The controversial Bush doctrine of preemptive war is often described as revolutionary. In fact, as this comparative study of rivalries involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) shows, notions of preventive and preemptive war have long been closely tied to such weapons. In this study, a wealth of historical data is analyzed to address the fundamental question that WMD proliferation raises for U.S. defense policy: will the projection of U.S. power be deterred by nascent WMD arsenals in the hands of rogue states?
This wide-ranging comparison yields the conclusion that small WMD arsenals do not have the deterrent effects often attributed to them by scholars and analysts. These theorists ignore history's close calls, an oversight we share at our peril.

In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

In this book, a leading authority on India's nuclear program offers an informed and thoughtful assessment of India's nuclear strategy. He shows that the country's nuclear-strategic culture is generally in accord with the principle of minimum deterrence, but is sometimes inconsistent and has a tendency to drift into a more open-ended process. He addresses areas of concern, notably the relationship between minimum deterrence and subnuclear conflict, the threat from nuclear terrorism, and the special challenges nuclear weapons pose for a democratic society.

"Huchthausen knows the hidden history of the Cuban Missile Crisis. . . . Contains a number of startling revelations. . . . Fascinating."–Tom Clancy

"Excellent. . . . Clearly and engagingly reflect[s] the young officer’s confidence and enthusiasm–and even glee–during his adventure. . . . Colorful and exciting."–Associated Press

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the defining moment of the Cold War. Yet one aspect of that drama–the naval confrontation between the U.S. and Soviet submarines off the coast of Cuba, in October of 1962–has, until now, received scant attention. Written by a naval officer who was there, October Fury vividly recreates that fateful encounter, from both the American and Russian points of view. Based on recently declassified Soviet naval records and interviews conducted with his Russian counterparts, Peter Huchthausen recounts in harrowing detail the dramatic events and reveals for the first time just how close we came to nuclear war at sea.

Captain Peter A. Huchthausen, U.S. Navy (Retired), (Hiram, ME), served as Electronics Materials Officer and a watch officer aboard the USS Blandy when it took part in the quarantine of Cuba in 1962.

"Huchthausen knows the hidden history of the Cuban missile crisis . . . October Fury contains startling revelations."
–– TOM CLANCY

Drama on the high seas as the world holds its breath

It was the most spectacular display of brinkmanship in the Cold War era. In October 1962, President Kennedy risked inciting a nuclear war to prevent the Soviet Union from establishing missile bases in Cuba. The risk, however, was far greater than Kennedy realized.

October Fury uncovers startling new information about the Cuban missile crisis and the potentially calamitous confrontation between U.S. Navy destroyers and Soviet submarines in the Atlantic. Peter Huchthausen, who served as a junior ensign aboard one of the destroyers, reveals that a single shot fired by any U.S. warship could have led to an immediate nuclear response from the Soviet submarines.

This riveting account re-creates those desperate days of confrontation from both the American and Russian points of view and discloses detailed information about Soviet operational plans and the secret orders given to submarine commanders. It provides an engrossing, behind-the-scenes look at the technical and tactical functions of two great navies along with stunning portraits of the officers and sailors on both sides who were determined to do their duty even in the most extreme circumstances.

As absorbing and detailed as a Tom Clancy novel, this real-life suspense thriller is destined to become a classic of naval literature.

On September 10, 1996, The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Copmprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), prohibiting nuclear explosions worldwide, in all environments. The treaty calls for a global verification system, including a network of 321 monitoring stations distributed around the globe, a data communications network, an international data center (IDC), and on-site inspections, to verify compliance. This volume presents certain recent research results pertaining on methods used to process data recorded by instruments of the International Monitoring System (IMS) and addressing recording infrasound signals generated by atmospheric explosions. Six papers treating data processing provide an important selection of topics expected to contribute to improving our ability to successfully monitor a CTBT. Five papers concerning infrasound include descriptions of ways in which that important research area can contribute to CTBT monitoring, the automatic processing of infrasound data, and site conditions that serve to improve the quality of infrasound data.

This volume presents summaries of recent research results on the related subjects of source processes and explosion yield estimation, which are important elements of any treaty verification system. The term Source Processes, in the context of nuclear test monitoring, refers to a wide range of research topics. In a narrow definition, it describes the complex physical phenomena that are directly associated with a nuclear explosion, and the catastrophic deformation and transformation of the material surrounding the explosion. In a broader sense, it includes a host of topics related to the inference of explosion phenomena from seismic and other signals. A further widening of the definition includes the study and characterization of source processes of events other than nuclear, such as earthquakes and, in particular, mining explosions. This latter research is especially important relative to the question of identifying and discriminating nuclear explosions from other seismic events. Explosion Yield Estimation deals with the corresponding inverse problem of inferring explosion source characteristics through analyses of the various types of seismic signals produced by the explosion. This is a complex technical task which has been the focus of some of the most contentious treaty monitoring debates. The current compilation of eight articles on Source Processes and six articles on Explosion Yield Estimation gives a good representation of state-of-the-art research currently being conducted in the broad area of seismic source characterization in the context of nuclear test monitoring.

Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, numerous ""atomic narratives"" - books, newspapers, magazines, textbooks, movies and television programs-addressed the implications of the bomb. Post-World War II youth encountered atomic narratives in their daily lives at school, at home and in their communities, and were profoundly affected by what they read and saw. This multidisciplinary study examines the exposure of American youth to atomic narratives during the ten years following World War II. In addition, it examines the broader ""social narrative of the atom,"" which included educational, social, cultural and political activities that surrounded and involved American youth. The activities ranged from school and community programs to movies and television shows to government-sponsored traveling exhibits on atomic energy. The book also presents numerous examples of writings by postwar adolescents, who clearly expressed their conflicted feelings about growing up in such a tumultuous time, and shows how may of the issues commonly associated with the sixties generation, such as peace, fellowship, free expression and environmental concern, can be traced to this earlier generation.

International nuclear disarmament is at a standstill. A Nuclear-Weapon-Free World discusses steps that should be taken to restart the disarmament process, including de-alerting nuclear weapons, ending production of fissile material, and introducing policies of 'no first use'. The book includes a history of attempts to eliminate nuclear weapons, together with a summary of the arguments for and against; an analysis of whether nuclear weapons prevented a war in Europe between 1945 and 1991; and a worldwide survey of public opinion on nuclear weapons.

The Cold War may be over, but you wouldn't know it from the tens of thousands of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction still held by Russia, the United States, and other world powers. Arguing that the time has come to dispense with incremental approaches to arms control, Admiral Stansfield Turner, the former head of the CIA and an experienced senior military commander, proposes a practical yet safe plan--strategic escrow--that would move the world into a new and secure millennium. The paperback edition of this widely acclaimed work has been updated to consider the implications of such a build-down if applied to non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction. Specifically, Admiral Turner details how a plan for weapons reduction could be carried out for biological and chemical weapons and what tactical and strategic differences exist between de-escalation of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons.

The "Nuclear Borderlands" alters the meaning of 'ethnography' in a way that will challenge all of us in anthropology. It will certainly take its place among the classic texts assessing the cultural politics of the bomb, and it will join the must-read ranks in the literature on American nationalism and nation-making in the late twentieth century."--Susan Harding, University of California, Santa Cruz, author of "The Book of Jerry Falwell" and "Remaking Ibieca"

"No account of the post Cold War environment can afford to ignore this study and the tangle of economic, political, and cultural rights, interests, and imperatives it maps. Joe Masco pushes the ethnographic agenda firmly forward into an ambivalent twenty-first century, where Los Alamos is both dangerous polluter and lifeline employer, where rival eco-cultures, ethnicities, and social hierarchies fight over control of nature, and where the technological future can exacerbate or redeem the nuclear past. Neither antinuclear environmentalists, nor Native Americans, nor Nuevomexicanos, nor the Los Alamos scientists, nor the Washington politicians have a monopoly on the answers, and Masco shows us why."--Michael M. J. Fischer, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, author of "Emergent Forms of Life and the Anthropological Voice"

"Joseph Masco's argument that nuclear weapons are no longer a technology subject to scientific challenge but rather exist primarily as powerful cultural constructs takes us a long way toward understanding post-Cold War continuities in U.S. security strategies, as well as some of the astounding aspects of American exceptionalism in international politics."--John Borneman, Princeton University

This book explains the origin and historical development of North Korean nuclear weapon dated from the aftermath of World War II. The story of North Korea's nuclear program began when the United States dropped atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 which led to Japan's immediate defeat. Surprised by the speed of Japan's surrender, North Korea's founding leader Kim Il-sung vowed to secure nuclear capability to avoid suffering the fate of its eastern neighbor. Based on the author's extensive experience in the academia, government, and intelligence circles, the book traces how the nuclear program has evolved since and explores wide-ranging issues including the positive function of nuclear weapon in Pyongyang's local politics, the history of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, the prospects of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, the diplomatic and military options presented to US President Donald Trump in dealing with the nuclear threat, and the future scenarios of the North Korean regime and the possibilities of a reunified Korea.With the nuclear weapon crisis likely to persist in the foreseeable time, is it feasible for South Korea to achieve reunification in the Korean Peninsula? Will the six-party members like the US, China, Russia and Japan agree with reunification without denuclearization? Can the issues of nuclear weapon and unification be settled simultaneously in the future? The book seeks to address these questions and more.

In 1945, the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and warfare was never the same again. Armageddon and Paranoia relates how the power of the atom was harnessed to produce weapons capable of destroying human civilisation and considers what this has done to the world. There are few villains in this story: on both sides of the Iron Curtain, dedicated scientists cracked the secrets of nature, dutiful military men planned out possible manoeuvres and politicians wrestled with potentially intolerable decisions. Patriotic citizens acquiesced to the idea that their country needed the ultimate means of defence. Some tried to grapple with the unanswerable question: what end could possibly be served by such fearsome means? Those who protested went unheard. None of them wanted to start a nuclear war, but all of them were paranoid about what the other side might do. The danger of annihilation by accident or misjudgement has not been entirely absent since. Rodric Braithwaite, author of bestsellers Moscow 1941 and Afgantsy, paints a vivid and detailed portrait of this intense period in history. Its implications are terrifyingly relevant today, as ignorant and thoughtless talk about nuclear war begins to spread once more.

This book, first published in 1995, explores how the everyday person reasons about nuclear strategy. James DeNardo's data reveals surprising patterns of thinking on basic issues from SDI, arms control, and proliferation to the end of the Cold War. The book describes a fascinating cast of players, including 'Nice Hawks' like Ronald Reagan, who wanted to give SDI to the Russians, and the 'NIFFs,' whose procurement rule, expressed simply, was: 'If they have it, we don't want it, but they don't have it, we should get it.' To explain his remarkable evidence, Professor DeNardo presents an innovative theory of intuitive deterrence reasoning. He then confronts the theory with data from professional nuclear strategists. His discovery that the amateur's strategic reasoning defies all conventional theories lays the groundwork for a new understanding of national security politics. His demonstration that professional strategists reason like novices - that we are all Amateur Strategists - challenges the intellectual foundations of modern deterrence theory, public opinion studies, and game theory.

This book gives a comprehensive account of post-war British and German policies towards nuclear weapons and how these interacted in the context of alliance strategy. In this fascinating explanation of an important, but previously unresearched topic, the author gives a detailed account of major episodes in the evolution of the alliance and its doctrine - such as the MLF debate, the origins of flexible response, theatre modernization programmes - and demonstrates how British and German interests impinged upon these episodes. On occasion, these interests converged; at others, they diverged and Britain and Germany took on the role of protagonists. In all of this, one of the less well-known nuclear relationships within the alliance comes vividly into focus. The book tells this part of the alliance's story for the first time, and, in the accounts of the development of German strategy, brings a refreshingly new perspective to the predominant Anglo-American interpretations.

The most significant challenge to the post-Cold War international order is the growing power of ambitious states opposed to the West. Iran, Russia and China each view the global structure through the prism of historical experience. Rejecting the universality of Western liberal values, these states and their governments each consider the relative decline of Western economic hegemony as an opportunity. Yet cooperation between them remains fragmentary. The end of Western sanctions and the Iranian nuclear deal; the Syrian conflict; new institutions in Central and East Asia: in all these areas and beyond, the potential for unity or divergence is striking. In this comprehensive study, Ariane Tabatabai and Dina Esfandiary address the substance of this `triple axis' in the realms of energy, trade, and military security. In particular they scrutinise Iran-Russia and the often overlooked field of Iran-China relations. Their argument - that interactions between the three will shape the world stage for decades to come - will be of interest to anyone looking to understand the contemporary international security puzzle.

This book provides a comprehensive account of the mysterious story of Pakistan's attempt to develop nuclear weapons in the face of severe odds. Hassan Abbas profiles the politicians and scientists involved, and the role of China and Saudi Arabia in supporting Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure. Abbas also unravels the motivations behind the Pakistani nuclear physicist Dr A.Q. Khan's involvement in nuclear proliferation in Iran, Libya and North Korea, drawing on extensive interviews. He argues that the origins and evolution of the Khan network were tied to the domestic and international political motivations underlying Pakistan's nuclear weapons project, and that project's organisation, oversight and management. The ties between the making of the Pakistani bomb and the proliferation that then ensued have not yet been fully illuminated or understood, and this book's disclosures have important lessons. The Khan proliferation breach remains of vital importance for understanding how to stop such transfers of sensitive technology in future.Finally, the book examines the prospects for nuclear safety in Pakistan, considering both Pakistan's nuclear control infrastructure and the threat posed by the Taliban and other extremist groups to the country's nuclear assets.

Ever since the late 1930s, scientists have been sharply divided on the question of atomic energy. It is hardly surprising, then, that the American public is so apprehensive about its use. Hack M. Holl, former chief historian a the U.S. Department of Energy, characterizes the furor over nuclear energy as "one of the great debates in American history." In this second edition of The American Atom, the editors have updated the collection of primary documents that tell the story of atomic energy in the United States from the discover of fission through the development of nuclear weapons, international proliferation, and attempts at control. Anyone interested in the evolution of the issues will want to examine the book's major sections on the Manhattan Project, the Oppenheimer Case, the hydrogen bomb, nuclear testing and the test ban, proliferation, arms control, and the strategy of deterrence.

Although the authors believe that the level of conventional and nuclear forces in Europe should and will be reduced, they do not consider that the military instrument will have lost all of its value in European political affairs. They still see a need to be prepared for tension and conflict.

President Eisenhower's reliance on atomic weapons created as many problems as he hoped to solve with his defense policy. He hoped to provide a sustainable defense strategy that allowed the United States to maintain its security requirements without creating an excessive economic burden. This defense strategy, known as the New Look, benefitted the U.S. Air Force due to the focus on strategic bombing. However ballistic missiles offered the capability to launch nuclear warheads into the Soviet Union without the risk of their being intercepted. In order to do this, the U.S. required European missile bases to deploy its Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, while efforts continued to develop U.S. based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Deploying atomic missiles to Europe required balancing regional European concerns with U.S. domestic security priorities. In the wake of the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957, many in the U.S. feared Soviet missile capability. Getting ballistic missiles into Europe mitigated this domestic security issue but convincing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to agree to base missiles in their country raised issues concerning sovereignty, weapons control, and ran the risk of creating divisions in the NATO alliance.

This historic document, generally known as 'The Smyth Report, ' was written in secret between the summer of 1944 and the spring of 1945 at the direction of Major General L.R. Groves, who was in charge of the atomic bomb project, as a 'report to the nation.'

At the battle of Agincourt, over six thousand noblemen--the flower of French knighthood--died in a day-long series of futile charges against a small band of English archers. They charged not simply because they failed to recognize the power of the longbow, but because their whole ethos revolved round an idealized figure of the knight that dated back to Homer: the man of great physical strength and valor, who excelled at hand-to-hand combat with men of equal worth. The bow was an affront to this ideal.
As Robert L. O'Connell points out in this vividly written history of weapons in Western culture, the battle of Agincourt typifies the complex and often paradoxical relationship between men and arms. In a sweeping narrative that ranges from prehistorc times to the Nuclear Age, O'Connell demonstrates how social and economic conditions determine the types of weapons and the tactics employed in warfare and how in turn innovations in weapons technology often undercut social values. He reveals, for instance, how the Church outlawed the use of crossbows--except against muslims--to preserve the status quo of the medieval world; how the invention of the gun required a redefinition of courage from aggressive ferocity to calmness under fire; and how the machine gun in World War I so overthrew traditional notions of combat that Lord Kitchener exclaimed, "This isn't war " Indeed, as O'Connell points out, the technology unleashed in the Great War radically changed our perception of ourselves: weapons had made human qualities almost irrelevant in combat. And with the invention of the atomic bomb, humanity itself became subservient to the weapons they had produced.
While its emphasis is historical, Of Arms and Men also draws on such disciplines as biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and literature to illuminate the course of arms. O'Connell integrates the evolution of politics, weapons, strategy, and tactics into a coherent narrative, one spiced with striking portraits of men in combat and brilliant insight into why men go to war.

An examination of nuclear arms control and defence containing papers that present opposing sides of the debate. Nuclear deterrence, Britain's defence budget, the state of Anglo-American relations, NATO strategies and Mr Gorbachev's security arrangements in Europe proposals are discussed.

More than forty years of commitment to nuclear weapons may have prepared Britain to take part in Armageddon, but not to defend itself against attack. What made British governments choose this path and how have they justified it? How have they responded to the moral questions it raises? Using material from recently-released official documents, Roger Ruston presents a moral history of British defence policy, from the 'lesson' of Appeasement to the nuclear modernizations of the eighties, and answers many of the questions that governments have avoided. The book will be of great interest to defence historians, moralists, politicians, and general readers who need a clear account of their country's defence predicament as a basis from which to devise workable and morally acceptable alternatives.