In the closing days of World War II, scientists working for the U.S. government invented nuclear explosives by splitting the atoms of heavy metals. Germany had already surrendered, but the United States and its allies remained at war with Japan. In the summer of 1945, the Japanese city of Hiroshima was flattened by a single nuclear bomb. A second bombing occurred just a few days later, decimating the city of Nagasaki. These were the first nuclear weapons ever used in war. And - so far - they are the last. Since then, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been manufactured and deployed by governments around the world. Many of these weapons are much more powerful than the atomic bombs that destroyed the two Japanese cities. None have been used so far, and the absence of nuclear war among nations armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons is a great mystery. While the threat of a nuclear attack on the United States has receded, the possibility of a nuclear attack on an American city by terrorists has taken its place in our official nightmares. So far, no terrorist group has made a serious effort to buy, steal, or build a nuclear weapon. The absence of nuclear terrorism in a world swarming with fanatical terrorists is another great mystery. The slippery slope to a nuclear Armageddon has been present for more than sixty years. In secure locations in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London, and Paris, there are buttons to push than could put an end to human civilization, but these buttons have never been pushed. Why not? What has so far kept us safe from these mortal dangers? Those are the questions that Caplow asks and answers in Armageddon Postponed.

This book strives to take stock of current achievements and existing challenges in nuclear verification, identify the available information and gaps that can act as drivers for exploring new approaches to verification strategies and technologies. With the practical application of the systems concept to nuclear disarmament scenarios and other, non-nuclear verification fields, it investigates, where greater transparency and confidence could be achieved in pursuit of new national or international nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts. A final discussion looks at how, in the absence of formal government-to-government negotiations, experts can take practical steps to advance the technical development of these concepts.

In 1988, Scott Cook was a boarding school PE teacher responsible for the proper inflation of dodge balls. A year later, he was operating an underground strategic missile control center with 10 intercontinental nuclear weapons capable of obliterating an entire country. This unexpected journey took him from the serene hills of Virginia through months of intensive training on the California coast to the front lines of the Cold War, beneath the frozen plains of North Dakota. His frank, entertaining memoir describes the insular and secretive military subculture of men and women who lived with the sobering burden of potentially unleashing global devastation, and how an easy-going gym coach ended up in an organization whose unofficial motto was "To err is human; to forgive is not Strategic Air Command policy.

This book is a comprehensive study of the development of China's nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). It offers insights into the secretive world of nuclear submarines and ballistic missiles of the Chinese (PLA) Navy and studies how these are likely to grow in the next two decades. The volume examines the technological origins of the design and development of Chinese nuclear submarines, ballistic missiles, and their naval construction capabilities. It provides an analysis of the underlying Chinese nuclear doctrine, China's maritime geographical constraints for submarine operations, and the credibility of its sea-based deterrence. It draws upon strategy, nuclear policy, technology, geography, and operational considerations to holistically predict the likely SSBN force levels of the PLA Navy for various scenarios. The book also assesses the spectrum of threats likely from the undersea domain for India and other nations in the Indo-Pacific region. A key text on an obscure but vital facet of Chinese defence studies, this book will be useful for scholars and researchers of strategic affairs, international relations and disarmament studies, peace and conflict studies, geopolitics, foreign policy, Indo-Pacific studies, and diplomacy.

Renegotiating the Nuclear Order offers a sociological approach to the nuclear order, and order defined by nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. The focus is on the need to renegotiate the nuclear order, given the conflict between deterrence and disarmament and the unbalanced distribution of rights and responsibilities between the nuclear and nonnuclear states. The study applies the concepts, a relevant social group, and a technological frame developed in the sociology of technology on the current competition between the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Treaty on the Prohibition on Nuclear Weapons. The negotiations of the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran form the empirical background. The policy challenges identified in the sociotechnical analysis are threefold. Firstly, there is the need to guarantee the credibility of the nuclear diplomacy in the gap between the "military" and the "peaceful". Secondly, during the past 50 years the rights of the non-nuclear states have been undermined, while the nuclear-weapon states have ignored their disarmament obligations. There is a need to renegotiate a new balance. Thirdly, the relationship between the two treaties has to be clarified. The proposal is to clearly separate the two into a comprehensive treaty on non-proliferation and to a verifiable treaty on prohibiting nuclear weapons. This book will be of much interest to students of security studies, arms control and disarmament, sociology, STS (Science-Technology-Society) studies, and International Relations.

The effects of weapons of mass destruction cannot be contained, either spatially or temporally, are unpredictable, discriminate poorly between combatants and civilians, and are highly disruptive of ecosystems. This book, first published in 1977, examines several WMD and analyses the extent and duration of environmental damage to be expected from them. Chapters are devoted to the ecological impacts of nuclear weapons, chemical and biological weapons, and geophysical and environmental weapons.

A deeply researched international history and exemplary study (New York Times Book Review) of how a divided world ended and our present world was fashioned, as the world drifts toward another great time of choosing. Two of America's leading scholar-diplomats, Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, have combed sources in several languages, interviewed leading figures, and drawn on their own firsthand experience to bring to life the choices that molded the contemporary world. Zeroing in on the key moments of decision, the might-have-beens, and the human beings working through them, they explore both what happened and what could have happened, to show how one world ended and another took form. Beginning in the late 1970s and carrying into the present, they focus on the momentous period between 1988 and 1992, when an entire world system changed, states broke apart, and societies were transformed. Such periods have always been accompanied by terrible wars -- but not this time. This is also a story of individuals coping with uncertainty. They voice their hopes and fears. They try out desperate improvisations and careful designs. These were leaders who grew up in a postwar world, who tried to fashion something better, more peaceful, more prosperous, than the damaged, divided world in which they had come of age. New problems are putting their choices, and the world they made, back on the operating table. It is time to recall not only why they made their choices, but also just how great nations can step up to great challenges. Timed for the thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall, To Build a Better World is an authoritative depiction of contemporary statecraft. It lets readers in on the strategies and negotiations, nerve-racking risks, last-minute decisions, and deep deliberations behind the dramas that changed the face of Europe -- and the world -- forever.

This book explores evolving patterns of nuclear deterrence, the impact of new technologies, and changing deterrent force postures in the South Asian region to assess future challenges for sustainable peace and stability. Under the core principles of the security dilemma, this book analyzes the prevailing security environment in South Asia and offers unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral frameworks to stabilize peace and ensure deterrence stability in the South Asian region. Moreover, contending patterns of deterrence dynamics in the South Asian region are further elaborated as becoming inextricably interlinked with the broader security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region and the interactions with the United States and China's Belt and Road Initiative. As India and Pakistan are increasingly becoming part of the competing strategies exercised by the United States and China, the authors analyze how strategic uncertainty and fear faced by these rival states cause the introduction of new technologies which could gradually drift these competing states into more serious crises and military conflicts. Presenting innovative solutions to emerging South Asian challenges and offering new security mechanisms for sustainable peace and stability, this book will be of interest to academics and policymakers working on Asian Security studies, Nuclear Strategy, and International Relations.

Since 1969, the United Kingdom always has always had one submarine armed with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles underwater, undetected, in constant communication, ready at a set notice to fire at targets anywhere in the world. This is part of its Trident Programme, which includes the development, procurement, and operation of the current generation of British nuclear weapons, as well as the means to deliver them. Operated by the Royal Navy and based at Clyde Naval Base on Scotland's west coast, it is the most expensive and most powerful capability of the British military forces. In 2016, the United Kingdom had to decide on whether to go ahead and build the next generation of nuclear submarines that will allow the UK to remain in the nuclear business well into the second half of this century. The book presents the political, cultural, technical, and strategic aspects of Trident to provide a thoughtful overview of the UK's complex relationship with nuclear weapons. The authors, both scholars and practitioners, bring together diverse perspectives on the issue, discussing the importance of UK nuclear history as well as the political, legal, and diplomatic aspects of UK nuclear weapons-internationally and domestically. Also addressed are the new technical, military, and strategic challenges to the UK nuclear thinking and strategy.

This book is a counter to the conventional wisdom that the United States can and should do more to reduce both the role of nuclear weapons in its security strategies and the number of weapons in its arsenal. The case against nuclear weapons has been made on many grounds-including historical, political, and moral. But, Brad Roberts argues, it has not so far been informed by the experience of the United States since the Cold War in trying to adapt deterrence to a changed world, and to create the conditions that would allow further significant changes to U.S. nuclear policy and posture. Drawing on the author's experience in the making and implementation of U.S. policy in the Obama administration, this book examines that real world experience and finds important lessons for the disarmament enterprise. Central conclusions of the work are that other nuclear-armed states are not prepared to join the United States in making reductions, and that unilateral steps by the United States to disarm further would be harmful to its interests and those of its allies. The book ultimately argues in favor of patience and persistence in the implementation of a balanced approach to nuclear strategy that encompasses political efforts to reduce nuclear dangers along with military efforts to deter them.

This book presents a rounded critique of the conventional wisdom about the legality of nuclear weapons by experts in international and constitutional law. Part I addresses the status of nuclear weapons under international law. Scholars on one side of the question draw upon treaties and international custom to argue that most uses of nuclear weapons are illegal and that even mere possession of such weaponry is legally unjustifiable. Others argue that law cannot be imposed on the nuclear weapons states without their consent and that nuclear weapons provide deterrence that binds the superpowers in a peaceful balance of power. Part I concludes with a comprehensive bibliography on nuclear weapons and international law. Part II, the section that focuses on nuclear weapons and American constitutional law, offers widely divergent approaches and conclusions. Although there is no explicit prohibition of such weapons in the United States Constitution, several contributors suggest that the advent of nuclear weapons has so changed the milieu in which constitutional institutions operate that many accepted conclusions must be reexamined. Part III explores the effects of nuclear weapons on the environment and the medical consequences of nuclear war.

The last two decades have seen a slow but steady increase in nuclear armed states, and in the seemingly less constrained policy goals of some of the newer "rogue" states in the international system. The authors of"On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century" argue that a time may come when one of these states makes the conscious decision that using a nuclear weapon against the United States, its allies, or forward deployed forces in the context of a crisis or a regional conventional conflict may be in its interests. They assert that we are unprepared for these types of "limited" nuclear wars and that it is urgent we rethink the theory, policy, and implementation of force related to our approaches to this type of engagement.
Together they critique Cold War doctrine on limited nuclear war and consider a number of the key concepts that should govern our approach to limited nuclear conflict in the future. These include identifying the factors likely to lead to limited nuclear war, examining the geopolitics of future conflict scenarios that might lead to small-scale nuclear use, and assessing strategies for crisis management and escalation control. Finally, they consider a range of strategies and operational concepts for countering, controlling, or containing limited nuclear war.

The main impact of the May 1998 nuclear tests of India and Pakistan was not on the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Peimani asserts, but on the structure of the international system. The tests could not encourage massive nuclear proliferation as many natural factors prevent such a scenario, but they surely contributed to the weakening of the mainly American-dominated international system.

The failure of nuclear India and Pakistan to achieve their objectives has increased their dissatisfaction with a system which they see as discriminating against them on the grounds of their insignificant nuclear arsenals and their severe underdevelopment. Given their limited resources, their attempts to deal with these problems in the near future and, in particular to develop credible arsenals, would be self-exhausting and not feasible. Their failure has turned them into dissatisfied regional powers who are being pushed toward forming alliances with their long-time friends, Russia and China, respectively. Each has strong reasons for dissatisfaction with the American system, which is marginalizing them. Their concerns about common enemies and threats as well as their economic and political needs are pushing these states toward the formation of tacit or official alliances. Decades of friendship and extensive ties make them natural allies and encourage the formation of an alliance between India and Russia on the one side, and China and Pakistan on the other. By creating strong regional poles, these predictably hostile alliances will contribute to the weakening of the international system and the consolidation of a rising multipolarity. Scholars, students, and researchers involved with foreign policy, American-Indian and American-Pakistani relations, and international military-political relations will find this analysis of particular interest.

This book offers new perspectives on British nuclear policy-making at the height of the Cold War, arguing that the decisions taken by the British government during the 1950s and 1960s in pursuit of its nuclear ambitions cannot be properly understood without close reference to Duncan Sandys, and in particular the policy preferences that emerged from his experiences of the Second World War and his efforts leading Britain's campaign against the V-1 and V-2. Immersing himself in this campaign against unmanned weaponry, Sandys came to see ballistic missiles as the only guarantor of nuclear credibility in the post-war world, placing them at the centre of his strategic thinking and developing a sincerely-held and logically-consistent belief system which he carried with him through a succession of ministerial roles, allowing him to exert a previously undocumented level of influence on the nature of Britain's nuclear capabilities and its approach to the Cold War. This book shows the profound influence Sandys' personal belief system had on Britain's attempts to acquire a credible nuclear deterrent.

This book addresses the under-researched discourse of the evolution of Chinese nuclear posture, and in particular, explains the absence from this evolution of a coherent and well-defined operational doctrine. Using a neoclassical realist framework, the book explains why China, after having launched a crash programme in the mid-1950s to develop a nuclear deterrent, did not debate a clear operational doctrine with respect to targeting and employment until the mid-1980s.

The India-Pakistan relationship is complex and choreographed with wars, protracted conflicts and active disputes. Although the presence of nuclear weapons has decreased the probability of an all-out conventional war, the frequency of minor conflicts and crises have increased manifold. India considers nuclear weapons a deterrent against nuclear strikes, whereas Pakistan assumes that these would deter a nuclear as well as a conventional war. The central argument of this book is that another military engagement between India and Pakistan, similar to one in February 2019, exists with varying degrees of probability, thus challenging the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Until the probabilities of military engagements are minimized, the possibilities of peace and stability in the region would remain elusive. Therefore, the situation asks for scholarly contribution in developing a new paradigm wherein the two nuclear neighbors are made to recognize the need to resolve their disputes instead of just managing them, to avoid recurrence of violent conflicts that can lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange, no matter how limited it is.

In the Post-Cold War era, US nuclear foreign policies towards India witnessed a major turnaround as a demand for 'cap, reduce, eliminate' under the Clinton administration was replaced by the implementation of the historic 'civil nuclear deal' in 2008 by Bush, a policy which continued under Obama's administration. This book addresses the change in US nuclear foreign policy by focusing on three core categories of identity, inequality, and great power narratives. Building upon the theoretical paradigm of critical constructivism, the concept of the 'state' is problematised by focusing on identity-related questions arguing that the 'state' becomes a constructed entity standing as valid only within relations of identity and difference. Focusing on postcolonial principles, Pate argues that imperialism as an organising principle of identity/difference enables us to understand how difference was maintained in unequal terms through US nuclear foreign policy. This manifested in five great power narratives constructed around peace and justice; India-Pakistan deterrence; democracy; economic progress; and scientific development. Identities of 'race', 'political economy', and 'gender', in terms of 'radical otherness' and 'otherness' were recurrently utilised through these narratives to maintain a difference enabling the respective administrations to maintain 'US' identity as a progressive and developed western nation, intrinsically justifying the US role as an arbiter of the global nuclear order. A useful work for scholars researching identity construction and US foreign and security policies, US-India bilateral nuclear relations, South Asian nuclear politics, critical security, and postcolonial studies.

"The Globalization of Security" is an important rethinking of the connections between globalization and security, focusing on a conceptual examination of the role of the state combined with key case studies. The book provides an analysis of the changing nature of security issues through three interlinking ways of conceptualizing the globalization of security: the expansion of the scope of threat, thinking about security in 'global' terms, and the development of transnational networks of power. Three cases are examined to provide potential examples of the globalization of security: nuclear weapons and the globalization of threat, the globalization of the arms industry, and the global security aspects of migration and citizenship. The book provides a novel historical sociological approach to the globalization of security, advancing both the understanding of security and the theory of state power in international relations.

The last two decades have seen a slow but steady increase in nuclear armed states, and in the seemingly less constrained policy goals of some of the newer "rogue" states in the international system. The authors of"On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century" argue that a time may come when one of these states makes the conscious decision that using a nuclear weapon against the United States, its allies, or forward deployed forces in the context of a crisis or a regional conventional conflict may be in its interests. They assert that we are unprepared for these types of "limited" nuclear wars and that it is urgent we rethink the theory, policy, and implementation of force related to our approaches to this type of engagement.
Together they critique Cold War doctrine on limited nuclear war and consider a number of the key concepts that should govern our approach to limited nuclear conflict in the future. These include identifying the factors likely to lead to limited nuclear war, examining the geopolitics of future conflict scenarios that might lead to small-scale nuclear use, and assessing strategies for crisis management and escalation control. Finally, they consider a range of strategies and operational concepts for countering, controlling, or containing limited nuclear war.

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today's international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.

The history of Pakistan's nuclear program is the history of Pakistan. Fascinated with the new nuclear science, the young nation's leaders launched a nuclear energy program in 1956 and consciously interwove nuclear developments into the broader narrative of Pakistani nationalism. Then, impelled first by the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan Wars, and more urgently by India's first nuclear weapon test in 1974, Pakistani senior officials tapped into the country's pool of young nuclear scientists and engineers and molded them into a motivated cadre committed to building the 'ultimate weapon.' The tenacity of this group and the central place of its mission in Pakistan's national identity allowed the program to outlast the perennial political crises of the next 20 years, culminating in the test of a nuclear device in 1998.
Written by a 30-year professional in the Pakistani Army who played a senior role formulating and advocating Pakistan's security policy on nuclear and conventional arms control, this book tells the compelling story of how and why Pakistan's government, scientists, and military, persevered in the face of a wide array of obstacles to acquire nuclear weapons. It lays out the conditions that sparked the shift from a peaceful quest to acquire nuclear energy into a full-fledged weapons program, details how the nuclear program was organized, reveals the role played by outside powers in nuclear decisions, and explains how Pakistani scientists overcome the many technical hurdles they encountered. Thanks to General Khan's unique insider perspective, it unveils and unravels the fascinating and turbulent interplay of personalities and organizations that took place and reveals how international opposition to the program only made it an even more significant issue of national resolve.
Listen to a podcast of a related presentation by Feroz Khan at the Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Fifty years into the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) regime, the risks of nuclear war, terrorism, and the threat of further proliferation remain. A lack of significant progress towards disarmament will cast doubt upon the viability of the NPT. By recognizing that certain fissile materials are essential to every nuclear weapon and that controlling their usage provides the foundation for international efforts to limit their spread, this book presents a comprehensive framework for nuclear disarmament. Based upon phased reductions, Shea provides a mechanism for the disposal of weapon-origin fissile material and controls on peaceful nuclear activities and non-explosive military uses. He explores the technological means for monitoring and verification, the legal arrangements required to provide an enduring foundation, and a financial structure which will enable progress. This book will be invaluable to professional organizations, arms control NGOs, government officials, scientists, and politicians. It will also appeal to academics and postgraduate researchers working on security studies, disarmament diplomacy and the politics and science of verification.

Rising concern over the increasing threat of nuclear war impelled the 2017 United Nations (UN) negotiations and adoption by 122 UN member states of a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty seeks to ban nuclear weapons globally in the same way chemical and biological weapons have already been prohibited. This book provides the first in-depth comprehensive analysis of the implications and possibilities of the new treaty, drawing on the insights of international relations, international laws, and disarmament experts and specialists from Europe, America, the Asia-Pacific, and the UN. In a context where existing nuclear weapon states have so far declined to be party to the new treaty, the book examines not only its emergence and significance but also the prospects and possibilities for its implementation, the challenges associated with verifying the new agreement, the role of both civil society and governments, and the treaty's wider implications in addressing regional and global nuclear threats. This book was originally published as a special issue of Global Change, Peace & Security but additionally includes the special section articles on the treaty in the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament.

This book examines the moral dilemmas of nuclear dissemination, and the justifications of both nuclear pursuit and avoidance by contemporary states. Applying Constructivist methodologies and moral theory, the author analyses a core set of moral dilemmas that ensnare decision-makers amongst state and non-state nuclear aspirants, as well as amongst states committed to preventing horizontal proliferation. The book shows that the character, structure and implications of these dilemmas have not yet been adequately understood or appreciated, and that such an understanding is necessary for an effective set of nonproliferation policies. Furthermore, it shows that the dilemmas' force and political policy import are evident in the 'discourses' that diverse actors undertake to defend their nuclear choices, and how the dilemmas of nuclear aspirants are implicated in those of nuclear preventers. The author advocates a number of policy recommendations that reinforce some already made by scholars and experts but, more importantly, others that advise significantly different courses of action. The book reveals how the moral dilemmas of nuclear aspiration, avoidance, and prevention constitute the security dilemmas and paradoxes that comprise much of the 21st century security environment. This book will be of much interest to students of nuclear proliferation, international relations, ethics, and international security studies.