A history of the Atomic Bomb from Marie Curie to Hiroshima. The atom bomb, which killed an estimated 140,000 civilians in Hiroshima and destroyed the countryside for miles around, was one of the defining moments in world history. That mushroom cloud cast a terrifying shadow over the contemporary world and continues to do so today. But how could this have happened? What led to the creation of such a weapon of mass destruction? From the moment scientists contemplated the destructive potential of splitting the atom, the role of science changed. Ethical and moral dilemmas faced all those who realized the implications of their research. Before the Fall-Out charts the chain of events from Marie Curies scientific breakthrough through the many colourful characters such as Einstein, Robert Oppenheimer and Lord Rutherford, whose discoveries contributed to the bomb. The story of the atomic bomb spans 50 years of prolific scientific innovation, turbulent politics, foreign affairs and world-changing history. Through personal stories of exile, indecision and soul-searching, to charges of collaboration, spying and deceit, Diana Preston presents the human side of an unstoppable programme with a lethal outcome.

In an era defined by the threat of nuclear annihilation, Western nations attempted to prepare civilian populations for atomic attack through staged drills, evacuations, and field exercises. In Stages of Emergency the distinguished performance historian Tracy C. Davis investigates the fundamentally theatrical nature of these Cold War civil defense exercises. Asking what it meant for civilians to be rehearsing nuclear war, she provides a comparative study of the civil defense maneuvers conducted by three NATO allies-the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom-during the 1950s and 1960s. Delving deep into the three countries' archives, she analyzes public exercises involving private citizens-Boy Scouts serving as mock casualties, housewives arranging home protection, clergy training to be shelter managers-as well as covert exercises undertaken by civil servants.Stages of Emergency covers public education campaigns and school programs-such as the ubiquitous "duck and cover" drills-meant to heighten awareness of the dangers of a possible attack, the occupancy tests in which people stayed sequestered for up to two weeks to simulate post-attack living conditions as well as the effects of confinement on interpersonal dynamics, and the British first-aid training in which participants acted out psychological and physical trauma requiring immediate treatment. Davis also brings to light unpublicized government exercises aimed at anticipating the global effects of nuclear war. Her comparative analysis shows how the differing priorities, contingencies, and social policies of the three countries influenced their rehearsals of nuclear catastrophe. When the Cold War ended, so did these exercises, but, as Davis points out in her perceptive afterword, they have been revived-with strikingly similar recommendations-in response to twenty-first-century fears of terrorists, dirty bombs, and rogue states.

The United States and the international community must do more to prevent terrorists from buying, stealing, or building nuclear weapons. Pakistans highly enriched uranium (HEU) is vulnerable to both external and insider theft by Islamic terrorists and Taliban sympathizers; Russias massive HEU supplies are susceptible to insider theft; a large portion of civilian nuclear material around the world remains in weapons-usable form; and Russias shorter-range tactical nuclear weapons are highly attractive to terrorists because of their smaller size and ease of transport. To address these vulnerabilities, the United States should pursue unilateral initiatives such as a clear declaration of retaliation against regimes aiding nuclear terrorists, multilateral initiatives that include increasing funding to the woefully underfunded International Atomic Energy Agency, and bilateral initiatives and dialogue, particularly with Pakistan and Russia. Implementing these practical steps could significantly reduce the risk of a catastrophic nuclear attack by terrorist groups.

Iran is aggressively seeking nuclear technology that could be used for making weapons -and its quest has set off alarms throughout the world. This widespread concern stems in part from Iran's uncertain intentions and recent history. Will it remain a revolutionary power determined to subvert its Sunni Arab neighbors, destroy Israel, and spread theocratic government to other lands? Or would an Iran with nuclear weapons merely defend its territory from foreign aggression and live in peace with its neighbors? Are the country's leaders and society willing to negotiate limits on nuclear capability and normalize relations with the West, or will they resist accommodation? Iran's Nuclear Ambitions provides a rare, balanced look into the motivations, perceptions, and domestic politics swirling around Iran. Shahram Chubin, an Iranian-born security expert, details the recent history of Iran's nuclear program and diplomacy. He argues that the central problem is not nuclear technology, but rather Iran's behavior as a revolutionary state, with ambitions that collide with the interests of its neighbors and the West. Topics include: The view from Tehran Iran's nuclear energy rationale Domestic politics, and decisionmaking Sources of concern, including the nature of Iran's regime Its nuclear infrastructure, Missile development, and terrorism Iran's negotiating strategy The international response Iran and regional security, including the U.S. as a threat and rival Iran's regional ambitions, and Israel Policy options

Bombs are as old as hatred itself. But it was the twentieth century--one hundred years of incredible scientific progress and terrible war--that brought forth the Big One, the Bomb, humanity's most powerful and destructive invention. In "The Bomb: A Life," Gerard DeGroot tells the story of this once unimaginable weapon that--at least since 8: 16 a.m. on August 6, 1945--has haunted our dreams and threatened our existence.

The Bomb has killed hundreds of thousands outright, condemned many more to lingering deaths, and made vast tracts of land unfit for life. For decades it dominated the psyches of millions, becoming a touchstone of popular culture, celebrated or decried in mass political movements, films, songs, and books. DeGroot traces the life of the Bomb from its birth in turn-of-the-century physics labs of Europe to a childhood in the New Mexico desert of the 1940s, from adolescence and early adulthood in Nagasaki and Bikini, Australia and Kazakhstan to maturity in test sites and missile silos around the globe. His book portrays the Bomb's short but significant existence in all its scope, providing us with a portrait of the times and the people--from Oppenheimer to Sakharov, Stalin to Reagan--whose legacy still shapes our world.

While deterrence was pursued through the threat of causing grievious hurt, vying with annihilation, diplomacy sought to construct a framework where the powerful sought to retain their advantage while pressing for reducing that of the adversary or completley dnying it to others.

The North Korean nuclear program is headed in a dangerous direction. Yet the United States and its allies have not set forth a coherent or unified strategy to stop it. This Task Force, sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, evaluates the challenges facing the United States in and around the Korean peninsula and assess American options for meeting them. The situation on the peninsula has deteriorated rapidly since October 2002, when North Korea admitted having a secret highly enriched uranium program that put it on course to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons. North Korea has since withdrawn from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, asserted it possess nuclear weapons, and declared that it is reprocessing its spent nuclear fuel. Having initially emphasized the need for a negotiated solution, North Korea's recent rhetoric has stressed the deterrent value of nuclear weapons. Co-chaired by Morton I. Abramowitz and James T. Laney, and directed by Council Senior Fellow Eric Heginbotham, the Task Force makes specific recommendations to help guide U.S. foreign policy: 1) articulate a strategy around which U.S. regional partners can rally; 2) as part of that strategy, engage in a serious negotiating effort with North Korea and test its intentions by proposing an interim agreement; 3) secure the commitment of U.S. allies to take tougher action should talks fail, 4) restore the health of the U.S.-ROK alliance; 5) persuade China to take greater responsibility for resolving the crisis; and 6) appoint a full-time high-level coordinator for Korea.

This is measured in terms of "half-life"--the time required for one-half of the original substance to decay--which ranges from days to thousands of years for the bomb-produced radionuclides of principal interest. (See "Nuclear Half-Life" note.) Another factor which is critical in determining the hazard of radionuclides is the chemistry of the atoms. This determines whether they will be taken up by the body through respiration or the food cycle.

The definitive account of the precipitous and politically charged revival of national missile defense--now updated to address post-9/11 developments Even as America faces a world of difficult-to-detect, low-tech, unconventional threats, the Bush administration has put its faith in a missile defense system or "shield" to keep us all safe. There are only two problems: this may not be the sort of threat we should be focusing on and this system may not work anyway. The recent alarming news about North Korea's nuclear and missile programs has strengthened the administration's support for this extremely expensive and still unproven defense. Bradley Graham, the longtime Pentagon correspondent of The Washington Post, tells the long, strange story of how missile defense, once considered a relic of the Cold War, was revived during the 1990s to address an emerging Third World missile threat, particularly from North Korea, Iraq, and other "rogue states." Over the past half century, no proposed weapons system has drawn more argument or dollars than national missile defense, and Graham explores the origins of the enduring debate, the costs to the nation of having failed to resolve it, and the wisdom of continuing to pursue what we used to call "Star Wars."

For thirty days I was close by him at historic events -- in the places where writers never are.

Before Britain could help the United States in the war against Saddam Hussein, Tony Blair faced a battle against his own voters, his own party, and his own allies in Europe. These were among the most tense and tumultuous weeks the world had seen since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

In thirty days, Blair took on his opponents and won.

Through it all, Peter Stothard had unprecedented access to Blair -- from Ten Downing Street and the House of Commons through the war summits in the Azores, Brussels, Belfast, and at Camp David. Stothard brings us inside the corridors of power during this extraordinary time, offering a vivid, up-close view of an enormously popular leader facing the challenge of his life.

We continue to face a choice with respect to nuclear weapons -- either to move safely toward their elimination or to remain their victim. A forty-year effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is breaking down, and the likely acquisition of these weapons by terrorist groups is growing. In Fatal Choice, Richard Butler, a well-known and respected voice on the subject of nuclear weapons, argues that we are poised on the verge of a second and much more threatening nuclear arms race than the one experienced throughout the Cold War. This threat is clearly reflected in nuclear weapons development by India, Pakistan, Iraq, and North Korea. The revival by the Bush administration of missile defense will not deal with the problem but worsen it. Butler outlines the steps that can be taken to give effect to the right choice on nuclear weapons.

This book, written with unique access to official archives, tells the secret story of Britain's H-bomb - the scientific and strategic background, the government's policy decision, the work of the remarkable men who created the bomb, the four weapon trials at a remote Pacific atoll in 1957-58, and the historic consequences.

Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Concise Edition

The closest most of us will ever come to being inside the Oval Office at a moment of crisis.

For sheer drama, this work of history may never be duplicated. The events of the Cuban Missile Crisis unfold in the actual words of President John F. Kennedy and his top advisers. Now available in a new, concise edition, this book retains its gripping sense of history in the making. 20 photographs.

"[A] splendid achievement, as powerful and exciting a book as one is likely to read this year...."—Barry Gewen, New York Times Book Review

"Gripping history."—Richard J. Tofel, Wall Street Journal

"[M]esmerizing. I was utterly fascinated....the best, fullest account of crisis yet and will remain so for decades to come."—Stephen E. Ambrose

"[A]s close as most people will ever get to being a fly on the wall during the discussions of leaders."—Los Angeles Times Sunday Book Review, James G. Blight

This provocative book argues that the United States is paying a high price for its dominance in the emergence of new chemical, biological, and nuclear threats. America's growing military, economic, and cultural preeminence motivates states to oppose American power through whatever means possible. Rogue states and terrorists can now obtain the technology to develop weapons of mass destruction. Only with the active cooperation of other states, especially U.N. Security Council members Russia, China, and France, can this threat be stopped. To get this cooperation, the United States will have to give up its " prompt retaliatory" nuclear war plans that if combined with needed limited antiballistic missile defenses, would give the United States a de facto nuclear first-strike capability and therefore absolute military dominance. The Price of Dominance recommends an integrated program of strategy, policy, arms control negotiations, and nuclear deployments to foster the necessary cooperation while retaining strong nuclear deterrence as the foundation of American security strategy.

No one better represents the plight and the conduct of German intellectuals under Hitler than Werner Heisenberg, whose task it was to build an atomic bomb for Nazi Germany. The controversy surrounding Heisenberg still rages, because of the nature of his work and the regime for which it was undertaken. What precisely did Heisenberg know about the physics of the atomic bomb? How deep was his loyalty to the German government during the Third Reich? Assuming that he had been able to build a bomb, would he have been willing? These questions, the moral and the scientific, are answered by Paul Lawrence Rose with greater accuracy and breadth of documentation than any other historian has yet achieved.
Digging deep into the archival record among formerly secret technical reports, Rose establishes that Heisenberg never overcame certain misconceptions about nuclear fission, and as a result the German leaders never pushed for atomic weapons. In fact, Heisenberg never had to face the moral problem of whether he "should" design a bomb for the Nazi regime. Only when he and his colleagues were interned in England and heard about Hiroshima did Heisenberg realize that his calculations were wrong. He began at once to construct an image of himself as a "pure" scientist who could have built a bomb but chose to work on reactor design instead. This was fiction, as Rose demonstrates: in reality, Heisenberg blindly supported and justified the cause of German victory. The question of why he did, and why he misrepresented himself afterwards, is answered through Rose's subtle analysis of German mentality and the scientists' problems of delusion and self-delusion. This fascinating study is a profound effort tounderstand one of the twentieth century's great enigmas.

This timely book contains excerpts from authoritative testimony, speeches and reports of political leaders, members of Congress, and leading experts who lay out a roadmap for understanding the nation's growing concern and response to the threat of super terrorism. It highlights warnings on the domestic and international threat form reports of the Bremer Commission, Gilmore Commission, Hart-Rudman Commission, Baker-Cutler Report and the USS Cole Commission. The text features statements and assessments of Madeleine Albright, Ahmed Al-Fadl, Ken Alibek, Seth Carus, Bill Clinton, Anthony Cordesman, John Deutch, Louis Freeh, Donald Henderson, Joshua Lederberg, Sam Nunn, John Parachini, Janet Reno, George Tenet and others. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states--and potential future ones--manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia.

Vipin Narang identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, he offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. Narang then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, he shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others.

"Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era" considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.

In the 1950s the Australian government agreed to let the British government test atomic bombs in South Australia's deserts. Prime Minister Menzies was flattered to be needed by "the mother country" and the rise of the science of physics and the power of atomic weapons was irresistible. The Australian public was assured that there was no risk from radioactive fallout, but one man wasn't satisfied. Biochemist Hedley Marston believed himself the only person qualified to assess the risk to biological organisms from radioactive fallout. His experiments proved that the government's Safety Committee were telling lies. Fallout is the story of a government desperate for prestige and one man willing to risk everything to expose the danger of radioactive fallout.

In March 1998, India broke 25 years silence when it detonated a series of nuclear devices in the Rajasthan desert. Having announced it possessed the requisite credentials for membership in the nuclear club in 1974, India quickly disavowed any desire to join, pledging not to develop its capability further. The Pokhran explosions revealed that promise to have been broken. The principal beneficiary of its breaking was a right-wing government seeking to shore up its shaky base with committment to the "Hindu bomb" While most in the West were taken unawares by this sudden bellicosity in the land of Gandhi, more scrupulous observers on the Indian scene insisted it had a clear history In this book, the author untangles many of the intertwined threads of an important story often poorly understood in the metropolitan West: that the right-wing nationalisms now flourishing in many regions of the world did not emerge fully formed and as if by accident. Their complex genealogies hold the key to comprehending them. Such an understanding is urgently required in India where, the author argues, the BJP's road to power, far from being a temporary detour from the path of secular democracy, may well

The story of the twentieth century is largely the story of the power of science and technology. Within that story is the incredible tale of the human conflict between three men-Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller-the scientists most responsible for the advent of weapons of mass destruction. How did science, enlisted in the service of the state during the Second World War, become a slave to its patron during the Cold War-and scientists with it? The story of these three men, is fundamentally about loyalty-to the country, to science, and to each other-and about the wrenching choices that had to be made when these allegiances came into conflict.

Gregg Herken gives us the behind-the-scenes account based upon a decade of research, interviews, and new documents. Brotherhood of the Bomb is a vital slice of American history told authoritatively-and grippingly-for the first time.

How will continued proliferation of nuclear weapons change the global political order? This collection of essays comes to conclusions at odds with the conventional wisdom. Stephen Rosen and Barry Posen explore how nuclear proliferation may affect US incentives to confront regional aggression. Stephen Walt argues that regional allies will likely prove willing to stand with a strong and ready United States against nuclear-backed aggression. George Quester and Brad Roberts examine long-term strategic objectives in responding to nuclear attack by a regional aggressor. Richard Betts highlights the potential for disastrous mistakes in moving toward and living in a world heavily populated with nuclear-armed states. Scott Sagan explains how the nuclear nonproliferation policies best suited to some states can spur proliferation by others. Caroline Ziemke shows how the analysis of a state's strategic personality can provide insights into why it might want nuclear weapons and how its policies may develop once it gets them. And, Victor Utgoff concludes that the United States seems more likely to intervene against regional aggression when the aggressor has nuclear weapons than when it does not.

Containing the histories (from 1945 to the present) of the nuclear strategies of NATO, Britain and France, and of the defence preferences of the FRG (West Germany) this book shows how strategies were functions of a perceived Soviet threat and an American "nuclear guarantee". There were three options for West Europeans: a compromise with differing American needs in NATO, pursued by Britain and the FRG; national nuclear forces, developed by Britain and France; and projects for an independent European nuclear force.

Shedding important new light on the history of the Cold War, Philip Nash tells the story of what the United States gave up to help end the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. By drawing on documents only recently declassified, he shows that one of President Kennedy's compromises with the Soviets involved the removal of Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey, an arrangement concealed from both the American public and the rest of the NATO allies. Nash traces the entire history of the Jupiters and explores why the United States offered these nuclear missiles, which were capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union, to its European allies after the launch of Sputnik. He argues that, despite their growing doubts, both Eisenhower and Kennedy proceeded with the deployment of the missiles because they felt that cancellation would seriously damage America's credibility with its allies and the Soviet Union. The Jupiters subsequently played a far more significant role in Khrushchev's 1962 decision to deploy his missiles in Cuba, in U.S. deliberations during the ensuing missile crisis, and in the resolution of events in Cuba than most existing histories have supposed.