Drawing parallels between tribal behavior and international relations to demonstrate that societies are not inherently aggressive but are led into conflict when pride or in-group pressures push people to fight, this profound look at the chilling reality of cold war and its arsenal of nuclear destruction offers valuable new insights into how prejudices and stereotypes contribute to what may seem like an inexorable drift to war. Yet the authors conclude that war is not inevitable, as they offer suggestions for an end to the arms race in the nuclear age. Based on original research, this is a long overdue contribution to the study of war and peace in our time and a text for newly emerging courses on the subject.

The end ofthe Cold War opened unprecedented opportunities for reductions in weapons of mass destruction. With these opportunities came new challenges, both scientific and political. Traditionally approached by different groups, the scientific, technical and political challenges are inextricably intertwined. Agreements to dismantle and destroy chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons, after having been negotiated via diplomatic channels, require the expertise of scientists associated with their development to determine the safest and most environmentally sound methods of destruction. It is in this context that representatives from sixteen countries and five international organizations were convened jointly by NATO, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and the State Government of North Rhine Westphalia 19-21 May, 1996 in a meeting near Bonn to take stock of worldwide efforts to destroy and dismantle chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons remaining after the end ofthe Cold War. NATO support was provided under the auspices of the NATO Science Committee's Panel on Disarmament Technologies. The conference brought together the major actors involved in the dismantlement and destruction of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons, highlighted the substantial accomplishments achieved in this area and pinpointed the remaining technical obstacles still to be overcome. It also underlined the critical importance of transparency, data exchange and verification as indispensable preconditions for disarmament and cooperative security.

Facing Down the Soviet Union reveals for the first time the historic deliberations regarding the Chevaline upgrade to Britain's Polaris force, the decisions to procure the Trident C-4 and then D-5 system from the Americans in 1980 and 1982. It also details the decision to base Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in the UK in 1983.

This book provides an important picture of India's nuclear intentions and capabilities at the beginning of the 21st century. Academic and governmental experts from both the United States and India explore the strategic, technological, military and economic dimensions of India's nuclear world. The contributors bring their expertise together in an unusual mix of viewpoints from three continents on the several dimensions of a nuclear India at the turn of the century. It is an important resource in the United States to help policymakers respond to the regional and global proliferation problems that have resulted from India and Pakistan's nuclear tests of 1998. It is an important aid to India in exploring and evaluating its nuclear strategy and the political, economic and military consequences of its nuclear decisions.

From the legendary whistle-blower who revealed the Pentagon Papers, the first insider exposé of the terrifying dangers of America's hidden, seventy-year-long nuclear policy.

At the same time former presidential advisor Daniel Ellsberg famously took the Pentagon Papers, he also took with him a cache of top-secret documents related to America's nuclear program in the 1960s. Here for the first time he reveals the contents of those now-declassified documents and makes clear their shocking relevance for today.

The Doomsday Machine is Ellsberg's account of the most dangerous arms build-up in the history of civilisation, whose legacy - and proposed renewal under the Trump administration - threatens the very survival of humanity.

In this book, Michael Krepon analyzes nuclear issues such as missile defenses, space warfare, and treaties, and argues that the United States is on a dangerous course. During the Cold War, Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, facilitated strategic arms control. Now that the Cold War has been replaced by asymmetric warfare, treaties based on nuclear overkill and national vulnerability are outdated and must be adapted to a far different world. A new strategic concept of Cooperative Threat Reduction is needed to replace MAD. A balance is needed that combines military might with strengthened treaty regimes.

This book tells the story of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the struggle that President Kennedy and his advisers (including the author, who was head of intelligence at the State Department) went through to try to understand why the Soviet Union had put nuclear missiles in Cuba, the alternative policies they debated to deal with the presence of the missiles, the aftermath of the crisis, and the lessons learned about defense and foreign policy in an age dominated by intercontinental missiles tipped with nuclear warheads capable of obliterating the northern hemisphere. The purpose of the book is to focus the world's attention on the fact that something must be done-and soon-if we are to avoid Armageddon. The world has never been as close to nuclear war as it was in November 1962. In this book, Roger Hilsman, head of intelligence at the U.S. State Department at that time, details the struggles that President Kennedy and his advisers went through to understand why the Soviet Union had deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, describes the debate over alternative policy choices to force the removal of the missiles, and determines how and why each particular course of action was eventually chosen. He relates how the U.S. government dealt with the public and with its allies, and traces the step-by-step negotiations between the Soviets and the United States. In his discussion, Hilsman reveals how Khrushchev chose a back-channel, deniable way of communicating with President Kennedy by sending messages to the head of the KGB in Washington, who passed them to Hilsman, who then took them to the president. This book shows how President Kennedy and his brother Robert used this information to bring about the withdrawal of the missiles without war. This book analyzes the motives behind the massive Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba, which were capable of destroying every major city in the United States except Seattle, backed up by anti-aircraft and ground forces to defend those missiles. One ship could carry 20-to-30 freight-train loads of war materiel and over 100 shiploads were sent-a total of between 2,000 and 3,000 train loads. Hilsman tells the story of how American intelligence found out-just in time-and, in a post-mortem, addresses the question of U.S. success and/or failure. He concludes with an assessment of the significance of the only nuclear crisis in the world's history, pointing out the lessons for humankind about war in a nuclear age. Hilsman's book is one of only two accounts of the Cuban missile crisis written by one of the principals, and has added significance in light of the turbid state and uncertain future of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

Leading international security scholars and policy advisors from universities, think-tanks, and nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States analyze the future of nuclear weapons proliferation. In April 1995, the earlier 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was renewed indefinitely and without change to the original clauses of the treaty. The authors examine the continuing relevance or irrelevance of the old treaty, the role of coercive sanctions in enforcing restraint, and the impact of biological, chemical and missile proliferation on the nuclear motives and ambitions of various states. Attention is given to proliferation conditions in the former Soviet republics, East and South Asia and the Middle East.

This work offers a broad interpretation of the extraordinary changes that have taken place in Soviet arms control policy since Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet head of state in March of 1985. GorbacheV's policy is usually portrayed as an effort to ease the Soviet defense burden and to improve relations with the West, but Daniel Calingaert goes further, arguing that the Gorbachev leadership has embarked on a basically new policy of nuclear disarmament. Calingaert outlines how this policy allows the Soviets to divert resources to industrial modernization, restructure the armed forces, and join the global economy, thereby revitalizing their economic strength and exerting a renewed influence on international affairs.

Organized thematically rather than chronologically, the book concentrates on interpreting the major decisions affecting nuclear weapons in Europe, strategic arms, and ballistic missile defenses. The first five chapters explore the various components of Soviet arms control policy: the personnel and institutional changes that gave impetus to revisions in Soviet security policy; the strong economic inducements to pursue disarmament; changes in national security aims that provide the rationale for undertaking nuclear disarmament; the impact of revisions in nuclear strategy on force requirements and on Soviet disarmament initiatives; and the pursuit of foreign policy objectives through arms control. A final chapter interprets Soviet conduct of nuclear arms talks in light of this analysis of the nation's security, nuclear strategy, and foreign policy. With its broad overview of GorbacheV's arms control policy, as well as its original analyses, this study will be a useful resource for both students and experts of Soviet policy and security studies.

The nuclear disarmament movement of the late '50s and early '60s was one of the largest and arguably one of the most significant, extra-parliamentary movements ever seen in modern Britain. A whole new style and conception of politics was born through this first anti-nuclear movement, and the subsequent radicalism of the '60s and '70s has its roots here. The movement was extraordinarily diverse and rich in its constituencies of support and complex in its ideological make-up. Thus anarchists, communists, and Trotskyists rubbed shoulders with Christians, liberals, members of the Labour party, and 'ordinary apolitical people', most of whom found in the movement a means by which they could articulate their growing fear and anxiety about the seemingly inexorable arms race, and the horror of nuclear war. Dr Taylor analyses the perceptions of these groups in detail and explains how and why they differed. This is the first comprehensive study of the movement to make use of a wide range of contemporary material, and the first to present in detail the previously unrecorded views and analyses of more than twenty of the leading figures of the movement some twenty-five years on. Although he provides a wealth of historical detail, Dr Taylor's approach is primarily political and analytical, and his examination of this first mass movement of its kind will be relevant to all those concerned about nuclear proliferation, as well as to courses in politics, sociology, modern history and peace studies.

During the presidency of George Bush (1989-93), the proliferation of nuclear chemical and biological weapons, and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, rose greatly in significance as issues on the American security agenda. In the missile field, this became evident by the efforts of certain elements in the executive branch and several congressmen to improve domestic and international implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation examines the political, bureaucratic and systemic issues that interacted to determine the outcome of these efforts.

While the Cold War is over, many of the problems it spawned live on. One of the worst of these is the continued presence of vast nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia. How did the thousands of American bombs come into existence and how did they so rapidly become the United States' first line of defence?;Drawing extensively on previously classified material, Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Steven L Rearden have written a history of this crucial period. They show how American policymakers, and least of all President Truman, never expected nuclear weapons to play such a major strategic role. Yet by relying on the atomic bomb time and again to shore up US defences in the face of worsening relations with the Soviet Union, rather than accept seemingly more costly conventional alternatives, Truman found himself ultimately with no other choice.;The authors not only document and analyze the origins and early evolution of US nuclear strategy, but they also demonstrate the close relationship between decisions affecting such diverse matters as foreign policy, new technologies and the budgetary process. The result is an analysis containing new insights and timely reminders of the myriad complications created by reliance on nuclear weapons.

In 1995 a conference will be convened to review and extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This work brings together a group of individuals, including the elected President of the 1995 NPT Conference, to analyze four crucial agenda areas relevant to the Conference: the pre-conference activities to be undertaken by both States Parties and the Conference Secretariat; those security issues that relate to a review of the treaty, such as nuclear disarmament and security assurances; peaceful uses and verification questions; and regional issues.

Despite its portrayal as a bold departure, the Bush Doctrine was not the "new" or "revolutionary" policy instrument that many at the time portended. This work seeks to argue that while it was clear that the Bush Doctrine certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, it is apparent that the adoption of this strategy did not mark a total break with American tradition or earlier Administrations. Warren seeks to dispel arguments pertaining to the supposed "radical" nature of the Bush Doctrine -- based on comparisons with previous National Security Strategies and previous Administrations' penchant for prevention. However, the work also highlights that what was new and bold about the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002, was its willingness to embrace reinvigorating a nuclear option that could ultimately be used in the context of preventive war. While Obama has struck bold rhetorical notes and promises in relation to limiting the role of nuclear weapons, he has stopped short of changing the status quo on critical issues that have lingered since the Cold War -- such as tactical nuclear weapons and keeping missiles on alert. This book's final section examines the extent to which Obama has attempted to adjust' the nuclear option with the recent release of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Offering new insights into the Bush doctrine and providing a comprehensive analysis of the current status of the US nuclear weapons strategy, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies and international relations.

From the dawn of the atomic age to today, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But nuclear weapons cooperation in US alliances has varied significantly between allies and over time. This book explores the history of America's nuclear posture worldwide, delving into alliance structures and interaction during and since the end of the Cold War to uncover the underlying dynamics of nuclear weapons cooperation between the US and its allies. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, the book reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Alliances are ecosystems of exchange rather than mere tools of external balancing, the book argues, and institutional perspectives can offer an unprecedented insight into how structured cooperation can promote policy convergence. -- .

A groundbreaking account of Pakistan's rise as a nuclear power draws on elite interviews and primary sources to challenge long-held misconceptions Pakistan's pathway to developing nuclear weapons remains shrouded in mystery and surrounded by misconceptions. While it is no secret why Pakistan became a nuclear power, how Pakistan became a nuclear state has been obscured by mythmaking. In Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb, Mansoor Ahmed offers a revisionist history of Pakistan's nuclear program and the bureaucratic politics that shaped its development from its inception in 1956 until the 1998 nuclear tests. Drawing on elite interviews and previously untapped primary sources, Ahmed offers a fresh assessment of the actual and perceived roles and contributions of the scientists and engineers who led the nuclear program. He shows how personal ambitions and politics within Pakistan's strategic enclave generated inter-laboratory competition in the nuclear establishment, which determined nuclear choices for the country for more than two decades. It also produced unexpected consequences such as illicit proliferation to other countries largely outside of the Pakistani state's control. As Pakistan's nuclear deterrent program continues to grow, Pakistan's Pathway to the Bomb provides fresh insights into how this nuclear power has evolved in the past and where it stands today. Scholars and students of security studies, Pakistani history, and nuclear proliferation will find this book to be invaluable to their understanding of the country's nuclear program, policies, and posture.

This book presents a comprehensive overview of Ukraine's nuclear history, beginning from its experiences within the Russian Empire in the early 20th century, through the Soviet period, to the emergence of Ukraine as an independent state that inherited the world's third-largest nuclear arsenal. The book discusses the development of the nuclear infrastructure on Ukrainian soil and offers a rich and nuanced background of how Ukraine became an important and integrated part of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. It further analyzes Ukraine's nuclear disarmament based on extensive primary source material and places the Ukrainian nuclear reversal process in a larger international political context where Russias, the United States, and other players actions are interpreted in the light of the impact on the current nuclear non-proliferation regime. Finally, the book presents the nuclear-related development after the nuclear disarmament. It describes the integration of Ukraine into the international community and the role of nuclear power in the energy mix of the nation today. Concluding, Ukraines adaptation to the new security situation after the Russian annexation of Crimea is described and discussed. This volume is a must-read for scholars, researchers, students, and policy-makers interested in a better understanding of Ukraine's nuclear history, the political background of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, as well as of security studies and international relations in general. The work on this book has been supported by the Swedish Radiation Authority (SSM) in the Nuclear History of Ukraine Project (2015-2019).

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the principal legal barrier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the past forty-five years. It promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and insures, through the application of safeguards inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that those technologies are not being diverted toward the production of nuclear weapons. It is also the only multinational treaty that obligates the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) to pursue nuclear disarmament measures. Though there have been many challenges over the years, most would agree that the treaty has largely been successful. However, many are concerned about the continued viability of the NPT. The perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the interest by some countries to consider a weapons program while party to the treaty, and the funding and staffing issues at the IAEA, are all putting considerable strain on the treaty. This manuscript explores those issues and offers some possible solutions to ensure that the NPT will survive effectively for many years to come.

At the dawn of the nuclear age, strategist Bernard Brodie recognized our predicament when he said, "Nuclear weapons exist and they are incredibly destructive." Despite the end of the Cold War, thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert on both sides of the Atlantic. Plans to develop, deploy, and detonate nuclear weapons (for purposes of war prevention or war fighting) are informed by the ambiguous notion that nuclear war can be avoided by maintaining a balance of power. Policy-makers and decision-makers believe that once the balance of power is destroyed, a crisis will ensue, and if this crisis cannot be resolved with words, it is somehow necessary to use weapons. This idea is held as an historic inevitability, but the nuclear subculture is unaware of the highly problematic nature of their fundamental assumptions. Hirschbein entertains the possibility that the theory and practice of these policy-makers and decision-makers are informed by concepts at once ancient and metaphorical. He analyzes the primary and secondary metaphors invoked to conceptualize and manage nuclear weaponry. Hirschbein draws a striking parallel between dramatic changes in the ancient Greek account of conflict and the American conceptualization of nuclear weapons. Facing harrowing times, Thucydides avoided supernatural, Homeric imagery in favor of naturalistic metaphors to account for conflict--an account regarded as "eternal wisdom" by today's realist. Likewise, facing the Soviet challenge, American strategists abandoned supernatural Judeo-Christian accounts of nuclear weapons in favor of Thucydides' naturalistic tropes.

An examination of the political and diplomatic role of American nuclear weapons in conflicts with a non-nuclear China in the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, this study analyzes the American tendency to become involved in confrontations with far weaker powers over issues of very little strategic significance to the United States. Washington threatens these adversaries with the use of incommensurate levels of force, then ultimately backs down in the face of international and domestic opposition to ill-considered plans to use force. Unlike works on nuclear history that have either focused on superpower nuclear conflicts and ignored cases of American nuclear diplomacy toward non-nuclear adversaries, or those that have focused merely on the outcomes of nuclear threats against non-nuclear powers, this book considers in depth American nuclear diplomacy toward China during the whole period of Sino-American military confrontations.

Soman offers new insights on Truman's decision to enter the Korean War, the extent of nuclear diplomacy during the war, and the way in which the war ended. He argues that the goal of American nuclear diplomacy in the spring of 1955 was to provoke a war with China, rather than to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Finally, he lays out, for the first time in print, the elaborate diplomacy that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initiated to defuse the 1958 crisis, involving a major shift in American policy that still remains hidden from the public as well as historians. Highlighting the central role of nuclear diplomacy in these crises, this book draws conclusions on the efficacy of such diplomacy, the impact of these crises on the development of policies of massive retaliation and limited war, the consequences of Dulles's brinkmanship, and the revival of nuclear diplomacy by the Clinton administration in conflicts with non-nuclear adversaries.

Karem is eminently qualified to write on the role of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs) in the processes of averting nuclear weapons proliferation, arresting the nuclear arms race, and eliminating the scourge of nuclear weapons. Karem's well-written, extensively documented, and cogent argument for a NWFZ in the Middle East reflects his scholarly and professional expertise on the technical and political issues surrounding such a proposal. . . . This is an important and much needed contribution to the literature on peace studies, arms limitation, disarmament, and world order studies. It should be part of every library collection. Choice It is clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the Middle East would pose grave problems for that politically explosive region and throughout the world. In this thoughful study, Dr Karem examines the possiblility of avoiding such a situation and reducing tensions generally by implementing United Nations resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Arguing that the NWFZ approach is a viable solution, he suggests how to implement it and how diplomatic obstacles facing such an agreement can be overcome.

Now a 6-part mini-series called Why the Rest of Us Die airing on VICE TV! The shocking truth about the government's secret plans to survive a catastrophic attack on US soil--even if the rest of us die--is "a frightening eye-opener" (Kirkus Reviews) that spans the dawn of the nuclear age to today, and "contains everything one could possibly want to know" (The Wall Street Journal). Every day in Washington, DC, the blue-and-gold first Helicopter Squadron, codenamed "MUSSEL," flies over the Potomac River. As obvious as the Presidential motorcade, most people assume the squadron is a travel perk for VIPs. They're only half right: while the helicopters do provide transport, the unit exists to evacuate high-ranking officials in the event of a terrorist or nuclear attack on the capital. In the event of an attack, select officials would be whisked by helicopters to a ring of secret bunkers around Washington, even as ordinary citizens were left to fend for themselves. "In exploring the incredible lengths (and depths) that successive administrations have gone to in planning for the aftermath of a nuclear assault, Graff deftly weaves a tale of secrecy and paranoia" (The New York Times Book Review) with details "that read like they've been ripped from the pages of a pulp spy novel" (Vice). For more than sixty years, the US government has been developing secret Doomsday strategies to protect itself, and the multibillion-dollar Continuity of Government (COG) program takes numerous forms--from its potential to evacuate the Liberty Bell from Philadelphia to the plans to launch nuclear missiles from a Boeing-747 jet flying high over Nebraska. Garrett M. Graff sheds light on the inner workings of the 650-acre compound, called Raven Rock, just miles from Camp David, as well as dozens of other bunkers the government built for its top leaders during the Cold War, from the White House lawn to Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado to Palm Beach, Florida, and the secret plans that would have kicked in after a Cold War nuclear attack to round up foreigners and dissidents and nationalize industries. Equal parts a presidential, military, and cultural history, Raven Rock tracks the evolution of the government plan and the threats of global war from the dawn of the nuclear era through the War on Terror.

Challenging nuclearism explores how a deliberate 'normalisation' of nuclear weapons has been constructed, why it has prevailed in international politics for over seventy years and why it is only now being questioned seriously. The book identifies how certain practices have enabled a small group of states to hold vast arsenals of these weapons of mass destruction and how the close control over nuclear decisions by a select group has meant that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been disregarded for decades. The recent UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will not bring about quick disarmament. It has been decried by the nuclear weapon states. But by rejecting nuclearism and providing a clear denunciation of nuclear weapons, it will challenge nuclear states in a way that has until now not been possible. Challenging nuclearism analyses the origins and repercussions of this pivotal moment in nuclear politics. -- .