Unpacking of the dynamics of conflict under conditions of nuclear monopoly, Paul C. Avey argues in Tempting Fate that the costs and benefits of using nuclear weapons create openings that weak nonnuclear actors can exploit. Avey uses four case studies to show the key strategies available to nonnuclear states: Iraqi decision-making under Saddam Hussein in confrontations with the United States; Egyptian leaders' thinking about the Israeli nuclear arsenal during wars in 1969–70 and 1973; Chinese confrontations with the United States in 1950, 1954, and 1958; and a dispute that never escalated to war, the Soviet-United States tensions between 1946 and 1948 that culminated in the Berlin Blockade. Strategies employed include limiting the scope of the conflict, holding chemical and biological weapons in reserve, seeking outside support, and leveraging international non-use norms. Avey demonstrates clearly that nuclear weapons cast a definite but limited shadow, and while the world continues to face various nuclear challenges, understanding conflict in nuclear monopoly will remain a pressing concern for analysts and policymakers. Thanks to generous funding from Virginia Tech and its participation in TOME, the ebook editions of this book are available as Open Access volumes, available from Cornell Open (cornellpress.cornell.edu/cornell-open) and other repositories.

Every nuclear weapons program for decades has relied extensively on illicit imports of nuclear-related technologies. This book offers the most detailed public account of how states procure what they need to build nuclear weapons, what is currently being done to stop them, and how global efforts to prevent such trade could be strengthened. While illicit nuclear trade can never be stopped completely, effective steps to block illicit purchases of nuclear technology have sometimes succeeded in slowing nuclear weapons programs and increasing their costs, giving diplomacy more chance to work. Hence, this book argues, preventing illicit transfers wherever possible is a key element of an effective global non-proliferation strategy.

In South Asia, every state has applied its own classified security measures for nuclear weapons security. In Pakistan, a nuclear weapons security regime involves human, physical and technical means. However, there is a general perception that, notwithstanding these technical measures, there is a danger that nuclear materials may possibly get into the hands of terrorist organisations. The future of illicit trade of nuclear materials in South Asia by non-state actors and terrorists may further jeopardise the security of the region. South Asian states are facing the threat of terrorism and violent extremism. The unending civil war in Afghanistan and Pakistan has destabilised the whole region. These are some of the issues deliberated in the book by eminent scholars.

This book discusses the danger of nuclear and biological terrorism and the strategies of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia based extremist and jihadist groups to purchase fissile material in black market or steal it from a military or civilian facility and then use that material to construct an improvised nuclear device.

In To Kill Nations, Edward Kaplan traces the evolution of American strategic airpower and preparation for nuclear war from this early air-atomic era to a later period (1950-1965) in which the Soviet Union's atomic capability, accelerated by thermonuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, made American strategic assets vulnerable and gradually undermined air-atomic strategy. Kaplan throws into question both the inevitability and preferability of the strategic doctrine of MAD. He looks at the process by which cultural, institutional, and strategic ideas about MAD took shape and makes insightful use of the comparison between generals who thought they could win a nuclear war and the cold institutional logic of the suicide pact that was MAD. Kaplan also offers a reappraisal of Eisenhower's nuclear strategy and diplomacy to make a case for the marginal viability of air-atomic military power even in an era of ballistic missiles.

For every major military invention in human history, there has quite always been a countervailing technology. Nuclear weapons have, however, remained an exception. Ballistic missile defence (BMD) has, in recent years, emerged as a formidable means to defend against nuclear-armed delivery systems though yet to prove their total reliability. What does the advent of BMD mean for the nuclear revolution - will it make nuclear weapons obsolete or in turn lead to a new arms race among great powers? This book is a concise volume that examines these strategic dimensions of missile defences, mainly its impact on deterrence. It promises thematic variety by incorporating a technological survey that explains the evolution of BMD concepts and also includes a case study of Southern Asia that throws light on BMD dynamics in a volatile region. The volume balances new conceptual inquests with policy analysis that will make it useful literature on BMD for academics and policymakers.