South Africa's Bomb kept the world guessing for years. Six-and-a- half nuclear bombs had been secretly built and destroyed, former South African President F.W. de Klerk announced in 1993. No other country has ever voluntarily destroyed its nuclear arsenal.

From 1975 Nic von Wielligh was involved in the production of nuclear weapons material, the dismantling of the nuclear weapons and the provision of evidence of South Africa's bona fides to the international community. The International Atomic Energy Agency declared South Africa's Initial Report to be the most comprehensive and professional that they had ever received. In this book the nuclear physicist and his daughter Lydia von Wielligh-Steyn tell the gripping story of the splitting of the atom and the power it releases. It is an account of ground-breaking research and the scientists responsible; it deals with uranium enrichment, the arms race and South Africa's secret programme.

The Bomb: South Africa's Nuclear Programme is a story of nuclear explosions, espionage, smuggling of nuclear materials and swords that became ploughshares.

The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was the most perilous event in history, when mankind faced a looming nuclear collision between the United States and Soviet Union. During those weeks, the world gazed into the abyss of potential annihilation.

Max Hastings’s graphic new history tells the story from the viewpoints of national leaders, Russian officers, Cuban peasants, American pilots and British disarmers. Max Hastings deploys his accustomed blend of eye-witness interviews, archive documents and diaries, White House tape recordings, top-down analysis, first to paint word-portraits of the Cold War experiences of Fidel Castro’s Cuba, Nikita Khrushchev’s Russia and Kennedy’s America; then to describe the nail-biting Thirteen Days in which Armageddon beckoned.

Hastings began researching this book believing that he was exploring a past event from twentieth century history. He is as shocked as are millions of us around the world, to discover that the current attack of Ukraine gives this narrative a hitherto unimaginable twenty-first century immediacy. We may be witnessing the onset of a new Cold War between nuclear-armed superpowers.

To contend with today’s threat, which Hastings fears will prove enduring, it is critical to understand how, sixty years ago, the world survived its last glimpse into the abyss. Only by fearing the worst, he argues, can our leaders hope to secure the survival of the planet.

There is only one scenario other than an asteroid strike that could end the world as we know it in a matter of hours: nuclear war. And one of the triggers for that war would be a nuclear missile inbound toward the United States.

Every generation, a journalist has looked deep into the heart of the nuclear military establishment: the technologies, the safeguards, the plans, and the risks. These investigations are vital to how we understand the world we really live in—where one nuclear missile will beget one in return, and where the choreography of the world’s end requires massive decisions made on seconds’ notice with information that is only as good as the intelligence we have.

Pulitzer Prize finalist Annie Jacobsen’s Nuclear War: A Scenario explores this ticking-clock scenario, based on dozens of exclusive new interviews with military and civilian experts who have built the weapons, have been privy to the response plans, and have been responsible for those decisions should they have needed to be made. Nuclear War: A Scenario examines the handful of minutes after a nuclear missile launch. It is essential reading, and unlike any other book in its depth and urgency.

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize, published to exceptional reviews in both the US and the UK, American Prometheus is as compelling a work of biography as it is a significant work of history.

Physicist and polymath, as familiar with Hindu scriptures as he was with quantum mechanics, J. Robert Oppenheimer - director of the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb - was the most famous scientist of his generation.

In their meticulous and riveting biography, Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin reveal a brilliant, ambitious, complex and flawed man, profoundly involved with some of the momentous events of the twentieth century.

In 1985 Jennifer and Ian Hartley left their home, bought a caravan and moved to Cambridgeshire to witness against the sighting of Cruise missiles at RAF Molesworth. This memoir recounts their day to day life living in this unusual place and the dialogue they had with MPs, the military, police, peace campaigners, the local community and the church.

This book details the evolution of General George Marshall's relationship with the atomic bomb-including the Manhattan Project and the use of atomic weapons on Japan-as it emerged as the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. The atomic bomb is not only the most powerful weapon ever used in the history of warfare: it is also the most significant in terms of its long-term impact on U.S. military power and policy, and as the reason behind the conflict that raged for four decades without actually happening-the Cold War. General George C. Marshall played an instrumental role in the development and use of the atomic bomb in World War II as well as in issues involving nuclear weapons in the post-World War II period. This book tells the story of Marshall's experience with the atomic bomb from his early skepticism of its effectiveness as a weapon, to his oversight of its development and deployment against Japan in World War II, to his recognition of the bomb as a weapon of such dire consequence that it should never be used again. Intended for a general audience as well as scholars with specific knowledge about the subject matter, this book presents a cohesive account of General Marshall's involvement with nuclear weapons and atomic power as Army chief of staff during World War II and as secretary of state and secretary of defense in the early years of the Cold War. Marshall's involvement with the use of nuclear weapons is set in the context of the Allies' efforts to force Japan to surrender and the initiation of the Cold War. Readers will gain insight into Marshall's quest for obtaining a Japanese surrender; his views on the use of the atomic bomb on Japan versus the use of conventional weapons, including fire bombing or poison gas; his interactions with Roosevelt and Truman on nuclear issues; and Marshall's diplomatic skillfulness in dealing with the issues surrounding the control and use of nuclear weapons as secretary of state and secretary of defense in the post-World War II era. These included consideration of the use of the atomic bomb during the Berlin crisis and the Korean war. Presents a clear and concise narrative of Marshall's interactions with nuclear weapons, from his appointment to President Roosevelt's advisory committee in 1941 to his tenure as President Truman's secretary of defense in 1950 Documents Marshall's role in pulling together the financial, material, and human resources required for the Manhattan Project as well as his collaboration with Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Manhattan Project leader General Leslie Groves to produce the atomic bomb Derives an accurate account of Marshall's involvement with nuclear weapons through official documents, his correspondence, the opinions of his peers, and personal interviews he granted later in his life

Despite recent attempts at 'negotiation', the attitudes of both Kim Jong-un's regime and the West seem unchanged. North Korea is still shrouded in mystery, and there are no clear plans for the future... Can we trust either side to bring about peace? And if so, how? This provocative insider's account blasts apart the myths which paint North Korea as a rogue state run by a mad leader. Informed by extraordinary access to the country's leadership, Glyn Ford investigates the regime from the inside, providing game-changing insights, which Trump and his administration have failed to do. Acknowledging that North Korea is a deeply flawed and repressive state, he nonetheless shows that sections of the leadership are desperate to modernise and end their isolation. With chapters on recent developments including the Trump / Kim summit, Ford supports a dialogue between East and West, whilst also criticising Trump's facile attempts. Talking to North Korea provides a road map for averting a war in North East Asia that would threaten the lives of millions.

An unflinching examination of the moral and professional dilemmas faced by physicians who took part in the Manhattan Project. After his father died, James L. Nolan, Jr., took possession of a box of private family materials. To his surprise, the small secret archive contained a treasure trove of information about his grandfather's role as a doctor in the Manhattan Project. Dr. Nolan, it turned out, had been a significant figure. A talented ob-gyn radiologist, he cared for the scientists on the project, organized safety and evacuation plans for the Trinity test at Alamogordo, escorted the "Little Boy" bomb from Los Alamos to the Pacific Islands, and was one of the first Americans to enter the irradiated ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Participation on the project challenged Dr. Nolan's instincts as a healer. He and his medical colleagues were often conflicted, torn between their duty and desire to win the war and their oaths to protect life. Atomic Doctors follows these physicians as they sought to maximize the health and safety of those exposed to nuclear radiation, all the while serving leaders determined to minimize delays and maintain secrecy. Called upon both to guard against the harmful effects of radiation and to downplay its hazards, doctors struggled with the ethics of ending the deadliest of all wars using the most lethal of all weapons. Their work became a very human drama of ideals, co-optation, and complicity. A vital and vivid account of a largely unknown chapter in atomic history, Atomic Doctors is a profound meditation on the moral dilemmas that ordinary people face in extraordinary times.

In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for "tactical" nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a "special reminder" of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a "long-route" policy of providing Saigon with a "decent chance" of survival for a "decent interval" after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to offer a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.

This is a study of how the information age in modern warfare coexists with the persistent appeal of nuclear weapons and its impact on crisis management. In today's information age, the coexistence of nuclear weapons with advanced conventional weapons and information-based concepts of warfare is a military contradiction. Nuclear deterrence was initially predicated on geopolitical, military, and technical assumptions. These were based on Cold War politics, rational deterrence theory, the concept of mutual vulnerability, and the fact that information and technology diffusion were limited. Today, however, far from being obsolete, nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction have not only survived, but have become weapons for states that face security threats, including perceived threats of nuclear blackmail, or expectation of conflicts. This study focuses on this unplanned coexistence of two distinct arts of war, including the possibility that states like the U.S. may be held hostage to nuclear blackmail by "outlier" regimes or terrorists, such as North Korea. It shows that restricting nuclear proliferation should still be on the agenda of policymakers, and calls for a revitalized global non-proliferation regime. This unique survey by a leading expert will appeal to anyone interested in arms control, nuclear proliferation, and defense policy.

An updated edition of ABC-CLIO's classic reference book on nuclear arms programs and proliferation in nations around the world. Fully updated and revised since its initial publication, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, Second Edition explores all key issues related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and efforts to curb them, from the U.S. atomic bomb project during World War II to current debates on nuclear terrorism, North Korea's nuclear test, and Iran's enrichment program. Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, Second Edition clarifies weapons-related policy debates from both U.S. and international perspectives, offering a detailed look at current technologies, arsenals, weapons tests, and nonproliferation efforts. Readers will find expert analysis of such crucial recent events as Libya's disarmament, the failed WMD search in Iraq, A.Q. Khan's nuclear technology black market, "dirty bombs," developments in North Korea and Iran, and the U.S. plan to aid India's nuclear program-plus recent progress (or lack thereof) on a range of treaties and initiatives. Primary documents include an excerpt from the 1945 U.S. report on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the UN resolution sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear test A detailed and updated chronology highlights major events between 1939-2007 pertaining to the buildup of nuclear weapons and the efforts to control and dismantle them

Challenging the legality of UK nuclear policy as a further generation of nuclear-armed submarines is developed, Trident and International Law asks who is really accountable for Coulport and Faslane. The UK government in Westminster controls nuclear policy decisions even though Britain's nuclear submarines and warheads are all based in Scotland, at Faslane and Coulport. The Scottish Government therefore has responsibilities under domestic and international law relating to the deployment of nuclear weapons in Scotland. Public concern about nuclear deployments, and particularly the security and proliferation implications of modernising Trident, led the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, the Edinburgh Peace and Justice Centre and Trident Ploughshares to organise an international conference on 'Trident and International Law: Scotland's Obligations' in Edinburgh in 2009. This book presents the key papers and documents, with additional arguments from renowned legal scholars. The findings should be of interest to lawyers, policymakers and citizens with interest or responsibilities in legal and nuclear issues, public safety and human security. Whilst focusing on Scotland, this book raises serious questions for nuclear weapon deployments worldwide.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs), often referred to as "battlefield," "sub-strategic," or "non-strategic" nuclear weapons, usually have a plutonium core and are typically distinct from strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, they warrant a separate consideration in the realm of nuclear security. The yield of such weapons is generally lower than that of strategic nuclear weapons and may range from the relatively low 0.1 kiloton to a few kilotons. Pakistan's quest to acquire tactical nuclear weapons has added a dangerous dimension to the already precarious strategic equation in South Asia. The security discourse in the subcontinent revolves around the perennial apprehension of a conventional or sub-conventional conflict triggering a chain reaction, eventually paving the way for a potential nuclear crisis haunting peace and stability in the region. Pakistan believes that the successful testing of the 60-km nuclear-capable short-range missile Hatf-9 (Nasr) "adds deterrence value to Pakistan's strategic weapons development programme at shorter ranges." In paradox, the fact remains that this step has further lowered Pakistan's nuclear threshold through the likely use of TNWs. The introduction of TNWs into the tactical battle area further exacerbates credibility of their control. Pakistan has not formally declared a nuclear doctrine, but it is well known that nuclear weapons are its first line of defence. The use of TNWs in the India-Pakistan case will alter the strategic scenario completely as Pakistan would threaten India with the use of TNWs in the event of New Delhi responding against Islamabad with a conventional strike in reaction to a 26/11-style terrorist attack. Pakistan forgets that given its offensive strategic posture and continuing involvement in terror strikes in India, it is New Delhi which is confronted with the problem of developing a strategy to counter Pakistan's "first-strike" and proxy war in the light of its declared "no-first-use" policy. This edited volume attempts to address and decipher complex issues, including aspects such as China's WMD collaboration with Pakistan, nuclear command and control dynamics within Pakistan, overall rationale and implications of TNWs, safety and security of nuclear weapons, scenarios for nuclear usage, India's potential response options and, more specifically, the technical aspects of the Nasr delivery system.