production of ecstasy, the development of covert assassination weapons and the manufacture of chemical poisons designed to be undetectable post-mortem.

The Dis-Eases Of Secrecy is a retrospective analysis of Project Coast and shows how South African governments (past and present) have chosen to deal with the issues of biochemical weapons and warfare. It investigates possibilities for understanding the world of politics by examining how Project Coast has been remembered – and, in some instances, forgotten – by African and international governments. Through their first-hand involvement in the investigation spanning over 20 years, the authors examine how the continuing silences, impunities and stories surrounding Project Coast are still relevant for political accountability today. Readers will engage with how what is hidden reveals, and what is revealed hides.

In this cleverly constructed book, readers are able to choose their own journey through the story. By taking on the role of investigator, readers are faced with the complexities of transitional justice, reconciliation and scientist developments that might give them a different view of South African politics in an ever-changing world order.

In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs.

Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.

Scourge provides a definitive account of the dramatic story of smallpox by a leading "expert on biological and chemical weapons" (The New York Times). Jonathan B. Tucker traces the history of the smallpox virus from its first recorded outbreak around 3700 b.c. through its use as the first biological warfare agent in human history, and draws some decisively important lessons for the future. In a timely debate, Tucker addresses the ever-growing concerns about the proliferation of the deadly smallpox virus and its use by terrorist organizations. Explaining how the eradication of the disease in the late 1970s encouraged military research and production of the virus, he exposes the failure of the Russian government to secure its remaining coldwar stockpiles, and evaluates the past and present measures undertaken by the United States to counter the existing dangers of a smallpox attack. Ultimately, he passionately argues for the strengthening of the existing legal ban on the development and possession of biological weapons. Impeccably researched, Scourge is as arresting as it is indispensable, and as William Beatty in Booklist raves, Tucker "has a sense of both the detail and the broad sweep of history that helps him make the story of smallpox as disease and as weapon fascinating and frightening."

State Secrets: An Insider's Chronicle of the Russian Chemical Weapons Program An unparalleled deception took place in the 1980s, while U.S.S.R. President Mikhail Gorbachev was negotiating for the Chemical Weapons Convention. This treaty was supposed to destroy chemical weapons of the world and ban new ones. The Moscow institute that developed chemical weapons at that same time was secretly developing newer and greatly more toxic ones known anecdotally as Novichok and new binaries. Dr. Vil Mirzayanov, a scientist there, was responsible for developing methods of detecting extremely minute traces in the environment surrounding the institute. He decided this dangerous hypocrisy was not tolerable, and he became the first whistleblower to reveal the Russian chemical weapons program to the world. His book, State Secrets, takes a startling detailed look at the inside workings of the Russian chemical weapons program, and it tells how the Russians set up a new program in Syria. Mirzayanov's book provides a shocking, up-close examination of Russia's military and political complex and its extraordinary efforts to hide dangerous weapons from the world. State Secrets should serve as a chilling cautionary tale for the world over.

This report examines seven disposal technologies being considered by the U.S. government as alternative methods to the process of incineration for destroying mortars, rockets, land mines, and other weapons that contain chemical warfare agents, such as mustard gas. These weapons are considered especially dangerous because they contain both chemical warfare agent and explosive materials in an assembled package that must be disassembled for destruction. The study identifies the strengths and weaknesses and advantages and disadvantages of each technology and assesses their potential for full-scale implementation.

"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb, ' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes." from Living Weapons

Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare.

Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments.

Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened."

Richard M. Price asks why, among all the ominous technologies of weaponry throughout the history of warfare, chemical weapons carry a special moral stigma. Something more seems to be at work than the predictable resistance people have expressed to any new weaponry, from the crossbow to nuclear bombs. Perceptions of chemical warfare as particularly abhorrent have been successfully institutionalized in international proscriptions and, Price suggests, understanding the sources of this success might shed light on other efforts at arms control.To explore the origins and meaning of the chemical weapons taboo, Price presents a series of case studies from World War I through the Gulf War of 1990 1991. He traces the moral arguments against gas warfare from the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century through negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. From the Italian invasion of Ethiopia to the war between Iran and Iraq, chemical weapons have been condemned as the "poor man's bomb." Drawing upon insights from Michel Foucault to explain the role of moral norms in an international arena rarely sensitive to such pressures, he focuses on the construction of and mutations in the refusal to condone chemical weapons."

Why would a nation, in the midst of a vicious and unrestricted war, hesitate to employ a weapon guaranteed to inflict massive casualties on the enemy? Major Frederic Brown offers here the first critical analysis of this curious World War II phenomenon. He investigates the nature of restraints-political, military, economic, and psychological-operative in varying degrees between 1919 and 1945, when U.S. chemical warfare policy was being formed. Starting with the experiences of toxic agent use during World War I, Major Brown shows how various restraints to gas warfare developed during the inter-war years. He then discusses the World War II experience. In the conclusion Major Brown relates his findings to contemporary conflicts and offers important implications for the future of the cold war. Originally published in 1968. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

The threat of biological weapons has never attracted as much public attention as in the past five years. Current concerns largely relate to the threat of weapons acquisition and use by rogue states or by terrorists. But the threat has deeper roots--it has been evident for fifty years that biological agents could be used to cause mass casualties and large-scale economic damage. Yet there has been little historical analysis of such weapons over the past half-century.

"Deadly Cultures" sets out to fill this gap by analyzing the historical developments since 1945 and addressing three central issues: Why have states continued or begun programs for acquiring biological weapons? Why have states terminated biological weapons programs? How have states demonstrated that they have truly terminated their biological weapons programs?

We now live in a world in which the basic knowledge needed to develop biological weapons is more widely available than ever before. "Deadly Cultures" provides the lessons from history that we urgently need in order to strengthen the long-standing prohibition of biological weapons.

To explore the origins and meaning of the chemical weapons taboo, Richard Price presents a series of case studies from World War I through the Gulf War of 1990-91. He traces the moral arguments against gas warfare from the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century through negotiations for the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993. From the Italian invasion of Ethiopia to the war between Iran and Iraq, chemical weapons have been condemned as the 'poor man's bomb.' Drawing upon insights from Michel Foucault to explain the role of moral norms in an international arena rarely sensitive to such pressures, he focuses on the construction of and mutations in the refusal to condone chemical weapons.

Gives readers a detailed understanding of how specific biological weapons work and how those affected by the weapons would be treated * Teaches the reader to recognize the symptoms of each biological weapon and understand the threat these weapons pose * Concentrates on the weapons considered the greatest threats by the CDC such as Anthrax, Botulism, Smallpox, Ricin toxin, Ebola, Plague, and Viral encephalitis * Provides a detailed understanding of how specific biological weapons work and how to recognize the symptoms of those affected by the weapons as well as how they would be treated * Includes case studies, chapter review questions, and the instructor s supplemental materials include PowerPoint presentations, a Test Bank, and suggestions for student projects * Begins with a primer on microbiology, the human immune system s response to these biological agents, and the defense agencies involved with protecting the public against these agents

A missing Iraqi scientist, an ex-Secret Service agent, and the threat of another biological terrorist attack-all these elements come together in the gripping true story of the Gray Bird of Baghdad. Iraqi Microbiologist Thamer Abdul Rahman Imran has information vital to stopping the unthinkable: a biological attack on the US. When he learns that the new Iraqi government wants to arrest him and the insurgents want to kill him, he goes into hiding. Racing against time, ex-Secret Service agent Steve Monteiro and his team set out on a mission to find the missing scientist and learn what he knows. The journey takes them from the White House to the Middle East as they fight bureaucrats in Washington who want them to fail. Why? And what is this vital information that Thamer possesses? The Gray Bird of Baghdad tells the true story of one's man's quest to protect his country and another man's fight to save his family from the ravages of a country at war.

One hundred years ago, French troops fired tear gas grenades into German trenches. Designed to force people out from behind barricades and trenches, tear gas causes burning of the eyes and skin, tearing, and gagging. Chemical weapons are now banned from war zones. But today, tear gas has become the most commonly used form of "less-lethal" police force. In 2011, the year that protests exploded from the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street, tear gas sales tripled. Most tear gas is produced in the United States, and many images of protestors in Tahrir Square showed tear gas canisters with "Made in USA" printed on them, while Britain continues to sell tear gas to countries on its own human-rights blacklist. An engrossing century-spanning narrative, Tear Gas is the first history of this weapon, and takes us from military labs and chemical weapons expos to union assemblies and protest camps, drawing on declassified reports and witness testimonies to show how policing with poison came to be.

Suburban Empire takes readers to the US missile base at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, at the matrix of postwar US imperial expansion, the Cold War nuclear arms race, and the tide of anti-colonial struggles rippling across the world. Hirshberg shows that the displacement of indigenous Marshallese within Kwajalein Atoll mirrors the segregation and spatial politics of the mainland US as local and global iterations of US empire took hold. Tracing how Marshall Islanders navigated US military control over their lands, Suburban Empire reveals that Cold War-era suburbanization was perfectly congruent with US colonization, military testing, and nuclear fallout. The structures of suburban segregation cloaked the destructive history of control and militarism under a veil of small-town innocence.

GRIPPING, MOVING AND INSPIRING: the remarkable life of a world-leading expert in chemical weapons defence. "His work has saved lives and given hope." - Professor David Nott, bestselling author of War Doctor For thirty years, Hamish has served and volunteered in conflict zones around the world. As the army's foremost chemical weapons expert, he built a unique first-hand understanding of how to prevent attacks and train doctors on the frontline - saving countless lives in the process. After suffering near-death experiences time and again, Hamish discovered he had a ticking time bomb in his own chest: a heart condition called Sudden Death Syndrome that could kill him at any time. But with a new awareness for the fragility of life, he fought harder to make his count. Despite facing extraordinary personal danger, Hamish has unearthed evidence of multiple chemical attacks in Syria and continues to advise the government at the highest level, including after the 2018 Novichok poisoning in Salisbury. Lifting the lid on Hamish's unique world of battlefield expertise and humanitarian work, Chemical Warrior is a thrilling story of bravery and compassion.

This book outlines how and why the United States government initiated, sustained and then dramatically expanded an illegal biological arms buildup. Most significantly, U.S. expert Francis A. Boyle reveals how the new billion- dollar U.S. Chemical and Biological Defense Program has been reorientated to accord with the Neo-Conservative pre-emptive strike agenda--this time by biological and chemical warfare. Linking U.S. biowarfare development to the October 2001 anthrax attack on Congress--the most significant political attack on the constitutional functioning of democracy in the United States in recent history--Boyle sheds new light on the motives for the attack, the media black hole of silence into which it has fallen, and why the FBI may never apprehend the perpetrators of this seminal political crime of the 21st century. Biowarfare and Terrorism should raise public concern at what the vastly expanded US biowarfare research and purported civilian preparedness programs hold in store for America--and the extent to which the Bush administration is prepared to pursue them, irrespective of their incitement to a global biowarfare arms race, and likely exposure of the American people to future accidents and reprisals.

Mutant Ecologies traces the spinning of new synthetic threads into the web of life. It is a critical cartography of the shifting landscapes of capital accumulation conjured by recent developments in genomic science, genome editing and the biotech industry. CRISPR crops, fast-growing salmons, heat-resistant Slick (TM) cows, Friendly (TM) Mosquitoes, humanised mice, pigs growing human organs - these are but a few of the dazzling new life-forms that have recently emerged from corporate and university laboratories around the world, all promising to lubricate the circuits of capital accumulation in distinct ways. The deliberate induction of genetic mutations is increasingly central to business operations in a number of sectors, from agriculture to pharmaceuticals. While the Nobel Committee recently proclaimed the life sciences to have entered 'a new epoch', the authors show how these technological innovations continue to operate within a socio-historical context defined by the iron rules of capitalist competition and exploitation. Capital no longer contents itself with simply appropriating the living bodies of plants and animals. It purposefully designs their internal metabolism, and in that way it redesigns the countless living vectors that constitute the global biosphere. It is driving a biological revolution, which will ripple through the everyday lives of people everywhere.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States contended with a state-run biological warfare program, bioterrorism, and a pandemic. Together, these threats spurred large-scale government demand for new vaccines, but few have materialized. A new anthrax vaccine has been a priority since the first Gulf War, but twenty years and a billion dollars later, the United States still does not have one. This failure is startling.

Historically, the United States has excelled at responding to national health emergencies. World War II era programs developed ten new or improved vaccines, often in time to meet the objectives of particular military missions. Probing the history of vaccine development for factors that foster timely innovation, Kendall Hoyt discovered that vaccine innovation has been falling, not rising, since World War II. This finding is at odds with prevailing theories of market-based innovation and suggests that a collection of nonmarket factors drove mid-century innovation. Ironically, many late-twentieth-century developments that have been celebrated as a boon for innovation the birth of a biotechnology industry and the rise of specialization and outsourcing undercut the collaborative networks and research practices that drove successful vaccine projects in the past.

Hoyt s timely investigation teaches important lessons for our efforts to rebuild twenty-first-century biodefense capabilities, especially when the financial payback for a particular vaccine is low, but the social returns are high.

The horrifying terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and the anthrax strikes that soon followed gave the United States new reason to fear unconventional enemies and atypical weapons. These fears have prompted extensive research, study, and planning within the U.S. military, intelligence, and policy communities regarding potential attacks involving biological weapons. In "Phantom Menace or Looming Danger?," Kathleen M. Vogel argues for a major shift in how analysts assess bioweapons threats. She calls for an increased focus on the social and political context in which technological threats are developed.

Vogel uses case studies to illustrate her theory: Soviet anthrax weapons development, the Iraqi mobile bioweapons labs, and two synthetic genomic experiments. She concludes with recommendations for analysts and policymakers to integrate sociopolitical analysis with data analysis, thereby making U.S. bioweapon assessments more accurate. Students of security policy will find her innovative framework appealing, her writing style accessible, and the many illustrations helpful. These features also make "Phantom Menace or Looming Danger?" a must-read for government policymakers and intelligence experts.