Until the events of September 11 and the anthrax attacks of 2001, biological weapons had never been a major public concern in the United States. Today, the possibility of their use by terrorists against Western states looms large as an international security concern. In "Biological Weapons," Jeanne Guillemin provides a highly accessible and compelling account of the circumstances under which scientists, soldiers, and statesmen were able to mobilize resources for extensive biological weapons programs and also analyzes why such weapons, targeted against civilians, were never used in a major conflict.

This book is essential for understanding the relevance of the historical restraints placed on the use of biological weapons for today's world. It serves as an excellent introduction to the problems biological weapons pose for contemporary policymakers and public officials, particularly in the United States. How can we best deter the use of such weapons? What are the resulting policies of the Department of Homeland Security? How can we constrain proliferation? Jeanne Guillemin wisely points out that these are vitally important questions for all Americans to consider and investigate -- all the more so because the development of these weapons has been carried out under a veil of secrecy, with their frightening potential open to exploitation by the media and government. Public awareness through education can help calm fears in today's tension-filled climate and promote constructive political action to reduce the risks of a biological weapons catastrophe.

"Biological Weapons" is required reading for every concerned citizen, government policymaker, public health official, and national security analyst who wants to understand this complex and timely issue.

GRIPPING, MOVING AND INSPIRING: the remarkable life of a world-leading expert in chemical weapons defence. "His work has saved lives and given hope." - Professor David Nott, bestselling author of War Doctor For thirty years, Hamish has served and volunteered in conflict zones around the world. As the army's foremost chemical weapons expert, he built a unique first-hand understanding of how to prevent attacks and train doctors on the frontline - saving countless lives in the process. After suffering near-death experiences time and again, Hamish discovered he had a ticking time bomb in his own chest: a heart condition called Sudden Death Syndrome that could kill him at any time. But with a new awareness for the fragility of life, he fought harder to make his count. Despite facing extraordinary personal danger, Hamish has unearthed evidence of multiple chemical attacks in Syria and continues to advise the government at the highest level, including after the 2018 Novichok poisoning in Salisbury. Lifting the lid on Hamish's unique world of battlefield expertise and humanitarian work, Chemical Warrior is a thrilling story of bravery and compassion.

Chronicling the horrific story of the Agent Orange experiments near Oromocto, New Brunswick, this shocking history reveals the tragic accounts of numerous families who lost loved ones due to military testing. Depicting the initial spraying of the deadly defoliant near Gagetown, this document portrays how the United States military, searching for a terrain similar to Vietnam, began conducting tests in this area. Although the Americans discontinued their trials in the late 1960s, this record uncovers more than an additional decade's worth of continued use by Canadian forces, who discovered it was cheaper to clear brush and kill trees with a dangerous chemical than to hire workers to perform the task. As this astonishing study demonstrates, what they did not know at the time was that Agent Orange also killed people. Hundreds of locals suffered and died, and cancer and other diseases ran rampant among military personnel and civilians who worked on the base. This stunning recollection investigates the stories of those who didn't survive as well as their relatives' daunting struggle to obtain compensation for their suffering and loss, exposing countless years of government complicity.

'We thought we had lived through the terror of a nuclear war, but some thing far more ominous was brewing in the Soviet Union - a biological Armageddon from which no one would escape. Dr Alibek has emerged from the world's deadliest labs to tell a story that is as important as it is chilling. Sometimes the truth is far worse than fiction.

No one can afford not to read this book. ' Robin Cook

'As the top scientist in the Soviet Union's biowarfare program and the inventor of the world's most powerful anthrax, Dr Ken Alibek has stunned the highest levels of the U.S. government with his revelations. Now, in a calm, compelling, utterly convincing voice, he tells the world what he knows. Modern biology is producing weapons that in killing power may exceed the hydrogen bomb. Ken Alibek describes them with the intimate knowledge of a top weaponeer. ' Richard Preston, author of The Hot Zone

Mustard gas is typically associated with the horrors of World War I battlefields and trenches, where chemical weapons were responsible for tens of thousands of deaths. Few realize, however, that mustard gas had a resurgence during the Second World War, when its uses and effects were widespread and insidious. Toxic Exposures tells the shocking story of how the United States and its allies intentionally subjected thousands of their own servicemen to poison gas as part of their preparation for chemical warfare. In addition, it reveals the racialized dimension of these mustard gas experiments, as scientists tested whether the effects of toxic exposure might vary between Asian, Hispanic, black, and white Americans. Drawing from once-classified American and Canadian government records, military reports, scientists' papers, and veterans' testimony, historian Susan L. Smith explores not only the human cost of this research, but also the environmental degradation caused by ocean dumping of unwanted mustard gas. As she assesses the poisonous legacy of these chemical warfare experiments, Smith also considers their surprising impact on the origins of chemotherapy as cancer treatment and the development of veterans' rights movements. Toxic Exposures thus traces the scars left when the interests of national security and scientific curiosity battled with medical ethics and human rights.

"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb, ' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes." from Living Weapons

Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare.

Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments.

Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened."

"Biological weapons are widely feared, yet rarely used. Biological weapons were the first weapon prohibited by an international treaty, yet the proliferation of these weapons increased after they were banned in 1972. Biological weapons are frequently called 'the poor man's atomic bomb, ' yet they cannot provide the same deterrent capability as nuclear weapons. One of my goals in this book is to explain the underlying principles of these apparent paradoxes." from Living Weapons

Biological weapons are the least well understood of the so-called weapons of mass destruction. Unlike nuclear and chemical weapons, biological weapons are composed of, or derived from, living organisms. In Living Weapons, Gregory D. Koblentz provides a comprehensive analysis of the unique challenges that biological weapons pose for international security. At a time when the United States enjoys overwhelming conventional military superiority, biological weapons have emerged as an attractive means for less powerful states and terrorist groups to wage asymmetric warfare.

Koblentz also warns that advances in the life sciences have the potential to heighten the lethality and variety of biological weapons. The considerable overlap between the equipment, materials and knowledge required to develop biological weapons, conduct civilian biomedical research, and develop biological defenses creates a multiuse dilemma that limits the effectiveness of verification, hinders civilian oversight, and complicates threat assessments.

Living Weapons draws on the American, Soviet, Russian, South African, and Iraqi biological weapons programs to enhance our understanding of the special challenges posed by these weapons for arms control, deterrence, civilian-military relations, and intelligence. Koblentz also examines the aspirations of terrorist groups to develop these weapons and the obstacles they have faced. Biological weapons, Koblentz argues, will continue to threaten international security until defenses against such weapons are improved, governments can reliably detect biological weapon activities, the proliferation of materials and expertise is limited, and international norms against the possession and use of biological weapons are strengthened."

In out post-9/11 world of shoe bombers and cyber-terrorism, a crude nuclear device no larger than a small ball could devastate a major city. As we live in fear of attacks of unknown proportion, why does the public remain confused and complacent in the face of potential disaster? Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. believes that a tide of misinformation has led to the public's lack of understanding of the vital issues. Here, in a straightforward and comprehensible style, Graham concisely provides the background necessary to understand the news and opinions surrounding WMDs. facts on: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism chemical and biological weapons; In out post-9/11 world of shoe bombers and cyber-terrorism, a crude nuclear device no larger than a small ball could devastate a major city. As we live in fear of attacks of unknown proportion, why does the public remain confused and complacent in the face of potential disaster? Ambassador Thomas Graham Jr. believes that a tide of misinformation has led to the public's lack of understanding of the vital issues. Here, in a straightforward and comprehensible style, Graham concisely provides the background necessary to understand the news and opinions surrounding WMDs. facts on: nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; chemical and biological weapons; land mines and small arms; missile defence and WMDs in outer space; WMDs in the Middle East and Asia; Thomas Graham Jr. served for several decades as general counsel and then acting director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He was also President Clinton's special ambassador for nuclear disarmament issues. Graham's work culminated in the 1995 agreement to extend indefinitely the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970.

A Higher Form of Killing opens with the first devastating battlefield use of lethal gas in World War I, and then investigates the stockpiling of biological weapons during World War II and in the decades afterward as well as the inhuman experiments con-ducted to test their effectiveness. This updated edition includes a new Introduction and a new final chapter exposing frightening developments in recent years, including the black market that emerged in chemical and biological weapons following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the acquisition of these weapons by various Third World states, the attempts of countries such as Iraq to build up arsenals, and--particularly and most recently--the use of these weapons in terrorist attacks.

This new work offers a clear and thorough account of the threats posed by bioterrorism from the perspective of biologists. The authors examine thirteen disease-causing agents, including those responsible for anthrax, the plague, smallpox, influenza, and SARS. Each chapter considers a particular pathogen from the standpoint of its history, molecular biology, pathology, clinical presentation, diagnosis, weaponization, and defenses. The book also examines strategies for making vaccines and protecting the population in a bioterror attack.

In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs.

Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.

Mustard gas is typically associated with the horrors of World War I battlefields and trenches, where chemical weapons were responsible for tens of thousands of deaths. Few realize, however, that mustard gas had a resurgence during the Second World War, when its uses and effects were widespread and insidious. Toxic Exposures tells the shocking story of how the United States and its allies intentionally subjected thousands of their own servicemen to poison gas as part of their preparation for chemical warfare. In addition, it reveals the racialized dimension of these mustard gas experiments, as scientists tested whether the effects of toxic exposure might vary between Asian, Hispanic, black, and white Americans. Drawing from once-classified American and Canadian government records, military reports, scientists' papers, and veterans' testimony, historian Susan L. Smith explores not only the human cost of this research, but also the environmental degradation caused by ocean dumping of unwanted mustard gas. As she assesses the poisonous legacy of these chemical warfare experiments, Smith also considers their surprising impact on the origins of chemotherapy as cancer treatment and the development of veterans' rights movements. Toxic Exposures thus traces the scars left when the interests of national security and scientific curiosity battled with medical ethics and human rights.

In Behind the Gas Mask, Thomas Faith offers an institutional history of the Chemical Warfare Service, the department tasked with improving the Army's ability to use and defend against chemical weapons during and after World War One. Taking the CWS's story from the trenches to peacetime, he explores how the CWS's work on chemical warfare continued through the 1920s despite deep opposition to the weapons in both military and civilian circles.
As Faith shows, the believers in chemical weapons staffing the CWS allied with supporters in the military, government, and private industry to lobby to add chemical warfare to the country's permanent arsenal. Their argument: poison gas represented an advanced and even humane tool in modern war, while its applications for pest control and crowd control made a chemical capacity relevant in peacetime. But conflict with those aligned against chemical warfare forced the CWS to fight for its institutional life--and ultimately led to the U.S. military's rejection of battlefield chemical weapons.

Recovering amphibious forces can be complicated if ashore forces come under attack from enemy weapons, particularly chemical, biological, or radiological weapons. This report assesses current policies and capabilities pertaining to the recovery and decontamination of ashore forces and identifies policy options the Navy could pursue to better perform this mission.

A Web of Prevention provides a timely contribution to the current debate about life science research and its implications for security. It is an informative guide for both experts and the public. It is a forward-looking contribution covering both ends of the equation and creates momentum for the current discussion on effective preventive measures and effective control measures. While there are no guarantees for preventing misuse, there are nonetheless crucial steps the world community can take towards the overarching goal of a global network for the life sciences. This book sheds light on concrete steps toward the achievement of this worthy goal. From the Foreword by Dr Gabriele Kraatz-Wadsack, Chief, Weapons of Mass Destruction Branch, Office for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations. This book with its collection of essays provides an in-depth analysis of the various mutually reinforcing elements that together create and strengthen a web of prevention - or of assurance - that is vital to ensure that the advances in the life sciences are not misused to cause harm. All those engaged in the life sciences and in policy making in governments around the world should read this book so they can take steps to strengthen the web preventing biological weapons. Dr Graham S. Pearson, Visiting Professor of International Security, University of Bradford, UK and previously Director-General, Chemical and Biological Defence Establishment, UK Since September 11, 2001 in many countries renewed attention has been given to how research in the life sciences might inadvertently or intentionally facilitate the development of biological or chemical weapons. This state-of-the-art volume examines the full extent of the issues and debates. Coverage includes an overview of recent scientific achievements in virology, microbiology, immunology and genetic engineering with a view to asking how they might facilitate the production of weapons of mass destruction by state, sub-state or terrorist organizations. Consideration is given to what we have and haven't learned from the past. Employing both academic analysis and reflections by practitioners, the book examines the security-inspired governance regimes for the life sciences that are under development. Ultimately the authors examine what is required to form a comprehensive and workable web of prevention and highlight the importance of encouraging discussions between scientists, policy makers and others regarding the governance of vital but potentially dangerous research.

"We heard that the FBI and the Justice Department made a ferocious effort to stop the writing of this book, and after reading it we understand why. Marching Plague offers a radical reframing of the discourse surrounding germ warfare. After refuting the idea that massive biological attack is a probable if not a certain future occurrence, Critical Art Ensemble goes on to argue that biological weapons programmes are little more than a monumental waste of taxpayer dollars and medical and health resources that could be better spend fighting the massive loss of life each year from emerging infectious diseases." The Yes Men"The first draft of this book was seized with other materials under Section 175 of the US Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act expanded by the USA PATRIOT Act. As the book was rewritten, the ensuing Kafkaesque legal and political process unfolding in parallel serve to demonstrate the argument presented within -- that the militarisation of medical institutions and public health policy is at odds with a transparent, comprehensible civil society. Clear, convincing and commanding analysis will guide you through the many ways in which biowarfare programmes have not and cannot secure this nation. Anyone interested in our shared biological future must read this book." Natalie Jeremijenko

Assesses the vulnerabilities of the agricultural sector and the food chain to a deliberate act of biological terrorism and explores the likely outcomes of a successful attack. Over the past decade, the United States has endeavoured to increase its ability to detect, prevent and respond to terrorist threats and incidents. The agriculture sector and the food industry in general, however, have received comparatively little attention with respect to protection against terrorist incidents. This study aims to expand the current debate on domestic homeland security by assessing the vulnerabilities of the agricultural sector and the food chain to a deliberate act of biological terrorism and exploring the likely outcomes of a successful attack.

A lethal germ is unleashed in the U.S. mail. A chain of letters spreads terror from Florida to Washington, D.C., from New York to Connecticut, from the halls of Congress to the assembly lines of the U.S. Postal Service. Five people die, and ten thousand more line up for antibiotics to protect against exposure. The government, already outsmarted by the terrorist hijackers of 9/11, leaves its workers vulnerable and a diabolical killer on the loose.

Based on hundreds of hours of interviews and a review of thousands of pages of government documents, "The Killer Strain is the definitive account of the year in which bioterrorism became a reality in the United States. Revealing the little-known victims and unsung heroes in the anthrax debacle, investigative reporter Marilyn Thompson also examines the FBI's slow-paced investigation of the crimes and the unprecedented scientific challenges posed by the case.

"The Killer Strain, more than just a thrilling read, is also a clarion wake-up call. It shows how billions of dollars and a decade of elaborate bioterror dress rehearsals meant nothing in the face of a real attack -- and how we may still be at risk.

"DON'T TELL ME ABOUT THE LAW. THE LAW IS ANYTHING I WRITE ON A SCRAP OF PAPER." -- SADDAM HUSSEIN

In a white-knuckle thriller, Khidhir Hamza, who spent twenty years developing Iraq's atomic weapon, recounts his life in Saddam Hussein's inner circle and his daring flight to the West.

Taking readers into the darkest corners of a regime ruled by a volatile, brutal leader, Dr. Hamza, the only defector who has lived to write a firsthand portrait of Iraq, also presents an unprecedented portrait of Saddam -- his drunken rages, his women, his cold-blooded murder of underlings, and his unrivaled power. If pushed to the wall, Saddam will use the bomb that Dr. Hamza helped create.

From the relentless dangers Dr. Hamza endured in Iraq to his harrowing flight across three continents and his first encounter with skeptical CIA agents who turned him away, Saddam's Bombmaker is a true-to-life thriller as rich in danger, intrigue, and personal courage as a well-crafted spy novel.

Dual-threat agents (DTAs) are those viruses, bacteria, fungi, and toxins which are not only natural enemies of living organisms but which can be deliberately used for hostile purposes as biological or toxin weapon agents. The development, production, and use of vaccines are the primary measures needed to prevent DTA-related diseases and intoxinations. However, the development and production of vaccines against DTAs are more or less restricted to military programs, and this frequently raises suspicions about possible offensive intentions. To counter such reservations, a proposal has been made to establish a Vaccines for Peace (VFP) program, an international program for the development and use of vaccines against DTAs, to be administered by the World Health Organization in close cooperation with the Program for Vaccine Development. This book provides a thorough and wide-ranging analysis of the VFP program. It contains contributions from a range of experts from fields as diverse as biotechnology, international law, and diplomacy.

In negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention delegates have addressed the question of how to verify compliance with those provisions which relate to the production and non-production of relevant chemicals. In order to facilitate the work of the negotiators, the Pugwash movement and SIPRI gave a group of fourteen scientific and other experts on the negotiations the task of analysing how the current Convention provisions would be applied to a specific chemical, thiodiglycol. This chemical can be used as a precursor to the chemical warfare agent, mustard gas. In eleven chapters and an annexe, the authors present their individual findings, illustrated with tables and figures. The steering committee of the project have provided summaries in introductory and concluding chapters. The particular problems of monitoring thiodiglycol production outlined may serve as a model for monitoring other chemicals which will be covered by the future Chemical Weapons Convention.

This source book presents the essential technical, political, legal, and historical background needed for informed judgments about the recent expansion of military interest in the life sciences - particularly in the weapons potential of the new biotechnology. Preventing a Biological Arms Race develops the case for strengthening national and international commitments to biological disarmament and proposes courses of action to achieve this goal."In theory," Susan Wright observes, "the menace of biological warfare should no longer be with us." Developing, producing, and stockpiling biological weapons are unconditionally banned by international treaty. East-West military rivalry and confrontations in the Middle East have eroded confidence in the treaty regime, however. The advent of genetic engineering and other new biotechnologies has revived military interest in biological weaponry, generating concern about the potential weapons applications of biological research.The 15 contributions by experts from a wide range of disciplines include a history of U.S. biological warfare policy, analyses of the ethical issues posed by defensive biological warfare research, case studies of alleged violations of the international legal regime prohibiting biological weapons, reviews of that regime, and proposals for strengthening the barriers to biological warfare. A series of 14 appendixes collect important data and documents related to biological weapons."Contributors: Barton J. Bernstein, Gordon Burck, Leonard A. Cole, Richard Falk, Jeanne Guillemin, John Isaacs, Stuart Ketcham, Jonathan King, Marc Lappe, Matthew Meselson, Richard Novick, Charles Piller, Julian Perry Robinson, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Seth Shulman, Nicholas A. Sims, Robert L. Sinsheimer, Harlee Strauss, Susan Wright, Keith R. Yamamoto."