'Go nuclear' or 'go zero'--as the international community stands at a nuclear crossroads, a number of questions demand urgent attention: How do established and emerging nuclear-armed states manage their nuclear affairs? Who commands and controls a country's nuclear forces? What effect does the balance between secrecy and openness have on larger questions of security and democracy?
Governing Nuclear Weapons is grounded in the belief that the public's ability to hold nuclear-armed states accountable for the security of their weapons is contingent on proper knowledge of domestic nuclear governance. With a special emphasis on civilian control and democratic accountability, it seeks to illuminate the structures and processes of nuclear weapons governance of eight nuclear-armed states: China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US, as well as India, Israel, and Pakistan.
It examines the theoretical as well as practical functions and structures of those who possess the power to make nuclear decisions and those who have the practical means and physical opportunity to execute those decisions. While the book assesses the whole spectrum of political oversight and control mechanisms in operation for each country--including the roles and requirements of the executive, the military and specialized civilian institutions--it also takes a closer look at parliamentary institutions and civil society at large.
As nuclear terrorism, proliferation and disarmament vie for the top slot on the global security agenda, a comparative understanding of the various national nuclear discourses is no longer optional, but required.

This sixth volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on current legal challenges regarding nuclear disarmament and security. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for further constructive discourse at both national and international levels. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Chair of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law and President and CEO of ISLAND - The Foundation for International Society of Law and Nuclear Disarmament. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

For nearly forty years, U.S. deterrence policy has depended on nuclear weapons, making the modernization of those weapons a key goal of every administration. "Nuclear Weapons, Policies, and the Test Ban Issue" presents a cogent discussion of the reasons why the United States should actively continue its nuclear weapons program. The authors claim that weapons testing and development has neither kept up with technological advances nor logically followed from professed U.S. policy. They attribute these shortcomings to such forces as budget limitations, alliance politics, domestic politics, and, most importantly, the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.

Proliferation of WMD technologies is by no means a new concern for the international community. Indeed, since the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, tremendous energies have been expended upon diplomatic efforts to create a web of treaties and international organizations regulating the production and stockpiling of WMD sensitive materials within states, as well as their spread through the increasingly globalized channels of international trade to other states and non-state actors.
However, the intervention in 2003 by Western powers in Iraq has served as an illustration of the importance of greater understanding of and attention to this area of law, as disagreements over its content and application have once again lead to a potentially destabilizing armed intervention by members of the United Nations into the sovereign territory of another member state. Other ongoing disputes between states regarding the character of obligations work assumed under non-proliferation treaty instruments, and the effect of international organizations' decisions in this area, form some of the most contentious and potentially destabilizing issues of foreign policy concern for many states.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis of international law and organizations in the area of WMD proliferation. It will serve both as a reference for understanding the law as it currently exists in its political and economic context, as well as an analysis of areas in which amendments to existing law and organizations are needed.

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998. Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve. Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation.

This book investigates the European involvement in managing the nuclear dispute with Iran, shedding new light on EU foreign policy-making. The author focuses on the peculiar format through which the EU managed Iran's nuclear issue: a 'lead group' consisting of France, Germany and the UK and the High Representative for EU foreign policy (E3/EU). The experience of the E3/EU lends credibility to the claim that lead groups give EU foreign policy direction and substance. The E3/EU set up a negotiating framework that worked as a de-escalating tool, a catalyst for Security Council unity and a forum for crisis management. They inflicted pain on Iran by adopting a comprehensive sanctions regime, but did so only having secured US commitment to a diplomatic solution. Once the deal was reached, they defended it vigorously. The E3/EU may have been supporting actors, but their achievements were real.

In Nuclear Weapons and the Environment, John Perry highlights the environmental damage caused by nuclear device testing. The failure of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons is a grave risk to not only human life but to the environment. Pointing to the unstable political situation between a variety of state and non-state actors, the remediation of nuclear test sites, and the risks involved in the production of nuclear weapons, Perry makes a clear case for the dire importance of non-proliferation.

Studying the impact of the nuclear revolution on the course of the rivalry between the former USSR and the USA, this book explains why it has been so different from great power in pre-nuclear times, in avoiding war and leading first to a co-operative relationship and then ending peacefully. The book analyzes four aspects of the nuclear revolution: reciprocal restraint, security co-operation, the deadlock of nuclear strategy (including strategic defence), and common deterrence.

In Supreme emergency, an ex-Trident submarine captain considers the evolution of UK nuclear deterrence policy and the implications of a previously unacknowledged aversion to military strategies that threaten civilian casualties. Drawing on extensive archival research, the book provides a unique synthesis of the factors affecting British nuclear policy decision-making and draws parallels between government debates about reprisals for First World War zeppelin raids on London, the strategic bombing raids of the Second World War and the evolution of the UK nuclear deterrent. It concludes that among all the technical factors, an aversion to being seen to condone civilian casualties has inhibited government engagement with the public on deterrence strategy since 1915. -- .

This book explores how human factors, in particular the contested notion of trust, influence the conduct and practice of arms control verification. In the nuclear arena, disarmament verification is often viewed purely in terms of a dispassionate, scientific process. Yet this view is fundamentally flawed since the technical impossibility of 100 per cent verification opens the door to a host of complex issues and questions regarding the process and its outcomes. Central among these is the fact that those involved in any verification inspection process must inevitably conduct their work in a space that falls well short of absolute certainty. The lines between scientific enquiry and human psychology can become blurred and outcomes have the potential to be influenced by perceptions. Drawing on extensive empirical evidence, the authors explore the complex interplay between evidence-based judgements and perceptions of intentions that frames the science of verification. The book provides new insights into the role and influence of human factors in the verification process, shedding light on this 'blind spot' of verification research. It is an invaluable resource for practitioners, academics and students working in arms control and disarmament.

This book explores what political conditions must be established and what obstacles overcome for the fi ve offi cial Nuclear Weapon States (NWS)- China, France, Russia, the UK and US- to eliminate their nuclear weapons. The different views and positions of a range of actors concerning nuclear weapons issues- including elite perspectives and public opinion- and the political assumptions underpinning them, are discussed to develop a more democratic approach to disarmament. Addressing the lack of detailed analysis concerning the meaning of nuclear disarmament for the domestic political orders of NWS, the book critically explores different approaches to and theories of disarmament within legal, political and technical literatures and orthodox and critical theory. It also builds on previous discussions of nuclear possession, restraint, arms control, and disarmament- concerning both nuclear possessor and non- possessor states- identifying the insights these works provide regarding how NWS disarmament may be advanced. Contributing to theoretical debates concerning how domestic politics interacts with and determines states' international behaviour, the book will be of interest to all scholars and students of history, politics, international relations, security studies, military history, war studies, peace studies, confl ict, democracy, and global governance.

This book, first published in 1970, examines the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, when an entire industrial city was devastated and the bulk of its population killed or wounded. Coming days after the bombing of Hiroshima, Nagasaki has largely been forgotten. This book traces the decision by the US to use the second bomb, and the choice of Nagasaki as its target. It follows the bomber to the skies over Nagasaki, and the terrible events that unfolded. Using diaries, written accounts and the testimonies of hundreds of Japanese civilians who survived the bombing, this book provides the definitive text on the Nagasaki atomic bomb.

General requirements for establishing a verification regime in the context of moving towards a nuclear weapon-free world have been the subject of numerous studies during the past decade. The studies presented in this book add significantly to the general discussion by addressing the technical means and procedures for establishing transparency in nuclear warheads and materials in the nuclear weapons states.

On November 10, 2017, Pope Francis became the first pontiff in the nuclear era to take a complete stand against nuclear weapons, even as a form of deterrence. At a Vatican conference of leaders in the field of disarmament, he made it clear that the possession of the bomb itself was immoral. A World Free from Nuclear Weapons presents the pope's address and original testimony from Nobel Peace Prize laureates, religious leaders, diplomats, and civil society activists. These luminaries, which include the pope and a Hiroshima survivor, make the moral case against possessing, manufacturing, and deploying nuclear arms. Drew Christiansen, a member of the Holy See delegation to the 2017 United Nations conference that negotiated the Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, helps readers to understand this conference in its historical context. A World Free from Nuclear Weapons is a critical companion for scholars of modern Catholicism, moral theology, and peace studies, as well as policymakers working on effective disarmament. It shows how the Church's revised position presents an opportunity for global leaders to connect disarmament to larger movements for peace, pointing toward future action.

This study attempts to bring the debate about nuclear weapons and arms control up to date by assessing the reasons for the recent superpower agreement, the decline of the peace movements, the new threats to international stability and the prospects for further detente.;The optimism of the first edition about an eventual return to arms control has been vindicated by events, but its pessimism about the deeply-rooted nature of superpower confrontation remains and the assessment is retained that the nuclear knot remains firmly tied.

This book, first published in 1967, examines the circumstances and events that led to the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan, devastating Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The death of President Roosevelt three weeks before the end of the European war led to an incoming President, Truman, who had heard nothing of the project before taking office. He and his advisers had no precedents to guide them as they considered what to do, and withing their closely drawn circle there were genuine differences of opinion about the use of atomic weapons. This book traces the course of the discussions between the politicians and their technical advisers, the part played by personal relationships, and the attempt by some of the scientists to stop the bomb being used without warning. In addition, it supplies a thorough analysis of developments abroad, and in particular the situation in Japan. It shows that the debate in Washington and the atomic plants was careful and wide-ranging, and that issues are no less complex for being supremely important. The result is to provide both a study of decision-making and a valuable contribution to our understanding of the closing months of the Second World War.

This book explores Eleanor Roosevelt's involvement in the global campaign for nuclear disarmament. Based on an extensive multi-archival research, it assesses her overall contribution to the global anti-nuclear campaign of the early cold war and shows how she constantly tried to raise awareness of the real hazards of nuclear testing. She strove to educate the general public about the implications of the nuclear arms race and, in doing so, she became for many a trustworthy anti-nuclear leader and a reliable voice of conscience.

To constrain nuclear proliferation, one must, in addition to designing a proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle, identify a set of long-term arms limitation and security policies for the major states. These policies should be capable of satisfying various security and political objectives of non-nuclear weapon states, thereby minimizing their incentives to acquire independent nuclear weapon capabilities, and thus collectively minimizing future nuclear proliferation. Originally published in 1979, this book attempts to identify such a comprehensive arms limitation and security regime. It reviews negotiations concerning the NPT through the end of the Review Conference of the NPT in mid-1975 and the subsequent strategic debate concerning nuclear proliferation.

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1985, this book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It breaks new ground by focusing on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures, and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. Safeguarding the Atom gives an analysis of the following questions: What are IAEA safeguards and how do they work? How effective are they? How can they be reinforced? What sanctions can be imposed in the event of non-compliance? IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined.

As nuclear weapons become ever more sophisticated, so the deterrence debate becomes increasingly complex. The 'Ban the Bomb' slogans of the 1950s had been replaced by cries for 'nuclear-free zones', and talk of 'megatonnage' and 'fallout' had given way to talk of 'tactical' nuclear weapons and 'limited strike capability'. Originally published in 1982, this book considers the ethical issues raised by nuclear policies and by the debate between proponents of the multilateralist/unilateralist approaches to disarmament and arms control at the time. It is not, like so many books on the subject, an ideological statement: there are essays by defence strategists which put the case for deterrence and essays by academics and churchmen which strenuously oppose it. The book also includes an essay on attempts to mitigate the appalling brutality of the many 'conventional' wars since 1945. At a time when the rhetoric and misinformation produced on both sides of the debate continued to obscure many vital issues, this book was welcome, sensible and necessary.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty had recently undergone its third formal review by its signatories, who had assessed its effectiveness and considered how it might better be implemented. This book, originally published in 1987, written by experts many of whom were leading participants in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime at the time, examines the whole range of issues connected with nuclear non-proliferation and the treaty. It looks at non-proliferation from the point of view of nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations and the nuclear industry. It assesses the work of the international monitoring bodies and reconsiders the place of non-proliferation in the changing balance of global nuclear power. It concludes by discussing the way forward.

'I pray that words spoken at this conference may carry beyond walls and reach thousands of ears hitherto deaf to warnings of the final catastrophe.' So said Patrick White in June 1983 at an important symposium organised by the Australian National University to examine the whole issue of nuclear war and its implications for Australia. Many prominent Australians - including H. C. Coombs, Senator Susan Ryan, leading academics and medics - attended the conference along with distinguished experts from overseas, and mingled and talked with many representatives of Australian peace movements. In two intense and emotional days they discussed many different aspects of the crisis that threatens the world, from the latest scientific thinking on possible effects on the atmosphere to the increasingly important role of the women's peace movement and the efforts of ordinary people around the world to stop the nuclear arms race. Originally published in 1983, this book presents the upshot of these deliberations, including unforgettable illustrations of some of the consequences of nuclear war. The book does not pretend to provide the answers, nor does it take any political viewpoint. It does present the authoritative opinions of some of the world's leading minds on the extent of the threat that faces Australia alongside powerful statements from committed men and women from around the world - opinions that will inform and disturb all thinking Australians.

The nuclear arms race had dominated international politics for the two decades prior to publication. Originally published in 1975, this symposium examines the dynamics of change within the arms race and the attempts at controlling and limiting it. At the time the nuclear arms race was strongly technologically determined, as Herbert York demonstrates in discussing the impact of MIRV. Such progress as has been made in nuclear disarmament has been far outdistanced by the technological developments so that, as Jack Ruina argues, SALT is only important when seen as part of a process of negotiating arms limitations. The most significant result of this technological advance has been the emergence of a qualitatively new system of international politics which Hans Morgenthau analyses. This system is essentially bipolar in nuclear terms and the history of the disarmament negotiations, as reviewed by William Epstein, is an exercise in freezing this structure. The negotiations themselves, particularly SALT, and the prospects for further progress are discussed extensively by Thomas Schelling, Kosta Tsipis, George Rathjens and others. The book also surveys developments in chemical and biological warfare and includes an important paper on chemical warfare agents by the Soviet chemist, O.A. Ruetov. The final section looks at recent developments in the theory of conflict and its applications in the Middle East, South Africa and a number of developing countries.