No one better represents the plight and the conduct of German intellectuals under Hitler than Werner Heisenberg, whose task it was to build an atomic bomb for Nazi Germany. The controversy surrounding Heisenberg still rages, because of the nature of his work and the regime for which it was undertaken. What precisely did Heisenberg know about the physics of the atomic bomb? How deep was his loyalty to the German government during the Third Reich? Assuming that he had been able to build a bomb, would he have been willing? These questions, the moral and the scientific, are answered by Paul Lawrence Rose with greater accuracy and breadth of documentation than any other historian has yet achieved.
Digging deep into the archival record among formerly secret technical reports, Rose establishes that Heisenberg never overcame certain misconceptions about nuclear fission, and as a result the German leaders never pushed for atomic weapons. In fact, Heisenberg never had to face the moral problem of whether he "should" design a bomb for the Nazi regime. Only when he and his colleagues were interned in England and heard about Hiroshima did Heisenberg realize that his calculations were wrong. He began at once to construct an image of himself as a "pure" scientist who could have built a bomb but chose to work on reactor design instead. This was fiction, as Rose demonstrates: in reality, Heisenberg blindly supported and justified the cause of German victory. The question of why he did, and why he misrepresented himself afterwards, is answered through Rose's subtle analysis of German mentality and the scientists' problems of delusion and self-delusion. This fascinating study is a profound effort tounderstand one of the twentieth century's great enigmas.

Some 20,000 or more people were killed instantly in the atomic bombing of Nagasaki on 9 August 1945; an additional 40,000 or more died from radiation and related illnesses in the coming days and weeks. Many others were exposed to radiation effects. Remembrance, the struggle for recognition on the part of the victims or hibakusha, and the even greater struggle waged by City Hall in Nagasaki to bring to world attention the threat of nuclear weapons, are at the heart of this book. This we term the Nagasaki peace discourse. Yet, other narratives vie with the `idealist' view. `Realists' welcome the nuclear umbrella provided by the US-Japan Treaty system and have eagerly embraced civilian nuclear power under the `atoms-forpeace' slogan. On their part, Japanese nationalists perceive Japan's `peace constitution' as ripe for revision, looking ahead to a legal Self Defense Force and, for some, a `normal' and even a nuclear-armed Japan. In the light of the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 11 March 2011, however, City Hall in Nagasaki cannot ignore the risks of civilian nuclear power or the nation's mounting stockpile of plutonium. With Nagasaki prefecture host to the second largest US naval base in Japan, as became apparent with the 2017-18 Korean missile crisis, neither can the city insulate itself from international politics. Seventy and more years on from the atomic bombings, Hiroshima and, in subtly different ways, Nagasaki, have a sombre message to convey. This is encapsulated in no better way than in the popular civil society slogan, `No! More! Hibakusha!'

The Titan II ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) program was developed by the United States military to bolster the size, strength, and speed of the nation's strategic weapons arsenal in the 1950s and 1960s. Each missile carried a single warhead -- the largest in U.S. inventory -- used liquid fuel propellants, and was stored and launched from hardened underground silos. The missiles were deployed at basing facilities in Arkansas, Arizona, and Kansas and remained in active service for over twenty years. Since military deactivation in the early 1980s, the Titan II has served as a reliable satellite launch vehicle.

This is the richly detailed story of the Titan II missile and the men and women who developed and operated the system. David K. Stumpf uses a wide range of sources, drawing upon interviews with and memoirs by engineers and airmen as well as recently declassified government documents and other public materials. Over 170 drawings and photographs, most of which have never been published, enhance the narrative. The three major accidents of the program are described in detail for the first time using authoritative sources.

Titan Il will be welcomed by librarians for its prodigious reference detail, by technology history professionals and laymen, and by the many civilian and Air Force personnel who were involved in the program -- a deterrent weapons system that proved to be successful in defending America from nuclear attack.

During the Cold War, the United States conducted atmospheric tests of nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands of the Pacific. The total explosive yield of these tests was 108 megatons, equivalent to the detonation of one Hiroshima bomb per day over nineteen years. These tests, particularly Castle Bravo, the largest one, had tragic consequences, including the irradiation of innocent people and the permanent displacement of many native Marshallese. Keith M. Parsons and Robert Zaballa tell the story of the development and testing of thermonuclear weapons and the effects of these tests on their victims and on the popular and intellectual culture. These events are also situated in their Cold War context and explained in terms of the prevailing hopes, fears, and beliefs of that age. In particular, the narrative highlights the obsessions and priorities of top American officials, such as Lewis L. Strauss, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission.

The book is a comprehensive study of India's relationship with the non-proliferation regime, and its transformative evolution from a perennial outlier to one seeking greater integration with the regime and its normative structures. The highlight of this study is its incisive conceptual analysis of the regime as a functional system and its structural complexities, which brings forth new insights on the regime's core ideas like non-proliferation and counter-proliferation. The book also provides an extensive non-Western narrative on the concept of counter-proliferation and its conceivable role and influence in the regime. It breaks new ground in explaining India's quest for an anti-proliferation strategy, which could determine its status and future in the emerging global nuclear order. It will be a substantial contribution to the literature on India's approach towards non-proliferation, counter-proliferation and disarmament, and will enhance the understanding of the impact of the regime's normative structures on India's nuclear decisions.

Apocalypse Never illuminates why we must abolish nuclear weapons, how we can, and what the world will look like after we do. The twenty-first century has ushered in a world at the atomic edge. The pop culture days of Dr. Strangelove have been replaced by the all-too-real single day of 24. Tad Daley has written a book for the general reader about this most crucial of contemporary challenges. Apocalypse Never maintains that the abolition of nuclear weapons is both essential and achievable, and reveals in fine detail what we need to do-both governments and movements-to make it a reality. Daley insists that while global climate change poses the single greatest long-term peril to the human race, the nuclear challenge in its many incarnations-nuclear terror, nuclear accident, a nuclear crisis spinning out of control- poses the single most immediate peril. Daley launches a wholesale assault on the nuclear double standard-the notion that the United States permits itself thousands of these weapons but forbids others from aspiring to even one-insisting that it is militarily unnecessary, morally indefensible, and politically unsustainable. He conclusively repudiates the most frequent objection to nuclear disarmament, "the breakout scenario"-the possibility that after abolition someone might whip back the curtain, reveal a dozen nuclear warheads, and proceed to "rule the world." On the wings of a brand new era in American history, Apocalypse Never makes the case that a comprehensive nuclear policy agenda from President Obama, one that fully integrates non-proliferation with disarmament, can both eliminate immediate nuclear dangers and set us irreversibly on the road to abolition. In jargon-free language, Daley explores the possible verification measures, enforcement mechanisms, and governance structures of a nuclear weapon-free world. Most importantly, he decisively argues that universal nuclear disarmament is something we can transform from a utopian fantasy into a concrete political goal.

There was an expectation that the end of the Cold War would herald a new era of peace and stability in which the importance of nuclear weapons was marginalized. Instead, we have been left with a fractious, inter-dependent international community rife with ethnic and religious tension and unbound by super-power competition. The challenges of climate change, demographic shifts and resource competition have further altered the security environment. As if this were not enough, nuclear proliferation is once again at the top of the international agenda.

In the last decade the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been challenged from within by Iraq, Iran and Libya while India s, Pakistan s and North Korea's nuclear weapon capabilities are threatening the non-proliferation norm from without. The new proliferators are predominantly, but not exclusively, aggressive, unstable and authoritarian regimes, considered by many in the international community to be outside the constraints of international normative behaviour. Some have even been labelled outlaw, or rogue states. Although inter-continental nuclear war is not presently considered a danger, the increased number of nuclear weapons states combined with the nature of those states and the strategic environment in which they exist makes the possibility of a lesser nuclear exchange potentially much greater. In parallel, the 9/11 atrocities raised fears of the prospect of apocalyptic terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons. Indications that the NPT is failing to rise to the challenge have resulted in policy decisions that have arguably reversed both the disarmament and non-proliferation norms.

This volume delves deep into the changing global nuclear landscape. The chapters document the increasing complexity of the global nuclear proliferation dynamic and the inability of the international community to come to terms with a rapidly changing strategic milieu. The future, in all likelihood, will be very different from the past, and the chapters in this volume develop a framework that may helps gain a better understanding of the forces that will shape the nuclear proliferation debate in the years to come.

Part I examines the major thematic issues underlying the contemporary discourse on nuclear proliferation.

Part II gives an overview of the evolving nuclear policies of the five established nuclear powers: the USA, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China.

Part III looks at the three de facto nuclear states: India, Pakistan and Israel.

Part IV examines two problem states' in the proliferation matrix today: Iran and North Korea.

Part V sheds light on an important issue often ignored during discussions of nuclear proliferation cases where states have made a deliberate policy choice of either renouncing their nuclear weapons programme, or have decided to remain a threshold state. The cases of South Africa, Egypt and Japan will be the focus of this section.

The final section, Part VI, will examine the present state of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, which most observers agree is currently facing a crisis of credibility. The three pillars of this regime the NPT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty will be analyzed.

Nuclear terrorism is such a disturbing prospect that we shy away from its details. Yet as a consequence, we fail to understand how best to defeat it. Michael Levi takes us inside nuclear terrorism and behind the decisions a terrorist leader would be faced with in pursuing a nuclear plot. Along the way, Levi identifies the many obstacles, large and small, that such a terrorist scheme might encounter, allowing him to discover a host of ways that any plan might be foiled.

Surveying the broad universe of plots and defenses, this accessible account shows how a wide-ranging defense that integrates the tools of weapon and materials security, law enforcement, intelligence, border controls, diplomacy, and the military can multiply, intensify, and compound the possibility that nuclear terrorists will fail. Levi draws from our long experience with terrorism and cautions us not to focus solely on the most harrowing yet most improbable threats. Nuclear terrorism shares much in common with other terrorist threats--and as a result, he argues, defeating it is impossible unless we put our entire counterterrorism and homeland security house in order.

As long as we live in a nuclear age, no defense can completely eliminate nuclear terrorism. But this book reminds us that the right strategy can minimize the risks and shows us how to do it.

The nuclear weapons question runs through post-1940 British history like an irradiated thread. It represents part of the hidden history of twentieth-century Britain, given the high level of technical secrecy and political sensitivity in which the bomb was - and is - embedded.
This volume publishes previously classified Cabinet papers and related archives, dealing with the first theoretical scientific breakthrough in 1940, through the A-bomb and H-bomb procurements, to the Polaris missile upgrading decisions of the 1970s. The story is brought up to date in Peter Hennessy's narrative, which covers developments up to the spring of 2007.
The fascination of the book lies in its uncovering the very private internal themes, debates and justifications for Britain's being a nuclear weapons power exchanged between ministers, civil servants, diplomats, scientists, military and intelligence officers. There is a strong element of now-it-can-be-told in the book, which will appeal not just to professional historians but also to undergraduates and A-Level students who are partaking in the current mini-boom on the study of the Cold War. Cabinets and the Bomb is also a contribution to wider public understanding in the context of the present debate about Trident upgrade (though it is a book of explanation, not advocacy).

In July 2005, the National Academies released the report Strengthening Long-term Nuclear Security: Protecting Weapon-Usable Material in Russia. The report highlighted several obstacles in the transition from a U.S.-Russian cooperative program to a Russian-directed and Russian-funded fully indigenized program that will ensure the security of 600 tons of weapon-usable nuclear material at a level of international acceptability. Overcoming these obstacles requires an increased political commitment at a number of levels of the Russian Government to modern material protection, control, and accounting systems (MPC&A). Adequate resources must be provided to facilities where weapon-usable material is located for upgrading and maintaining MPC&A systems. Additionally, the technical security systems that are being installed through the cooperative program need to be fully embraced by Russian managers and specialists. The report recommends the establishment of a ten-year indigenization fund of about $500 million provided by Russia and its G-8 partners as a new mechanism for gradually shifting the financial burden of MPC&A to the Russian Government.

NATO was hugely successful in facing off the Soviet Union during the Cold War. But has it been equally successful in addressing the "new threats" of the post-Cold War era? This new study assesses the organization's political and military initiatives, and how its outreach to Russia, Ukraine, and other countries in the Euro-Atlantic and Mediterranean regions, devoted considerable attention to WMD proliferation risks. It also probes the political factors, both inside and outside NATO, as well as resource constraints, which have limited the alliance's "added value" in the international community's effort to combat proliferation. The events of 11 September 2001 and bitter intra-alliance controversy over the 2003 Iraq intervention have highlighted questions regarding NATO's future role, and even its continued viability. This is a serious reflection on how the alliance should figure in the fight against WMD and terrorist threats and an examination of today's key issues, including the use of force in international relations and the possibility of constructing new, post-Cold War collective security rules. This is the first study to evaluate, critically and in-depth, how a long-standing security organization has adapted - and must continue to adapt - to the global security challenges of our time. This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of international politics, military history and all readers interested in the future of NATO and international security.

We have had the bomb on our minds since 1945. It was first our weaponry and then our diplomacy, and now it's our economy. How can we suppose that something so monstrously powerful would not, after forty years, compose our identity? -E. L. Doctorow

This book tells the story of how-like it or not, know it or not-we have become "the people of the bomb." Integrating fifteen years of field research at weapons laboratories across the United States with discussion of popular movies, political speeches, media coverage of war, and the arcane literature of defense intellectuals, Hugh Gusterson shows how the military-industrial complex has built consent for its programs and, in the process, taken the public "nuclear."

People of the Bomb mixes empathic and vivid portraits of individual weapons scientists with hard-hitting scrutiny of defense intellectuals' inability to foresee the end of the cold war, government rhetoric on missile defense, official double standards about nuclear proliferation, and pork barrel politics in the nuclear weapons complex. Overall, the book assembles a disturbing picture of the ways in which the military-industrial complex has transformed our public culture and personal psychology in the half century since we entered the nuclear age.

Hugh Gusterson is associate professor of anthropology and science studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and professor of public policy at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is the author of Nuclear Rites: A Weapons Laboratory at the End of the Cold War (1996) and coeditor of Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger (Minnesota, 1999). Lynne Cheney's American Council of Trustees andAlumni named him one of the most dangerous intellectuals in the United States today.

In March 1998, India broke a quarter-century's silence when it detonated a series of nuclear devices in the Rajasthan desert. Having announced it possessed the requisite credentials for membership in the nuclear club in 1974, India quickly disavowed any desire to join, pledging not to develop its capability further.. As the Pokhran explosions revealed, that promise would not be kept for ever, and the principal beneficiary of its breaking was now to be a right-wing government seeking to shore up its shaky political base by demonstrating its commitment to the 'Hindu bomb'. While most in the West were taken unawares by this sudden bellicosity in the land of Ghandi, more scrupulous observers on the South-Asian scene insisted it had a clear history. In this, his first book since the hotly debated In Theory, Aijaz Ahmad untangles many of the intertwined threads of historical and political traditions in a still-too-poorly-understood region of the world.

The Manhattan Project-the World War II race to produce an atomic bomb-transformed the entire country in myriad ways, but it did not affect each region equally. Acting on an enduring perception of the American West as an "empty" place, the U.S. government located a disproportionate number of nuclear facilities-particularly the ones most likely to spread pollution-in western states. The Manhattan Project manufactured plutonium at Hanford, Washington; designed and assembled bombs at Los Alamos, New Mexico; and detonated the world's first atomic bomb at Alamagordo, New Mexico, on June 16, 1945. In the years that followed the war, the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission selected additional western sites for its work. Many westerners initially welcomed the atom. Like federal officials, they, too, regarded their region as "empty," or underdeveloped. Facilities to make, test, and base atomic weapons, sites to store nuclear waste, and even nuclear power plants were regarded as assets. By the 1960s and 1970s, however, regional attitudes began to change. At a variety of locales, ranging from Eskimo Alaska to Mormon Utah, westerners devoted themselves to resisting the atom and its effects on their environments and communities. Just as the atomic age had dawned in the American West, so its artificial sun began to set there. The Atomic West brings together contributions from several disciplines to explore the impact on the West of the development of atomic power from wartime secrecy and initial postwar enthusiasm to public doubts and protest in the 1970s and 1980s. An impressive example of the benefits of interdisciplinary studies on complex topics, The Atomic West advances our understanding of both regional history and the history of science, and does so with human communities as a significant focal point. The book will be of special interest to students and experts on the American West, environmental history, and the history of science and technology.

A collection of essays on the nuclear revolution and the end of the Cold War by E. P. Thompson, Mike Davis, Raymond Williams, Rudolf Bahro, Lucio Magri, Etienne Balibar, Roy and Zhores Medvedev, John Cox, Saburo Kugai, Marcus Raskin, Noam Chomsky, Alan Wolfe, Mary Kaldorf and Fred Halliday.

Exploring how the United States manages its still-powerful nuclear arsenalArms control agreements and the end of the cold war have made the prospect of nuclear war a distant fear for the general public. But the United States and its principle rivals China and Russia still maintain sizable arsenals of nuclear weapons, along with the systems for managing them and using them if that terrible day ever comes. Understanding U.S. Nuclear Operations describes how the United States manages its nuclear forces, focusing on how theories and policies are put into practice. It addresses such questions as: What have been the guiding priorities of U.S. nuclear strategy since the end of the cold war? What nuclear attack options would the President have during a war? How are these war plans developed and reviewed by civilian and military leaders? How would presidential orders be conveyed to the uniformed men and women who are entrusted with U.S. nuclear weapons systems? And are these communications systems and supporting capabilities vulnerable to disruption or attack? The answers to such questions depend on the process by which national strategy for nuclear deterrence, developed by civilian leaders, is converted into nuclear war plans and the entire range of procedures for implementing those plans if necessary. The authors of the book's chapters have extensive experience in government, the armed forces, and the analytic community. Drawing on their firsthand knowledge, as well as the public record, they provide unique, authoritative accounts of how the United States manages it nuclear forces today. This book will be of interest to the national security community, particularly younger experts who did not grow up in the nuclear-centric milieu of the cold war. Any national security analyst, professional or government staffer aiming to learn more about nuclear modernization policy and the U.S. nuclear arsenal should be interested in this book. It should also be of interest to professors and students who want a deep understanding of U.S. nuclear policy.

In Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis': Theoretical Approaches, Halit M.E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr. analyze the 'crisis' surrounding Iran's nuclear program through a variety of theoretical approaches, including realism, world-systems theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and multi-level games. Through these theories, Tagma and Lenze use established academic perspectives to create a more objective understanding and explanation of the debates and issues. Introducing the concept of eclectic pluralism to the study of international relations, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis' presents theoretical approaches side by side to explore a complex and evolving international dispute.

A groundbreaking account of Pakistan's rise as a nuclear power draws on elite interviews and primary sources to challenge long-held misconceptions Pakistan's pathway to developing nuclear weapons remains shrouded in mystery and surrounded by misconceptions. While it is no secret why Pakistan became a nuclear power, how Pakistan became a nuclear state has been obscured by mythmaking. In Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb, Mansoor Ahmed offers a revisionist history of Pakistan's nuclear program and the bureaucratic politics that shaped its development from its inception in 1956 until the 1998 nuclear tests. Drawing on elite interviews and previously untapped primary sources, Ahmed offers a fresh assessment of the actual and perceived roles and contributions of the scientists and engineers who led the nuclear program. He shows how personal ambitions and politics within Pakistan's strategic enclave generated inter-laboratory competition in the nuclear establishment, which determined nuclear choices for the country for more than two decades. It also produced unexpected consequences such as illicit proliferation to other countries largely outside of the Pakistani state's control. As Pakistan's nuclear deterrent program continues to grow, Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb provides fresh insights into how this nuclear power has evolved in the past and where it stands today. Scholars and students of security studies, Pakistani history, and nuclear proliferation will find this book to be invaluable to their understanding of the country's nuclear program, policies, and posture.

Samuel S. Kloda spent more than 40 years meeting with the scientists who built the first atomic bombs, and the crews that delivered them to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those conversations encouraged him to search archives throughout the U.S. Newly unearthed documents were brought to former members of the Manhattan Project or the 509th Composite Group, who were always willing to autograph and recount the details of these artifacts. Most of the major books on the Manhattan Project were published before 1973. In the years that followed, newly declassified documents became available and showed that many authors had included huge inaccuracies. Richly illustrated with important documents and photographs, Kloda's chronicle of the dawn of the atomic age sets the record straight on one of the greatest scientific advancements of all time. Readers will see how a single letter from Albert Einstein to President Franklin Roosevelt in 1939 led to the formation of the Advisory Committee on Uranium and, within six years, to the secret Manhattan Project employing more than 100,000 men and women.

In Nuclear Weapons and the Environment, John Perry highlights the environmental damage caused by nuclear device testing. The failure of the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty and the continued proliferation of nuclear weapons is a grave risk to not only human life but to the environment. Pointing to the unstable political situation between a variety of state and non-state actors, the remediation of nuclear test sites, and the risks involved in the production of nuclear weapons, Perry makes a clear case for the dire importance of non-proliferation.

In 1988, Scott Cook was a boarding school PE teacher responsible for the proper inflation of dodge balls. A year later, he was operating an underground strategic missile control center with 10 intercontinental nuclear weapons capable of obliterating an entire country. This unexpected journey took him from the serene hills of Virginia through months of intensive training on the California coast to the front lines of the Cold War, beneath the frozen plains of North Dakota. His frank, entertaining memoir describes the insular and secretive military subculture of men and women who lived with the sobering burden of potentially unleashing global devastation, and how an easy-going gym coach ended up in an organization whose unofficial motto was "To err is human; to forgive is not Strategic Air Command policy.

In Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis': Theoretical Approaches, Halit M.E. Tagma and Paul E. Lenze, Jr. analyze the 'crisis' surrounding Iran's nuclear program through a variety of theoretical approaches, including realism, world-systems theory, liberal institutionalism, domestic politics, and multi-level games. Through these theories, Tagma and Lenze use established academic perspectives to create a more objective understanding and explanation of the debates and issues. Introducing the concept of eclectic pluralism to the study of international relations, Understanding and Explaining the Iranian Nuclear 'Crisis' presents theoretical approaches side by side to explore a complex and evolving international dispute.

In 1960, President Kennedy warned of a dangerous future, rife with nuclear-armed states and a widespread penchant for conflict by the end of the century. Thankfully, his prediction failed to pass; in fact, roughly three times as many countries have since opted to give up their nuclear pursuit or relinquish existing weapons than have maintained their arsenals. Nevertheless, clandestine acquisition of nuclear materials and technology by states such as Iraq, Syria, and Iran, and a nuclear North Korea, has reaffirmed the need for United States' commitment to pursuing aggressive counterproliferation strategies, particularly with rogue states. This book looks at the experiences of countries that ventured down the path of nuclear proliferation but were stopped short, and examines how the international community bargains with proliferators to encourage nuclear reversal. It asks why so many states have relented to pressure to abandon their nuclear weapons programs, and which counterproliferation policies have been successful. Rupal N. Mehta argues that the international community can persuade countries to reverse their weapons programs with rewards and sanctions especially when the threat to use military force remains "on the table". Specifically, nuclear reversal is most likely when states are threatened with sanctions and offered face-saving rewards that help them withstand domestic political opposition. Historically, the United States has relied on a variety of policy levers-including economic and civilian nuclear assistance and, sometimes, security guarantees, as well as economic sanctions-to achieve nuclear reversal. Underlying these negotiations is the possibility of military intervention, which incentivizes states to accept the agreement (often spearheaded by the United States) and end their nuclear pursuit. The book draws on interviews with current and former policymakers, as well as in-depth case studies of India, Iran, and North Korea, to provide policy recommendations on how best to manage nuclear proliferation challenges from rogue states. It also outlines the proliferation horizon, or the set of state and non-state actors that are likely to have interest in acquiring nuclear technology for civilian, military, or unknown purposes. The book concludes with implications and recommendations for U.S. and global nuclear counterproliferation policy.