With the dissolution of the Soviet Union the nuclear threats facing the world are constantly evolving and have grown more complex since the end of the Cold War. The diversion of complete weapon systems or nuclear material to rogue nations and terrorist organizations has increased and new nuclear powers (e.g. Iran, Korea, Pakistan and India) have further complicated global proliferation issues. The events of the past years have proved the necessity to reevaluate these threats on a level never before considered. In recognition that no single country possesses all of the answers to the critical scientific, institutional and legal questions associated with combating nuclear and radiological terrorism, the 2005 Workshop and this proceeding was structured to promote wide-ranging, multi-national exploration of critical technology needs and underlying scientific challenges to reducing the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism; to illustrate through country-specific presentations how resulting technologies were used in national programs; and to outline the role of legal, policy and institutional frameworks in countering nuclear/radiological terrorism. One key outcome of this book is better understanding of the independent contributions from across the international community of the scientific and technological components and the legal, policy and institutional components to combating nuclear/radiological terrorism. The book can serve as a tool for communicating the outcomes of the workshop not only to the multi-national scientific communities engaged in combating nuclear/radiological terrorism, but also to those working at governmental and policy levels whose actions affect the directionsscience takes and how the technology is incorporated into country-specific national systems for combating nuclear/radiological terrorism.

"Treating Weapons Proliferation" is a chilling exploration of the dynamics of weapons proliferation and nonproliferation. Through an analogy with the disease of cancer, the book walks the reader through the history of the phenomenon, its growing complexities and changing dimensions, its causes and consequences, and the various policy responses currently available to address it. Taking stock of the nature and challenges of such responses, the book shows that there is no all-encompassing cure for weapons proliferation at the present time, only treatments of relative and contextual effectiveness. Simply put, weapons proliferation, like cancer, has no single cure, but it is a condition that can often be treated, sometimes successfully.

This book explores the history of the nuclear nonproliferation dialogue between Russia (USSR) and the United States. By looking into the particulars of bilateral cooperation on NPT, Cooperative Threat Reduction program, arms control, and other issues, the authors offer lessons to be learned in preventing nuclear confrontations in the future. The book has been prepared in coordination between Russian and American scholars and experts and is a result of a series of Track 2.5 events devoted to restoring the nonproliferation cooperation between Russia and the United States. Covering all the aspects of the bilateral partnership since 1960 until today, this book will interest scholars of great power conflicts and nonproliferation. The workshop and the consequent work on the monograph became possible thanks to generous organizational & financial support from Centre russe d`etudes politiques (Geneva) and the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (Monterey, USA).

This book offers new perspectives on British nuclear policy-making at the height of the Cold War, arguing that the decisions taken by the British government during the 1950s and 1960s in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions cannot be properly understood without close reference to Duncan Sandys, and in particular the policy preferences that emerged from his experiences of the Second World War and his efforts leading Britain's campaign against the V-1 and V-2. Immersing himself in this campaign against unmanned weaponry, Sandys came to see ballistic missiles as the only guarantor of nuclear credibility in the post-war world, placing them at the centre of his strategic thinking and developing a sincerely-held and logically-consistent belief system which he carried with him through a succession of ministerial roles, allowing him to exert a previously undocumented level of influence on the nature of Britain's nuclear capabilities and its approach to the Cold War. This book shows the profound influence Sandys' personal belief system had on Britain's attempts to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent.

This book addresses the under-researched discourse of the evolution of Chinese nuclear posture, and in particular, explains the absence from this evolution of a coherent and well-defined operational doctrine. Using a neoclassical realist framework, the book explains why China, after having launched a crash programme in the mid-1950s to develop a nuclear deterrent, did not debate a clear operational doctrine with respect to targeting and employment until the mid-1980s.

Will the 21st century see terrorist fingers on the nuclear trigger? How likely is it terrorists will obtain weapons of mass destruction? What factors would determine their decision to use them? In this text the author assesses the causes for, and implications of, the escalating lethality of terrorism. The growing opportunities for nuclear proliferation, primarily arising from the collapse of the Soviet Union are explained. The book concludes that the organizational and psychological pressures within terrorist groups and the changing nature of political violence combined with the heightened danger of nuclear micro proliferation have made mass destructive terrorism the greatest non traditional threat to international security in the world today.

This volume affords a fascinating and rare look at the sensitive issue of nuclear diplomacy between two critical Cold War allies, the United States and Japan, during the 1960s. Challenging the silence of the official bureaucracies in Washington and Tokyo, Wakaizumi Kei reveals the truth behind the secret 1969 agreement that ensured the eventual reversion of Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction in 1972. Revelation of this secret accord created considerable controversy in Japan when Wakaizumi's memoir was first published in 1994. With the publication of this translation, his description of the events leading up to the closed-door agreement is available to an English-language audience for the first time.

At a time when security matters are once again predominant in the U.S. -- Japan alliance, Professor Wakaizumi's account is a timely reminder of the gap between official, media-filtered descriptions of diplomatic relations and the private discussions of national leaders. The long-standing reluctance of the Japanese government to declassify its postwar diplomatic records has meant that Japan's side of its relationship with the U.S. has been only partially revealed. The Best Course Available attempts to correct this shortcoming and at the same time provides insight into the complicated and arcane process of foreign policymaking, national leadership, and domestic politics in Japan after 1945.

The nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union are larger, better equipped, and deadlier than at any other time in history. This incisive book contends that the superpowers, while exhibiting enormous ingenuity in the area of arms development, have shown only a minimal interest toward the containment of arms. This is a carefully documented evaluation of the mismanagement of nuclear arms control by the superpowers, and of their failure to contain the nuclear arms race despite their involvement in the process for over a quarter of a century. Only the superpowers can reduce the proliferation of nuclear arms and in the process lessen the likelihood of nuclear war through accident, miscalculation, or crisis escalation. Yet forty-four years after Hiroshima, not a single wanted nuclear weapon has been eliminated by them.

"The Superpowers and Nuclear Arms Control" addresses a broad spectrum of nuclear arms control issues, beginning with the history of the nuclear arms race, the lukewarm attempts by the superpowers at nuclear arms control, and the role of the nuclear havenots. The book then considers current threats to arms control evidenced by the termination of the SALT regime and plans to discard the ABM Treaty. A discussion of the congressional-executive split on numerous key arms control issues is followed by conclusions drawn from observing decades of negotiation. Comprehensive appendices contain valuable charts and other documents that reinforce the content of the text. This resource is a useful tool for arms control and disarmament activists, students, and researchers, and for the many men and women everywhere who are at a loss to understand why so little is being accomplished in this critical area.

At the battle of Agincourt, over six thousand noblemen--the flower of French knighthood--died in a day-long series of futile charges against a small band of English archers. They charged not simply because they failed to recognize the power of the longbow, but because their whole ethos revolved round an idealized figure of the knight that dated back to Homer: the man of great physical strength and valor, who excelled at hand-to-hand combat with men of equal worth. The bow was an affront to this ideal.
As Robert L. O'Connell points out in this vividly written history of weapons in Western culture, the battle of Agincourt typifies the complex and often paradoxical relationship between men and arms. In a sweeping narrative that ranges from prehistorc times to the Nuclear Age, O'Connell demonstrates how social and economic conditions determine the types of weapons and the tactics employed in warfare and how in turn innovations in weapons technology often undercut social values. He reveals, for instance, how the Church outlawed the use of crossbows--except against muslims--to preserve the status quo of the medieval world; how the invention of the gun required a redefinition of courage from aggressive ferocity to calmness under fire; and how the machine gun in World War I so overthrew traditional notions of combat that Lord Kitchener exclaimed, "This isn't war " Indeed, as O'Connell points out, the technology unleashed in the Great War radically changed our perception of ourselves: weapons had made human qualities almost irrelevant in combat. And with the invention of the atomic bomb, humanity itself became subservient to the weapons they had produced.
While its emphasis is historical, Of Arms and Men also draws on such disciplines as biology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, and literature to illuminate the course of arms. O'Connell integrates the evolution of politics, weapons, strategy, and tactics into a coherent narrative, one spiced with striking portraits of men in combat and brilliant insight into why men go to war.

Since his election, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran has reversed the more moderate and pluralistic policies of his predecessor and projected himself onto the public scene with headline-grabbing speeches regarding Jews and the state of Israel, open defiance of the UN Security Council on the nuclear issue, and an apparent vision of his country becoming the dominant power in the Middle East. Iran's nuclear ambitions are in direct conflict with the wishes of the United States, the European Union, and many of the governments of the Middle East, leading to consequences that remain uncertain. Iran is a focus of attention in the most recent war in Lebanon, expanding its influence as a (the?) major supporter and supplier of Hezbollah. And Iran is cited in the most recent annual U.S. State Department report on terrorism as the country that is the "most active sponsor of terrorism." This book documents Ahmadinejad's background and rise to power. It explains the current structure of the Iranian revolutionary government--the competing centers of power and the major players. In separate sections it details the terrorist groups funded and armed by Iran, primarily Hezbollah and Hamas. And it provides a comprehensive picture of Iran's apparent aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as the related implications for regional and global security concerns. There is little reason to believe that Ahmadinejad will leave the scene anytime soon, or that Iran's behavior will change in the near term.

Jina Kim investigates how North Korea rationalized its pursuit of nuclear weapons programs for more than two decades, by exploring the dialectical development of the nuclear crisis and the obstacles generated by complex internal Korean dynamics and conflicting interests amongst the major players concerned.

"A study of the political, military and technical aspects of Britains nuclear weapons programme under the Macmillan government, contrasting Britains perceived political decline with its growth in technological mastery and military nuclear capability. Important reading for anyone interested in the history and military technology of the cold war"--Provided by publisher.

In the late 1940s, the U.S. Department of Defense established a nuclear weapons depository in the Manzano Mountains of New Mexico. For more than 40 years, Manzano Base served as a maintenance and storage site for some of the most destructive weapons ever created. Operated by the U.S. Air Force, the facility was small and obscure, with highly restricted access. Its covert mission fostered a sense of mystery, leaving the public to speculate about what really went on there. The site was decommissioned in 1992 yet its rich history continues to influence America's nuclear weapons program. This book tells the full story of Manzano and the personnel who served there. Firsthand accounts recall their experiences of nuclear weapons accidents, aircraft crashes, UFO/UAF sightings and a radiation demonstration called "tickling the tiger's tail.

This third volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within a contemporary global context, an interdependent characteristic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty along with disarmament and non-proliferation. The scholarly contributions in this volume explore this interrelationship, considering the role of nation States as well as international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring and implementing the Treaty. The 2015 Nuclear Accord with Iran and its implementation is also discussed, highlighting relevant developments in this evolving area. Overall, the volume explores relevant issues, ultimately presenting a number of suggestions for international cooperation in this sensitive field where political discussion often dominates over legal analysis. The important tasks of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ensuring the safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, calls for the interpretation and application of international legal principles and rules in their relevant context, a task that this book series endeavours to facilitate whilst presenting new information and evaluating current developments in this area of international law. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Dean of Law and Professor of International and Comparative Law at Robson Hall, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba; a Barrister at One Garden Court, London; a Magistrate in Oxfordshire; a Justice of the Peace for England & Wales; a Member of Wolfson College, University of Oxford; and Chair of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); and Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

Why do some American intelligence officials maintain fallout shelters and private contingency plans to evacuate their families in the event of a Russian nuclear strike--even in today's post-Cold War era of U.S.-Russian partnership? The frightening answer lies within the pages of "War Scare," a terrifying assessment of the prospect for nuclear holocaust in our day. Written by Peter Vincent Pry, a former CIA military analyst, "War Scare" provides a history of our country's little-known brushes with nuclear war and warns that, contrary to popular opinion and the assurances of our political leaders, the possibility of a Russian attack still exists. Nuclear deterrence has been the foundation of Western security for the last 50 years, but since the end of the Cold War, Russian military doctrine has become more destabilizing, and much more dangerous, than is commonly believed.

By making use of a wealth of declassified and unclassified material, Dr. Pry illustrates how Russia's brutal past continues to shape the consciousness and decision making of its leaders, many of whom are unreconstructed ideologues from the old Soviet regime. Gripped by a perpetual perception of imminent threat--a war scare--the Russian General Staff, which controls the technical capability of launching a nuclear strike, has shown itself to be unstable at best. The author explores recent history and near-disasters such as the Bosnian crisis, the Norway missile incident, and U.S. air strikes on Iraq from the perspective of the Russian General Staff, believing that only by understanding their viewpoint can we minimize the risk of unintentionally provoking a deadly attack. Wary of NATO expansion and reeling from the Russian economy's descent into chaos, the General Staff may interpret Western military exercises and operations in the Middle East and elsewhere as concealing surprise aggression against Russia. This is a grave situation, indeed, as even after the START I, II, and III agreements, Russia will retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world--not to mention significantly expanded chemical and biological warfare capability. "War Scare" convincingly shows that we ignore these facts at our peril.

The core principle underlying the strategy of nonproliferation - acceptance of a two tier international nuclear order - has become unsustainable. Policy makers and those in the academic world need to turn their attention to exploring new proliferation management strategies premised first and foremost on recognizing that nuclear weapons are here to stay and that determined proliferators can not be stopped from going nuclear. Andrew O'Neil develops this argument in relation to the role of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, the engine house of world economic growth. To what extent does the failing strategy of nonproliferation pose serious challenges for Northeast Asia's security environment? Are there alternative strategies for managing nuclear weapons in the region? Should the presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia necessarily be seen in exclusively negative terms, as many experts believe?

Concepts associated with nuclear strategy often go beyond any objective logic of deterrence. Nuclear weapons have special roles in different national belief-systems, myths surround them, they have catalyzed tensions already existing in societies, and become symbols of power or of past sins. This book explores the conscious and unconscious beliefs in Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (all voiced in debates about nuclear strategy), about society, the state and power structures, each country's place in the world, the international system, and allies and enemies.

From the dawn of the atomic age to today, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But nuclear weapons cooperation in US alliances has varied significantly between allies and over time. This book explores the history of America's nuclear posture worldwide, delving into alliance structures and interaction during and since the end of the Cold War to uncover the underlying dynamics of nuclear weapons cooperation between the US and its allies. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, the book reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Alliances are ecosystems of exchange rather than mere tools of external balancing, the book argues, and institutional perspectives can offer an unprecedented insight into how structured cooperation can promote policy convergence. -- .

Most nuclear proliferation literature is focused on states seeking nuclear weapons, conducted in most cases clandestinely. The sharing of nuclear weapons technology between states is as important strategically, if unexpected, because nuclear weapons are such a powerful instrument in international politics. This book proposes to answer why, if nuclear weapons are such good preservers of peace, are states not more willing to see them proliferate? Schofield also examines the underlying phenomenon of the threat of proliferation races, and how nonproliferation bargains between adversaries make nuclear sharing far less common. But sharing is not rare. This book proposes a theory to explain nuclear sharing and surveys its rich history from its beginnings in the Second World War, including the cases of France-Israel, US-NATO, Russia-China, Israel-South Africa, China-Pakistan and Pakistan-Iran, as well as the incidence of soft balancing and permissive nuclear sharing in the cases of the US and Japan, Israel and India.

Sooner or later, if the world keeps following its current course, there will be a nuclear war. Roger Hilsman, who played a significant role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, is convinced that the only way to prevent an eventual nuclear conflict is to abolish war itself. This study examines and critiques all of the various proposals to date for incorporating nuclear weapons into strategic doctrine and concludes that these efforts have failed. Plans for abolishing only nuclear weapons are, according to Hilsman, good-intentioned but ill-advised attempts to rehabilitate war. Instead, he proposes a gradual transition to world government, which will perform the traditional social and political functions that were in the past served only by war.

War will not disappear immediately. The world must still be prepared to deal with three types of war: wars that have the potential for escalating to a nuclear World War III; wars that are self-confining; and civil wars that cry out for peacekeeping intervention on humanitarian grounds. While the United States will have to be responsible for dealing with potentially nuclear wars, an entirely new force structure will be necessary. Self-confining wars, such as Bosnia, pose a particular problem as far as world public opinion for intervention is concerned; this study proposes solutions to such dilemmas. Finally, because national forces are ill-suited to peacekeeping missions in countries ravaged by civil war, the UN must recruit and maintain an international force along the lines of the French Foreign Legion.

This book is a treatise on the history of American psychology's role in nuclear war prevention. So writes Marilyn S. Jacobs in the preface to "American Psychology in the Quest for Nuclear Peace." This timely and important study will facilitate the work of those psychologists who wish to use their knowledge and expertise in the cause of nuclear war prevention. Jacobs places the psychologist's struggle for nuclear peace in historical perspective and examines the complicated context in which the threat of nuclear war is embedded; one which is influenced by international relations, economic and political systems and weapons technology. Student and professional psychologists, political scientists, as well as the general reader concerned with the threat of nuclear war will find this book imperative reading.

The study begins by examining the psychologist's role of social responsibility in the nuclear dilemma. Why is psychology involved? How did it become involved? What is the nature of the involvement? Is it appropriate that psychology be involved? The book is directed toward these questions. Jacobs interviews prominent individuals in the peace movement, most notably, Herbert Kelman, Irving Janis, Ralph White, and Thomas Milburn. Other chapters explore the psychologist's role as scientist, government consultant, and social activist.

"Challenge to Deterrence" is based on a panel discussion from the 1985 American Political Science Association meeting in New Orleans. In this comprehensive study, eminent scholars address all aspects of U.S. deterrence policy from both technical and policy aspects. Along with discussions on technology currently available to the U.S. and how it can be used more effectively, contributors speculate on Soviet strategic planning and how the U.S. can get allies, such as Japan and Israel, more involved in deterrence activity.

The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including reductions in forces and political realignment, remains disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas that are most important to actual security. Broad aspects of the problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between political and military levels of analysis discussed in the conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of nature and the state of war, explains how they apply tothe problem of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war, including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on the "New Soviet Thinking" and why the probability of accidental and inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four, reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and students of military affairs, political scientists, government officials, and members of the military establishment will find the up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on this profoundly important world issue.

The armaments of chemical and biological warfare (CBW), as Eric Coddy shows in this introduction for the concerned layman, are now widely held not just by nation-states, but by terrorist and criminal enterprises. The weapons themselves are relatively inexpensive and very easy to hide, and organizations of just a few dozen people are capable of deploying potentially devastating attacks with them. While in the twentieth century most of our arms-control effort focused, rightly, on nuclear arsenals, in the twenty-first century CBW will almost certainly require just as much attention. This book defines the basics of CBW for the concerned citizen, including non-alarmist scientific descriptions of the weapons and their antidotes, methods of deployment and defensive response, and the likelihood in the current global political climate of additional proliferation.