Making the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party 's nuclear tests in 1998 its starting point, this book examines how opinion amongst India 's attentive public shifted from supporting nuclear abstinence to accepting and even feeling a need for a more assertive policy, by examining the complexities of the debate in India on nuclear policy in the 1990s.

The study seeks to account for the shift in opinion by looking at the parallel processes of how nuclear policy became an important part of the public discourse in India, and what it came to symbolise for the country 's intelligentsia during this decade. It argues that the pressure on New Delhi in the early 1990s to fall in line with the non-proliferation regime, magnified by India 's declining global influence at the time, caused the issue to cease being one of defence, making it a focus of nationalist pride instead. The country 's nuclear programme thus emerged as a test of its ability to withstand external compulsions, guaranteeing not so much the sanctity of its borders as a certain political idea of it that of a modern, scientific and, most importantly, sovereign state able to defend its policies and set its goals.

This book explores the conditions under which Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZs) can be established. It analyzes four hypotheses that explain the factors contributing to the formation of NWFZs, building upon realist, constructivist and liberal theories from international relations. Through structured focused comparison, the book presents and compares the emergence of NWFZs in Latin America, the South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia, and the Middle East, which is a prospect for a NWFZ. The book argues that NWFZ projects depend on the following conditions: the security interest of regional states in avoiding nuclear threats, preexisting regional institutions and regional economic cooperation, leadership by a core of regional powers and shared interest in spreading non-proliferation norms. Democracy is not a necessary condition, but democratization can help overcome barriers presented by hesitant or opposed regional governments. As too many of the mentioned necessary conditions are lacking in the Middle East, a NWFZ project, thus, will be possible only after major political changes. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, arms control, security studies and International Relations.

This book investigates what is driving Iran's nuclear weapons programme in a less-hostile regional environment, using a theory of protracted conflicts to explicate proliferation. Iran's nuclear weapons program has alarmed the international community since the 1990s, but has come to the forefront of international security concerns since 2000. This book argues that Iran's hostility with the United States remains the major causal factor for its proliferation activities. With the US administration pursuing aggressive foreign policies towards Iran since 2000, the latter's security threat intensified. A society that is split on many important domestic issues remained united on the issue of nuclear weapons acquisition after the US war in Iraq. Consequently, Iran became determined in its drive to acquire nuclear weapons and boldly announced its decision to enrich uranium, leaving the US in no doubt about its nuclear status. This book underscores the importance of protracted conflicts in proliferation decisions, and underpinning this is the assumption that non-proliferation may be achieved through the termination of intractable conflicts. The aims of this work are to demonstrate that a state's decision to acquire nuclear weapons depends largely on its engagement in protracted conflicts, which shows not only that the presence of nuclear rivals intensifies the nuclear ambition, but also that non-nuclear status of rival states can promote non-proliferation incentives in conflicting states inclined to proliferate. This study will be of great interest to students of Iran, Middle Eastern politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations theory. Saira Khan is a Research Associate in the McGill-University of Montreal Joint Research Group in International Security (REGIS).

This book looks at the prospects for international cooperation over nuclear weapons proliferation in the 21st century.

Nuclear weapons served as stabilizing forces during the Cold War, or the First Nuclear Age, on account of their capability for destruction, the fear that this created among politicians and publics, and the domination of the nuclear world order by two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the potential for nuclear weapons acquisition among revisionist states, or even non-state actors including terrorists, creates the possibility of a 'wolves eat dogs' phenomenon in the present century.

In the 21st century, three forces threaten to undo or weaken the long nuclear peace and fast-forward states into a new and more dangerous situation: the existence of large US and Russian nuclear weapons arsenals; the potential for new technologies, including missile defenses and long-range, precision conventional weapons, and a collapse or atrophy of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and the opening of the door for nuclear weapons to spread among more than the currently acknowledged nuclear states.

This book explains how these three 'weakening' forces interact with one another and with US and Russian policy-making in order to create an environment of large possibilities for cooperative security - but also of considerable danger. Instead, the choices made by military planners and policy-makers will create an early twenty-first century story privileging nuclear stability or chaos. The US and Russia can, and should, make incremental progress in arms control and nonproliferation.

This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation and arms control, strategic studies, international security and IR in general.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Pennsylvania State University. He is the author of numerous works in the fields of international security, defense studies, nuclear arms control and other topics. He has consulted for various US government agencies and defense contractors.

India s Nuclear Bomb and National Security gives an analytic account of the dynamics of India's nuclear build up. It puts forward a new comprehensive model, which goes beyond the classic strategic model of accepting motives of arming behaviour, and incorporates the dynamics in India s nuclear programme. The core argument of the book surrounds the question about India's security considerations and their impact on India's nuclear policy development.

Karsten Frey explores this analytic model by including explanatory variables on the unit-level, where interests are generally related to symbolic, less strategic values attributed to nuclear weapons. These play a significant role within India's domestic political party competition and among certain pressure groups. They also impacted India's relationship with other countries on non-proliferation matters, for example the concept of the country's 'status' and 'prestige'.

Identifying the role of the strategic elite in determining India's nuclear course, this book also argues that one of the pivotal driving forces behind India's quest for the nuclear bomb is India's struggle for international recognition and the strong, often obsessive sensitivities of India's elite regarding 'acts of discrimination' or 'ignorance' by the West towards India.

The Project on Nuclear Issues 2013 conference series included events at Northrop Grumman in May, Sandia National Laboratory in July, and CSIS in December, before concluding with a Capstone Conference at Offutt Air Force Base, home of the U.S. Strategic Command, in March 2014. The papers included in this volume are a collection of some of the presentations delivered at the Capstone Conference. Spanning a wide range of technical and policy issues, these selected papers hope to further discussion in their respective areas, as well as contribute to the success of the greater nuclear community.

Previous works on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) have approached the topic from the point of view of the U.S. and its allies, while Cuban experiences have still not been sufficiently discussed. This book presents new aspects which have seldom - or never - been offered before, giving a detailed account of the crisis from a Cuban perspective. It also investigates the archaeological and anthropological aspects of the crisis, by exploring the tangible and intangible remains that still can be found on the former Soviet missile bases in the Cuban countryside, and through interviews which add a local, human dimension to the subject.

Nuclear disarmament is firmly back on the international agenda. But almost all current thinking on the subject is focused on the process of reducing the number of weapons from thousands to hundreds. This rigorous analysis examines the challenges that exist to abolishing nuclear weapons completely, and suggests what can be done now to start overcoming them. The paper argues that the difficulties of 'getting to zero' must not preclude many steps being taken in that direction. It thus begins by examining steps that nuclear-armed states could take in cooperation with others to move towards a world in which the task of prohibiting nuclear weapons could be realistically envisaged. The remainder of the paper focuses on the more distant prospect of prohibiting nuclear weapons, beginning with the challenge of verifying the transition from low numbers to zero. It moves on to examine how the civilian nuclear industry could be managed in a nuclear-weapons-free world so as to prevent rearmament. The paper then considers what political-security conditions would be required to make a nuclear-weapons ban enforceable and explores how enforcement might work in practice. Finally, it addresses the latent capability to produce nuclear weapons that would inevitably exist after abolition, and asks whether this is a barrier to disarmament, or whether it can be managed to meet the security needs of a world newly free of the bomb.

A much-needed exploration of when, and under what conditions, could a conflict transform to a level of almost indefinite protraction.

Saira Khan argues that with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states in a conflict, the situation is transformed to a level of indefinite protraction. She maintains that such crises are embedded in each protracted conflict and that their escalation to war depends on the nuclear status of the adversaries.

Khan also shows how pre-nuclear states have a tendency to manage serious crises with full-scale wars, while nuclear adversaries tend to use violent clashes or low-to-medium intensity violence as crises management tools. The occurrence of frequent crises and continuance of low-to-medium intensity violence - functions of the absence of wars - generate a situation where the life of a protracted conflict changes direction. It is this change that transforms the conflict and has a propensity of keeping the conflict alive indefinitely.

This book will appeal to all students of strategic studies, international relations and security.

Pakistan is a vitally important country in the contemporary global political system. It is a de facto nuclear state, and a pivotal country in the War on Terror. This book provides a comprehensive study of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, investigating the implications of its emergence as a nuclear weapons state.

Setting out the historical background of Pakistani nuclear development, the book examines the lessons for proliferation that can be drawn from the Pakistan case. It explains the changes and continuities of Pakistan's nuclear policy, assessing its emerging force posture and the implications for Pakistani, South Asian and global security. It also considers the extent to which Pakistan can be said to have a nuclear doctrine, the Pakistani nuclear command and control system, and the relationship between Pakistan and the Non-Proliferation regime. Addressing the issue of whether Pakistan should be viewed as a proliferator, and the implications of a nuclear Pakistan for global terrorism, Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons is an important study of all the major issues surrounding Pakistan's emergence as a nuclear power.

This edited volume explores competing perspectives on the impact of nuclear weapons proliferation on the South Asian security environment. The spread of nuclear weapons is one of the world's foremost security concerns. The effect of nuclear weapons on the behaviour of newly nuclear states, and the potential for future international crises, are of particular concern. As a region of burgeoning economic and political importance, South Asia offers a crucial test of proliferation's effects on the crisis behaviour of newly nuclear states. This volume creates a dialogue between scholars who believe that nuclear weapons have stabilized the subcontinent, and those who believe that nuclear weapons have made South Asia more conflict prone. It does so by pairing competing analyses of four major regional crises: the 1987 "Brasstacks" crisis, the Indo-Pakistani crisis of 1990, the 1999 Kargil war, which occurred after the nuclear tests; and the 2001-2 Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. In addition, the volume explores the implications of the South Asian nuclear experience for potential new nuclear states such as North Korea and Iran.

In the 1980s the West German Peace Movement -- fearing that the stationing of NATO nuclear missiles in Germany threatened an imminent nuclear war in Europe -- engaged in massive protests, including sustained civil disobedience in the form of sit-down demonstrations. Civil Disobedience and the German Courts traces the historical and philosophical background of this movement and follows a group of demonstrators through their trials in the German criminal courts up to the German Constitutional Court -- in which their fate was determined in two important constitutional cases. In this context, the volume also analyzes the German Constitutional Court, as a crucial institution of government, in comparative perspective. The book is the first full-length English language treatment of these events and these constitutional decisions, and it also places the decisions at an important turning-point in German constitutional history.

Since the end of the Cold War, globalization has brought new actors to the political arena. One of those which has attracted considerable attention in academic research is civil society or NGOs. Claudia Kissling addresses the topic of civil society participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The regime qualifies well for this objective since it features, given its characteristics as a treaty regime in the international security field, notable legal avenues for civil society participation. The study takes on a twofold perspective. It addresses the empirical question of whether civil society can contribute to the evolution of regimes in the security field, especially when it comes to security cooperation. It also questions whether civil society can, under certain conditions, contribute to the democratic quality of international decision-making. Here, empirical findings are used in order to test normative political theories on the legitimacy and democracy of global institutions.

This book offers a broader theory of nuclear deterrence and examines the way nuclear and conventional deterrence interact with non-military factors in a series of historical case studies. The existing body of literature largely leans toward the analytical primacy of nuclear deterrence and it is often implicitly assumed that nuclear weapons are so important that, when they are present, other factors need not be studied. This book addresses this omission. It develops a research framework that incorporates the military aspects of deterrence, both nuclear and conventional, together with various perceptual factors, international circumstances, domestic politics, and norms. This framework is then used to re-examine five historical crises that brought two nuclear countries to the brink of war: the hostile asymmetric nuclear relations between the United States and China in the early 1960s; between the Soviet Union and China in the late 1960s; between Israel and Iraq in 1977-1981; between the United States and North Korea in 1992-1994; and, finally, between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. The main empirical findings challenge the common expectation that the threat of nuclear retaliation represents the ultimate deterrent. In fact, it can be said, with a high degree of confidence, that it was rather the threat of conventional retaliation that acted as a major stabilizer. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, cold war studies, deterrence theory, security studies and IR in general.

In the 1980s the West German Peace Movement -- fearing that the stationing of NATO nuclear missiles in Germany threatened an imminent nuclear war in Europe -- engaged in massive protests, including sustained civil disobedience in the form of sit-down demonstrations.

Civil Disobedience and the German Courts traces the historical and philosophical background of this movement and follows a group of demonstrators through their trials in the German criminal courts up to the German Constitutional Court -- in which their fate was determined in two important constitutional cases. In this context, the volume also analyzes the German Constitutional Court, as a crucial institution of government, in comparative perspective.

The book is the first full-length English language treatment of these events and constitutional decisions, and it also places the decisions at an important turning-point in German constitutional history.

Drawing on the author's personal experience, this book presents an insider's chronology and policy analysis of the EU's role in the nuclear negotiations with Iran. The European Union strives to be a global player, a "soft power" leader that can influence international politics and state behavior. Yet critics argue that the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) remains largely ineffective and incoherent. The EU's early and continuous involvement in the effort to dissuade Iran from developing nuclear weapons can be viewed as a test case for the EU as a global actor. As Chair of the European Parliament's delegation for relations with Iran, Tarja Cronberg had a ringside seat in the negotiations to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Drawing on her experiences leading a parliamentary delegation to Iran and interviews with officials, legislators and opposition leaders in nearly every country participating in the negotiations, as well as reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency, parliaments and independent experts, the author illustrates an insider's strategic understanding of the negotiations. Intersecting history, politics, economics, culture and the broader security context, this book not only delivers a unique analysis of this historic deal and the twelve-year multilateral pursuit of it, but draws from it pertinent lessons for European policy makers for the future. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, EU policy, diplomacy and international relations in general.

The concept and utility of strategic defense should be evaluated in an embracing cultural context defined by the values, attitudes, and worldview of society-its ethos. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) responds both to changes in the American ethos and to shifts in the balance of power. Together, these changes have undermined the basis of U.S.

For many years historians of the Cuban missile crisis have concentrated on those thirteen days in October 1962 when the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Mark White s study adds an equally intense scrutiny of the causes and consequences of the crisis. "Missiles in Cuba" is based on up-to-date scholarship as well as Mr. White s own findings in National Security Archive materials, Kennedy Library tapes of ExComm meetings, and correspondence between Soviet officials in Washington and Havana all newly released. His more rounded picture gives us a much clearer understanding of the policy strategies pursued by the United States and the Soviet Union (and, to a lesser extent, Cuba) that brought on the crisis. His almost hour-by-hour account of the confrontation itself also destroys some venerable myths, such as the unique initiatives attributed to Robert Kennedy. And his assessment of the consequences of the crisis points to salutary effects on Soviet-American relation and on U.S. nuclear defense strategy, but questionable influences on Soviet defense spending and on Washington s perception of its talents for "crisis management," later tested in Vietnam.

"On Thermonuclear War" was controversial when originally published and remains so today. It is iconoclastic, crosses disciplinary boundaries, and finally it is calm and compellingly reasonable. The book was widely read on both sides of the Iron Curtain and the result was serious revision in both Western and Soviet strategy and doctrine. As a result, both sides were better able to avoid disaster during the Cold War.

The strategic concepts still apply: defense, local animosities, and the usual balance-of-power issues are still very much with us. Kahn's stated purpose in writing this book was simply: "avoiding disaster and buying time, without specifying the use of this time." By the late 1950s, with both sides H-bomb-armed, reason and time were in short supply. Kahn, a military analyst at Rand since 1948, understood that a defense based only on thermonuclear arnaments was inconceivable, morally questionable, and not credible.

The book was the first to make sense of nuclear weapons. Originally created from a series of lectures, it provides insight into how policymakers consider such issues. One may agree with Kahn or disagree with him on specific issues, but he clearly defined the terrain of the argument. He also looks at other weapons of mass destruction such as biological and chemical, and the history of their use. The Cold War is over, but the nuclear genie is out of the bottle, and the lessons and principles developed in "On Thermonuclear War" apply as much to today's China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea as they did to the Soviets.

"India's Nuclear Bomb and National Security" gives an analytic account of the dynamics of India's nuclear build up. It puts forward a new comprehensive model, which goes beyond the classic strategic model of accepting motives of arming behaviour, and incorporates the dynamics in India's nuclear programme. The core argument of the book surrounds the question about India's security considerations and their impact on India's nuclear policy development.
Karsten Frey explores this analytic model by including explanatory variables on the unit-level, where interests are generally related to symbolic, less strategic values attributed to nuclear weapons. These play a significant role within India's domestic political party competition and among certain pressure groups. They also impacted India's relationship with other countries on non-proliferation matters, for example the concept of the country's 'status' and 'prestige'.
Identifying the role of the strategic elite in determining India's nuclear course, this book also argues that one of the pivotal driving forces behind India's quest for the nuclear bomb is India's struggle for international recognition and the strong, often obsessive sensitivities of India's elite regarding 'acts of discrimination' or 'ignorance' by the West towards India.

This important new book explores the strategic reasons behind the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons as well as ballistic missile delivery systems in the Greater Middle East. It examines the uses and limitations of chemical weapons in regional combat, ballistic missile warfare and defenses, as well as Iran's drive for nuclear weapons and the likely regional reactions should Tehran acquire a nuclear weapons inventory. This book also discusses Chinese assistance to WMD and ballistic programs in the Greater Middle East. Finally, this book recommends policy options for American diplomacy to counter the challenges posed by WMD proliferation. This essential study prepares the ground for the challenges facing the international community. Richard Russell is a professor at the National Defense University's Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies in Washington, DC. He also teaches at the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He previously served as a political-military analyst at the CIA.

In Euromissiles, Susan Colbourn tells the story of the height of nuclear crisis and the remarkable waning of the fear that gripped the globe. In the Cold War conflict that pitted nuclear superpowers against one another, Europe was the principal battleground. Washington and Moscow had troops on the ground and missiles in the fields of their respective allies, the NATO nations and the states of the Warsaw Pact. Euromissiles-intermediate-range nuclear weapons to be used exclusively in the regional theater of war-highlighted how the peoples of Europe were dangerously placed between hammer and anvil. That made European leaders uncomfortable and pushed fearful masses into the streets demanding peace in their time. At the center of the story is NATO. Colbourn highlights the weakness of the alliance seen by many as the most effective bulwark against Soviet aggression. Divided among themselves and uncertain about the depth of US support, the member states were riven by the missile issue. This strategic crisis was, as much as any summit meeting between US president Ronald Reagan and Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, the hinge on which the Cold War turned. Euromissiles is a history of diplomacy and alliances, social movements and strategy, nuclear weapons and nagging fears, and politics. To tell that history, Colbourn takes a long view of the strategic crisis-from the emerging dilemmas of allied defense in the early 1950s through the aftermath of the INF Treaty thirty-five years later. The result is a dramatic and sweeping tale that changes the way we think about the Cold War and its culmination.

This Adelphi Paper examines the motives behind Libyaa (TM)s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafia (TM)s rise to power in 1969 through to the end of 2003. It also assesses the proliferation pathways that the regime followed during this period, including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance, subsequently relying on technological infusions from the A.Q. Khan network.

Wyn Q. Bowen clearly analyzes the decision to give up the quest for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced the Gadhafi regimea (TM)s calculations, including the perceived need to re-engage, both politically and economically, with the international community, particularly the United States. It explores the process of dismantling the nuclear programme and the question of whether Libya constitutes a a ~modela (TM) for addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.

This collection examines the extent to which nuclear weapons modernization has become a significant point of concern and consideration in international security. Recent statements and substantial investments by nuclear weapon possessor states in the upkeep and modernization of their nuclear postures - particularly the United States, Russia and China - illustrate a return of primacy and the salience of nuclear forces in international politics. The upgrading of systems, the introduction of new capabilities, the intermingling of new technologies, and the advancement of new strategic models, are all indicative of their elevation in importance and reliance. With contributions from leading thinkers in the nuclear weapons domain, this book elucidates the global strategic and policy implications such modernization efforts by the above-mentioned states will have on international security. In unpacking and conceptualizing this developing source of potential (in)security and tension, the collection not only provides a technical context, but also frames the likely effects modernization could have on the relations between these nuclear weapon powers and the larger impact upon efforts to curb nuclear weapons - both in terms of horizontal and vertical proliferation. The chapters have been arranged so as to inform a variety of stakeholders, from academics to policy-makers, by connecting analytical and normative insights, and thereby, advancing debates pertaining to where nuclear modernization sits as a point of global security consternation in the 21st century.

A "second nuclear age" has begun in the post-Cold War world. Created by the expansion of nuclear arsenals and new proliferation in Asia, it has changed the familiar nuclear geometry of the Cold War. Increasing potency of nuclear arsenals in China, India, and Pakistan, the nuclear breakout in North Korea, and the potential for more states to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold from Iran to Japan suggest that the second nuclear age of many competing nuclear powers has the potential to be even less stable than the first. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age assembles a group of distinguished scholars to grapple with the matter of how the United States, its allies, and its friends must size up the strategies, doctrines, and force structures currently taking shape if they are to design responses that reinforce deterrence amid vastly more complex strategic circumstances. By focusing sharply on strategy - that is, on how states use doomsday weaponry for political gain - the book distinguishes itself from familiar net assessments emphasizing quantifiable factors like hardware, technical characteristics, and manpower. While the emphasis varies from chapter to chapter, contributors pay special heed to the logistical, technological, and social dimensions of strategy alongside the specifics of force structure and operations. They never lose sight of the human factor - the pivotal factor in diplomacy, strategy, and war.