In the spring of 1945 the Allies arrested the physicists they believed had worked on the German nuclear programme during the war. Interned in an English country house, their conversations were secretly recorded. MI6's Operation Epsilon sought to determine how close Nazi Germany had come to building an atomic bomb. It was in this remote setting - Farm Hall, near Cambridge - that the German physicists first heard of the bombing ofHiroshima. August 6 1945 was a night that changed the course of history. The terrible weapon unleashed on Japan caused unprecedented destruction and loss of life. That the Allies had such a weapon at their disposal came as a great shock to the German scientists who had worked under the assumption that the Allies knew nothing of nuclear fission. This is the story of the wartime race to develop an atomic bomb, and the genius, guilt, complicity and hubris of Nobel Prize-winning scientists working to create a weapon that would undoubtedly have won the war for the Germans.

In Resurrecting Nagasaki, Chad R. Diehl explores the genesis of narratives surrounding the atomic bombing of August 9, 1945, by following the individuals and groups who contributed to the shaping of Nagasaki City's postwar identity. Municipal officials, survivor-activist groups, the Catholic community, and American occupation officials all interpreted the destruction and reconstruction of the city from different, sometimes disparate perspectives. Diehl's analysis reveals how these atomic narratives shaped both the way Nagasaki rebuilt and the ways in which popular discourse on the atomic bombings framed the city's experience for decades.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the principal legal barrier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the past forty-five years. It promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and insures, through the application of safeguards inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that those technologies are not being diverted toward the production of nuclear weapons. It is also the only multinational treaty that obligates the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) to pursue nuclear disarmament measures.Though there have been many challenges over the years, most would agree that the treaty has largely been successful. However, many are concerned about the continued viability of the NPT. The perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the interest by some countries to consider a weapons program while party to the treaty, and the funding and staffing issues at the IAEA, are all putting considerable strain on the treaty. This manuscript explores those issues and offers some possible solutions to ensure that the NPT will survive effectively for many years to come.

Four decades have passed since India conducted its first nuclear test. Since then the world has undergone a transition, both in terms of power dynamics and military warfare. The emergence of New Nuclear and Threshold states has transformed the traditional military warfare, making it more asymmetric. Though the concept of nuclear deterrence in the American strategic thought has diminished, but the Asian countries still consider nuclear weapons as an important strategy in combating conventional weaknesses. This altered strategic space has created problems in the civilian and the military domains. The emergence of economically strong China aiming for military modernization, to achieve global reach through precision missiles, is making Asia edgy. A nuclear Pakistan which is constantly increasing its nuclear stockpile is creating stability-instability paradoxes in Asia. India which is also emerging as a powerful state needs to approach this dynamic shift in a holistic manner. A strategic churning has begun in Asia and whether this will be in India's favour depends on the strategic choices that India adopts. China has revolutionized its Second Artillery through a process of Informationalization and Modernisation" and is diversifying the military technology which is having a cascading effect in Asia. Pakistan through its nuclear policy of First Use", its alleged use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons" is making South Asia vulnerable to nuclear terrorism. Under such conditions are there any gaps between India's nuclear doctrine and its force structure? Can India's nuclear strategy counter China? Is India capable of countering a Sino-Pak nexus? These are a few questions along with others which this book will try to unravel.

Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Turkey, with a robust modern economy and growing energy needs, is pursuing a switch to nuclear power. But that shift is occurring in an environment fraught with security challenges: Turkey borders Iraq, Syria, and Iran-all states with nuclear or WMD ambitions or capabilities. As a NATO member, Turkey also hosts U.S. nuclear bombs on its territory, although some question the durability of this relationship. This dynamic has naturally led to speculation that Turkish leaders might someday consider moving beyond a civilian course to develop nuclear weapons. Yet there has been remarkably little informed analysis and debate on Turkey's nuclear future, either within the country or in broader international society. This volume explores the current status and trajectory of Turkey's nuclear program, adding historical perspective, analytical rigor, and strategic insight.

"The most likely site for a nuclear war is the Indian subcontinent, but we have little understanding of India's nuclear program. This will change with George Perkovich's fascinating and important study. It is informed, free from bias, and a great read as well."--Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University

"George Perkovich has written a comprehensive and thoughtful book on one of the most troubling security problems of the day--the introduction of nuclear weapons to the already dangerous confrontation between India and Pakistan." --William J. Perry, Professor, Stanford University, Former US Secretary of Defense

"George Perkovich's India's Nuclear Bomb is an authoritative account in Indian decision-making. I have found no other statement as comprehensive and persuasive. It provides unique insights into Indian politics and is an invaluable contribution to American thinking about nonproliferation." --Frank G. Wisner, U.S. Ambassador to India, 1994-1997

"With a great deal of empathy and understanding of the Indian psyche, George Perkovich leads us through contradictory perceptions of events to give us a sense of the evolution of nuclear decision making in India. What emerges is a highly nuanced and sensitive narration of the complex interaction between domestic and external factors that led to the nuclear tests of May, 1998 and the shattering of a number of Indian and international myths about nuclear weapons and their role in global politics." --K. Subrahmanyam, Consulting Editor The Times of India and The Economic Times, Chairman, Indian National Security Advisory Board

"George Perkovich's book is one I wish I had written. India'sNuclear Bomb appears at a critical moment in global nuclear history, and it will have an important impact on the current policy debate in the United States, India, and Pakistan, as well as on the future histories of Indian politics and international security policy." --Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

Recent books and journal articles published in China provide new insights into nuclear doctrine, operations, training, and the employment of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) strategic rocket forces. The major insights come from exploiting sections of a doctrinal text published for PLA institutions of higher military education by the Chinese National Defense University, A Guide to the Study of Campaign Theory (Zhanyi Lilun Xuexi Zhinan). In the view of many in the PLA, the military power of the United States, the potential to use that power to coerce or dominate China, and the ability to threaten China's pursuit of its own its interests, presents a latent threat to China. Additionally, China's own threats against democratic Taiwan, and the fact that PLA leaders believe that the United States is likely to come to Taiwan's assistance in the event of Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait, magnifies the threat that PLA officers perceive from the United States. This perceived threat drives the PLA to follow U.S. military developments more carefully than those of other nations and to be prepared to counter American forces. The PLA is mixing nuclear and conventional missile forces in its military doctrine. Also, some in China are questioning whether the doctrine of "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons serves China's deterrent needs.

Four decades have passed since India conducted its first nuclear test. Since then the world has undergone a transition, both in terms of power dynamics and military warfare. The emergence of New Nuclear and Threshold states has transformed the traditional military warfare, making it more asymmetric. Though the concept of nuclear deterrence in the American strategic thought has diminished, but the Asian countries still consider nuclear weapons as an important strategy in combating conventional weaknesses. This altered strategic space has created problems in the civilian and the military domains. The emergence of economically strong China aiming for military modernization, to achieve global reach through precision missiles, is making Asia edgy. A nuclear Pakistan which is constantly increasing its nuclear stockpile is creating stability-instability paradoxes in Asia. India which is also emerging as a powerful state needs to approach this dynamic shift in a holistic manner. A strategic churning has begun in Asia and whether this will be in India's favour depends on the strategic choices that India adopts.China has revolutionized its Second Artillery through a process of "Informationalisation and Modernisation" and is diversifying the military technology which is having a cascading effect in Asia. Pakistan through its nuclear policy of "First Use", its alleged use of "Tactical Nuclear Weapons" is making South Asia vulnerable to nuclear terrorism. Under such conditions are there any gaps between India's nuclear doctrine and its force structure? Can India's nuclear strategy counter China? Is India capable of countering a Sino-Pak nexus? These are a few questions along with others which this book will try to unravel.

Nuclear weapons are an essential part of the nation's defence strategy. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) manages the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile and carries out research to help extend the life of existing weapons. The core of a nuclear weapon, called a "pit", requires plutonium (a man-made radioactive element) to create a nuclear explosion. Until 1989, the Rocky Flats Plant (CO) mass-produced pits. Since then, the United States has made at most 11 pits per year (ppy). U.S. policy is to maintain existing nuclear weapons. To do this, the Department of Defense states that it needs the Department of Energy (DOE), which maintains U.S. nuclear weapons, to produce 50-80 ppy by 2030. While some argue that few if any new pits are needed, at least for decades, this book focuses on options to reach 80 ppy. Since pit issues are complicated, this book contains technical and regulatory details that are needed to understand the advantages, drawbacks, and uncertainties of various options. The book includes a description of plutonium, pits, and pit factory problems before considering several pit production options.

Every nuclear weapons program for decades has relied extensively on illicit imports of nuclear-related technologies. This book offers the most detailed public account of how states procure what they need to build nuclear weapons, what is currently being done to stop them, and how global efforts to prevent such trade could be strengthened. While illicit nuclear trade can never be stopped completely, effective steps to block illicit purchases of nuclear technology have sometimes succeeded in slowing nuclear weapons programs and increasing their costs, giving diplomacy more chance to work. Hence, this book argues, preventing illicit transfers wherever possible is a key element of an effective global non-proliferation strategy.

With the end of the Cold War and break-up of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, control of surplus nuclear weapons material became an urgent U.S. foreign policy goal. Particular U.S. concern focused on plutonium from Soviet nuclear warheads, which it was feared posed a major nuclear weapons proliferation risk. The United States supported a successful effort to consolidate the storage of Soviet nuclear weapons and materials in Russia, and then began negotiating reductions in weapons material stockpiles. Congress has been closely involved in formulating U.S. policy on surplus plutonium disposition, as well as funding the necessary facilities, operations, and Russian assistance to implement the program. Congressional debate is now focusing on the U.S. program's escalating costs and the Obama Administration's FY2015 proposal to halt construction of plutonium disposition facilities in South Carolina and prepare a new strategy. This book discusses the mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plant and plutonium disposition. It also examines drivers the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) identified for the cost increases of construction projects for plutonium disposition; the extent to which NNSA analysed underlying causes of the cost increases; steps NNSA took to hold construction contractors accountable for their role, if any, in the cost increases; and the extent to which NNSA's most recent estimates met cost- and schedule-estimating best practices.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)plays a crucial role in supporting U.S. nuclear non-proliferation goals through its safeguards and nuclear security programs. The Department of State (State) co-ordinates the United States' financial and policy relationship with IAEA. IAEA's safeguards program is designed to detect and deter the diversion of nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, while the agency's nuclear security program assists countries in improving the physical protection of their nuclear material and facilities. IAEA plans to create an international fuel bank to guarantee the supply of fuel for civilian nuclear power programs. This book examines any challenges that IAEA faces in carrying out its safeguards program; any limitations regarding the nuclear security program; and the status of IAEA's planned nuclear fuel bank.

March 7, 1968: Several hundred miles northwest of Hawaii, the nuclear-armed K-129 surfaces and then sinks; all of its crewmen and officers perish at sea. Who was commanding the rogue Russian sub? What was its target? How did it infiltrate American waters undetected? Navy veteran Kenneth Sewell, drawing from newly declassified documents and extensive confidential interviews, exposes the stunning truth behind an operation calculated to provoke war between the U.S. and China -- a nightmare scenario averted by only seconds. In full, authoritative detail, "Red Star Rogue" illuminates this history-shaping event -- and rings with chilling relevance in light of today's terrorist threat.