The 2007 Iran Nuclear Estimate Revisited: Anatomy of a Controversy explores both the contents and reaction to the U.S. intelligence community's (IC) National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that Iran had suspended its clandestine program to develop nuclear weapons. The volume offers insights into the art of intelligence analysis and the issues encountered when estimates run counter to policy or partisan preferences. In November 2007, the U.S. National Intelligence Council issued an NIE entitled Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities that contained a surprising finding. Analysts concluded that Iran had probably suspended its clandestine effort to develop a nuclear weapon. This assessment created a political firestorm, despite the fact that analysts went to great lengths to assess the accuracy of their sources and to offer nuanced judgments about the complex issues surrounding Iran's civilian and military nuclear programs. In this edited volume, former intelligence professionals and leading intelligence scholars describe and assess the factors that shaped this NIE and the course of events that sparked an international controversy. These chapters make a valuable contribution to the understanding of the state of the art when it comes to intelligence analysis and the challenges that emerge when intelligence estimates address significant foreign and defence policy issues and on-going political debates. One of the chapters in this volume was originally published in the book titled, Routledge Companion to Intelligence Studies, edited by Robert Dover, Michael Goodman, Claudia Hillebrand. Other chapters were originally published in the journals Intelligence and National Security and Comparative Strategy.

Samuel S. Kloda spent more than 40 years meeting with the scientists who built the first atomic bombs, and the crews that delivered them to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Those conversations encouraged him to search archives throughout the U.S. Newly unearthed documents were brought to former members of the Manhattan Project or the 509th Composite Group, who were always willing to autograph and recount the details of these artifacts. Most of the major books on the Manhattan Project were published before 1973. In the years that followed, newly declassified documents became available and showed that many authors had included huge inaccuracies. Richly illustrated with important documents and photographs, Kloda's chronicle of the dawn of the atomic age sets the record straight on one of the greatest scientific advancements of all time. Readers will see how a single letter from Albert Einstein to President Franklin Roosevelt in 1939 led to the formation of the Advisory Committee on Uranium and, within six years, to the secret Manhattan Project employing more than 100,000 men and women.

The establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons, a concept more recently broadened to cover all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), has been before the international community for decades. In this book, two experts from the region explore why the matter remains unresolved, and outline a comprehensive yet achievable roadmap to a Middle East free of WMD. Weapons of mass destruction pose an existential threat to global peace and security. But nowhere is it more urgent to stem their spread than in the Middle East, a region fraught with mistrust and instability. Accounting for these geopolitical realities, including the ongoing talks to curb Iran's nuclear program, the authors present a practical and innovative strategy to a Middle East free of weapons of mass destructions (WMD). They outline a phased approach toward disarmament in the region, prescribing confidence-building measures and verification tools to create trust among the region's governments. Their vision also sees the realization of a WMD-free zone within a broader regional agenda for security and cooperation to advance socioeconomic and political progress. This book will be of great interest to students and scholars of international relations, politics and security studies in the Middle East.

A groundbreaking account of Pakistan's rise as a nuclear power draws on elite interviews and primary sources to challenge long-held misconceptions Pakistan's pathway to developing nuclear weapons remains shrouded in mystery and surrounded by misconceptions. While it is no secret why Pakistan became a nuclear power, how Pakistan became a nuclear state has been obscured by mythmaking. In Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb, Mansoor Ahmed offers a revisionist history of Pakistan's nuclear program and the bureaucratic politics that shaped its development from its inception in 1956 until the 1998 nuclear tests. Drawing on elite interviews and previously untapped primary sources, Ahmed offers a fresh assessment of the actual and perceived roles and contributions of the scientists and engineers who led the nuclear program. He shows how personal ambitions and politics within Pakistan's strategic enclave generated inter-laboratory competition in the nuclear establishment, which determined nuclear choices for the country for more than two decades. It also produced unexpected consequences such as illicit proliferation to other countries largely outside of the Pakistani state's control. As Pakistan's nuclear deterrent program continues to grow, Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb provides fresh insights into how this nuclear power has evolved in the past and where it stands today. Scholars and students of security studies, Pakistani history, and nuclear proliferation will find this book to be invaluable to their understanding of the country's nuclear program, policies, and posture.

New York Times bestselling author Lesley Blume reveals how a courageous reporter uncovered one of the greatest and deadliest cover-ups of the 20th century - the true effects of the atom bomb - potentially saving millions of lives. In the days following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese surrendered unconditionally. But even before the surrender, the US had begun a secret propaganda campaign to celebrate these weapons as the ultimate peacekeepers - hiding the true extent and nature of their devastation. The cover-up intensified as Americans closed the atomic cities to Allied reporters, preventing information from leaking about the horrific and lasting effects of radiation that would kill thousands of people during the months after the blast. For nearly a year, the cover-up worked - until New Yorker journalist John Hersey got into Hiroshima and reported the truth to the world. As Hersey and his editors prepared his article for publication, they kept the whistleblowing story secret - even from most of their New Yorker colleagues. When the magazine published 'Hiroshima' in August 1946, it became an instant global sensation, and inspired pervasive horror about the weapons that had been covertly waged in America's name. Since 1945, no nuclear weapons have ever been deployed in war, partly because Hersey alerted the world to their true, devastating impact. This knowledge has remained among the greatest deterrents to using them since the end of World War II. Released on the 75th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing, Fallout is an engrossing detective story, as well as an important piece of hidden history, which shows how one heroic scoop saved - and can still save - the world.

This book seeks to elucidate the decisions of states that have chosen to acquire nuclear arms or inherited nuclear arsenals, and have either disarmed or elected to retain their warheads. It examines nuclear arms policy via an interconnected framework involving the eclectic use of national security based realism, economic interdependence liberalism, and nuclear weapons norms or morality based constructivism. Through the various chapters examining the nuclear munitions decisions of South Africa, Ukraine and North Korea, a case is built that a state's leadership decides whether to keep or give up "the Bomb" based on interlinked security, economic and norms governed motivations. Thereafter, frameworks evaluating the likelihood of nuclear proliferation and accessing the feasibility of disarmament are then applied to North Korea and used to examine recent Iranian nuclear negotiability. This book is an invaluable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, WMD analysts and post graduate or undergraduate candidates focusing on nuclear arms politics related courses

In the closing days of World War II, scientists working for the U.S. government invented nuclear explosives by splitting the atoms of heavy metals. Germany had already surrendered, but the United States and its allies remained at war with Japan. In the summer of 1945, the Japanese city of Hiroshima was flattened by a single nuclear bomb. A second bombing occurred just a few days later, decimating the city of Nagasaki. These were the first nuclear weapons ever used in war. And - so far - they are the last. Since then, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been manufactured and deployed by governments around the world. Many of these weapons are much more powerful than the atomic bombs that destroyed the two Japanese cities. None have been used so far, and the absence of nuclear war among nations armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons is a great mystery. While the threat of a nuclear attack on the United States has receded, the possibility of a nuclear attack on an American city by terrorists has taken its place in our official nightmares. So far, no terrorist group has made a serious effort to buy, steal, or build a nuclear weapon. The absence of nuclear terrorism in a world swarming with fanatical terrorists is another great mystery. The slippery slope to a nuclear Armageddon has been present for more than sixty years. In secure locations in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London, and Paris, there are buttons to push than could put an end to human civilization, but these buttons have never been pushed. Why not? What has so far kept us safe from these mortal dangers? Those are the questions that Caplow asks and answers in Armageddon Postponed.

This book strives to take stock of current achievements and existing challenges in nuclear verification, identify the available information and gaps that can act as drivers for exploring new approaches to verification strategies and technologies. With the practical application of the systems concept to nuclear disarmament scenarios and other, non-nuclear verification fields, it investigates, where greater transparency and confidence could be achieved in pursuit of new national or international nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts. A final discussion looks at how, in the absence of formal government-to-government negotiations, experts can take practical steps to advance the technical development of these concepts.

In 1988, Scott Cook was a boarding school PE teacher responsible for the proper inflation of dodge balls. A year later, he was operating an underground strategic missile control center with 10 intercontinental nuclear weapons capable of obliterating an entire country. This unexpected journey took him from the serene hills of Virginia through months of intensive training on the California coast to the front lines of the Cold War, beneath the frozen plains of North Dakota. His frank, entertaining memoir describes the insular and secretive military subculture of men and women who lived with the sobering burden of potentially unleashing global devastation, and how an easy-going gym coach ended up in an organization whose unofficial motto was "To err is human; to forgive is not Strategic Air Command policy.

The contributors to this book describe, discuss, and evaluate the normative reframing brought about by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty), taking you on a journey through its genesis and negotiation history to the shape of the emerging global nuclear order. Adopted by the United Nations on 7 July 2017, the Ban Treaty came into effect on 22 January 2021. For advocates and supporters, weapons that were always immoral are now also illegal. To critics, it represents a profound threat to the stability of the existing global nuclear order with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as the normative anchor. As the most significant leap in nuclear disarmament in fifty years and a rare case study of successful state-civil society partnership in multilateral diplomacy, the Ban Treaty challenges the established order. The book's contributors are leading experts on the Ban Treaty, including senior scholars, policymakers and civil society activists. A vital guide to the Ban Treaty for students of nuclear disarmament, arms control and diplomacy as well as for policymakers in those fields.

The contributors to this book describe, discuss, and evaluate the normative reframing brought about by the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Ban Treaty), taking you on a journey through its genesis and negotiation history to the shape of the emerging global nuclear order. Adopted by the United Nations on 7 July 2017, the Ban Treaty came into effect on 22 January 2021. For advocates and supporters, weapons that were always immoral are now also illegal. To critics, it represents a profound threat to the stability of the existing global nuclear order with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty as the normative anchor. As the most significant leap in nuclear disarmament in fifty years and a rare case study of successful state-civil society partnership in multilateral diplomacy, the Ban Treaty challenges the established order. The book's contributors are leading experts on the Ban Treaty, including senior scholars, policymakers and civil society activists. A vital guide to the Ban Treaty for students of nuclear disarmament, arms control and diplomacy as well as for policymakers in those fields.

In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for "tactical" nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a "special reminder" of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a "long-route" policy of providing Saigon with a "decent chance" of survival for a "decent interval" after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to offer a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.

This book, first published in 1970, examines the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, when an entire industrial city was devastated and the bulk of its population killed or wounded. Coming days after the bombing of Hiroshima, Nagasaki has largely been forgotten. This book traces the decision by the US to use the second bomb, and the choice of Nagasaki as its target. It follows the bomber to the skies over Nagasaki, and the terrible events that unfolded. Using diaries, written accounts and the testimonies of hundreds of Japanese civilians who survived the bombing, this book provides the definitive text on the Nagasaki atomic bomb.

This book, first published in 1967, examines the circumstances and events that led to the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan, devastating Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The death of President Roosevelt three weeks before the end of the European war led to an incoming President, Truman, who had heard nothing of the project before taking office. He and his advisers had no precedents to guide them as they considered what to do, and withing their closely drawn circle there were genuine differences of opinion about the use of atomic weapons. This book traces the course of the discussions between the politicians and their technical advisers, the part played by personal relationships, and the attempt by some of the scientists to stop the bomb being used without warning. In addition, it supplies a thorough analysis of developments abroad, and in particular the situation in Japan. It shows that the debate in Washington and the atomic plants was careful and wide-ranging, and that issues are no less complex for being supremely important. The result is to provide both a study of decision-making and a valuable contribution to our understanding of the closing months of the Second World War.

This book is a comprehensive study of the development of China's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It offers insights into the secretive world of nuclear submarines and ballistic missiles of the Chinese (PLA) Navy and studies how these are likely to grow in the next two decades. The volume examines the technological origins of the design and development of Chinese nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and their naval construction capabilities. It provides an analysis of the underlying Chinese nuclear doctrine, China's maritime geographical constraints for submarine operations, and the credibility of its sea-based deterrence. It draws upon strategy, nuclear policy, technology, geography, and operational considerations to holistically predict the likely SSBN force levels of the PLA Navy for various scenarios. The book also assesses the spectrum of threats likely from the undersea domain for India and other nations in the Indo-Pacific region. A key text on an obscure but vital facet of Chinese defence studies, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers of strategic affairs, international relations and disarmament studies, peace and conflict studies, geopolitics, foreign policy, Indo-Pacific studies, and diplomacy.

Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland's west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK's complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons-internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.

This book presents a rounded critique of the conventional wisdom about the legality of nuclear weapons by experts in international and constitutional law. Part I addresses the status of nuclear weapons under international law. Scholars on one side of the question draw upon treaties and international custom to argue that most uses of nuclear weapons are illegal and that even mere possession of such weaponry is legally unjustifiable. Others argue that law cannot be imposed on the nuclear weapons states without their consent and that nuclear weapons provide deterrence that binds the superpowers in a peaceful balance of power. Part I concludes with a comprehensive bibliography on nuclear weapons and international law. Part II, the section that focuses on nuclear weapons and American constitutional law, offers widely divergent approaches and conclusions. Although there is no explicit prohibition of such weapons in the United States Constitution, several contributors suggest that the advent of nuclear weapons has so changed the milieu in which constitutional institutions operate that many accepted conclusions must be reexamined. Part III explores the effects of nuclear weapons on the environment and the medical consequences of nuclear war.

- offers most comprehensive and up to date0 history of the IAEA's six decades - features essay by leading academics and policymakers - makes an important contribution to security and nonproliferation studies, as well as to the field of international organizations and global governance

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China's Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

The effects of weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained, either spatially or temporally, are unpredictable, discriminate poorly between combatants and civilians, and are highly disruptive of ecosystems. This book, first published in 1977, examines several WMD and analyses the extent and duration of environmental damage to be expected from them. Chapters are devoted to the ecological impacts of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and geophysical and environmental weapons.

The main impact of the May 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan was not on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Peimani asserts, but on the structure of the international system. The tests could not encourage massive nuclear proliferation as many natural factors prevent such a scenario, but they surely contributed to the weakening of the mainly American-dominated international system.

The failure of nuclear India and Pakistan to achieve their objectives has increased their dissatisfaction with a system which they see as discriminating against them on the grounds of their insignificant nuclear arsenals and their severe underdevelopment. Given their limited resources, their attempts to deal with these problems in the near future and, in particular to develop credible arsenals, would be self-exhausting and not feasible. Their failure has turned them into dissatisfied regional powers who are being pushed toward forming alliances with their long-time friends, Russia and China, respectively. Each has strong reasons for dissatisfaction with the American system, which is marginalizing them. Their concerns about common enemies and threats as well as their economic and political needs are pushing these states toward the formation of tacit or official alliances. Decades of friendship and extensive ties make them natural allies and encourage the formation of an alliance between India and Russia on the one side, and China and Pakistan on the other. By creating strong regional poles, these predictably hostile alliances will contribute to the weakening of the international system and the consolidation of a rising multipolarity. Scholars, students, and researchers involved with foreign policy, American-Indian and American-Pakistani relations, and international military-political relations will find this analysis of particular interest.

Renegotiating the Nuclear Order offers a sociological approach to the nuclear order, and order defined by nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. The focus is on the need to renegotiate the nuclear order, given the conflict between deterrence and disarmament and the unbalanced distribution of rights and responsibilities between the nuclear and nonnuclear states. The study applies the concepts, a relevant social group, and a technological frame developed in the sociology of technology on the current competition between the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons. The negotiations of the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran form the empirical background. The policy challenges identified in the sociotechnical analysis are threefold. Firstly, there is the need to guarantee the credibility of the nuclear diplomacy in the gap between the "military" and the "peaceful". Secondly, during the past 50 years the rights of the non-nuclear states have been undermined, while the nuclear-weapon states have ignored their disarmament obligations. There is a need to renegotiate a new balance. Thirdly, the relationship between the two treaties has to be clarified. The proposal is to clearly separate the two into a comprehensive treaty on non-proliferation and to a verifiable treaty on prohibiting nuclear weapons. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, arms control and disarmament, sociology, STS (Science-Technology-Society) studies, and International Relations.

This book offers new perspectives on British nuclear policy-making at the height of the Cold War, arguing that the decisions taken by the British government during the 1950s and 1960s in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions cannot be properly understood without close reference to Duncan Sandys, and in particular the policy preferences that emerged from his experiences of the Second World War and his efforts leading Britain's campaign against the V-1 and V-2. Immersing himself in this campaign against unmanned weaponry, Sandys came to see ballistic missiles as the only guarantor of nuclear credibility in the post-war world, placing them at the centre of his strategic thinking and developing a sincerely-held and logically-consistent belief system which he carried with him through a succession of ministerial roles, allowing him to exert a previously undocumented level of influence on the nature of Britain's nuclear capabilities and its approach to the Cold War. This book shows the profound influence Sandys' personal belief system had on Britain's attempts to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent.