This volume is based on a multidisciplinary approach towards biological and chemical threats that can, and have been previously used in bioterrorism attacks around the globe. Current knowledge and evidence-based principles from the fields of synthetic biology, microbiology, plant biology, chemistry, food science, forensics, tactics, infective medicine, psychology and others are compiled to address numerous aspects and the complexity of bioterrorism attacks. The main focus is on biological threats, especially in the context of synthetic biology and its emerging findings that can be observed as possible threat and tool. The book examines microorganisms and their possible use in forensics, i.e. as possible detection tool that could enable fast and precise detection of possible treats. A number of plant derived components are also discussed as possible agents in bioterrorism attacks, and in relation to infectious disease pathology. Another integral part is food safety, especially in terms of large food supply chains, like airline caterings, institutionalized kitchens etc. Food can be observed as a possible mean of delivery of various agents (biological and chemical) for bioterrorism attacks. Steps on how to recognize specific critical points in a food supply chain, along with proposed corrective activities are discussed. Examples from around the globe, along with the methodological approach on how to differentiate bioterrorism attacks from other epidemics are provided. However, epidemics are also discussed in the context of migrations, with the special emphasis on the current refugee migrations that affect not only Europe, but also the United States. The book will be of interest to experts from various fields of science as well as professionals working in the field. The book encompasses examples and tools developed for easier, more specific, and faster detection of possible bioterrorism treats, along with proposed actions for some aspects of a bioterrorism attack.

Bacillus anthracis anthrax had largely faded from public consciousness until it resurfaced as a terrorist weapon in 2001. It was always with us , lurking in the soil and hosted by our livestock. Long before it was identified as a specific bacterium in the late 1800s, anthrax was a catchphrase for a variety of diseases and symptoms, from ancient biblical plagues to a painful carbuncle on George Washingtons leg. Only when industrialization turned anthrax into a widespread disease that threatened economies did a true understanding of Bacillus anthracis begin to emerge.

This history of anthrax follows the development of our understanding of the disease, beginning in the 18th century, when science began breaking ground on the subject, until the present, when anthrax is feared more as an agent of biowarfare than as a health hazard harbored by the environment. There are three appendices: the first outlines the reaction of Manchester, New Hampshire, to the 2001 anthrax attacks; the second documents workplace warnings to anthrax-prone workers; and the third lists novels that involve anthrax. Bibliographical references are also provided.

Mycotoxins are made by different biosynthetic pathways, and they have an extremely wide range of pharmacological effects. This book will update readers on several cutting-edge aspects of mycotoxin research, including topics such as: new analytical methods for detection; the adoption of an ancient Mexican process for detoxification of aflatoxins; mycotoxin management in Ireland, Lithuania and South America; mycotoxin reduction through plant breeding and integrated management practices; and natural aflatoxin inhibitors from medicinal plants. Further contributions examine ochratoxins, selected trichothecenes, zearalenone, and aflatoxin-like gene clusters, as well as sclerotial development in Aspergillus flavus and A. parasiticus. Of particular interest are the chapters on the potential use of mycotoxins as bioweapons. This book will stimulate new thinking on the need to develop therapeutic as well as preventative interventions to reduce the toxicological threat of mycotoxins.

New and unpredicted technologies are emerging at an unprecedented pace around the world. Communication of those new discoveries is occurring faster than ever, meaning that the unique ownership of a piece of new technology is no longer a sufficient position, if not impossible. In today's world, recognition of the potential applications of a technology and a sense of purpose in exploiting it are far more important than simply having access to it. Technological surprise has and will continue to take many forms. A plethora of new technologies are under development for peaceful means but may have un- tended security consequences and will certainly require innovative counterme- ures. A relevant example is the tremendous development in biotechnology that has occurred since the advent of recombinant DNA and tissue culture-based processes in the 1970s. If US government agencies and the defense and academic commu- ties had more clearly recognized the potential for biotechnology to affect fun- mental security and warfighting doctrines 20 years ago, the situation today could be very different. Defense against chemical and biological weapons - from both states and nonstate actors - currently presents a threat that is difficult to predict and for which traditional solutions are increasingly less effective. Nanotechnology has emerged as a well-funded discipline that, like biote- nology, carries the potential for groundbreaking applications and the potential for unpredictable harm. The world is likely 20 years away from the full impact of the nanotechnology on defensive capabilities.

The terrorist act with sarin gas in the Tokyo underground and the case with the spread of anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system stimulated the development of orga- zation of fight against terrorism on a national and global level. The goal of this wo- shop was assessment of scientific concepts and practical means for management of chemical and biological agents casualties in the area of terrorist attacks with emphasis on improving the problems and situation in Eastern European Countries. In this book are included the results of both theoretical and practical research of chemical and biological terrorism presented during the workshop. Different trends of research to fight against terrorism on both local and governmental level including some Eastern European countries are discussed. The scientific articles are grouped into those areas: - New approaches in counteraction to chemical and biological terrorism - Medical treatment and decontamination of casualties from chemical and biological agents - Diagnosis of exposure to chemical and biological agents - Development of protection against injuries from chemical and biological agents In these articles the following are emphasized: - Some aspects of national and global defense against chemical and biological terrorism - National action plans and global agreements on combating terrorism - The characteristics of the major specific injuries connected with chemical and biological terrorism - Threats of terroristic attacks - Epidemiological and clinical peculiarities, ways of diagnosing, medical tre- ment and preventive health care measures These problems are analyzed from an interdisciplinary perspective.

The use of biological warfare (BW) agents by states or terrorists is one of the world's most frightening security threats but, thus far, little attention has been devoted to understanding how to improve policies and procedures to identify and attribute BW events. "Terrorism, War, or Disease?" is the first book to examine the complex political, military, legal, and scientific challenges involved in determining when BW have been used and who has used them.
Through detailed analysis of the most significant and controversial allegations of BW use from the Second World War to the present, internationally recognized experts assess past attempts at attribution of unusual biological events and draw lessons to improve our ability to counter these deadly silent killers. This volume presents the most comprehensive analysis of actual and alleged BW use, and provides an up-to-date evaluation of law enforcement, forensic epidemiology, and arms control measures available to policymakers to investigate and attribute suspected attacks.

"Biosecurity" comprehensively analyzes the dramatic transformations that are reshaping how the international community addresses biological weapons and infectious diseases.
The book examines the renewed threat from biological weapons, and explores the new world of biological weapons governance. Gostin and Fidler argue that the arms control approach in the Biological Weapons Convention no longer dominates. Other strategies have emerged to challenge the arms control approach, and the book identifies four important policy trends--the criminalization of biological weapons, regulation of the biological sciences, management of the biodefense imperative, and preparation for biological weapons attack.
The book also explores the challenges to public health resulting from new security threats. The authors look at the linkages between security and public health policy, both at the national and international level. For instance, Gostin and Fidler scrutinize the difficulty of developing policies that improve defenses against both biological weapons and the threat of infectious diseases from new viral strains.
The new worlds of biological weapons and public health governance raise the importance of crafting policy responses informed by the rule of law. Thinking about the rule of law underscores the importance of finding globalized forms of biosecurity governance. The book explores patterns in recent governance initiatives and advocates building a "global biosecurity concert" as a way to address the threats biological weapons and infectious diseases present in the early 21st century.

This book contains articles from leading experts in the various disciplines associated with risk assessment and risk communication associated with bioterrorism. These papers are based on presentations at a NATO Advanced Research Workshop in Israel in June 2005, which addressed these issues. The book offers a comprehensive, practical guide for approaching risk assessment and risk communication in a bioterrorism event.

Stemming from the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, this book asserts that no single institution or country possesses all the resources to effectively address radiological and nuclear threats. Moreover, the book asserts that fundamental scientific challenges must be overcome to achieve new and improved technologies. In response, the book sets forth research strategies that advance the ability to counter nuclear and radiological threats.

Without sensationalizing or providing the technical details that would result in a terrorist's handbook, the volume reflects the concerns expressed by experts from 12 states (including many from Slavic regions adjoining or aspiring to membership of the European Union). A range of vulnerabilities are highlighted that are usually neglected. Assessments that focus on the horrifying potential of bioterrorism directly targeting people are commonplace. This book is exceptional because indirect impacts on human health and welfare through challenge to the security of food supplies are the focus. These urgently need to be recognised and made subjects of planned investment to counter the threat. Examples of past state-sponsored and independent actions are discussed. The evolution of biological (chemical defoliant) systems for controlling plant growth with unambiguously humanitarian aims is shown to have resulted in a range of counter terrorist uses.

A DAILY TELEGRAPH BOOK OF THE YEAR.

'A compelling, authoritative insight into possibly the most controversial death in Britain this century' Observer.

'Masterful ... This book made me proud of my trade as a journalist' Daily Mail.

'This searing excavation of the mysterious death of Dr David Kelly is investigative journalism at its best. It is brave, relentless, dazzlingly revealing' Peter Oborne.

In March 2003 British forces invaded Iraq after Tony Blair said the country could deploy weapons of mass destruction at 45 minutes' notice. A few months later, government scientist Dr David Kelly was unmasked by Blair's officials as the assumed source of a BBC news report challenging this claim. Within days, Dr Kelly was found dead in a wood near his home. Blair immediately convened the controversial Hutton Inquiry, which concluded Dr Kelly committed suicide.

Yet key questions remain: could Dr Kelly really have taken his life in the manner declared? And why did Blair's government derail the coroner's inquest into Dr Kelly's death? In this meticulous account, award-winning journalist Miles Goslett shows why we should be sceptical of the official story of what happened in that desperate summer of 2003.

This book provides an analysis of the development and deployment of chemical weapons from 700 BC to the present day. The First World War is examined in detail since it remains the most significant experience of the chemical threat, but the Second World War and post-war conflicts are also evaluated. Additionally, protocols attempting to control the proliferation and use of chemical weapons are assessed. Finally, the book examines the threat (real and imagined) from a chemical warfare attack today by rationally assessing to what extent terrorist groups around the world are capable of making and using such weapons.

The controversial Bush doctrine of preemptive war is often described as revolutionary. In fact, as this comparative study of rivalries involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) shows, notions of preventive and preemptive war have long been closely tied to such weapons. In this study, a wealth of historical data is analyzed to address the fundamental question that WMD proliferation raises for U.S. defense policy: will the projection of U.S. power be deterred by nascent WMD arsenals in the hands of rogue states?
This wide-ranging comparison yields the conclusion that small WMD arsenals do not have the deterrent effects often attributed to them by scholars and analysts. These theorists ignore history's close calls, an oversight we share at our peril.

James Bond's amazing gadgets reveal both enthusiasm about technology and fear of its potential ramifications. The popularity of the 007 franchise depends on a seductive formula of sex, violence, and snobbery. Much of its appeal, too, lies in its gadgets: slick, somewhat improbable technological devices that give everyone's favorite secret agent the edge over his adversaries. In Equipping James Bond, Andre Millard chronicles a hundred-year history of espionage technology through the lens of Ian Fleming's infamous character and his ingenious spyware. Beginning with the creation of MI6, the British secret service, Millard traces the development of espionage technology from the advanced weaponry of the nineteenth century to the evolving threat of computer hacking and surveillance. Arguing that the gadgets in the books and films articulate the leading edge of technological awareness at the time, Millard describes how Bond goes from protecting 1950s England from criminal activity to saving a world threatened by nuclear bombs, poison gas, and attacks from space. As a modern and modernizing hero, Bond has to keep up with the times. His film franchise is committed to equipping both Bond and his adversaries with the latest technological gadgets. Simultaneously, Millard stresses, the villains and threats that Bond faces embody contemporary fears about the downside of technological change. Taking a wide-ranging look at factual (and fictional) technology, Millard views the James Bond universe as evidence for popular perceptions of technological development as both inevitably progressive and apocalyptically threatening.

Incidents of bioterrorism and biowarfare are likely to recur, leading to increased public concern and government action. The deficiencies of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) are in urgent need of attention: the BTWC is the central international agreement to prevent the proliferation of biological warfare programmes. Uniquely, this book is written by diplomats involved in the decade-long effort (1991-2001) in which State Parties to the BTWC tried to agree a Protocol to the Convention with legally binding measures to strengthen its effectiveness, and academics concerned with the negotiations. Just before negotiations foundered, when the Chairman's proposed text was virtually complete, the problems and proposed solutions were examined thoroughly, leading to this book. The book is wide-ranging in its review of the history of biological warfare, the reasons why the current biological revolution is of such concern, and the main features of the BTWC itself. The core of the book examines the key elements of the proposed protocol - declarations, visits, challenge-type investigations, and enhanced international cooperation - and the implications for government, industry and biodefence, giving us all a better understanding of what still remains to be done to avert a biowarfare catastrophe.

The Editors would like to thank the authors of the papers at the Advanced Research Workshops for their excellent presentations at the workshops and the production of their drafts. We are indebted to those who helped in the preparation of this volume. We should particularly like to acknowledge the help of Piers Millett, who compiled the papers, set them into camera-ready format and produced the index and Dr. Simon Whitby who made the final changes to the manuscript. Any remaining errors are, of course, our responsibility. Malcolm R. Dando Cyril Klement Marian Negut Graham S. Pearson IX ACHIEVING SECURITY BENEFITS FROM TECHNICAL COOPERATION UNDER THE BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION GRAHAM S. PEARSON Visiting Professor of International Security, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, Bradford, West Yorkshire BD7 IDP, UK 1. Background l The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention which opened for signature in 1972 2 and entered into force in 1975 currently has 144 States Parties and 18 Signatory States Article I of the Convention is all-embracing in its complete prohibition of biological weapons stating that: Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: (1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes; (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such

This special issue of "Military Psychology" reports behavioral, pharmacological, and toxicological science research on military performance as it is affected by chemical warfare agents (CWAs) and their pharmacological countermeasures. The papers in this issue are a diverse assembly; some very pharmacological in orientation, others driven by behavioral neuroscience. The unifying theme is the psychological consequences or organic syndromes that may be confused with consequences resulting from exposure to CWAs or use of their medical countermeasures.

Suburban Empire takes readers to the US missile base at Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, at the matrix of postwar US imperial expansion, the Cold War nuclear arms race, and the tide of anti-colonial struggles rippling across the world. Hirshberg shows that the displacement of indigenous Marshallese within Kwajalein Atoll mirrors the segregation and spatial politics of the mainland US as local and global iterations of US empire took hold. Tracing how Marshall Islanders navigated US military control over their lands, Suburban Empire reveals that Cold War-era suburbanization was perfectly congruent with US colonization, military testing, and nuclear fallout. The structures of suburban segregation cloaked the destructive history of control and militarism under a veil of small-town innocence.

Holding Their Breath uncovers just how close Britain, the United States, and Canada came to crossing the red line that restrained chemical weapon use during World War II. Unlike in World War I, belligerents did not release poison gas regularly during the Second World War. Yet, the looming threat of chemical warfare significantly affected the actions and attitudes of these three nations as they prepared their populations for war, mediated their diplomatic and military alliances, and attempted to defend their national identities and sovereignty. The story of chemical weapons and World War II begins in the interwar period as politicians and citizens alike advocated to ban, to resist, and eventually to prepare for gas use in the next war. M. Girard Dorsey reveals, through extensive research in multinational archives and historical literature, that although poison gas was rarely released on the battlefield in World War II, experts as well as lay people dedicated significant time and energy to the weapon's potential use; they did not view chemical warfare as obsolete or taboo. Poison gas was an influential weapon in World War II, even if not deployed in a traditional way, and arms control, for various reasons, worked. Thus, what did not happen is just as important as what did. Holding Their Breath provides insight into these potentialities by untangling World War II diplomacy and chemical weapons use in a new way.

Dual-threat agents (DTAs) are those viruses, bacteria, fungi, and toxins which are not only natural enemies of living organisms but which can be deliberately used for hostile purposes as biological or toxin weapon agents. The development, production, and use of vaccines are the primary measures needed to prevent DTA-related diseases and intoxinations. However, the development and production of vaccines against DTAs are more or less restricted to military programs, and this frequently raises suspicions about possible offensive intentions. To counter such reservations, a proposal has been made to establish a Vaccines for Peace (VFP) program, an international program for the development and use of vaccines against DTAs, to be administered by the World Health Organization in close cooperation with the Program for Vaccine Development. This book provides a thorough and wide-ranging analysis of the VFP program. It contains contributions from a range of experts from fields as diverse as biotechnology, international law, and diplomacy.

Significant advances have been made in animal model development for biological research since the publication of the first edition of this volume, and the ramifications of the FDA's Animal Efficacy Rule have become better understood in the scientific community. With each chapter completely updated with the latest research findings, Biodefense Research Methodology and Animal Models, Second Edition spans the spectrum of coverage from basic research to advanced development of medical countermeasures. Topics discussed in this volume include: A history of biological agents as weapons, from the use of corpses to contaminate water supplies to modern day anthrax attacks Concepts and strategies involved in biowarfare and bioterrorism The development, validation, and importance of animal models in biodefense research Infectious disease aerobiology Studies involving anthrax, glanders, plague, tularemia, Q fever, alphaviruses, orthopoxviruses, and a new chapter on brucellosis Animal models for viral hemorrhagic fevers Botulinum and Ricin toxins Staphylococcal and streptococcal superantigens As the scientific community works diligently to protect the world's population from the misuse of infectious organisms and toxins, it is imperative that researchers stay abreast of the latest techniques for biodefense research. Exploring in vivo and in vitro assays, this volume brings researchers up to date on the latest information on bacterial and viral infectious agents and biological toxins considered to pose the greatest threats to public safety. In addition, the contributors take a step toward minimizing the use of animals in further experiments by presenting documented findings that can be built upon.

Banning Chemical Weapons, first published in 1993, provides a readable and brief outline of chemical warfare, its origins and the offensive and defensive aspects. The aim of this book is to give technical information to people interested in the wider aspects of disarmament, by showing how this technical material must be used in the negotiations to achieve a worldwide and enforceable ban on chemical weapons. While not a textbook, this volume provides accessible technical background to the issue of chemical disarmament.

In negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention delegates have addressed the question of how to verify compliance with those provisions which relate to the production and non-production of relevant chemicals. In order to facilitate the work of the negotiators, the Pugwash movement and SIPRI gave a group of fourteen scientific and other experts on the negotiations the task of analysing how the current Convention provisions would be applied to a specific chemical, thiodiglycol. This chemical can be used as a precursor to the chemical warfare agent, mustard gas. In eleven chapters and an annexe, the authors present their individual findings, illustrated with tables and figures. The steering committee of the project have provided summaries in introductory and concluding chapters. The particular problems of monitoring thiodiglycol production outlined may serve as a model for monitoring other chemicals which will be covered by the future Chemical Weapons Convention.

At the battle of Agincourt, over six thousand noblemen--the flower of French knighthood--died in a day-long series of futile charges against a small band of English archers. They charged not simply because they failed to recognize the power of the longbow, but because their whole ethos revolved round an idealized figure of the knight that dated back to Homer: the man of great physical strength and valor, who excelled at hand-to-hand combat with men of equal worth. The bow was an affront to this ideal.
As Robert L. O'Connell points out in this vividly written history of weapons in Western culture, the battle of Agincourt typifies the complex and often paradoxical relationship between men and arms. In a sweeping narrative that ranges from prehistorc times to the Nuclear Age, O'Connell demonstrates how social and economic conditions determine the types of weapons and the tactics employed in warfare and how in turn innovations in weapons technology often undercut social values. He reveals, for instance, how the Church outlawed the use of crossbows--except against muslims--to preserve the status quo of the medieval world; how the invention of the gun required a redefinition of courage from aggressive ferocity to calmness under fire; and how the machine gun in World War I so overthrew traditional notions of combat that Lord Kitchener exclaimed, "This isn't war " Indeed, as O'Connell points out, the technology unleashed in the Great War radically changed our perception of ourselves: weapons had made human qualities almost irrelevant in combat. And with the invention of the atomic bomb, humanity itself became subservient to the weapons they had produced.
While its emphasis is historical, Of Arms and Men also draws on such disciplines as biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and literature to illuminate the course of arms. O'Connell integrates the evolution of politics, weapons, strategy, and tactics into a coherent narrative, one spiced with striking portraits of men in combat and brilliant insight into why men go to war.

Learn how to assess and prevent biosecurity threats to protect public health and national security

With contributions from experts in all facets of biosecurity, this book explains the fundamental elements of biosecurity as well as the related concepts of biosafety and biosurety, detailing how all three concepts fit within the framework of biodefense. Readers are then given the tools needed to assess and prevent biosecurity threats and vulnerabilities. The book explores the nature of biosecurity threats to research laboratories as well as to agriculture, food, and mass transit. Moreover, readers will learn how to apply principles of biosecurity to assess epidemics and protect public health.

"Biosecurity" takes a detailed look at today's biosecurity policy, explaining how it is likely to evolve given current and potential threats to national security. The authors stress the importance of education and advocacy, helping readers develop effective programs to build public awareness and preparedness. The book also presents a novel tool to assess the effectiveness of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity programs.

"Biosecurity" is divided into four parts: Part I: An Introduction to BiosecurityPart II: Elements of BiosecurityPart III: Biosecurity in Various SectorsPart IV: Biosecurity Policy, Bioterrorism, and the Future

This book will instill a deep understanding of what biosecurity is and what it is not. It urges readers to think about the importance of biosecurity as it relates to national security, safety, and health. By exposing major flaws in global biosecurity thinking, "Biosecurity" sets forth a clear pathway to correct those errors and build stronger biosecurity programs.