This book investigates drivers and trends in nuclear proliferation in the Global South. Based on an in-depth analysis of South Africa's nuclear history, it examines general causes of proliferation, such as technical capabilities and constraints; a country's motivation to build a nuclear bomb; and particular domestic and international situations. It also highlights Britain's role in the development of technological capability in South Africa and explains how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Finally, the study offers effective solutions to the problem of nuclear proliferation in developing countries.

The effects of weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained, either spatially or temporally, are unpredictable, discriminate poorly between combatants and civilians, and are highly disruptive of ecosystems. This book, first published in 1977, examines several WMD and analyses the extent and duration of environmental damage to be expected from them. Chapters are devoted to the ecological impacts of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and geophysical and environmental weapons.

During the 1950s nuclear weapons began to play an increasingly important role in Britain's defence policy. The development of thermonuclear bombs and assessments of the great destruction that would result from an exchange of nuclear warheads helped alter Britain's planning for war, and influenced the structure and deployment of her armed forces. In this study Martin Navias seeks to analyse the significance of the 1957 White Paper on Defence in the context of British strategic planning during the mid-1950s. He assesses claims that the White Paper represented a culmination of trends already prevalent in British defence planning, discusses whether the basis for a truly independent deterrent was established during 1955-6, and identifies continuities and discontinuities in strategic policies. A major theme throughout is the relationship between nuclear deterrence and the shape and size of conventional forces. Before Duncan Sandys became Minister of Defence, that ministry seemed unable to impose itself on the service departments. Sandys, however, was able to override many traditional service preferences. The result was the adoption of a British New Look: conventional forces were reduced, greater relative importance was placed on the nuclear deterrent, but once more the requirements of a truly independent deterrent did not receive priority.

There is a high risk that someone will use, by accident or design, one or more of the 17,000 nuclear weapons in the world today. Many thought such threats ended with the Cold War or that current policies can prevent or contain nuclear disaster. They are dead wrong-these weapons, possessed by states large and small, stable and unstable, remain an ongoing nightmare. Joseph Cirincione surveys the best thinking and worst fears of experts specializing in nuclear warfare and assesses the efforts to reduce or eliminate these nuclear dangers. His book offers hope: in the 1960s, twenty-three states had nuclear weapons and research programs; today, only nine states have weapons. More countries have abandoned nuclear weapon programs than have developed them, and global arsenals are just one-quarter of what they were during the Cold War. Yet can these trends continue, or are we on the brink of a new arms race-or worse, nuclear war? A former member of Senator Obama's nuclear policy team, Cirincione helped shape the policies unveiled in Prague in 2009, and, as president of an organization intent on reducing nuclear threats, he operates at the center of debates on nuclear terrorism, new nuclear nations, and the risks of existing arsenals.

Originally published in 1985, this book explores the nuclear confrontation between East and West in Europe: where we stand, how we got there and what the future may hold. Its concluding chapter outlines the prospects for nuclear arms control in Europe, and it frames the debate over NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in the years ahead. Can NATO reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons? Can it cope with the issues at all? The chapters on NATO theatre nuclear forces and doctrine provide a rich background to current policy issues. The public debate over NATO's 1979 decision to deploy new American cruise and Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe was hardly unprecedented in NATO's history: similar controversy surrounded NATO deliberations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That debate, however, subsided in the mid-1960s; the nuclear question in Europe was relegated to the 'wilderness', though efforts - largely unavailing - continued within official circles to define more clearly the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defense. Against this backdrop, the nuclear debate emerged again in the 1970s. This title unravels the military and political considerations at play in that debate and maps the European politics surrounding it. Today it can be read in its historical context.

The nuclear non-proliferation treaty had recently undergone its third formal review by its signatories, who had assessed its effectiveness and considered how it might better be implemented. This book, originally published in 1987, written by experts many of whom were leading participants in the nuclear non-proliferation treaty regime at the time, examines the whole range of issues connected with nuclear non-proliferation and the treaty. It looks at non-proliferation from the point of view of nuclear nations, non-nuclear nations and the nuclear industry. It assesses the work of the international monitoring bodies and reconsiders the place of non-proliferation in the changing balance of global nuclear power. It concludes by discussing the way forward.

'I pray that words spoken at this conference may carry beyond walls and reach thousands of ears hitherto deaf to warnings of the final catastrophe.' So said Patrick White in June 1983 at an important symposium organised by the Australian National University to examine the whole issue of nuclear war and its implications for Australia. Many prominent Australians - including H. C. Coombs, Senator Susan Ryan, leading academics and medics - attended the conference along with distinguished experts from overseas, and mingled and talked with many representatives of Australian peace movements. In two intense and emotional days they discussed many different aspects of the crisis that threatens the world, from the latest scientific thinking on possible effects on the atmosphere to the increasingly important role of the women's peace movement and the efforts of ordinary people around the world to stop the nuclear arms race. Originally published in 1983, this book presents the upshot of these deliberations, including unforgettable illustrations of some of the consequences of nuclear war. The book does not pretend to provide the answers, nor does it take any political viewpoint. It does present the authoritative opinions of some of the world's leading minds on the extent of the threat that faces Australia alongside powerful statements from committed men and women from around the world - opinions that will inform and disturb all thinking Australians.

Europe has everything to lose from nuclear war, and nothing to gain from it. Yet it is nuclear deterrence that we are relying on to shield us from war. More and more people are coming to believe that security under a nuclear shield is an illusion, and that nuclear deterrence embodies a dangerous paradox. It is too close to provocation, it cannot prevent nuclear blackmail, and its short-term success can only lead to proliferation and ultimate instability. In this book, originally published in 1983, philosophers go behind the rhetoric of the nuclear debate and analyse the dangers of deterrence. The contributors all share a concern about the radical confusions that have arisen concerning nuclear deterrence. Showing how unilateral arguments can be developed from hard-headed political and military considerations, they stress their belief that carefully managed unilateralism is the best method for securing the political independence of Western Europe. The doctrine is not founded on sheer moral idealism. This book will be essential reading for anyone engaged in the public discussion of defence policy.

Originally published in 1956, atomic policy overshadowed political considerations in the same way that 'the balance of power' had mesmerized European politicians for so long. Admiral Biorklund here makes a general survey of the whole problem. He traces the development of the atom and hydrogen bombs and the history of international atomic policy as revealed by post-war conferences, by official statements, and in official and unofficial publications. His thirty years study of Russia and complete command of the language have enabled him to give a more thorough and authoritative account of the Soviet attitude than has so far appeared in English. He also presents fully the American point of view that the preservation of force is vital to the democracies of the world. Admiral Biorklund makes an expert contribution to a full appreciation of the primary question of the day. He feels that it is unrealistic to attempt a total prohibition of atomic weapons. But it is not therefore necessary to sit with folded arms. By starting with what is politically possible now, he outlines a solution which recognizes that the smaller tactical weapons would have to be tolerated while the heaviest bombs are strictly controlled. Clearly written, his book is extremely readable and of absorbing interest. It presents, soberly and objectively a great deal of information in a readily assimilable form. A large map (available online) plots the position of the world's fissile material (uranium, thorium, lithium, etc.). Assessing every known scrap of information, it has been the most complete map yet published.

Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics. The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.

The nuclear arms race had dominated international politics for the two decades prior to publication. Originally published in 1975, this symposium examines the dynamics of change within the arms race and the attempts at controlling and limiting it. At the time the nuclear arms race was strongly technologically determined, as Herbert York demonstrates in discussing the impact of MIRV. Such progress as has been made in nuclear disarmament has been far outdistanced by the technological developments so that, as Jack Ruina argues, SALT is only important when seen as part of a process of negotiating arms limitations. The most significant result of this technological advance has been the emergence of a qualitatively new system of international politics which Hans Morgenthau analyses. This system is essentially bipolar in nuclear terms and the history of the disarmament negotiations, as reviewed by William Epstein, is an exercise in freezing this structure. The negotiations themselves, particularly SALT, and the prospects for further progress are discussed extensively by Thomas Schelling, Kosta Tsipis, George Rathjens and others. The book also surveys developments in chemical and biological warfare and includes an important paper on chemical warfare agents by the Soviet chemist, O.A. Ruetov. The final section looks at recent developments in the theory of conflict and its applications in the Middle East, South Africa and a number of developing countries.

In the 1980s the world spent an enormous amount on preparations for war. Year by year, more and more resources went into the military sector. More and more complex weapon systems were devised. At the time, of all research scientists and engineers in the world, more than one in four was working for the military. Throughout the 40 years since the end of World War II, the technological arms race continued. Then began moving faster. The United States lead the way, followed by the Soviet Union. Between them, they possessed some 50 000 nuclear warheads-more than enough to destroy the world. They planned to increase the number, to make the weapons more accurate, and to base them on new weapon platforms closer to the borders of the other side. Some people preferred not to think about these things. Many, however, were becoming increasingly concerned-wondering about the future for themselves and for their children. Originally published in 1985, this book was for those who wanted to know what was happening. What new missiles were being built? What was happening in outer space? What are the facts about chemical weapons? What progress was being made (if any) in Geneva, Vienna and Stockholm, where the powers were negotiating on these matters?

In the late 1980s it was felt that World War III could start in the Pacific. Long regarded by the USA as an American lake, the Pacific was now a focus of competition between the superpowers. The USSR, whose nuclear-arms navy was limited to their north Pacific ports, now had a major new naval base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. In response to this new threat, the Americans were planning more urgently for nuclear war in the Pacific, adding to their own mighty arsenal in the region and taunting the Soviets with aggressive surveillance and military exercises. The Soviets did the same. For 40 years, Pacific Islanders have had cause to resent the use of their ocean as a nuclear playground: of the five nuclear powers, three - the USA, USSR and China - launched missiles into the Pacific for text purposes; two - the USA and Britain - exploded nuclear devices there but had stopped; and one, France, continued to test nuclear bombs in one of its colonies. Pacific Islanders now have cause to fear that the ocean is becoming a nuclear battleground. Originally published in 1987, this book tells the story of the nuclear men in the Pacific and of those people they 'displaced' and irradiated. It is also about what these people and their governments had begun to do in response. The nuclear issue had transformed the political landscape of Micronesia and the South Pacific in the 1980s, loosening the US grip and making the French increasingly unpopular. The people of these remote communities, largely forgotten or considered dispensable, had a nuclear past made for them. Now they want to make their own future.

Moral and political questions are vitally relevant to the issue of survival in the nuclear age. Ethics has much to teach us about the meaning of national defence and civic responsibility in the nuclear state. For instance, those in NATO who argue for increased spending on such weapons do so with the intention of defending the values of the West. They must therefore be absolutely sure that they are not - as the contributors to this volume, originally published in 1984, powerfully suggest - undermining or destroying those values by the very means they adopt to preserve them. With the continued success of nuclear deterrence itself in question, responsible citizens feel an urgent need to assess the clash between personal doubts, cherished principles and their governments' loudly voiced moral certainties. In Objections to Nuclear Defence, professional philosophers of widely varying persuasions provide new analyses of these problems. They spell out clearly and vividly the moral and political objections - objections to the concrete nuclear policies of the Western governments today. Often impassioned but always rational, the book will be of special interest to students of international affairs, peace studies and applied philosophy as well as to the general reader who is trying to choose between political parties in Europe or North America.

As nuclear weapons become ever more sophisticated, so the deterrence debate becomes increasingly complex. The 'Ban the Bomb' slogans of the 1950s had been replaced by cries for 'nuclear-free zones', and talk of 'megatonnage' and 'fallout' had given way to talk of 'tactical' nuclear weapons and 'limited strike capability'. Originally published in 1982, this book considers the ethical issues raised by nuclear policies and by the debate between proponents of the multilateralist/unilateralist approaches to disarmament and arms control at the time. It is not, like so many books on the subject, an ideological statement: there are essays by defence strategists which put the case for deterrence and essays by academics and churchmen which strenuously oppose it. The book also includes an essay on attempts to mitigate the appalling brutality of the many 'conventional' wars since 1945. At a time when the rhetoric and misinformation produced on both sides of the debate continued to obscure many vital issues, this book was welcome, sensible and necessary.

How does the Soviet Union view the costs and benefits of nuclear arms control? What factors motivate Soviet negotiations with the Western world on this crucial issue? And what, precisely, does the Soviet Union hope to accomplish through nuclear arms control? Originally published in 1988, The Other Side of Arms Control provides an in-depth examination of this too infrequently discussed aspect of the arms race and the ongoing negotiations to halt it. In The Other Side of Arms Control, Alan B. Sherr argues that the time is now right for significant substantive progress to be made on nuclear arms control: the Soviet leadership under Mikhail Gorbachev has demonstrated greater flexibility and willingness to compromise on a number of difficult issues, including verification. But more important, circumstances within and outside the Soviet Union now make progress on arms control crucial to Soviet political and economic goals as well as foreign policy objectives. Written in accessible, nontechnical language, The Other Side of Arms Control will be of historical interest to students, teachers, policymakers, and others concerned with the future of nuclear arms control.

Originally published in 1985, Deterrence in the 1980s offers analyses by leading American and Canadian scholars and decision-makers in the field of strategic studies of the current problems and dilemmas of contemporary international security with deterrence, nuclear and conventional, as the unifying conceptual theme. Deterrence as theory, as history, as psychology, as politics, as ethics and as policy is addressed. The authors outline the complexities of deterrence, in theory and in practice, and offer proposals regarding the future operationalization of deterrence in order both to reassure Western publics and to enhance Western and international security. Soviet-American strategic relations, along with the problems posed for the Western Alliance, are analysed. Within the context of NATO, the dilemmas, for both Europe and North America, of extended deterrence are raised. Despite the current crisis of deterrence, no other security strategy appears viable as long as nuclear weapons are retained for purposes of national security. However, current trends in the operationalization of deterrence - nuclear-war fighting capabilities - have raised concerns about the future of deterrence.

Ideological debate is one component of the intellectual background to Soviet policy-making. Originally published in 1987, this paper explores how Soviet writers wrestle with the challenge to their ideology that is posed by the threat of nuclear war. What, for example, is the relationship between the values of peace and of socialism? What drives the arms race? Is capitalism inherently militaristic, or is a demilitarized capitalism conceivable? Is the outcome of history predetermined or open? It is shown that the range of permissible views is wider than often assumed, and that the constraints of Soviet ideology do not exclude evolution towards a more cooperative approach to international security.

Originally published in 1993, this volume was unique in its scope and approach: Unlike most literature on nuclear weapons proliferation at the time, the essays in this volume offer theoretical discussions and suggest testable hypotheses about the causes and effects of nuclear weapons proliferation. The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an ideal subject for social science scholarship, and such scholarship is especially timely now. Among the topics discussed in The Proliferation Puzzle are: The building of nuclear weapons is a complex task touching upon many of the subjects of study at the core of social science and international relations. Nuclear weapons may be acquired as a hedge against external threat, for reasons of national prestige, or as a result of pressures by domestic coalitions among scientists, bureaucrats, and the military. They may be sought for defensive purposes or to support hegemonic aspirations. Nuclear weapons also raise questions about civilian command and control, especially in crisis situations. During the last two decades the acquisition of nuclear weapons has been proscribed by the non-proliferation regime. The decisions countries made about acquiring these weapons and the manner they chose to build them serve as a test of the efficacy of this particular regime, and of international regimes more generally. Nuclear weapons were introduced at the time bipolarity became the international order. As the world moves away from bipolarity, there is a need to answer questions such as: What would be the effect of nuclear weapons in a multipolar order? How will the spread of nuclear weapons affect the distribution of capabilities among states? If nuclear weapons spread to additional countries, will they enhance stability or exacerbate instability? Can the spread of these weapons be managed or controlled? This book brings together scholars from different schools within international relations and the social sciences to address the question of why nuclear weapons spread. A disciplined, rigorous examination of proliferation is important not only for scholarship but also for informed policymaking. The purpose of social science is to formulate hypotheses and devise theories that advance our understanding of society and aid in the fashioning of enlightened policy. The essays in this volume show how explicit hypotheses about the causes and consequences of nuclear weapons proliferation provide a deeper understanding of the problem and suggest specific, theory-informed policy recommendations.

To constrain nuclear proliferation, one must, in addition to designing a proliferation-resistant nuclear fuel cycle, identify a set of long-term arms limitation and security policies for the major states. These policies should be capable of satisfying various security and political objectives of non-nuclear weapon states, thereby minimizing their incentives to acquire independent nuclear weapon capabilities, and thus collectively minimizing future nuclear proliferation. Originally published in 1979, this book attempts to identify such a comprehensive arms limitation and security regime. It reviews negotiations concerning the NPT through the end of the Review Conference of the NPT in mid-1975 and the subsequent strategic debate concerning nuclear proliferation.

In mid-1980 a second conference for the review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would take place in Geneva. Given the importance of preventing, or at least slowing down, nuclear weapon proliferation, this conference would be a crucial event in the field of arms control and disarmament. For many countries the technical and economic barriers to proliferation had disappeared, and the only remaining barriers were political. In an attempt to contribute to the discussions at the NPT Review Conference, SIPRI assembled a group of experts from a number of countries to discuss the technical aspects of the control of fissionable materials in non-military applications. The meeting took place in Stockholm, 12-16 October 1978. Originally published in 1979, this book on nuclear energy and nuclear weapon proliferation contains the papers presented at the symposium and reflects the discussions at the meeting.

In the early 1980s there had been an upsurge of public concern over the nuclear threat to Europe. Already saturated with nuclear weapons, Europe faced controversial new deployments and there was alarm over military strategies for nuclear war in the region. It is in this context that the idea of nuclear weapon-free zones had captured the popular imagination and became a political issue in Europe. Not only would such zones build confidence and raise the nuclear threshold, but they would be first steps towards a more comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1983 Nuclear Disengagement in Europe probes the question of nuclear weapon-free zones in the region. Pugwash and SIPRI arranged a meeting at which an international team of lawyers, scientists, politicians and military experts gave background information and provided an appraisal of problems regarding the zone initiatives as well as benefits that would accrue. Possible elements in a European zone arrangement were elaborated on and procedures towards the establishment of such a zone were suggested.

The debate on no-first-use of nuclear weapons has been conducted on a number of fronts. First use of nuclear weapons has come under challenge from many different directions: from church synods, from international lawyers, in debates at the United Nations, and from strategic thinkers. Originally published in 1984, this book takes stock for and against no-first-use and examines the political, military and arms control implications of such a commitment.

Safeguards play a key role in verifying the effectiveness of restraints on the spread of nuclear weapons. Originally published in 1985, this book is a study of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, an important element of the non-proliferation regime. It breaks new ground by focusing on the politics of safeguards, especially the political problems of the IAEA and of the day-to-day application of safeguards. It contains a critical appraisal and proposals for ways of improving existing procedures, and of adapting them to the political and technological changes of recent years. Safeguarding the Atom gives an analysis of the following questions: What are IAEA safeguards and how do they work? How effective are they? How can they be reinforced? What sanctions can be imposed in the event of non-compliance? IAEA safeguards represent the world's first and so far only attempt to verify an arms control agreement by systematic on-site inspection, and their applicability to other arms control measures is examined.

There is growing interest world wide in nuclear-free zones. Originally published in 1987, this book explores the question of what constitutes a nuclear-free zone and charts the progress of the movement to establish them. The book shows how definitions of nuclear-free zones vary from those intended to exclude everything nuclear (including nuclear power installations and the dumping of nuclear waste) to those aiming to exclude nuclear weapons in a limited way. Special attention is paid to the three treaties which have established major international nuclear-free zones, (Latin America, South Pacific, Antarctica) examining their strengths and weaknesses as well as areas where the idea has been proposed (Balkans, Africa). The book concludes with a review of problems and prospects for the future.