The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for
democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of
General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police
countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed
international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and
stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold
War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume
addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum
created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of
military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala
argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including
reductions in forces and political realignment, remains
disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and
uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and
military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international
power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume
clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have
made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala
provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of
nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War
world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas
that are most important to actual security. Broad aspects of the
problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first
chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between
political and military levels of analysis discussed in the
conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of
nature and the state of war, explains how they apply tothe problem
of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war,
including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on
the "New Soviet Thinking" and why the probability of accidental and
inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the
levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems
facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation
control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence
fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion
over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four,
reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war
termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear
deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by
preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter
six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding
chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and
students of military affairs, political scientists, government
officials, and members of the military establishment will find the
up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First
Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on
this profoundly important world issue.
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