This Second Edition continues the fine tradition of its predecessor by exploring the various automatic control systems in aircraft and on board missiles. Considerably expanded and updated, it now includes new or additional material on: the effectiveness of beta-beta feedback as a method of obtaining coordination during turns using the F-15 as the aircraft model; the root locus analysis of a generic acceleration autopilot used in many air-to-air and surface-to-air guided missiles; the guidance systems of the AIM-9L Sidewinder as well as bank-to-turn missiles; various types of guidance, including proportional navigation and line-of-sight and lead-angle command guidance; the coupling of the output of a director fire control system into the autopilot; the analysis of multivariable control systems; and methods for modeling the human pilot, plus the integration of the human pilot into an aircraft flight control system. Also features many new additions to the appendices.

At 8:15 a.m. on August 6th, 1945, the Japanese port city of Hiroshima was struck by the world's first atomic bomb. Built in the US by the top-secret Manhattan Project and delivered by a B-29 Superfortress, a revolutionary long-range bomber, the weapon destroyed large swaths of the city, instantly killing tens of thousands. The world would never be the same again.

The Hiroshima Men's unique narrative recounts the decade-long journey towards this first atomic attack. It charts the race for nuclear technology before, and during the Second World War, as the allies fought the axis powers in Europe, North Africa, China, and across the vastness of the Pacific, and is seen through the experiences of several key characters: General Leslie Groves, leader of the Manhattan Project alongside Robert Oppenheimer; pioneering Army Air Force bomber pilot Colonel Paul Tibbets II; the mayor of Hiroshima, Senkichi Awaya, who would die alongside over eighty-thousand of his fellow citizens; and Pulitzer Prize-winning novelist John Hersey, who travelled to post-war Japan to expose the devastation the bomb had inflicted upon the city, and in a historic New Yorker article, described in unflinching detail the dangers posed by its deadly after-effect, radiation poisoning.

This thrilling account takes the reader from the corridors of the White House to the laboratories and test sites of New Mexico; from the air war above Nazi Germany and the savage reconquest of the Pacific to the deadly firebombing air raids across the Japanese Home Islands. The Hiroshima Men also includes Japanese perspectives - a vital aspect often missing from Western narratives - to complete MacGregor's nuanced, deeply human account of the bombing's meaning and aftermath.

Why do some American intelligence officials maintain fallout shelters and private contingency plans to evacuate their families in the event of a Russian nuclear strike--even in today's post-Cold War era of U.S.-Russian partnership? The frightening answer lies within the pages of "War Scare," a terrifying assessment of the prospect for nuclear holocaust in our day. Written by Peter Vincent Pry, a former CIA military analyst, "War Scare" provides a history of our country's little-known brushes with nuclear war and warns that, contrary to popular opinion and the assurances of our political leaders, the possibility of a Russian attack still exists. Nuclear deterrence has been the foundation of Western security for the last 50 years, but since the end of the Cold War, Russian military doctrine has become more destabilizing, and much more dangerous, than is commonly believed.

By making use of a wealth of declassified and unclassified material, Dr. Pry illustrates how Russia's brutal past continues to shape the consciousness and decision making of its leaders, many of whom are unreconstructed ideologues from the old Soviet regime. Gripped by a perpetual perception of imminent threat--a war scare--the Russian General Staff, which controls the technical capability of launching a nuclear strike, has shown itself to be unstable at best. The author explores recent history and near-disasters such as the Bosnian crisis, the Norway missile incident, and U.S. air strikes on Iraq from the perspective of the Russian General Staff, believing that only by understanding their viewpoint can we minimize the risk of unintentionally provoking a deadly attack. Wary of NATO expansion and reeling from the Russian economy's descent into chaos, the General Staff may interpret Western military exercises and operations in the Middle East and elsewhere as concealing surprise aggression against Russia. This is a grave situation, indeed, as even after the START I, II, and III agreements, Russia will retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world--not to mention significantly expanded chemical and biological warfare capability. "War Scare" convincingly shows that we ignore these facts at our peril.

What were the important developments in the military sector in 1988, and what effect did they have on peace and security? What progress was made in the attempts to control military activity and to reduce tension and the chances of war? In short, what are the prospects for a more stable international order? This twentieth edition of the SIPRI Yearbook presents detailed information on arms and arms control issues in a format that is both concise and standardized for ease of use. The Yearbooks attract world-wide attention and are used by governments, arms control negotiators, United Nations delegations, parliaments, scholars, students, the media and citizens as unique and indispensable reference works. The SIPRI Yearbook 1989 continues SIPRI`s review of the latest developments in nuclear weapons, nuclear explosions, world military expenditure, the international arms trade, chemical and biological weapons, the military use of outer space, ongoing armed conflicts and European arms control, and presents the unique annual calendar of military activities required by the Stockholm Document. Efforts to control the arms race - in nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, and space weapons - are described, and the status of negotiations and agreements is analysed. In addition to these regular features and statistics, this latest SIPRI Yearbook contains special studies on the arms trade regulations of seven weapon-exporting countries, on ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World, and on the enhanced role of the United Nations in regional conflict resolution. Its comprehensive coverage makes it an invaluable sourcebook for anyone seeking authoritative, factual information on issues of armaments and disarmament and thus to anyone interested in strategic studies, war studies, peace studies and international relations.

The core principle underlying the strategy of nonproliferation - acceptance of a two tier international nuclear order - has become unsustainable. Policy makers and those in the academic world need to turn their attention to exploring new proliferation management strategies premised first and foremost on recognizing that nuclear weapons are here to stay and that determined proliferators can not be stopped from going nuclear. Andrew O'Neil develops this argument in relation to the role of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, the engine house of world economic growth. To what extent does the failing strategy of nonproliferation pose serious challenges for Northeast Asia's security environment? Are there alternative strategies for managing nuclear weapons in the region? Should the presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia necessarily be seen in exclusively negative terms, as many experts believe?

This third volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within a contemporary global context, an interdependent characteristic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty along with disarmament and non-proliferation. The scholarly contributions in this volume explore this interrelationship, considering the role of nation States as well as international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring and implementing the Treaty. The 2015 Nuclear Accord with Iran and its implementation is also discussed, highlighting relevant developments in this evolving area. Overall, the volume explores relevant issues, ultimately presenting a number of suggestions for international cooperation in this sensitive field where political discussion often dominates over legal analysis. The important tasks of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ensuring the safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, calls for the interpretation and application of international legal principles and rules in their relevant context, a task that this book series endeavours to facilitate whilst presenting new information and evaluating current developments in this area of international law. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Dean of Law and Professor of International and Comparative Law at Robson Hall, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba; a Barrister at One Garden Court, London; a Magistrate in Oxfordshire; a Justice of the Peace for England & Wales; a Member of Wolfson College, University of Oxford; and Chair of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); and Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

Concepts associated with nuclear strategy often go beyond any objective logic of deterrence. Nuclear weapons have special roles in different national belief-systems, myths surround them, they have catalyzed tensions already existing in societies, and become symbols of power or of past sins. This book explores the conscious and unconscious beliefs in Britain, France and the Federal Republic of Germany (all voiced in debates about nuclear strategy), about society, the state and power structures, each country's place in the world, the international system, and allies and enemies.

Sooner or later, if the world keeps following its current course, there will be a nuclear war. Roger Hilsman, who played a significant role during the Cuban Missile Crisis, is convinced that the only way to prevent an eventual nuclear conflict is to abolish war itself. This study examines and critiques all of the various proposals to date for incorporating nuclear weapons into strategic doctrine and concludes that these efforts have failed. Plans for abolishing only nuclear weapons are, according to Hilsman, good-intentioned but ill-advised attempts to rehabilitate war. Instead, he proposes a gradual transition to world government, which will perform the traditional social and political functions that were in the past served only by war.

War will not disappear immediately. The world must still be prepared to deal with three types of war: wars that have the potential for escalating to a nuclear World War III; wars that are self-confining; and civil wars that cry out for peacekeeping intervention on humanitarian grounds. While the United States will have to be responsible for dealing with potentially nuclear wars, an entirely new force structure will be necessary. Self-confining wars, such as Bosnia, pose a particular problem as far as world public opinion for intervention is concerned; this study proposes solutions to such dilemmas. Finally, because national forces are ill-suited to peacekeeping missions in countries ravaged by civil war, the UN must recruit and maintain an international force along the lines of the French Foreign Legion.

This book is a treatise on the history of American psychology's role in nuclear war prevention. So writes Marilyn S. Jacobs in the preface to "American Psychology in the Quest for Nuclear Peace." This timely and important study will facilitate the work of those psychologists who wish to use their knowledge and expertise in the cause of nuclear war prevention. Jacobs places the psychologist's struggle for nuclear peace in historical perspective and examines the complicated context in which the threat of nuclear war is embedded; one which is influenced by international relations, economic and political systems and weapons technology. Student and professional psychologists, political scientists, as well as the general reader concerned with the threat of nuclear war will find this book imperative reading.

The study begins by examining the psychologist's role of social responsibility in the nuclear dilemma. Why is psychology involved? How did it become involved? What is the nature of the involvement? Is it appropriate that psychology be involved? The book is directed toward these questions. Jacobs interviews prominent individuals in the peace movement, most notably, Herbert Kelman, Irving Janis, Ralph White, and Thomas Milburn. Other chapters explore the psychologist's role as scientist, government consultant, and social activist.

"Challenge to Deterrence" is based on a panel discussion from the 1985 American Political Science Association meeting in New Orleans. In this comprehensive study, eminent scholars address all aspects of U.S. deterrence policy from both technical and policy aspects. Along with discussions on technology currently available to the U.S. and how it can be used more effectively, contributors speculate on Soviet strategic planning and how the U.S. can get allies, such as Japan and Israel, more involved in deterrence activity.

The lifting of the Iron Curtain in response to pressures for democratic reform in the Eastern Bloc nations and the refusal of General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to use the Red Army to police countries of the Warsaw Pact have led to a radically changed international environment. Preceded by over 40 years of peace and stability, unprecedented in the history of modern Europe, the Cold War ended in a climate of upheaval and uncertainty. This volume addresses issues associated with the political and military vacuum created by recent events and explores in depth a problem of military uncertainty: first strike stability. Stephen J. Cimbala argues that war in a system undergoing rapid change, including reductions in forces and political realignment, remains disturbingly possible due to the unforeseeable, inadvertent, and uncontrollable uncertainties that plague decision making and military planning in Washington, Moscow, and other international power centers, hence, first strike instability. This timely volume clarifies the kind of bargain superpowers and their allies have made in regard to nuclear weapons and command systems. Cimbala provides enhanced understandings of the concept and practice of nuclear deterrence and of first strike stability in a post-Cold War world that can help direct arms control efforts toward those areas that are most important to actual security. Broad aspects of the problem of first strike stability are set forth in the first chapter which also anticipates some of the connections between political and military levels of analysis discussed in the conclusion. Chapter two introduces the concepts of the state of nature and the state of war, explains how they apply tothe problem of first strike stability, and why the possibility of war, including nuclear war, cannot be excluded. Chapter three focuses on the "New Soviet Thinking" and why the probability of accidental and inadvertent war and escalation is not affected by reducing the levels of armaments alone. Chapter four emphasizes the problems facing the United States and NATO, and the approaches to escalation control which NATO assumes will be implemented, should deterrence fail. The results of the theoretical and administrative confusion over approaches to escalation control, outlined in chapter four, reappear in chapter five in the form of problems for war termination. The controversial issue of eliminating nuclear deterrence, with emphasis on the proposal for elimination by preclusive antinuclear strategic defenses is the focus of chapter six. The final chapter reviews the implications of the preceding chapters and arrives at some startling conclusions. Scholars and students of military affairs, political scientists, government officials, and members of the military establishment will find the up-to-the-minute information and judgements contained in First Strike Stability invaluable aids to their own decision making on this profoundly important world issue.

Most nuclear proliferation literature is focused on states seeking nuclear weapons, conducted in most cases clandestinely. The sharing of nuclear weapons technology between states is as important strategically, if unexpected, because nuclear weapons are such a powerful instrument in international politics. This book proposes to answer why, if nuclear weapons are such good preservers of peace, are states not more willing to see them proliferate? Schofield also examines the underlying phenomenon of the threat of proliferation races, and how nonproliferation bargains between adversaries make nuclear sharing far less common. But sharing is not rare. This book proposes a theory to explain nuclear sharing and surveys its rich history from its beginnings in the Second World War, including the cases of France-Israel, US-NATO, Russia-China, Israel-South Africa, China-Pakistan and Pakistan-Iran, as well as the incidence of soft balancing and permissive nuclear sharing in the cases of the US and Japan, Israel and India.

The armaments of chemical and biological warfare (CBW), as Eric Coddy shows in this introduction for the concerned layman, are now widely held not just by nation-states, but by terrorist and criminal enterprises. The weapons themselves are relatively inexpensive and very easy to hide, and organizations of just a few dozen people are capable of deploying potentially devastating attacks with them. While in the twentieth century most of our arms-control effort focused, rightly, on nuclear arsenals, in the twenty-first century CBW will almost certainly require just as much attention. This book defines the basics of CBW for the concerned citizen, including non-alarmist scientific descriptions of the weapons and their antidotes, methods of deployment and defensive response, and the likelihood in the current global political climate of additional proliferation.

Vogele provides a contemporary history of the nuclear arms control negotiations of the 1980s, tracing these negotiations from their initiation at the beginning of the decade through the agreements that were reached by the end. Two chapters provide background on arms control efforts from the mid-1950s through 1980. The work is an analytical history of nuclear arms control bargaining processes, and an evaluation of the utility of alternative negotiation strategies for producing agreement. Thus, the history of these negotiations offers lessons for the continuing pursuit of arms control and other cooperative security arrangement in the post-Cold War international order.

This book is a historical and strategic analysis of the nuclear dimension of the US alliance with Australia, Australia's relationship with nuclear weapons, nuclear strategy, and US extended nuclear deterrence.

Almost the entire southern hemisphere is now covered by nuclear-weapon-free zones. The ones in Latin America and the South Pacific were established during the Cold War, those in Southeast Asia and Africa after its ending. Zones have also been proposed, so far without success, for the Middle East, South Asia and Northeast Asia. In this book, analysts from within the respective regions explore the reasons for success and failure in the establishment of the zone, and their utility and limitations as stepping stones to a nuclear-weapon-free world.

""Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons" is accessible, short and breathless. It has the tone of a TED talk: an avid speaker bursting with one big idea and eighteen minutes to hold your attention." --"New York Times"
Nuclear war would be an apocalypse. Nuclear deterrence is effective in a crisis. Nuclear weapons shock and awe opponents. Killing civilians causes leaders to back down. The bomb has kept the peace for sixty-five years. These are the things we think we know about nuclear weapons, but it turns out they are myths, myths that nonetheless still shape our nuclear policy.
In "Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons," Ward Wilson blows the lid off the stale debate surrounding nuclear weapons, stripping away emotion and exaggeration. By drawing on new facts and historical research, Wilson methodically shatters each of these myths in turn. His conclusions will surprise you, enlighten you, and spur debates about whether nuclear weapons have any power and importance in the twenty-first century.

The failure of six countries to reach an agreement in the Six-Party Talks on Korea has shown the futility of negotiations to denuclearize North Korea. As Victor Ofosu shows in this timely new study, diplomacy failed because nuclear reversal is not in Pyongyang security, regional, or economic interests. This analysis examines factors which may encourage North Korea and other nuclear powers to reverse their posture, including considerations of constraint surrounding the INF treaty between the United States and Russia. The book also considers arguments criticizing the effectiveness of arms control agreements, the application of security and domestic models of arms control, and how security and domestic issues can deter a state from complying with a treaty.

Stemming from the NATO Advanced Research Workshop, this book asserts that no single institution or country possesses all the resources to effectively address radiological and nuclear threats. Moreover, the book asserts that fundamental scientific challenges must be overcome to achieve new and improved technologies. In response, the book sets forth research strategies that advance the ability to counter nuclear and radiological threats.

In this powerful new analysis of the importance of U.S. nuclear proliferation policy, Eric H. Arnett realistically assesses the impact of nuclear proliferation on the ability of the United States to protect what is currently perceived to be its interests. The book offers a thorough review of the effects of nuclear weapons on U.S. power projection forces, the current capabilities of proliferant countries, and the ability of these proliferant to successfully deliver their nuclear weapons. Arnett constructs scenarios that test the relevance of the proliferant arsenals to U.S. capabilities, and probable willingness, to protect its interests in future crisis. Using India, Iran, and Libya to present these scenarios, the book questions whether a proliferant would be immune to intervention from a nuclear superpower or, rather, immune to the purported benefits of nuclear deterrence.

With a special focus on U.S. naval power, this book asks whether nuclear proliferation will limit options and opportunities the U.S. would otherwise have. Will the U.S. have to forego certain regional interests in the face of nuclear attacks on ships and bases? Would the Navy have struck Benghazi had Qaddafi deployed a small nuclear arsenal? Will the Freedom of Navigation Program have to be abandoned in some cases? Or will the U.S. Navy be able to cope through modifications to forces and tactics, as more countries cross the nuclear threshold?

Often lost in the discussion about the nuclear crisis are its regional dynamics. From 2002 China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea struggled to navigate between the unsettling belligerence of North Korea and the unilateral insistence of the United States. This book focuses on their strategic thinking over four stages of the crisis. Drawing on sources from each of the countries, it examines how the four perceived their role in the Six-Party Talks and the regional context, as they eyed each other. The book emphasizes the significance of these talks for the emerging security framework and great power cooperation in Northeast Asia.

In the next few years the US government will make decisions regarding the renewal of its triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear weapons that will have huge implications for the security of the country and its allies, its public finances, and the salience of nuclear weapons in global politics. Current plans provide for spending an estimated US$1 trillion over 30 years to modernise or replace the full triad. The purpose of this book is to demonstrate viable alternatives to the current US plan to modernise or replace its full triad of air-, land- and sea-based nuclear weapons. These alternatives would allow the US to maintain deterrence at a lower cost, thereby freeing up funds to ease pressing shortfalls in spending on conventional procurement and nuclear security. Moreover, these alternative structures - which propose a reduction in the size and shape of the US arsenal - offer distinct advantages over the existing plan with regard to maintaining strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China; upholding existing arms-control treaties, in particular New START and the INF Treaty; and boosting the security of US nuclear forces and supporting the global non-proliferation regime, including the NPT. They would also endow the US with a nuclear force better suited to the strategic environment of the twenty-first century and mark an advance on the existing triad with regard to supporting conventional military operations.

This book presents a fundamental departure in presenting an analysis of the internal dynamics of defense management and decision-making in Pakistan--a new nuclear weapon state. This is an in-depth study of Pakistan's security link with its arms suppliers and defense industrial capacity, and the influence of Pakistan's army on conventional and unconventional defense decisions. The analysis is backed with numerous case studies of defense decisions carried out from 1979-99.

As proven by the recent discovery of ongoing research and tests in India and Pakistan, the nuclear age is not dead. Nuclear weapons, deployed in plentiful numbers during the Cold War by the Americans and Soviets, and, in lesser numbers, by others, were nevertheless controlled in their use by the essential equivalence, of U.S. and Soviet strategic power and by the ability of the U.S. and the Soviet Union to dominate the international security environment by means of their global military power. Now the setting within which nuclear weapons exist has been transformed.

Now that the Cold War has ended, and the Soviet Union has vanished, states seeking nuclear weapons operate under decision making rules that are sometimes opaque to Western observers. If the end of the Cold War leads to the unrestrained spread of nuclear weapons, Cimbala stresses that a combination of military hubris and arms control insolvency could lead to new nuclear crises or worse. The author provides a provocative analysis for policy makers and professional military staff as well as scholars and researchers involved with international relations, security studies, and arms control.

A "second nuclear age" has begun in the post-Cold War world. Created by the expansion of nuclear arsenals and new proliferation in Asia, it has changed the familiar nuclear geometry of the Cold War. Increasing potency of nuclear arsenals in China, India, and Pakistan, the nuclear breakout in North Korea, and the potential for more states to cross the nuclear-weapons threshold from Iran to Japan suggest that the second nuclear age of many competing nuclear powers has the potential to be even less stable than the first. Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age assembles a group of distinguished scholars to grapple with the matter of how the United States, its allies, and its friends must size up the strategies, doctrines, and force structures currently taking shape if they are to design responses that reinforce deterrence amid vastly more complex strategic circumstances. By focusing sharply on strategy - that is, on how states use doomsday weaponry for political gain - the book distinguishes itself from familiar net assessments emphasizing quantifiable factors like hardware, technical characteristics, and manpower. While the emphasis varies from chapter to chapter, contributors pay special heed to the logistical, technological, and social dimensions of strategy alongside the specifics of force structure and operations. They never lose sight of the human factor - the pivotal factor in diplomacy, strategy, and war.