South Africa's Bomb kept the world guessing for years. Six-and-a- half nuclear bombs had been secretly built and destroyed, former South African President F.W. de Klerk announced in 1993. No other country has ever voluntarily destroyed its nuclear arsenal.

From 1975 Nic von Wielligh was involved in the production of nuclear weapons material, the dismantling of the nuclear weapons and the provision of evidence of South Africa's bona fides to the international community. The International Atomic Energy Agency declared South Africa's Initial Report to be the most comprehensive and professional that they had ever received. In this book the nuclear physicist and his daughter Lydia von Wielligh-Steyn tell the gripping story of the splitting of the atom and the power it releases. It is an account of ground-breaking research and the scientists responsible; it deals with uranium enrichment, the arms race and South Africa's secret programme.

The Bomb: South Africa's Nuclear Programme is a story of nuclear explosions, espionage, smuggling of nuclear materials and swords that became ploughshares.

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was the most perilous event in history, when mankind faced a looming nuclear collision between the United States and Soviet Union. During those weeks, the world gazed into the abyss of potential annihilation.

Max Hastings’s graphic new history tells the story from the viewpoints of national leaders, Russian officers, Cuban peasants, American pilots and British disarmers. Max Hastings deploys his accustomed blend of eye-witness interviews, archive documents and diaries, White House tape recordings, top-down analysis, first to paint word-portraits of the Cold War experiences of Fidel Castro’s Cuba, Nikita Khrushchev’s Russia and Kennedy’s America; then to describe the nail-biting Thirteen Days in which Armageddon beckoned.

Hastings began researching this book believing that he was exploring a past event from twentieth century history. He is as shocked as are millions of us around the world, to discover that the current attack of Ukraine gives this narrative a hitherto unimaginable twenty-first century immediacy. We may be witnessing the onset of a new Cold War between nuclear-armed superpowers.

To contend with today’s threat, which Hastings fears will prove enduring, it is critical to understand how, sixty years ago, the world survived its last glimpse into the abyss. Only by fearing the worst, he argues, can our leaders hope to secure the survival of the planet.

There is only one scenario other than an asteroid strike that could end the world as we know it in a matter of hours: nuclear war. And one of the triggers for that war would be a nuclear missile inbound toward the United States.

Every generation, a journalist has looked deep into the heart of the nuclear military establishment: the technologies, the safeguards, the plans, and the risks. These investigations are vital to how we understand the world we really live in—where one nuclear missile will beget one in return, and where the choreography of the world’s end requires massive decisions made on seconds’ notice with information that is only as good as the intelligence we have.

Pulitzer Prize finalist Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario explores this ticking-clock scenario, based on dozens of exclusive new interviews with military and civilian experts who have built the weapons, have been privy to the response plans, and have been responsible for those decisions should they have needed to be made. Nuclear War: A Scenario examines the handful of minutes after a nuclear missile launch. It is essential reading, and unlike any other book in its depth and urgency.

In 1985 Jennifer and Ian Hartley left their home, bought a caravan and moved to Cambridgeshire to witness against the sighting of Cruise missiles at RAF Molesworth. This memoir recounts their day to day life living in this unusual place and the dialogue they had with MPs, the military, police, peace campaigners, the local community and the church.

This book details the evolution of General George Marshall's relationship with the atomic bomb-including the Manhattan Project and the use of atomic weapons on Japan-as it emerged as the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. The atomic bomb is not only the most powerful weapon ever used in the history of warfare: it is also the most significant in terms of its long-term impact on U.S. military power and policy, and as the reason behind the conflict that raged for four decades without actually happening-the Cold War. General George C. Marshall played an instrumental role in the development and use of the atomic bomb in World War II as well as in issues involving nuclear weapons in the post-World War II period. This book tells the story of Marshall's experience with the atomic bomb from his early skepticism of its effectiveness as a weapon, to his oversight of its development and deployment against Japan in World War II, to his recognition of the bomb as a weapon of such dire consequence that it should never be used again. Intended for a general audience as well as scholars with specific knowledge about the subject matter, this book presents a cohesive account of General Marshall's involvement with nuclear weapons and atomic power as Army chief of staff during World War II and as secretary of state and secretary of defense in the early years of the Cold War. Marshall's involvement with the use of nuclear weapons is set in the context of the Allies' efforts to force Japan to surrender and the initiation of the Cold War. Readers will gain insight into Marshall's quest for obtaining a Japanese surrender; his views on the use of the atomic bomb on Japan versus the use of conventional weapons, including fire bombing or poison gas; his interactions with Roosevelt and Truman on nuclear issues; and Marshall's diplomatic skillfulness in dealing with the issues surrounding the control and use of nuclear weapons as secretary of state and secretary of defense in the post-World War II era. These included consideration of the use of the atomic bomb during the Berlin crisis and the Korean war. Presents a clear and concise narrative of Marshall's interactions with nuclear weapons, from his appointment to President Roosevelt's advisory committee in 1941 to his tenure as President Truman's secretary of defense in 1950 Documents Marshall's role in pulling together the financial, material, and human resources required for the Manhattan Project as well as his collaboration with Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Manhattan Project leader General Leslie Groves to produce the atomic bomb Derives an accurate account of Marshall's involvement with nuclear weapons through official documents, his correspondence, the opinions of his peers, and personal interviews he granted later in his life

It began with plutonium, the first element ever manufactured in quantity by humans. Fearing that the Germans would be the first to weaponise the atom, the United States marshalled brilliant minds and seemingly inexhaustible bodies to find a way to create a nuclear chain reaction of inconceivable explosive power. In a matter of months, the Hanford nuclear facility was built to produce the enigmatic and deadly new material that would fuel atomic bombs. In the desert of eastern Washington State, far from prying eyes, scientists Glenn Seaborg, Enrico Fermi and thousands of others-the physicists, engineers, labourers and support staff at the facility-manufactured plutonium for the bomb dropped on Nagasaki, and for the bombs in the current American nuclear arsenal, enabling the construction of weapons with the potential to end human civilisation. With his characteristic blend of scientific clarity and storytelling, Steve Olson asks why Hanford has been largely overlooked in histories of the Manhattan Project and the Cold War. Olson, who grew up just twenty miles from Hanford's B Reactor, recounts how a small Washington town played host to some of the most influential scientists and engineers in American history as they sought to create the substance at the core of the most destructive weapons ever created. The Apocalypse Factory offers a new generation this dramatic story of human achievement and ultimately, of lethal hubris. *2020 marks the 75th anniversary of the United States' detonation of nuclear weapons over the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August 1945.

Most observers who follow nuclear history agree on one major aspect regarding Israel's famous policy of nuclear ambiguity; mainly that it is an exception. More specifically, it is largely accepted that the 1969 Nixon-Meir understanding, which formally established Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity and transformed it from an undeclared Israeli strategy into a long-lasting undisclosed bilateral agreement, was in fact a singularity, aimed at allowing Washington to turn a blind eye to the existence of an Israeli arsenal. According to conventional wisdom, this nuclear bargain was a foreign policy exception on behalf of Washington, an exception which reflected a relationship growing closer and warmer between the superpower leading the free world and its small Cold War associate. Contrary to the orthodox narrative, this research demonstrates that this was not the case. The 1969 bargain was not, in fact, an exception, but rather the first of three Cold War era deals on nuclear tests brokered by Washington with its Cold War associates, the other two being Pakistan and South Africa. These two deals are not well known and until now were discussed and explored in the literature in a very limited fashion. Bargaining on Nuclear Tests places the role of nuclear tests by American associates, as well as Washington's attempts to prevent and delay them, at the heart of a new nuclear history narrative.

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize, published to exceptional reviews in both the US and the UK, American Prometheus is as compelling a work of biography as it is a significant work of history.

Physicist and polymath, as familiar with Hindu scriptures as he was with quantum mechanics, J. Robert Oppenheimer - director of the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb - was the most famous scientist of his generation.

In their meticulous and riveting biography, Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin reveal a brilliant, ambitious, complex and flawed man, profoundly involved with some of the momentous events of the twentieth century.

This is a study of how the information age in modern warfare coexists with the persistent appeal of nuclear weapons and its impact on crisis management. In today's information age, the coexistence of nuclear weapons with advanced conventional weapons and information-based concepts of warfare is a military contradiction. Nuclear deterrence was initially predicated on geopolitical, military, and technical assumptions. These were based on Cold War politics, rational deterrence theory, the concept of mutual vulnerability, and the fact that information and technology diffusion were limited. Today, however, far from being obsolete, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have not only survived, but have become weapons for states that face security threats, including perceived threats of nuclear blackmail, or expectation of conflicts. This study focuses on this unplanned coexistence of two distinct arts of war, including the possibility that states like the U.S. may be held hostage to nuclear blackmail by "outlier" regimes or terrorists, such as North Korea. It shows that restricting nuclear proliferation should still be on the agenda of policymakers, and calls for a revitalized global non-proliferation regime. This unique survey by a leading expert will appeal to anyone interested in arms control, nuclear proliferation, and defense policy.

The book examines Bernard Brodie's strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age, embedding his work within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz. Bernard Brodie (1910-1978) was a leading 20th century theorist and philosopher of war. A key architect of American nuclear strategy, Brodie was one of the first civilian defense intellectuals to cross over into the military world. "State of Doom" explores Brodie's evolution as a theorist and his response to the technological innovations that transformed warfare from WWII to the Vietnam War. It situates his theoretical development within the classical theories of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), as Brodie came to be known as "America's Clausewitz." While his first influential works focused on naval strategy, his most lasting impact came within the field of nuclear strategic thinking. Brodie helped conceptualize America's strategy of deterrence, later taking into account America's loss of nuclear monopoly, thermonuclear weapons, and intercontinental missiles. This in-depth exploration of Brodie's strategic and philosophical response to the nuclear age and of his effort to reconcile Clausewitz's theories to the new challenges of the nuclear era will make this book a must read to anyone in strategic studies, international relations, and philosophy of war.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), often referred to as "battlefield," "sub-strategic," or "non-strategic" nuclear weapons, usually have a plutonium core and are typically distinct from strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, they warrant a separate consideration in the realm of nuclear security. The yield of such weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons and may range from the relatively low 0.1 kiloton to a few kilotons. Pakistan's quest to acquire tactical nuclear weapons has added a dangerous dimension to the already precarious strategic equation in South Asia. The security discourse in the subcontinent revolves around the perennial apprehension of a conventional or sub-conventional conflict triggering a chain reaction, eventually paving the way for a potential nuclear crisis haunting peace and stability in the region. Pakistan believes that the successful testing of the 60-km nuclear-capable short-range missile Hatf-9 (Nasr) "adds deterrence value to Pakistan's strategic weapons development programme at shorter ranges." In paradox, the fact remains that this step has further lowered Pakistan's nuclear threshold through the likely use of TNWs. The introduction of TNWs into the tactical battle area further exacerbates credibility of their control. Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear doctrine, but it is well known that nuclear weapons are its first line of defence. The use of TNWs in the India-Pakistan case will alter the strategic scenario completely as Pakistan would threaten India with the use of TNWs in the event of New Delhi responding against Islamabad with a conventional strike in reaction to a 26/11-style terrorist attack. Pakistan forgets that given its offensive strategic posture and continuing involvement in terror strikes in India, it is New Delhi which is confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to counter Pakistan's "first-strike" and proxy war in the light of its declared "no-first-use" policy. This edited volume attempts to address and decipher complex issues, including aspects such as China's WMD collaboration with Pakistan, nuclear command and control dynamics within Pakistan, overall rationale and implications of TNWs, safety and security of nuclear weapons, scenarios for nuclear usage, India's potential response options and, more specifically, the technical aspects of the Nasr delivery system.