Challenging nuclearism explores how a deliberate 'normalisation' of nuclear weapons has been constructed, why it has prevailed in international politics for over seventy years and why it is only now being questioned seriously. The book identifies how certain practices have enabled a small group of states to hold vast arsenals of these weapons of mass destruction and how the close control over nuclear decisions by a select group has meant that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been disregarded for decades. The recent UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will not bring about quick disarmament. It has been decried by the nuclear weapon states. But by rejecting nuclearism and providing a clear denunciation of nuclear weapons, it will challenge nuclear states in a way that has until now not been possible. Challenging nuclearism analyses the origins and repercussions of this pivotal moment in nuclear politics. -- .

This book discusses the decision to use the atomic bomb. Libraries and scholars will find it a necessary adjunct to their other studies by Pulitzer-Prize author Herbert Feis on World War II. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

General requirements for establishing a verification regime in the context of moving towards a nuclear weapon-free world have been the subject of numerous studies during the past decade. The studies presented in this book add significantly to the general discussion by addressing the technical means and procedures for establishing transparency in nuclear warheads and materials in the nuclear weapons states.

Some states have violated international commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. Yet the effects of international sanctions or positive inducements on their internal politics remain highly contested. How have trade, aid, investments, diplomacy, financial measures and military threats affected different groups? How, when and why were those effects translated into compliance with non-proliferation rules? Have inducements been sufficiently biting, too harsh, too little, too late or just right for each case? How have different inducements influenced domestic cleavages? What were their unintended and unforeseen effects? Why are self-reliant autocracies more often the subject of sanctions? Leading scholars analyse the anatomy of inducements through novel conceptual perspectives, in-depth case studies, original quantitative data and newly translated documents. The volume distils ten key dilemmas of broad relevance to the study of statecraft, primarily from experiences with Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, bound to spark debate among students and practitioners of international politics.

Will AI make accidental nuclear war more likely? If so, how might these risks be reduced? AI and the Bomb provides a coherent, innovative, and multidisciplinary examination of the potential effects of AI technology on nuclear strategy and escalation risk. It addresses a gap in the international relations and strategic studies literature, and its findings have significant theoretical and policy ramifications for using AI technology in the nuclear enterprise. The book advances an innovative theoretical framework to consider AI technology and atomic risk, drawing on insights from political psychology, neuroscience, computer science, and strategic studies. In this multidisciplinary work, James Johnson unpacks the seminal cognitive-psychological features of the Cold War-era scholarship, and offers a novel explanation of why these matter for AI applications and strategic thinking. The study offers crucial insights for policymakers and contributes to the literature that examines the impact of military force and technological change.

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.

The Nuclear Club reveals how a coalition of powerful and developing states embraced global governance in hopes of a bright and peaceful tomorrow. While fears of nuclear war were ever-present, it was the perceived threat to their preeminence that drove Washington, Moscow, and London to throw their weight behind the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) banishing nuclear testing underground, the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco banning atomic armaments from Latin America, and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) forbidding more countries from joining the most exclusive club on Earth. International society, the Cold War, and the imperial U.S. presidency were reformed from 1945 to 1970, when a global nuclear order was inaugurated, averting conflict in the industrial North and yielding what George Orwell styled a "peace that is no peace" everywhere else. Today the nuclear order legitimizes foreign intervention worldwide, empowering the nuclear club and, above all, the United States, to push sanctions and even preventive war against atomic outlaws, all in humanity's name.

We are at a time when international law and the law of war are particularly important. The testing of nuclear weapons that is being used in the rhetoric surrounding threats of war is creating new fears and heightening current tensions. Richard Falk has for decades been an outspoken authority calling for nuclear disarmament and the enforcement of non-proliferation treaties. In this collection of essays, Falk examines the global threats to all humanity posed by nuclear weapons. He is not satisfied with accepting arms control measures as a managerial stopgap to these threats and seeks no less than to move the world back from the nuclear precipice and towards denuclearization. Falk's essays reflect the wisdom and innovative thinking he has brought to his long career as a scholar and activist, as he reminds nuclear weapons states of their obligation under international law and moral imperative to seek nuclear disarmament.

This book explores the American use of atomic bombs, and the role these weapons played in the defeat of the Japanese Empire in World War II. It focuses on President Harry S. Truman's decision making regarding this most controversial of all his decisions. The book relies on notable archival research, and the best and most recent scholarship on the subject to fashion an incisive overview that is fair and forceful in its judgments. This study addresses a subject that has been much debated among historians, and it confronts head-on the highly disputed claim that the Truman administration practiced atomic diplomacy. The book goes beyond its central historical analysis to ask whether it was morally right for the United States to use these terrible weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It also provides a balanced evaluation of the relationship between atomic weapons and the origins of the Cold War."

This book explores the American use of atomic bombs, and the role these weapons played in the defeat of the Japanese Empire in World War II. It focuses on President Harry S. Truman's decision making regarding this most controversial of all his decisions. The book relies on notable archival research, and the best and most recent scholarship on the subject to fashion an incisive overview that is fair and forceful in its judgments. This study addresses a subject that has been much debated among historians, and it confronts head-on the highly disputed claim that the Truman administration practiced atomic diplomacy. The book goes beyond its central historical analysis to ask whether it was morally right for the United States to use these terrible weapons against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It also provides a balanced evaluation of the relationship between atomic weapons and the origins of the Cold War.

Peace, Security, and Conflict Prevention: SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook is a comprehensive, concise volume on security and conflict prevention in the post-cold war period 1992-96. It is drawn from the results of SIPRI's research and includes chapters on major armed conflicts; armed conflict prevention, management and resolution; world military expenditure, arms production and the arms trade; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the arms control and agreements currently in force and under negotiation; the United Nations Organization; and special studies of regional and subregional security in Europe and Asia. A detailed chronology lists the major events of 1992-96 related to peace, security, and conflict prevention. The book also includes a useful glossary of terms and acronyms used in the security literature and gives the membership of international organizations concerned with security issues.

Over the past fifteen years, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons has been a staple in International Relations courses because of its brevity and crystal-clear explanations. The new edition, An Enduring Debate, continues the important discussion of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of a nuclear-armed world. With new chapters on the questions surrounding a nuclear North Korea, Iran, and Iraq and the potential for a world free of nuclear weapons, this Third Edition will continue to generate a lively classroom experience.

Peace, Security, and Conflict Prevention: SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook is a comprehensive, concise volume on security and conflict prevention in the post-cold war period 1992-96. It is drawn from the results of SIPRI's research and includes chapters on major armed conflicts; armed conflict prevention, management and resolution; world military expenditure, arms production and the arms trade; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the arms control and agreements currently in force and under negotiation; the United Nations Organization; and special studies of regional and subregional security in Europe and Asia. A detailed chronology lists the major events of 1992-96 related to peace, security, and conflict prevention. The book also includes a useful glossary of terms and acronyms used in the security literature and gives the membership of international organizations concerned with security issues.

North Korea remains a puzzle to Americans. How did this country—one of the most isolated in the world and in the policy cross hairs of every U.S. administration during the past 30 years—progress from zero nuclear weapons in 2001 to a threatening arsenal of perhaps 50 such weapons in 2021? Hinge Points brings readers literally inside the North Korean nuclear program, joining Siegfried Hecker to see what he saw and hear what he heard in his visits to North Korea from 2004 to 2010. Hecker goes beyond the technical details—described in plain English from his on-the-ground experience at the North's nuclear center at Yongbyon—to put the nuclear program exactly where it belongs, in the context of decades of fateful foreign policy decisions in Pyongyang and Washington. Describing these decisions as "hinge points," he traces the consequences of opportunities missed by both sides. The result has been that successive U.S. administrations have been unable to prevent the North, with the weakest of hands, from becoming one of only three countries in the world that might target the United States with nuclear weapons. Hecker's unique ability to marry the technical with the diplomatic is well informed by his interactions with North Korean and U.S. officials over many years, while his years of working with Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear officials have given him an unmatched breadth of experience from which to view and interpret the thinking and perspective of the North Koreans.

This book is a history of nuclear weapons. From their initial theoretical development at the start of the twentieth century to the recent tests in North Korea, Jeremy Bernstein seeks to describe the basic science of nuclear weaponry at each point in the narrative. At the same time, he offers accounts and anecdotes of the personalities involved, many of whom he has known firsthand. Dr Bernstein writes in response to what he sees as a widespread misunderstanding throughout the media and hence among the general public of the basic workings and potential impact of nuclear weaponry. For example, he points out that it has been nearly thirty years since anyone has even seen a nuclear detonation. Likewise, the Nagasaki bomb, primitive when compared to more modern devices, generated an explosion roughly the equivalent of eight thousand copies of the truck bomb used by Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City.

This book examines the likely implications of the CTB for nuclear modernization programmes and the non-proliferation regime. The key considerations affecting decisions by states to join the CTB are reviewed and the likely impact of these decisions on the treaty's non-proliferation goals is assessed.

This sixth volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on current legal challenges regarding nuclear disarmament and security. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for further constructive discourse at both national and international levels. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Chair of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law and President and CEO of ISLAND - The Foundation for International Society of Law and Nuclear Disarmament. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

Leading analysts have predicted for decades that nuclear weapons would help pacify international politics. The core notion is that countries protected by these fearsome weapons can stop competing so intensely with their adversaries: they can end their arms races, scale back their alliances, and stop jockeying for strategic territory. But rarely have theory and practice been so opposed. Why do international relations in the nuclear age remain so competitive? Indeed, why are today's major geopolitical rivalries intensifying? In The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution, Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press tackle the central puzzle of the nuclear age: the persistence of intense geopolitical competition in the shadow of nuclear weapons. They explain why the Cold War superpowers raced so feverishly against each other; why the creation of "mutual assured destruction" does not ensure peace; and why the rapid technological changes of the 21st century will weaken deterrence in critical hotspots around the world. By explaining how the nuclear revolution falls short, Lieber and Press discover answers to the most pressing questions about deterrence in the coming decades: how much capability is required for a reliable nuclear deterrent, how conventional conflicts may become nuclear wars, and how great care is required now to prevent new technology from ushering in an age of nuclear instability.

This book examines the question: is the elimination of nuclear weapons politically feasible and technically practical? With the end of the cold war, a re-thinking of the nuclear foundations of international security is imperative. There are no compelling reasons to perpetuate a cold war-era nuclear security approach. Neither is the world ready to abolish nuclear weapons by agreement. What it is ready for, however, is a radical reappraisal of conventional strategic and disarmament wisdom. The book's explicit focus on non-nuclear security takes issues with prevailing pro- and anti-nuclear views. The study challenges the assumptions of the strategic community that there is no alternative to nuclear security in an anarchic international system and of the advocates of radical nuclear disarmament who propose solutions at the expense of security. Instead, the contributors argue that nuclear weapons abolition should be seen as a long-term process, pursued on a broad political front, aimed at a steady transformation of international politics that encourages security co-operation between states. Individual chapters of the book address the major conceptual, technical, and economic issues in t

Part I discusses the creation of the Commissariat a I'Energie Atomique and outlines its structure and function. Part II focuses on the development of military atomic policy. Originally published in 1965. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

During the 1950s nuclear weapons began to play an increasingly important role in Britain's defence policy. The development of thermonuclear bombs and assessments of the great destruction that would result from an exchange of nuclear warheads helped alter Britain's planning for war, and influenced the structure and deployment of her armed forces. In this study Martin Navias seeks to analyse the significance of the 1957 White Paper on Defence in the context of British strategic planning during the mid-1950s. He assesses claims that the White Paper represented a culmination of trends already prevalent in British defence planning, discusses whether the basis for a truly independent deterrent was established during 1955-6, and identifies continuities and discontinuities in strategic policies. A major theme throughout is the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the shape and size of conventional forces. Before Duncan Sandys became Minister of Defence, that ministry seemed unable to impose itself on the service departments. Sandys, however, was able to override many traditional service preferences. The result was the adoption of a British New Look: conventional forces were reduced, greater relative importance was placed on the nuclear deterrent, but once more the requirements of a truly independent deterrent did not receive priority.

Originating in the armed forces of the early 20th century, weapons based on chemical, biological or nuclear agents have become an everpresent threat that has not vanished after the end of the cold war. Since the technology to produce these agents is nowadays available to
many countries and organizations, including those with terrorist aims, civil authorities across the world need to prepare against incidents involving these agents and train their personnel accordingly.
As an introductory text on NBC CBRN weapons and agents, this book leads the reader from the scientific basics to the current threats and strategies to prepare against them. After an introductory part on the history of NBC CBRN weapons and their international control, the three classes of nuclear/radiological, biological, and chemical weapons are introduced, focusing on agents and delivery vehicles. Current methods
for the rapid detection of NBC CBRN agents are introduced, and the principles of physical protection of humans and structures are explained.
The final parts addresses more general issues of risk management, preparedness and response management, as the set of tools that authorities and civil services will be needed in a future CBRN scenario as well as the likely future scenarios that authorities and civil services will be faced with in the coming years.
This book is a must-have for Health Officers, Public Health Agencies, and Military Authorities.

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) is an independent institute for scientific research, which aims to further an understanding of the conditions for peaceful solutions to international conflicts and for a stable peace. Over the past 20 years, SIPRI has concentrated on problems of armaments, disarmaments, and arms regulation. This study analyzes the evolution of the current security order and the role of nuclear weapons in it. It investigates how and why countries have responded to the existence of nuclear weapons as they have. It traces the development of security thinking in the nuclear age through case studies of countries that have nuclear weapons, those that do not, those on the nuclear threshold and those whose security is believed to benefit from the nuclear arsenals of other countries. The framework of analysis is comparative, and the study provides insight into shared and different appreciations of the impact nuclear weapons have had upon states' understanding of national and international security. This book offers a comprehensive reassessment of the concept of security with nuclear weapons that goes beyond traditional East-West analyses of the nuclea

Since the Second World War five navies are known to have acquired nuclear weapons, and naval forces and activities around the world have become increasingly important and dangerous. However, there has been no serious consideration of naval arms control for more than forty years. SIPRI gathered together a group of experts from eight nations to consider the problems of naval forces and the possibilities for arms control. This book is a product of that conference, and it presents for the first time a broad and detailed assessment of the dangers of the naval arms race, problems with arms control, possible approaches, confidence-building measures, and verification technologies.

Atomic Steppe tells the untold true story of how the obscure country of Kazakhstan said no to the most powerful weapons in human history. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the marginalized Central Asian republic suddenly found itself with the world's fourth largest nuclear arsenal on its territory. Would it give up these fire-ready weapons—or try to become a Central Asian North Korea? This book takes us inside Kazakhstan's extraordinary and little-known nuclear history from the Soviet period to the present. For Soviet officials, Kazakhstan's steppe was not an ecological marvel or beloved homeland, but an empty patch of dirt ideal for nuclear testing. Two-headed lambs were just the beginning of the resulting public health disaster for Kazakhstan—compounded, when the Soviet Union collapsed, by the daunting burden of becoming an overnight nuclear power. Equipped with intimate personal perspective and untapped archival resources, Togzhan Kassenova introduces us to the engineers turned diplomats, villagers turned activists, and scientists turned pacifists who worked toward disarmament. With thousands of nuclear weapons still present around the world, the story of how Kazakhs gave up their nuclear inheritance holds urgent lessons for global security.