The Nuclear Club reveals how a coalition of powerful and developing states embraced global governance in hopes of a bright and peaceful tomorrow. While fears of nuclear war were ever-present, it was the perceived threat to their preeminence that drove Washington, Moscow, and London to throw their weight behind the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) banishing nuclear testing underground, the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco banning atomic armaments from Latin America, and the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) forbidding more countries from joining the most exclusive club on Earth. International society, the Cold War, and the imperial U.S. presidency were reformed from 1945 to 1970, when a global nuclear order was inaugurated, averting conflict in the industrial North and yielding what George Orwell styled a "peace that is no peace" everywhere else. Today the nuclear order legitimizes foreign intervention worldwide, empowering the nuclear club and, above all, the United States, to push sanctions and even preventive war against atomic outlaws, all in humanity's name.

India's nuclear profile, doctrine, and practices have evolved rapidly since the country's nuclear breakout in 1998. However, the outside world's understanding of India's doctrinal debates, forward-looking strategy, and technical developments are still two decades behind the present. India and Nuclear Asia will fill that gap in our knowledge by focusing on the post-1998 evolution of Indian nuclear thought, its arsenal, the triangular rivalry with Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's nonproliferation policy approaches. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell show how India's nuclear trajectory has evolved in response to domestic, regional, and global drivers. The authors argue that emerging trends in all three states are elevating risks of regional inadvertent and accidental escalation. These include the forthcoming launch of naval nuclear forces within an environment of contested maritime boundaries; the growing employment of dual-use delivery vehicles; and the emerging preferences of all three states to employ missiles early in a conflict. These dangers are amplified by the near-absence of substantive nuclear dialogue between these states, and the growing ambiguity of regional strategic intentions. Based on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of nuclear deterrence and India's international relations, as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences both within and outside South Asia.

When plutonium was first manufactured at Berkeley in the spring of 1941, there was so little of it that it was not visible to the naked eye. It took a year to accumulate enough so that one could actually see it. Now so much has been produced that we don't know what to do to get rid of it. We have created a monster.

The history of plutonium is as strange as the element itself. When scientists began looking for it, they did so simply in the spirit of inquiry, not certain whether there were still spots to fill on the periodic table. But the discovery of fission made it clear that this still-hypothetical element would be more than just a scientific curiosity it could be the main ingredient of a powerful nuclear weapon. As it turned out, it is good for almost nothing else. Plutonium's nuclear potential put it at the heart of the World War II arms race the Russians found out about it through espionage, the Germans through independent research, and everybody wanted some. Now it is warehoused around the world the United States alone possesses about forty-seven metric tons but it has almost no practical use outside its role in nuclear weaponry. How did the product of scientific curiosity become such a dangerous burden?

In his history of this complex and dangerous element, noted physicist Jeremy Bernstein describes the steps that were taken to transform plutonium from a laboratory novelty into the nuclear weapon that destroyed Nagasaki. This is the first book to weave together the many strands of plutonium's story, explaining not only the science but also the people involved."

Nuclear proliferation in the Middle East remains an issue of concern. Saudi Arabia's actions will largely rest on Iran's decisions, and discussions and preparations within Saudi Arabia would suggest that it is ready to react to potential shifts in the region's nuclear powers. Saudi Arabia and Nuclear Weapons uses an "inside out" approach that emphasises the Saudis' own national interests in relation to the nuclear threat, and their understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in defense, foreign policy and the concept of deterrence. It is the first study with comprehensive use of the local Arabic language military and civilian media to provide this understanding of official thinking and policy. The Saudi case study is contextualised against the prevailing proliferation models, to conclude that the Saudi case shares both commonalities and elements of uniqueness with other proliferation cases, implying the need for a 'multi-causal' approach. Its comparative analysis also suggests potential implications applicable more broadly to the issue of nuclear proliferation. A comprehensive study of Saudi Arabia's attitude to nuclear weapons, this book offers an exploration of nuclear proliferation that would interest students, scholars and policymakers working in Middle East studies, as well as Military and nuclear proliferation studies.

If you think you know the full story of Trinity Site, birthplace of the atomic bomb, you don't. Robert Oppenheimer didn't built the bomb, it was hand made by engineers, chemists and young physicists in their twenties and many not yet having earned a degree. The first atomic bomb was originally planned as a backup device, a weapon not then currently achievable. The Trinity Site was bombed several times by US aircraft while one Manhattan Project facility was struck by a Japanese weapon. Many commonly held ""facts"" are actually at best unsubstantiated and here for the first time is a book that speaks of a pivot point in history from the point of view of the men who served in the American desert. Five years of research using original letters, memos and reports, many only recently declassified from those involved bring a fresh perspective on the events now approaching it's 75th anniversary.

If the nuclear weapons club were to further expand, would America s democratic allies in Northeast Asia be among the next entrants? Japan, South Korea and Taiwan all have robust civilian nuclear energy programmes that make them virtual nuclear powers according to many analysts. All three once pursued nuclear weapons and all face growing security threats from nuclear-armed adversaries. But will they or rather, under what circumstances might they? This book analyses these past nuclear pursuits and current proliferation drivers. In explaining the nuclear technology that the three now possess, it considers how long it would take each to build a nuclear weapon if such a fateful decision were made. Although nuclear dominoes Northeast Asia cannot be ruled out, the author does not predict such a scenario. Unlike when each previously went down a nuclear path, democracy and a free press now prevail as barriers to building nukes in the basement. Reliance on US defence commitments is a better security alternative -- as long as such guarantees remain credible, an issue that is also assessed. But extended deterrence is not a tight barrier to proliferation of sensitive nuclear technologies. Nuclear hedging by its Northeast Asian partners will challenge Washington s nuclear diplomacy.

This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds-including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author's experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them.

Are nuclear weapons useful for coercive diplomacy? Since 1945, most strategic thinking about nuclear weapons has focused on deterrence - using nuclear threats to prevent attacks against the nation's territory and interests. But an often overlooked question is whether nuclear threats can also coerce adversaries to relinquish possessions or change their behavior. Can nuclear weapons be used to blackmail other countries? The prevailing wisdom is that nuclear weapons are useful for coercion, but this book shows that this view is badly misguided. Nuclear weapons are useful mainly for deterrence and self-defense, not for coercion. The authors evaluate the role of nuclear weapons in several foreign policy contexts and present a trove of new quantitative and historical evidence that nuclear weapons do not help countries achieve better results in coercive diplomacy. The evidence is clear: the benefits of possessing nuclear weapons are almost exclusively defensive, not offensive.

Presidential nominations in the United States can sometimes seem like a media circus, over-hyped and overly speculative. Even informed citizens might be tempted to tune them out. Yet understanding the process, one distinct to American politics, is crucial for civic participation. If presidential elections are about who will lead the nation, presidential nominations are about who appears on the ballot. This concise and coherent Citizen's Guide examines who has power in presidential nominations and how this affects who we as citizens choose to nominate, and ultimately to sit in the Oval Office. Political scientist Wayne Steger defines the nominating system as a tension between an "insider game" and an "outsider game." He explains how candidates must appeal to a broad spectrum of elected and party officials, political activists, and aligned groups in order to form a winning coalition within their party, which changes over time. Either these party insiders unify early behind a candidate, effectively deciding the nominee before anyone casts a vote, or they are divided and the nomination is determined by citizens voting in the caucuses and primaries. Steger portrays how shifts in party unity and the participation of core party constituencies affect the options presented to voters. Amidst all this, the candidate still matters. Primaries with one strong candidate look much different than those with a field of weaker ones. By clearly addressing the key issues, past and present, of presidential nominations, Steger's guide will be informative, relevant, and accessible for students and general readers alike.

Dekades lank het die wereld gegis oor Suid-Afrika en Die Bom. Die land het ses kernbomme in die geheim ontwikkel, maar hulle self vernietig. Geen ander land ter wereld het dit nog ooit gedoen nie. Hierdie boek is vir wetenskaplikes en leke, en lees soos 'n spanningsverhaal. Dit is die volledigste opgaaf van Suid-Afrika se kernwapenvermoe tot dusver, en geskryf deur 'n kernfisikus wat sedert 1975 direk by die proses betrokke was. Saam met sy dogter Lydia von Wielligh-Steyn deel dr. Nic von Wielligh 'n fassinerende verhaal oor die atoommonster en hoe hy getem is.

This book focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy during the period from 1945 to 1964. Based on recently released documents, the book argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations in light of the original balance of principles underlying the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

'Go nuclear' or 'go zero'--as the international community stands at a nuclear crossroads, a number of questions demand urgent attention: How do established and emerging nuclear-armed states manage their nuclear affairs? Who commands and controls a country's nuclear forces? What effect does the balance between secrecy and openness have on larger questions of security and democracy?
Governing Nuclear Weapons is grounded in the belief that the public's ability to hold nuclear-armed states accountable for the security of their weapons is contingent on proper knowledge of domestic nuclear governance. With a special emphasis on civilian control and democratic accountability, it seeks to illuminate the structures and processes of nuclear weapons governance of eight nuclear-armed states: China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US, as well as India, Israel, and Pakistan.
It examines the theoretical as well as practical functions and structures of those who possess the power to make nuclear decisions and those who have the practical means and physical opportunity to execute those decisions. While the book assesses the whole spectrum of political oversight and control mechanisms in operation for each country--including the roles and requirements of the executive, the military and specialized civilian institutions--it also takes a closer look at parliamentary institutions and civil society at large.
As nuclear terrorism, proliferation and disarmament vie for the top slot on the global security agenda, a comparative understanding of the various national nuclear discourses is no longer optional, but required.

Cryptic Concrete explores bunkered sites in Cold War Germany in order to understand the inner workings of the Cold War state. A scholarly work that suggests a reassessment of the history of geo- and bio-politics Attempts to understand the material architecture that was designed to protect and take life in nuclear war Zooms in on two types of structures - the nuclear bunker and the atomic missile silo Analyzes a broad range of sources through the lens of critical theory and argues for an appreciation of the two subterranean structures' complementary nature

We are at a time when international law and the law of war are particularly important. The testing of nuclear weapons that is being used in the rhetoric surrounding threats of war is creating new fears and heightening current tensions. Richard Falk has for decades been an outspoken authority calling for nuclear disarmament and the enforcement of non-proliferation treaties. In this collection of essays, Falk examines the global threats to all humanity posed by nuclear weapons. He is not satisfied with accepting arms control measures as a managerial stopgap to these threats and seeks no less than to move the world back from the nuclear precipice and towards denuclearization. Falk's essays reflect the wisdom and innovative thinking he has brought to his long career as a scholar and activist, as he reminds nuclear weapons states of their obligation under international law and moral imperative to seek nuclear disarmament.

This sixth volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on current legal challenges regarding nuclear disarmament and security. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for further constructive discourse at both national and international levels. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Chair of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law and President and CEO of ISLAND - The Foundation for International Society of Law and Nuclear Disarmament. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

Proliferation of WMD technologies is by no means a new concern for the international community. Indeed, since the signing of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968, tremendous energies have been expended upon diplomatic efforts to create a web of treaties and international organizations regulating the production and stockpiling of WMD sensitive materials within states, as well as their spread through the increasingly globalized channels of international trade to other states and non-state actors.
However, the intervention in 2003 by Western powers in Iraq has served as an illustration of the importance of greater understanding of and attention to this area of law, as disagreements over its content and application have once again lead to a potentially destabilizing armed intervention by members of the United Nations into the sovereign territory of another member state. Other ongoing disputes between states regarding the character of obligations work assumed under non-proliferation treaty instruments, and the effect of international organizations' decisions in this area, form some of the most contentious and potentially destabilizing issues of foreign policy concern for many states.
This book provides a comprehensive analysis of international law and organizations in the area of WMD proliferation. It will serve both as a reference for understanding the law as it currently exists in its political and economic context, as well as an analysis of areas in which amendments to existing law and organizations are needed.

In December 2016, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists moved their iconic "Doomsday Clock" thirty seconds forward to two and a half minutes to midnight, the latest it has been set since 1952, the year of the first United States hydrogen bomb test. But a group of scientists-geologists, engineers, and physicists-has been fighting to turn back the clock. Since the dawn of the Cold War, they have advocated a halt to nuclear testing, their work culminating in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which still awaits ratification from China, Iran, North Korea-and the United States. The backbone of the treaty is every nation's ability to independently monitor the nuclear activity of the others. The noted seismologist Lynn R. Sykes, one of the central figures in the development of the science and technology used in monitoring, has dedicated his career to halting nuclear testing. In Silencing the Bomb, he tells the inside story behind scientists' quest for disarmament. Called upon time and again to testify before Congress and to inform the public, Sykes and his colleagues were, for much of the Cold War, among the only people on earth able to say with certainty when and where a bomb was tested and how large it was. Methods of measuring earthquakes, researchers realized, could also detect underground nuclear explosions. When politicians on both sides of the Iron Curtain attempted to sidestep disarmament or test ban treaties, Sykes was able to deploy the nascent science of plate tectonics to reveal the truth. Seismologists' discoveries helped bring about treaties limiting nuclear testing, but it was their activism that played a key role in the quest for peace. Full of intrigue, international politics, and hard science used for the global good, Silencing the Bomb is a timely and necessary chronicle of one scientist's efforts to keep the clock from striking midnight.

The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945 unleashed a force as mysterious as it was deadly--radioactivity. In 1946, the United States government created the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) to serve as a permanent agency in Japan with the official mission of studying the medical effects of radiation on the survivors. The next ten years saw the ABCC's most intensive research on the genetic effects of radiation, and up until 1974 the ABCC scientists published papers on the effects of radiation on aging, life span, fertility, and disease.
"Suffering Made Real" is the first comprehensive history of the ABCC's research on how radiation affected the survivors of the atomic bomb. Arguing that Cold War politics and cultural values fundamentally shaped the work of the ABCC, M. Susan Lindee tells the compelling story of a project that raised disturbing questions about the ethical implications of using human subjects in scientific research.
How did the politics of the emerging Cold War affect the scientists' biomedical research and findings? How did the ABCC document and publicly present the effects of radiation? Why did the ABCC refuse to provide medical treatment to the survivors? Through a detailed examination of ABCC policies, archival materials, the minutes of committee meetings, newspaper accounts, and interviews with ABCC scientists, Lindee explores how political and cultural interests were reflected in the day-to-day operations of this controversial research program.
Set against a period of conflicting views of nuclear weapons and nuclear power, "Suffering Made Real" follows the course of a politically charged research program and reveals indetail how politics and cultural values can shape the conduct, results, and uses of science.

Drawing on the voices of atomic bomb survivors and the new science of forensic archaeology, Charles Pellegrino describes the events and the aftermath of two days in August when nuclear devices, detonated over Japan, changed life on Earth forever. To Hell and Back offers readers a stunning, "you are there" time capsule, wrapped in elegant prose. Charles Pellegrino's scientific authority and close relationship with the A-bomb survivors make his account the most gripping and authoritative ever written. At the narrative's core are eyewitness accounts of those who experienced the atomic explosions firsthand-the Japanese civilians on the ground. As the first city targeted, Hiroshima is the focus of most histories. Pellegrino gives equal weight to the bombing of Nagasaki, symbolized by the thirty people who are known to have fled Hiroshima for Nagasaki-where they arrived just in time to survive the second bomb. One of them, Tsutomu Yamaguchi, is the only person who experienced the full effects of both cataclysms within Ground Zero. The second time, the blast effects were diverted around the stairwell behind which Yamaguchi's office conference was convened-placing him and few others in a shock cocoon that offered protection while the entire building disappeared around them. Pellegrino weaves spellbinding stories together within an illustrated narrative that challenges the "official report," showing exactly what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki-and why. Also available from compatible vendors is an enhanced e-book version containing never-before-seen video clips of the survivors, their descendants, and the cities as they are today. Filmed by the author during his research in Japan, these 18 videos are placed throughout the text, taking readers beyond the page and offering an eye-opening and personal way to understand how the effects of the atomic bombs are still felt 70 years after detonation.

This work features the classified lectures that galvanized the Manhattan Project scientists - with annotations for the nonspecialist reader and an introduction by a Pulitzer Prize-winning historian. In March 1943 a group of young scientists, sequestered on a mesa near Santa Fe, attended a crash course in the new atomic physics. The lecturer was Robert Serber, J. Robert Oppenheimer's protege, and they learned that their job was to invent the world's first atomic bomb. Serber's lecture notes, nicknamed the "Los Alamos Primer", were mimeographed and passed from hand to hand, remaining classified for many years. They are published here for the first time, and now contemporary readers can see just how much was known and how terrifyingly much was unknown when the Manhattan Project began. Could this 'gadget', based on the newly discovered principles of nuclear fission, really be designed and built? Could it be small enough and light enough for an airplane to carry? If it could be built, could it be controlled? Working with Richard Rhodes, Pulitzer Prize-winning historian of the development of the atomic bomb, Professor Serber has annotated original lecture notes with explanations of the physics terms for the nonspecialist. His preface, an informal memoir, vividly conveys the mingled excitement, uncertainty, and intensity felt by the Manhattan Project scientists. Rhodes' introduction provides a brief history of the development of atomic physics up to the day that Serber stood before his blackboard at Los Alamos. In this edition, "The Los Alamos Primer" finally emerges from the archives to give a new understanding of the very beginning of nuclear weapons. No seminar anywhere has had greater historical consequences.

The recent controversy over Iran's nuclear programme represents an early and important test for a distinctively European approach to addressing concerns about suspected programmes for the development of weapons of mass destruction. Against this background, the report brings together European and Iranian perspectives on a range of security- and proliferation-related issues that have a bearing on diplomatic efforts to resolve the controversy. The contributors describe the discussions under way between Europe, Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency aimed at clarifying the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear activities. They examine the development of the European Union's strategy to combat the spread of WMD; Iran's evolving security and defence structures and policies, including Iranian thinking about deterrence-based defence strategies and the requirements for credibly implementing them; and the internal dynamics of security policy decision making in Iran. The report highlights some of the problems and possibilities inherent in the EU's efforts to implement a more targeted, multifunctional strategy to prevent WMD proliferation.

General requirements for establishing a verification regime in the context of moving towards a nuclear weapon-free world have been the subject of numerous studies during the past decade. The studies presented in this book add significantly to the general discussion by addressing the technical means and procedures for establishing transparency in nuclear warheads and materials in the nuclear weapons states.

Some states have violated international commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. Yet the effects of international sanctions or positive inducements on their internal politics remain highly contested. How have trade, aid, investments, diplomacy, financial measures and military threats affected different groups? How, when and why were those effects translated into compliance with non-proliferation rules? Have inducements been sufficiently biting, too harsh, too little, too late or just right for each case? How have different inducements influenced domestic cleavages? What were their unintended and unforeseen effects? Why are self-reliant autocracies more often the subject of sanctions? Leading scholars analyse the anatomy of inducements through novel conceptual perspectives, in-depth case studies, original quantitative data and newly translated documents. The volume distils ten key dilemmas of broad relevance to the study of statecraft, primarily from experiences with Iraq, Libya, Iran and North Korea, bound to spark debate among students and practitioners of international politics.

Despite the global spread of nuclear hardware and knowledge, at least half of the nuclear weapons projects launched since 1970 have definitively failed, and even the successful projects have generally needed far more time than expected. To explain this puzzling slowdown in proliferation, Jacques E. C. Hymans focuses on the relations between politicians and scientific and technical workers in developing countries. By undermining the workers' spirit of professionalism, developing country rulers unintentionally thwart their own nuclear ambitions. Combining rich theoretical analysis, in-depth historical case studies of Iraq, China, Yugoslavia and Argentina and insightful analyses of current-day proliferant states, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions develops a powerful new perspective that effectively counters the widespread fears of a coming cascade of new nuclear powers.