Keith Payne begins by asking, "Did we really learn how to deter
predictably and reliably during the Cold War?" He answers
cautiously in the negative, pointing out that we know only that our
policies toward the Soviet Union did not fail. What we can be more
certain of, in Payne's view, is that such policies will almost
assuredly fail in the Second Nuclear Age -- a period in which
direct nuclear threat between superpowers has been replaced by
threats posed by regional "rogue" powers newly armed with chemical,
biological, or nuclear weapons.
The fundamental problem with deterrence theory is that is posits
a rational -- hence predictable -- opponent. History frequently
demonstrates the opposite. Payne argues that as the one remaining
superpower, the United States needs to be more flexible in its
approach to regional powers.
General
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