This book explores China's approach to the nuclear programs in Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. A major power with access to nuclear technology, China has a significant impact on international nuclear weapons proliferation, but its attitude towards the spread of the bomb has been inconsistent. China's mixed record raises a broader question: why, when and how do states support potential nuclear proliferators? This book develops a framework for analyzing such questions, by putting forth three factors that are likely to determine a state's policy: (1) the risk of changes in the nuclear status or military doctrines of competitors; (2) the recipient's status and strategic value; and (3) the extent of pressure from third parties to halt nuclear assistance. It then demonstrates how these factors help explain China's policies towards Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Overall, the book finds that China has been a selective and strategic supporter of nuclear proliferators. While nuclear proliferation is a security challenge to China in some settings, in others, it wants to help its friends build the bomb. This book will be of much interest to students of international security, nuclear proliferation, Chinese foreign policy and International Relations in general.

Interest in nuclear energy has surged in recent years, yet there are risks that accompany the global diffusion of nuclear power--especially the possibility that the spread of nuclear energy will facilitate nuclear weapons proliferation. In this book, leading experts analyze the tradeoffs associated with nuclear energy and put the nuclear renaissance in historical context, evaluating both the causes and the strategic effects of nuclear energy development.
They probe critical issues relating to the nuclear renaissance, including if and how peaceful nuclear programs contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation, whether the diffusion of nuclear technologies lead to an increase in the trafficking of nuclear materials, and under what circumstances the diffusion of nuclear technologies and latent nuclear weapons capabilities can influence international stability and conflict. The book will help scholars and policymakers understand why countries are pursuing nuclear energy and evaluate whether this is a trend we should welcome or fear.

From the very start, at the age of twenty-one, Herbert F. York was swept into the century's most daring and dangerous technical achievement, the making of the atomic bomb. Throughout his fifty-year career as scientist and statesman, York has been there - at the center of this formidable and fractious era. His is not a dispassionate scholar's treatise, nor is it a reporter's story clipped from the files. Instead, this is a charged, eye-witness documentary, told in the first person by a principal actor. York takes us backstage to witness key events of our time: to the Manhattan Project for the birth of the atomic bomb; to Lawrence Livermore where the H-bomb was built; to Washington to eavesdrop on how post-war history was being forged; and to Geneva where he tried to stem the madness. Along the way, you'll meet some of our greatest heros and villains - Lawrence, Oppenheimer, Weisskopf, Teller, General Groves, President Eisenhower, and a cast of hundreds - friends, colleagues, enemies, who for more than half a century, held the fate of the world in their hands.

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China's Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

The nine nuclear weapon states are extending their commitments to nuclear 'deterrence' well into the second half of this century, despite treaty obligations and an 'unequivocal undertaking' to disarm. The us alone is expecting to spend up to $1 trillion (ie. $1,000,000,000,000) upgrading its nuclear weapons over the next 30 years. With around 15,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled worldwide, the risk of one going off by accident or design is increasing every day. Timmon Milne Wallis explores the arguments in favour of nuclear weapons with a critical eye, cutting through the rhetoric and obfuscation to get to the real truth about these weapons.

In Atomic Bill, Vincent Kiernan examines the fraught career of New York Times science journalist, William L. Laurence and shows his professional and personal lives to be a cautionary tale of dangerous proximity to power. Laurence was fascinated with atomic science and its militarization. When the Manhattan Project drew near to perfecting the atomic bomb, he was recruited to write much of the government's press materials that were distributed on the day that Hiroshima was obliterated. That instantly crowned Laurence as one of the leading journalistic experts on the atomic bomb. As the Cold War dawned, some assessed Laurence as a propagandist defending the militarization of atomic energy. For others, he was a skilled science communicator who provided the public with a deep understanding of the atomic bomb. Laurence leveraged his perch at the Times to engage in paid speechmaking, book writing, filmmaking, and radio broadcasting. His work for the Times declined in quality even as his relationships with people in power grew closer and more lucrative. Atomic Bill reveals extraordinary ethical lapses by Laurence such as a cheating scandal at Harvard University and plagiarizing from press releases about atomic bomb tests in the Pacific. In 1963 a conflict of interest related to the 1964 World's Fair in New York City led to his forced retirement from the Times. Kiernan shows Laurence to have set the trend, common among today's journalists of science and technology, to prioritize gee-whiz coverage of discoveries. That approach, in which Laurence served the interests of governmental official and scientists, recommends a full revision of our understanding of the dawn of the atomic era.

In Global Challenges for Leviathan, Furio Cerutti illumines for the reader the precarious situation in which the world currently exists. Far beyond international terrorism and the troubles with globalization in our age, there are two threats that really are global, as they can hurt everyone on earth and can be addressed only by the combined effort of all relevant human groups. Nuclear weapons may now play a lesser role than they did during the Cold War, but they will always endanger the survival of humankind, while global warming can bring disaster to future generations. Not only our obligations to current and future generations but also the very feeling that our life has little meaning if we or our posterity are confronted with man-made annihilation requires us to deal with these two global challenges. Neither the political realism that relies on deterrence and market fundamentalism nor the utopian salvation entrusted to world government provide an adequate response to global challenges. The question that confonts us is whether politics and democracy will be able to put these challenges on their agendas. Cerutti shows how political philosophy can highlight problems and prevent illusions, and how it can teach us to live in an uncertain world.

This dictionary provides a comprehensive and ready guide to the key concepts, issues, persons, and technologies related to the nuclear programmes of India and Pakistan and other South Asian states. This will serve as a useful reference especially as the nuclear issue continues to be an important domestic and international policy concern.

The balance of power in South Asia is tenuous. Neighbouring states with nuclear arsenal pose a serious threat in times of conflict and the danger of escalation into a nuclear holocaust in South are ever-present.This book locates the change in India's war doctrine at the turn of the century, following the Kargil War in 1999 between India and Pakista

Despite clear legal rules and political commitments, no significant progress has been made in nuclear disarmament for two decades. Moreover, not even the use of these weapons has been banned to date. New ideas and strategies are therefore necessary. The author explores an alternative approach to arms control focusing on the human dimension rather than on States' security: "humanization" of arms control! The book explores the preparatory work on arms control treaties and in particular the role of civil society. It analyzes the positive experiences of the movements against chemical weapons, anti-personnel mines, and cluster munitions, as well as the recent conclusion of the Arms Trade Treaty. The author examines the question of whether civil society will be able to replicate the success strategies that have been used, in particular, in the field of anti-personnel mines (Ottawa Convention) and cluster munitions (Oslo Convention) in the nuclear weapons field. Is there any reason why the most destructive weapons should not be outlawed by a legally binding instrument? The book also explains the effects of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, on human beings, the environment, and global development, thereby focusing on vulnerable groups, such as indigenous peoples, women, and children. It takes a broad approach to human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights. The author concludes that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal under international humanitarian and human rights law and, moreover, constitutes international crimes under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. In his general conclusions, the author makes concrete proposals for the progress toward a world without nuclear weapons.

This volume, Nuclear Disarmament, provides a comprehensive overview of nuclear disarmament and a critical assessment of the way forward. Comprising essays by leading scholars on nuclear disarmament, the book highlights arguments in favour and against a world without nuclear weapons (global zero). In doing so, it proposes a new baseline from which an everchanging nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda can be assessed. Numerous paths to nuclear disarmament have been proposed and scrutinized, and with an increasing number of countries signing off on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, it is vital to ask which path is the most likely and realistic to succeed. The chapters here also address the rapid pace of technological, political and climatic developments, in relation to nuclear disarmament, and how they add to the complexity of the issue. Taking care to unite the different tribes in the debate, this book provides a community of dissent at a time when academic tribalism all too often prevents genuine debates from taking place. This book will be of interest to students of nuclear proliferation, arms control, security studies and International Relations.

This volume provides the most comprehensive and authoritative projections of nuclear proliferation over the next decade and offers a range of practical nonproliferation measures.
The authors address a set of overarching questions regarding the propensity of selected states from different regions of the world to "go nuclear," the sources of national decisions to do so, and the potential for one state's proliferation behavior to impact on that of other states. In addition, authors address the most effective policy tools available for impeding nuclear weapons spread. Although this volume is not the first effort to look systematically and comparatively at nuclear decision-making, it is unique in its combination of future orientation, comparative perspective, and emphasis on harnessing the insights from social science theory and country case studies to aid policy makers in forecasting nuclear proliferation developments.

This volume, Nuclear Disarmament, provides a comprehensive overview of nuclear disarmament and a critical assessment of the way forward. Comprising essays by leading scholars on nuclear disarmament, the book highlights arguments in favour and against a world without nuclear weapons (global zero). In doing so, it proposes a new baseline from which an everchanging nuclear arms control and disarmament agenda can be assessed. Numerous paths to nuclear disarmament have been proposed and scrutinized, and with an increasing number of countries signing off on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, it is vital to ask which path is the most likely and realistic to succeed. The chapters here also address the rapid pace of technological, political and climatic developments, in relation to nuclear disarmament, and how they add to the complexity of the issue. Taking care to unite the different tribes in the debate, this book provides a community of dissent at a time when academic tribalism all too often prevents genuine debates from taking place. This book will be of interest to students of nuclear proliferation, arms control, security studies and International Relations.

Previous works on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) have approached the topic from the point of view of the U.S. and its allies, while Cuban experiences have still not been sufficiently discussed. This book presents new aspects which have seldom - or never - been offered before, giving a detailed account of the crisis from a Cuban perspective. It also investigates the archaeological and anthropological aspects of the crisis, by exploring the tangible and intangible remains that still can be found on the former Soviet missile bases in the Cuban countryside, and through interviews which add a local, human dimension to the subject.

The Iranian nuclear crisis is a proxy arena for competing visions about the functioning of international relations. This book is the first to provide comprehensive and comparative analyses to conceptualise the interaction between 'hegemonic structures' and those actors resisting them using the Iranian nuclear case as an illustration. It analyses the foreign policies of China, Russia and Turkey towards the Iranian nuclear programme and thereby answers the question to what extent these policies are indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony. Based on 70 elite interviews with experts and decision-makers closely involved with the Iranian nuclear file, it analyses resistance to hegemony across its ideational, material and institutional framework conditions. The cases examined show how 'compliance' on the part of China, Russia and Turkey with parts of US approaches to the Iranian nuclear conflict has been selective, and how US policy preferences in the Iran dossier have been resisted on other occasions. As such, the Iran nuclear case serves as an illustration to shed light on the contemporaneous interaction of the forces of consent and coercion in international politics. This book will be of key interest to scholars, students and practitioners in International Relations, Security Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis.

Since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki attacks, no state has unleashed nuclear weapons. What explains this? According to the author, the answer lies in a prohibition inherent in the "tradition of non-use," a time-honored obligation that has been adhered to by all nuclear states--thanks to a consensus view that use would have a catastrophic impact on humankind, the environment, and the reputation of the user.
The book offers an in-depth analysis of the nuclear policies of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK, France, India, Israel, and Pakistan and assesses the contributions of these states to the rise and persistence of the tradition of nuclear non-use. It examines the influence of the tradition on the behavior of nuclear and non-nuclear states in crises and wars, and explores the tradition's implications for nuclear non-proliferation regimes, deterrence theory, and policy. And it concludes by discussing the future of the tradition in the current global security environment.

Nuclear-armed adversaries India and Pakistan have fought three wars since their creation as sovereign states in 1947. They went to the brink of a fourth in 2001 following an attack on the Indian parliament, which the Indian government blamed on the Pakistan-backed Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorist organizations. Despite some attempts at rapprochement in the intervening years, a new standoff between the two countries was precipitated when India accused Lashkar-e-Taiba of being behind the Mumbai attacks late last year.
The relentlessness of the confrontations between these two nations makes "Inside Nuclear South Asia" a must read for anyone wishing to gain a thorough understanding of the spread of nuclear weapons in South Asia and the potential consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent.
The book begins with an analysis of the factors that led to India's decision to cross the nuclear threshold in 1998, with Pakistan close behind: factors such as the broad political support for a nuclear weapons program within India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the intense rivalry between the two countries, the normative and prestige factors that influenced their behaviors, and ultimately the perceived threat to their respective national security.
The second half of the book analyzes the consequences of nuclear proliferation on the subcontinent. These chapters show that the presence of nuclear weapons in South Asia has increased the frequency and propensity of low-level violence, further destabilizing the region. Additionally, nuclear weapons in India and Pakistan have led to serious political changes that also challenge the ability of the two states to produce stable nuclear detente. Thus, this book provides both new insights into the domestic politics behind specific nuclear policy choices in South Asia, a critique of narrow realist views of nuclear proliferation, and the dangers of nuclear proliferation in South Asia.

Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British government's strategic nuclear policy from 1945 to 1964. Written with full access to the UK documentary record, this volume examines how British governments after 1945 tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic nuclear capability, and the debates this provoked in official circles. Against a background of evolving British ideas about deterrence during the Cold War, it focuses on the strategic, political and diplomatic considerations that compelled governments, in the face of ever-increasing pressures on the defence budget, to persist in their efforts to develop nuclear weapons and to deploy a credible nuclear force, as the age of the manned bomber gave way to the ballistic missile. Particular attention is given to controversies over the portion of the defence budget devoted to the deterrent programme, the effects of the restoration of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration after 1958, increasing reliance on the United States for nuclear delivery systems, the negotiations that led to the Nassau Agreement of 1962 and the supply of Polaris, and discussions within the Western Alliance over the control of nuclear forces. By the time of the October 1964 election, when this volume concludes, previous dismissal of the prospects for successful ballistic missile defence were giving way to growing doubts over the long-term effectiveness of the Polaris system in its role as an independent deterrent, several years before it was due to enter service with the Royal Navy. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, Cold War history, nuclear proliferation and international relations.

In 1945, the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and warfare was never the same again. Armageddon and Paranoia relates how the power of the atom was harnessed to produce weapons capable of destroying human civilisation and considers what this has done to the world. There are few villains in this story: on both sides of the Iron Curtain, dedicated scientists cracked the secrets of nature, dutiful military men planned out possible manoeuvres and politicians wrestled with potentially intolerable decisions. Patriotic citizens acquiesced to the idea that their country needed the ultimate means of defence. Some tried to grapple with the unanswerable question: what end could possibly be served by such fearsome means? Those who protested went unheard. None of them wanted to start a nuclear war, but all of them were paranoid about what the other side might do. The danger of annihilation by accident or misjudgement has not been entirely absent since. Rodric Braithwaite, author of bestsellers Moscow 1941 and Afgantsy, paints a vivid and detailed portrait of this intense period in history. Its implications are terrifyingly relevant today, as ignorant and thoughtless talk about nuclear war begins to spread once more.

This book addresses the incentives for nations to develop nuclear weapons and the technical expertise needed for that purpose. Ballistic missiles are required by any nation wanting to optimize the effectiveness of deterrence and the threat derived from possessing nuclear weapons. The basic science of ballistic missile programs is discussed using the North Korean program as an example, although to some extent the programs of other countries are also covered. In addition, there is an introduction to the basics of nuclear weapons technology.Unlike most books on these topics, this one includes, besides the technical component, the policy aspects surrounding nuclear weapons. It also shows how nuclear weapons can - and have - stabilized conflicts, discussing why the concept of deterrence may not always be relied upon to prevent war. The origin of terrorism in the Middle East and the possibility of nuclear terrorism originating from that region are other topics of interest.

India's nuclear profile, doctrine, and practices have evolved rapidly since the country's nuclear breakout in 1998. However, the outside world's understanding of India's doctrinal debates, forward-looking strategy, and technical developments are still two decades behind the present. India and Nuclear Asia will fill that gap in our knowledge by focusing on the post-1998 evolution of Indian nuclear thought, its arsenal, the triangular rivalry with Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's nonproliferation policy approaches. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell show how India's nuclear trajectory has evolved in response to domestic, regional, and global drivers. The authors argue that emerging trends in all three states are elevating risks of regional inadvertent and accidental escalation. These include the forthcoming launch of naval nuclear forces within an environment of contested maritime boundaries; the growing employment of dual-use delivery vehicles; and the emerging preferences of all three states to employ missiles early in a conflict. These dangers are amplified by the near-absence of substantive nuclear dialogue between these states, and the growing ambiguity of regional strategic intentions. Based on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of nuclear deterrence and India's international relations, as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences both within and outside South Asia.

The Long Shadow is the first comprehensive, systematic examination of the roles and implications of nuclear weapons in the dramatically different post-Cold War security environment. Leading experts investigate the roles and salience of nuclear weapons in the national security strategies of twelve countries and the ASEAN states, and their implications for security and stability in a broadly defined Asian security region that includes the Middle East. The study also investigates the prospects for nuclear terrorism in Asia. A chief conclusion of the study is that nuclear weapons influence national security strategies in fundamental ways and that deterrence continues to be the dominant role and strategy for the employment of nuclear weapons. Offensive and defensive strategies may increase in salience but will not surpass the deterrence function. Another major conclusion is that although there could be destabilizing situations, on balance, nuclear weapons have reinforced security and stability in the Asian security region by assuaging national security concerns, strengthening deterrence and the status quo, and preventing the outbreak and escalation of major hostilities. As nuclear weapons will persist and cast a long shadow on security in Asia and the world, it is important to reexamine and redefine "old" ideas, concepts, and strategies as well as develop "new" ones relevant to the contemporary era. In line with this, the global nuclear order should be constructed anew based on present realities.

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today's international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.

In the Post-Cold War era, US nuclear foreign policies towards India witnessed a major turnaround as a demand for 'cap, reduce, eliminate' under the Clinton administration was replaced by the implementation of the historic 'civil nuclear deal' in 2008 by Bush, a policy which continued under Obama's administration. This book addresses the change in US nuclear foreign policy by focusing on three core categories of identity, inequality, and great power narratives. Building upon the theoretical paradigm of critical constructivism, the concept of the 'state' is problematised by focusing on identity-related questions arguing that the 'state' becomes a constructed entity standing as valid only within relations of identity and difference. Focusing on postcolonial principles, Pate argues that imperialism as an organising principle of identity/difference enables us to understand how difference was maintained in unequal terms through US nuclear foreign policy. This manifested in five great power narratives constructed around peace and justice; India-Pakistan deterrence; democracy; economic progress; and scientific development. Identities of 'race', 'political economy', and 'gender', in terms of 'radical otherness' and 'otherness' were recurrently utilised through these narratives to maintain a difference enabling the respective administrations to maintain 'US' identity as a progressive and developed western nation, intrinsically justifying the US role as an arbiter of the global nuclear order. A useful work for scholars researching identity construction and US foreign and security policies, US-India bilateral nuclear relations, South Asian nuclear politics, critical security, and postcolonial studies.

South Asia is often viewed as a potential nuclear flashpoint and a probable source of nuclear terrorism. But, how valid are such perceptions? This book seeks to address this question and assesses the region's nuclear security from two principal standpoints. First, it evaluates the robustness of the Indo-Pakistani mutual deterrence by analysing the strength and weaknesses of the competing arguments regarding the issue. It also analyses the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan, the nature of deterrence structure in the region and the challenges of confidence building and arms control between the two countries in order to assess the robustness of South Asia's nuclear deterrence. Second, it assesses the safety and security of the nuclear assets and nuclear infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The author holds that the debate on South Asia's nuclear security is largely misplaced because the optimists tend to overemphasise the stabilising effects of nuclear weapons and the pessimists are too alarmists. It is argued that while the risks of nuclear weapons are significant, it is unlikely that India and Pakistan will give up their nuclear arsenals in the foreseeable future. Therefore, what needs to happen is that while nuclear elimination should be the long-term goal, in the interim years the two countries need to pursue minimum deterrence policies to reduce the likelihood of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining fissile materials by non-state actors.