This work offers a broad interpretation of the extraordinary changes that have taken place in Soviet arms control policy since Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet head of state in March of 1985. GorbacheV's policy is usually portrayed as an effort to ease the Soviet defense burden and to improve relations with the West, but Daniel Calingaert goes further, arguing that the Gorbachev leadership has embarked on a basically new policy of nuclear disarmament. Calingaert outlines how this policy allows the Soviets to divert resources to industrial modernization, restructure the armed forces, and join the global economy, thereby revitalizing their economic strength and exerting a renewed influence on international affairs.

Organized thematically rather than chronologically, the book concentrates on interpreting the major decisions affecting nuclear weapons in Europe, strategic arms, and ballistic missile defenses. The first five chapters explore the various components of Soviet arms control policy: the personnel and institutional changes that gave impetus to revisions in Soviet security policy; the strong economic inducements to pursue disarmament; changes in national security aims that provide the rationale for undertaking nuclear disarmament; the impact of revisions in nuclear strategy on force requirements and on Soviet disarmament initiatives; and the pursuit of foreign policy objectives through arms control. A final chapter interprets Soviet conduct of nuclear arms talks in light of this analysis of the nation's security, nuclear strategy, and foreign policy. With its broad overview of GorbacheV's arms control policy, as well as its original analyses, this study will be a useful resource for both students and experts of Soviet policy and security studies.

The nuclear disarmament movement of the late '50s and early '60s was one of the largest and arguably one of the most significant, extra-parliamentary movements ever seen in modern Britain. A whole new style and conception of politics was born through this first anti-nuclear movement, and the subsequent radicalism of the '60s and '70s has its roots here. The movement was extraordinarily diverse and rich in its constituencies of support and complex in its ideological make-up. Thus anarchists, communists, and Trotskyists rubbed shoulders with Christians, liberals, members of the Labour party, and 'ordinary apolitical people', most of whom found in the movement a means by which they could articulate their growing fear and anxiety about the seemingly inexorable arms race, and the horror of nuclear war. Dr Taylor analyses the perceptions of these groups in detail and explains how and why they differed. This is the first comprehensive study of the movement to make use of a wide range of contemporary material, and the first to present in detail the previously unrecorded views and analyses of more than twenty of the leading figures of the movement some twenty-five years on. Although he provides a wealth of historical detail, Dr Taylor's approach is primarily political and analytical, and his examination of this first mass movement of its kind will be relevant to all those concerned about nuclear proliferation, as well as to courses in politics, sociology, modern history and peace studies.

During the presidency of George Bush (1989-93), the proliferation of nuclear chemical and biological weapons, and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, rose greatly in significance as issues on the American security agenda. In the missile field, this became evident by the efforts of certain elements in the executive branch and several congressmen to improve domestic and international implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation examines the political, bureaucratic and systemic issues that interacted to determine the outcome of these efforts.

While the Cold War is over, many of the problems it spawned live on. One of the worst of these is the continued presence of vast nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia. How did the thousands of American bombs come into existence and how did they so rapidly become the United States' first line of defence?;Drawing extensively on previously classified material, Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Steven L Rearden have written a history of this crucial period. They show how American policymakers, and least of all President Truman, never expected nuclear weapons to play such a major strategic role. Yet by relying on the atomic bomb time and again to shore up US defences in the face of worsening relations with the Soviet Union, rather than accept seemingly more costly conventional alternatives, Truman found himself ultimately with no other choice.;The authors not only document and analyze the origins and early evolution of US nuclear strategy, but they also demonstrate the close relationship between decisions affecting such diverse matters as foreign policy, new technologies and the budgetary process. The result is an analysis containing new insights and timely reminders of the myriad complications created by reliance on nuclear weapons.

From the dawn of the atomic age to today, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But nuclear weapons cooperation in US alliances has varied significantly between allies and over time. This book explores the history of America's nuclear posture worldwide, delving into alliance structures and interaction during and since the end of the Cold War to uncover the underlying dynamics of nuclear weapons cooperation between the US and its allies. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, the book reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Alliances are ecosystems of exchange rather than mere tools of external balancing, the book argues, and institutional perspectives can offer an unprecedented insight into how structured cooperation can promote policy convergence. -- .

A groundbreaking account of Pakistan's rise as a nuclear power draws on elite interviews and primary sources to challenge long-held misconceptions Pakistan's pathway to developing nuclear weapons remains shrouded in mystery and surrounded by misconceptions. While it is no secret why Pakistan became a nuclear power, how Pakistan became a nuclear state has been obscured by mythmaking. In Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb, Mansoor Ahmed offers a revisionist history of Pakistan's nuclear program and the bureaucratic politics that shaped its development from its inception in 1956 until the 1998 nuclear tests. Drawing on elite interviews and previously untapped primary sources, Ahmed offers a fresh assessment of the actual and perceived roles and contributions of the scientists and engineers who led the nuclear program. He shows how personal ambitions and politics within Pakistan's strategic enclave generated inter-laboratory competition in the nuclear establishment, which determined nuclear choices for the country for more than two decades. It also produced unexpected consequences such as illicit proliferation to other countries largely outside of the Pakistani state's control. As Pakistan's nuclear deterrent program continues to grow, Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb provides fresh insights into how this nuclear power has evolved in the past and where it stands today. Scholars and students of security studies, Pakistani history, and nuclear proliferation will find this book to be invaluable to their understanding of the country's nuclear program, policies, and posture.

Despite its portrayal as a bold departure, the Bush Doctrine was not the "new" or "revolutionary" policy instrument that many at the time portended. This work seeks to argue that while it was clear that the Bush Doctrine certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, it is apparent that the adoption of this strategy did not mark a total break with American tradition or earlier Administrations. Warren seeks to dispel arguments pertaining to the supposed "radical" nature of the Bush Doctrine -- based on comparisons with previous National Security Strategies and previous Administrations' penchant for prevention. However, the work also highlights that what was new and bold about the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002, was its willingness to embrace reinvigorating a nuclear option that could ultimately be used in the context of preventive war. While Obama has struck bold rhetorical notes and promises in relation to limiting the role of nuclear weapons, he has stopped short of changing the status quo on critical issues that have lingered since the Cold War -- such as tactical nuclear weapons and keeping missiles on alert. This book's final section examines the extent to which Obama has attempted to adjust' the nuclear option with the recent release of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Offering new insights into the Bush doctrine and providing a comprehensive analysis of the current status of the US nuclear weapons strategy, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies and international relations.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the principal legal barrier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the past forty-five years. It promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and insures, through the application of safeguards inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that those technologies are not being diverted toward the production of nuclear weapons. It is also the only multinational treaty that obligates the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) to pursue nuclear disarmament measures. Though there have been many challenges over the years, most would agree that the treaty has largely been successful. However, many are concerned about the continued viability of the NPT. The perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the interest by some countries to consider a weapons program while party to the treaty, and the funding and staffing issues at the IAEA, are all putting considerable strain on the treaty. This manuscript explores those issues and offers some possible solutions to ensure that the NPT will survive effectively for many years to come.

At the dawn of the nuclear age, strategist Bernard Brodie recognized our predicament when he said, "Nuclear weapons exist and they are incredibly destructive." Despite the end of the Cold War, thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert on both sides of the Atlantic. Plans to develop, deploy, and detonate nuclear weapons (for purposes of war prevention or war fighting) are informed by the ambiguous notion that nuclear war can be avoided by maintaining a balance of power. Policy-makers and decision-makers believe that once the balance of power is destroyed, a crisis will ensue, and if this crisis cannot be resolved with words, it is somehow necessary to use weapons. This idea is held as an historic inevitability, but the nuclear subculture is unaware of the highly problematic nature of their fundamental assumptions. Hirschbein entertains the possibility that the theory and practice of these policy-makers and decision-makers are informed by concepts at once ancient and metaphorical. He analyzes the primary and secondary metaphors invoked to conceptualize and manage nuclear weaponry. Hirschbein draws a striking parallel between dramatic changes in the ancient Greek account of conflict and the American conceptualization of nuclear weapons. Facing harrowing times, Thucydides avoided supernatural, Homeric imagery in favor of naturalistic metaphors to account for conflict--an account regarded as "eternal wisdom" by today's realist. Likewise, facing the Soviet challenge, American strategists abandoned supernatural Judeo-Christian accounts of nuclear weapons in favor of Thucydides' naturalistic tropes.

Now a 6-part mini-series called Why the Rest of Us Die airing on VICE TV! The shocking truth about the government's secret plans to survive a catastrophic attack on US soil--even if the rest of us die--is "a frightening eye-opener" (Kirkus Reviews) that spans the dawn of the nuclear age to today, and "contains everything one could possibly want to know" (The Wall Street Journal). Every day in Washington, DC, the blue-and-gold first Helicopter Squadron, codenamed "MUSSEL," flies over the Potomac River. As obvious as the Presidential motorcade, most people assume the squadron is a travel perk for VIPs. They're only half right: while the helicopters do provide transport, the unit exists to evacuate high-ranking officials in the event of a terrorist or nuclear attack on the capital. In the event of an attack, select officials would be whisked by helicopters to a ring of secret bunkers around Washington, even as ordinary citizens were left to fend for themselves. "In exploring the incredible lengths (and depths) that successive administrations have gone to in planning for the aftermath of a nuclear assault, Graff deftly weaves a tale of secrecy and paranoia" (The New York Times Book Review) with details "that read like they've been ripped from the pages of a pulp spy novel" (Vice). For more than sixty years, the US government has been developing secret Doomsday strategies to protect itself, and the multibillion-dollar Continuity of Government (COG) program takes numerous forms--from its potential to evacuate the Liberty Bell from Philadelphia to the plans to launch nuclear missiles from a Boeing-747 jet flying high over Nebraska. Garrett M. Graff sheds light on the inner workings of the 650-acre compound, called Raven Rock, just miles from Camp David, as well as dozens of other bunkers the government built for its top leaders during the Cold War, from the White House lawn to Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado to Palm Beach, Florida, and the secret plans that would have kicked in after a Cold War nuclear attack to round up foreigners and dissidents and nationalize industries. Equal parts a presidential, military, and cultural history, Raven Rock tracks the evolution of the government plan and the threats of global war from the dawn of the nuclear era through the War on Terror.

An examination of the political and diplomatic role of American nuclear weapons in conflicts with a non-nuclear China in the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, this study analyzes the American tendency to become involved in confrontations with far weaker powers over issues of very little strategic significance to the United States. Washington threatens these adversaries with the use of incommensurate levels of force, then ultimately backs down in the face of international and domestic opposition to ill-considered plans to use force. Unlike works on nuclear history that have either focused on superpower nuclear conflicts and ignored cases of American nuclear diplomacy toward non-nuclear adversaries, or those that have focused merely on the outcomes of nuclear threats against non-nuclear powers, this book considers in depth American nuclear diplomacy toward China during the whole period of Sino-American military confrontations.

Soman offers new insights on Truman's decision to enter the Korean War, the extent of nuclear diplomacy during the war, and the way in which the war ended. He argues that the goal of American nuclear diplomacy in the spring of 1955 was to provoke a war with China, rather than to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Finally, he lays out, for the first time in print, the elaborate diplomacy that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initiated to defuse the 1958 crisis, involving a major shift in American policy that still remains hidden from the public as well as historians. Highlighting the central role of nuclear diplomacy in these crises, this book draws conclusions on the efficacy of such diplomacy, the impact of these crises on the development of policies of massive retaliation and limited war, the consequences of Dulles's brinkmanship, and the revival of nuclear diplomacy by the Clinton administration in conflicts with non-nuclear adversaries.

Karem is eminently qualified to write on the role of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs) in the processes of averting nuclear weapons proliferation, arresting the nuclear arms race, and eliminating the scourge of nuclear weapons. Karem's well-written, extensively documented, and cogent argument for a NWFZ in the Middle East reflects his scholarly and professional expertise on the technical and political issues surrounding such a proposal. . . . This is an important and much needed contribution to the literature on peace studies, arms limitation, disarmament, and world order studies. It should be part of every library collection. Choice It is clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the Middle East would pose grave problems for that politically explosive region and throughout the world. In this thoughful study, Dr Karem examines the possiblility of avoiding such a situation and reducing tensions generally by implementing United Nations resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Arguing that the NWFZ approach is a viable solution, he suggests how to implement it and how diplomatic obstacles facing such an agreement can be overcome.

Challenging nuclearism explores how a deliberate 'normalisation' of nuclear weapons has been constructed, why it has prevailed in international politics for over seventy years and why it is only now being questioned seriously. The book identifies how certain practices have enabled a small group of states to hold vast arsenals of these weapons of mass destruction and how the close control over nuclear decisions by a select group has meant that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been disregarded for decades. The recent UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will not bring about quick disarmament. It has been decried by the nuclear weapon states. But by rejecting nuclearism and providing a clear denunciation of nuclear weapons, it will challenge nuclear states in a way that has until now not been possible. Challenging nuclearism analyses the origins and repercussions of this pivotal moment in nuclear politics. -- .

The US debate surrounding ballistic-missile defence is becoming increasingly polarized: advocates claim that these defences are essential to US security and should be deployed as soon as possible; critics argue that they upset strategic stability, encourage regional arms races, and therefore, will not work. What is lacking in the current debate is a quantitative analysis of how well defences would have to work to meet specific security objectives, and what level of defence might upset strategic stability. This paper argues that there is no immediate need to deploy US national missile defences because accidental or unauthorized Russian or Chinese attacks are unlikely, and because deterrence should mean that the risk of attack from emerging ballistic-missile states is acceptably low. National missile defence might be a useful insurance, but other defence needs are more pressing. However, if the US did deploy such a system, a modified Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that allowed the US and Russia to deploy 100 interceptors at multiple sites around their territory should not pose a realistic threat to the retaliatory capabilities of four of the five declared nuclear powers.; This bo

In the late 1940s, the U.S. Department of Defense established a nuclear weapons depository in the Manzano Mountains of New Mexico. For more than 40 years, Manzano Base served as a maintenance and storage site for some of the most destructive weapons ever created. Operated by the U.S. Air Force, the facility was small and obscure, with highly restricted access. Its covert mission fostered a sense of mystery, leaving the public to speculate about what really went on there. The site was decommissioned in 1992 yet its rich history continues to influence America's nuclear weapons program. This book tells the full story of Manzano and the personnel who served there. Firsthand accounts recall their experiences of nuclear weapons accidents, aircraft crashes, UFO/UAF sightings and a radiation demonstration called "tickling the tiger's tail.

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a major concern and the Middle East is at the forefront of US-lead efforts to counter and control their spread. This vital book examines why states seek to gain WMD, a crucial issue in developing strategies against proliferation. Leading experts examine specific countries and the interplay among political, economic, cultural and regional factors driving decisions whether to acquire WMD. The result is enhanced understanding of the challenge proliferation poses to US strategy and policy and the wider international community.

Available for the first time in many years, Commonsense and Nuclear Warfare presents Russell's keen insights into the threat of nuclear conflict, and his argument that the only way to end this threat is to end war itself.
Written at the height of the Cold War, this volume is crucial for understanding Russell's involvement in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and his passionate campaigning for peace. It remains an extremely important book in today's uncertain nuclear world, and is essential reading for all those interested in Russell and postwar history.
Includes a new introduction by Ken Coates, Chairman of The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

Johnston argues that the preemptive first-use of nuclear weapons, long the foundation of American nuclear strategy, was not the carefully reasoned response to a growing Soviet conventional threat. Instead, it was part of a process of cultural 'socialization', by which the United States reconstituted the previously nationalist strategic cultures of the European allies into a seamless western community directed by Washington. Building a bridge between theory and practice, this book examines the usefulness of cultural theory in international history.

Full Contributors:
Vladimir D. Andrianov, Natalya Bazhanova, Evgeniy Bazhanov, Valery I. Denisov, Georgiy Kaurov, Vladimir Li, Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Valentin I. Moiseyev, James Clay Moltz, Alexander Platkovskiy, Roald Savelyev, Larisa Zabrovskaya, Alexander Zarubin, Alexander Zhebin

This timely book contains excerpts from authoritative testimony, speeches and reports of political leaders, members of Congress, and leading experts who lay out a roadmap for understanding the nation's growing concern and response to the threat of super terrorism. It highlights warnings on the domestic and international threat form reports of the Bremer Commission, Gilmore Commission, Hart-Rudman Commission, Baker-Cutler Report and the USS Cole Commission. The text features statements and assessments of Madeleine Albright, Ahmed Al-Fadl, Ken Alibek, Seth Carus, Bill Clinton, Anthony Cordesman, John Deutch, Louis Freeh, Donald Henderson, Joshua Lederberg, Sam Nunn, John Parachini, Janet Reno, George Tenet and others. Published under the Transnational Publishers imprint.

This book presents a comprehensive overview of Ukraine's nuclear history, beginning from its experiences within the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, through the Soviet period, to the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state that inherited the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal. The book discusses the development of the nuclear infrastructure on Ukrainian soil and offers a rich and nuanced background of how Ukraine became an important and integrated part of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. It further analyzes Ukraine's nuclear disarmament based on extensive primary source material and places the Ukrainian nuclear reversal process in a larger international political context where Russias, the United States, and other players actions are interpreted in the light of the impact on the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finally, the book presents the nuclear-related development after the nuclear disarmament. It describes the integration of Ukraine into the international community and the role of nuclear power in the energy mix of the nation today. Concluding, Ukraines adaptation to the new security situation after the Russian annexation of Crimea is described and discussed. This volume is a must-read for scholars, researchers, students, and policy-makers interested in a better understanding of Ukraine's nuclear history, the political background of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, as well as of security studies and international relations in general. The work on this book has been supported by the Swedish Radiation Authority (SSM) in the Nuclear History of Ukraine Project (2015-2019).

Having served opposite Warsaw Pact forces in the 1950s and on Embassy duty in the 70s in Europe, the author offers a reasoned assessment of Britain's role in the so-called "nuclear club." He asks whether Britain really needs to be a member.

The proliferation of advanced weapons to volatile regions of the world has become a major issue in the post Cold War era. It was thought that no Third World nation could ever pose a technologically-based threat to the great powers by acquiring advanced weaponry. But this has proved to be wrong. The Persian Gulf War changed the worldwide perception of the spread of ballistic missiles to countries like Iraq. Access to a new type of weapon--cruise missiles--poses an even greater threat. With technology that is accessible, affordable, and relatively simple to produce, Third World countries could acquire highly accurate, long-range cruise missile forces to escalate local conflicts and threaten the forces and even the territories of the industrial powers. This book is a warning to policymakers. It is not too late to confront the realities of cruise missile proliferation and to devise international responses that could contain the worst possible consequences. Carus proposes a new regime of technology controls, security-building measures, and conflict resolution that need to be considered, and acted on, by policymakers and international relations experts everywhere.

Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain proposes a new legal and institutional framework for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its proposal is designed to remedy the widely acknowledged breakdown of the architecture of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on which we can no longer rely for global nuclear security.
First, Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation defines the distinctively dangerous character of contemporary nuclear risk and explains why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty no longer provides a viable foundation for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. It then sets out the reforms needed in order to limit the radical increase in availability, for rogue governments and terrorists, of nuclear weapons related material and technology. Garvey proposes a new counterproliferation architecture, to be built on presently available scientific, legal, and institutional resources, which could achieve a critical reduction of nuclear risk and an expanded deterrence. Guiding principles for establishing this new architecture are formulated, including, most importantly, the principal mechanism for implementation, a United Nations Security Council Counterproliferation Resolution applying equally for all states.
This book presents what may be our best opportunity to secure a profoundly more effective global nuclear security and counter the world's current course to a catastrophic nuclear detonation.