The end ofthe Cold War opened unprecedented opportunities for reductions in weapons of mass destruction. With these opportunities came new challenges, both scientific and political. Traditionally approached by different groups, the scientific, technical and political challenges are inextricably intertwined. Agreements to dismantle and destroy chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons, after having been negotiated via diplomatic channels, require the expertise of scientists associated with their development to determine the safest and most environmentally sound methods of destruction. It is in this context that representatives from sixteen countries and five international organizations were convened jointly by NATO, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany and the State Government of North Rhine Westphalia 19-21 May, 1996 in a meeting near Bonn to take stock of worldwide efforts to destroy and dismantle chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons remaining after the end ofthe Cold War. NATO support was provided under the auspices of the NATO Science Committee's Panel on Disarmament Technologies. The conference brought together the major actors involved in the dismantlement and destruction of chemical, nuclear and conventional weapons, highlighted the substantial accomplishments achieved in this area and pinpointed the remaining technical obstacles still to be overcome. It also underlined the critical importance of transparency, data exchange and verification as indispensable preconditions for disarmament and cooperative security.

Facing Down the Soviet Union reveals for the first time the historic deliberations regarding the Chevaline upgrade to Britain's Polaris force, the decisions to procure the Trident C-4 and then D-5 system from the Americans in 1980 and 1982. It also details the decision to base Ground Launched Cruise Missiles in the UK in 1983.

This book provides an important picture of India's nuclear intentions and capabilities at the beginning of the 21st century. Academic and governmental experts from both the United States and India explore the strategic, technological, military and economic dimensions of India's nuclear world. The contributors bring their expertise together in an unusual mix of viewpoints from three continents on the several dimensions of a nuclear India at the turn of the century. It is an important resource in the United States to help policymakers respond to the regional and global proliferation problems that have resulted from India and Pakistan's nuclear tests of 1998. It is an important aid to India in exploring and evaluating its nuclear strategy and the political, economic and military consequences of its nuclear decisions.

This book tells the story of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the struggle that President Kennedy and his advisers (including the author, who was head of intelligence at the State Department) went through to try to understand why the Soviet Union had put nuclear missiles in Cuba, the alternative policies they debated to deal with the presence of the missiles, the aftermath of the crisis, and the lessons learned about defense and foreign policy in an age dominated by intercontinental missiles tipped with nuclear warheads capable of obliterating the northern hemisphere. The purpose of the book is to focus the world's attention on the fact that something must be done-and soon-if we are to avoid Armageddon. The world has never been as close to nuclear war as it was in November 1962. In this book, Roger Hilsman, head of intelligence at the U.S. State Department at that time, details the struggles that President Kennedy and his advisers went through to understand why the Soviet Union had deployed nuclear missiles in Cuba, describes the debate over alternative policy choices to force the removal of the missiles, and determines how and why each particular course of action was eventually chosen. He relates how the U.S. government dealt with the public and with its allies, and traces the step-by-step negotiations between the Soviets and the United States. In his discussion, Hilsman reveals how Khrushchev chose a back-channel, deniable way of communicating with President Kennedy by sending messages to the head of the KGB in Washington, who passed them to Hilsman, who then took them to the president. This book shows how President Kennedy and his brother Robert used this information to bring about the withdrawal of the missiles without war. This book analyzes the motives behind the massive Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles to Cuba, which were capable of destroying every major city in the United States except Seattle, backed up by anti-aircraft and ground forces to defend those missiles. One ship could carry 20-to-30 freight-train loads of war materiel and over 100 shiploads were sent-a total of between 2,000 and 3,000 train loads. Hilsman tells the story of how American intelligence found out-just in time-and, in a post-mortem, addresses the question of U.S. success and/or failure. He concludes with an assessment of the significance of the only nuclear crisis in the world's history, pointing out the lessons for humankind about war in a nuclear age. Hilsman's book is one of only two accounts of the Cuban missile crisis written by one of the principals, and has added significance in light of the turbid state and uncertain future of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

In this book, Michael Krepon analyzes nuclear issues such as missile defenses, space warfare, and treaties, and argues that the United States is on a dangerous course. During the Cold War, Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, facilitated strategic arms control. Now that the Cold War has been replaced by asymmetric warfare, treaties based on nuclear overkill and national vulnerability are outdated and must be adapted to a far different world. A new strategic concept of Cooperative Threat Reduction is needed to replace MAD. A balance is needed that combines military might with strengthened treaty regimes.

Leading international security scholars and policy advisors from universities, think-tanks, and nuclear weapons laboratories in the United States analyze the future of nuclear weapons proliferation. In April 1995, the earlier 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was renewed indefinitely and without change to the original clauses of the treaty. The authors examine the continuing relevance or irrelevance of the old treaty, the role of coercive sanctions in enforcing restraint, and the impact of biological, chemical and missile proliferation on the nuclear motives and ambitions of various states. Attention is given to proliferation conditions in the former Soviet republics, East and South Asia and the Middle East.

This work offers a broad interpretation of the extraordinary changes that have taken place in Soviet arms control policy since Mikhail Gorbachev became Soviet head of state in March of 1985. GorbacheV's policy is usually portrayed as an effort to ease the Soviet defense burden and to improve relations with the West, but Daniel Calingaert goes further, arguing that the Gorbachev leadership has embarked on a basically new policy of nuclear disarmament. Calingaert outlines how this policy allows the Soviets to divert resources to industrial modernization, restructure the armed forces, and join the global economy, thereby revitalizing their economic strength and exerting a renewed influence on international affairs.

Organized thematically rather than chronologically, the book concentrates on interpreting the major decisions affecting nuclear weapons in Europe, strategic arms, and ballistic missile defenses. The first five chapters explore the various components of Soviet arms control policy: the personnel and institutional changes that gave impetus to revisions in Soviet security policy; the strong economic inducements to pursue disarmament; changes in national security aims that provide the rationale for undertaking nuclear disarmament; the impact of revisions in nuclear strategy on force requirements and on Soviet disarmament initiatives; and the pursuit of foreign policy objectives through arms control. A final chapter interprets Soviet conduct of nuclear arms talks in light of this analysis of the nation's security, nuclear strategy, and foreign policy. With its broad overview of GorbacheV's arms control policy, as well as its original analyses, this study will be a useful resource for both students and experts of Soviet policy and security studies.

The nuclear disarmament movement of the late '50s and early '60s was one of the largest and arguably one of the most significant, extra-parliamentary movements ever seen in modern Britain. A whole new style and conception of politics was born through this first anti-nuclear movement, and the subsequent radicalism of the '60s and '70s has its roots here. The movement was extraordinarily diverse and rich in its constituencies of support and complex in its ideological make-up. Thus anarchists, communists, and Trotskyists rubbed shoulders with Christians, liberals, members of the Labour party, and 'ordinary apolitical people', most of whom found in the movement a means by which they could articulate their growing fear and anxiety about the seemingly inexorable arms race, and the horror of nuclear war. Dr Taylor analyses the perceptions of these groups in detail and explains how and why they differed. This is the first comprehensive study of the movement to make use of a wide range of contemporary material, and the first to present in detail the previously unrecorded views and analyses of more than twenty of the leading figures of the movement some twenty-five years on. Although he provides a wealth of historical detail, Dr Taylor's approach is primarily political and analytical, and his examination of this first mass movement of its kind will be relevant to all those concerned about nuclear proliferation, as well as to courses in politics, sociology, modern history and peace studies.

During the presidency of George Bush (1989-93), the proliferation of nuclear chemical and biological weapons, and the ballistic missiles capable of delivering them, rose greatly in significance as issues on the American security agenda. In the missile field, this became evident by the efforts of certain elements in the executive branch and several congressmen to improve domestic and international implementation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Politics of Ballistic Missile Nonproliferation examines the political, bureaucratic and systemic issues that interacted to determine the outcome of these efforts.

While the Cold War is over, many of the problems it spawned live on. One of the worst of these is the continued presence of vast nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia. How did the thousands of American bombs come into existence and how did they so rapidly become the United States' first line of defence?;Drawing extensively on previously classified material, Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Steven L Rearden have written a history of this crucial period. They show how American policymakers, and least of all President Truman, never expected nuclear weapons to play such a major strategic role. Yet by relying on the atomic bomb time and again to shore up US defences in the face of worsening relations with the Soviet Union, rather than accept seemingly more costly conventional alternatives, Truman found himself ultimately with no other choice.;The authors not only document and analyze the origins and early evolution of US nuclear strategy, but they also demonstrate the close relationship between decisions affecting such diverse matters as foreign policy, new technologies and the budgetary process. The result is an analysis containing new insights and timely reminders of the myriad complications created by reliance on nuclear weapons.

In 1995 a conference will be convened to review and extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This work brings together a group of individuals, including the elected President of the 1995 NPT Conference, to analyze four crucial agenda areas relevant to the Conference: the pre-conference activities to be undertaken by both States Parties and the Conference Secretariat; those security issues that relate to a review of the treaty, such as nuclear disarmament and security assurances; peaceful uses and verification questions; and regional issues.

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize, published to exceptional reviews in both the US and the UK, American Prometheus is as compelling a work of biography as it is a significant work of history.

Physicist and polymath, as familiar with Hindu scriptures as he was with quantum mechanics, J. Robert Oppenheimer - director of the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb - was the most famous scientist of his generation.

In their meticulous and riveting biography, Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin reveal a brilliant, ambitious, complex and flawed man, profoundly involved with some of the momentous events of the twentieth century.

Despite its portrayal as a bold departure, the Bush Doctrine was not the "new" or "revolutionary" policy instrument that many at the time portended. This work seeks to argue that while it was clear that the Bush Doctrine certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, it is apparent that the adoption of this strategy did not mark a total break with American tradition or earlier Administrations. Warren seeks to dispel arguments pertaining to the supposed "radical" nature of the Bush Doctrine -- based on comparisons with previous National Security Strategies and previous Administrations' penchant for prevention. However, the work also highlights that what was new and bold about the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002, was its willingness to embrace reinvigorating a nuclear option that could ultimately be used in the context of preventive war. While Obama has struck bold rhetorical notes and promises in relation to limiting the role of nuclear weapons, he has stopped short of changing the status quo on critical issues that have lingered since the Cold War -- such as tactical nuclear weapons and keeping missiles on alert. This book's final section examines the extent to which Obama has attempted to adjust' the nuclear option with the recent release of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Offering new insights into the Bush doctrine and providing a comprehensive analysis of the current status of the US nuclear weapons strategy, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies and international relations.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the principal legal barrier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the past forty-five years. It promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and insures, through the application of safeguards inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that those technologies are not being diverted toward the production of nuclear weapons. It is also the only multinational treaty that obligates the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) to pursue nuclear disarmament measures. Though there have been many challenges over the years, most would agree that the treaty has largely been successful. However, many are concerned about the continued viability of the NPT. The perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the interest by some countries to consider a weapons program while party to the treaty, and the funding and staffing issues at the IAEA, are all putting considerable strain on the treaty. This manuscript explores those issues and offers some possible solutions to ensure that the NPT will survive effectively for many years to come.

At the dawn of the nuclear age, strategist Bernard Brodie recognized our predicament when he said, "Nuclear weapons exist and they are incredibly destructive." Despite the end of the Cold War, thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert on both sides of the Atlantic. Plans to develop, deploy, and detonate nuclear weapons (for purposes of war prevention or war fighting) are informed by the ambiguous notion that nuclear war can be avoided by maintaining a balance of power. Policy-makers and decision-makers believe that once the balance of power is destroyed, a crisis will ensue, and if this crisis cannot be resolved with words, it is somehow necessary to use weapons. This idea is held as an historic inevitability, but the nuclear subculture is unaware of the highly problematic nature of their fundamental assumptions. Hirschbein entertains the possibility that the theory and practice of these policy-makers and decision-makers are informed by concepts at once ancient and metaphorical. He analyzes the primary and secondary metaphors invoked to conceptualize and manage nuclear weaponry. Hirschbein draws a striking parallel between dramatic changes in the ancient Greek account of conflict and the American conceptualization of nuclear weapons. Facing harrowing times, Thucydides avoided supernatural, Homeric imagery in favor of naturalistic metaphors to account for conflict--an account regarded as "eternal wisdom" by today's realist. Likewise, facing the Soviet challenge, American strategists abandoned supernatural Judeo-Christian accounts of nuclear weapons in favor of Thucydides' naturalistic tropes.

In the heady days of the Cold War, when the Bomb loomed large in the ruminations of Washington's wise men, policy intellectuals flocked to the home of Albert and Roberta Wohlstetter to discuss deterrence and doomsday. The Cold World They Made takes a fresh look at the original power couple of strategic studies. Seeking to unravel the complex tapestry of the Wohlstetters' world and worldview, Ron Robin reveals fascinating insights into an unlikely husband-and-wife pair who, at the height of the most dangerous military standoff in history, gained access to the deepest corridors of American power. The author of such classic Cold War treatises as "The Delicate Balance of Terror," Albert Wohlstetter is remembered for advocating an aggressive brinksmanship that stood in stark contrast with what he saw as weak and indecisive policies of Soviet containment. Yet Albert's ideas built crucially on insights gleaned from his wife. Robin makes a strong case for the Wohlstetters as a team of intellectual equals, showing how Roberta's scholarship was foundational to what became known as the Wohlstetter Doctrine. Together at RAND Corporation, Albert and Roberta crafted a mesmerizing vision of the Soviet threat, theorizing ways for the United States to emerge victorious in a thermonuclear exchange. Far from dwindling into irrelevance after the Cold War, the torch of the Wohlstetters' intellectual legacy was kept alive by well-placed disciples in George W. Bush's administration. Through their ideological heirs, the Wohlstetters' signature combination of brilliance and hubris continues to shape American policies.

During the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of people died from the use of nuclear weapons in Nuclear War I and other nuclear disasters. Dr. Newtan's book describes the disastrous consequences of the following nuclear developments all of which occurred in the 20th century: The Trinity Test of a nuclear device (explosion) The destruction of Hiroshima by a uranium bomb The destruction of Nagasaki by a plutonium bomb The hydrogen bomb, neutron bomb, and cobalt bomb Radioactive fallout Radiological weapons The BRAVO Test (hydrogen bomb) Three Mile Island nuclear reactor disaster Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster Fermi I breeder reactor disaster Nuclear submarine disasters (U.S., U.S.S.R.) Thresher nuclear submarine disaster Scorpion nuclear submarine disaster Nuclear satellite disasters Lost nuclear weapons Lost nuclear fissile materials for weapons Nuclear waste disasters Acts of war on nuclear facilities Nuclear terrorism Proliferation of nuclear weapons Nuclear reactors in space Nuclear weapons in space Nuclear waste - can it be safely stored for millennia?

An examination of the political and diplomatic role of American nuclear weapons in conflicts with a non-nuclear China in the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, this study analyzes the American tendency to become involved in confrontations with far weaker powers over issues of very little strategic significance to the United States. Washington threatens these adversaries with the use of incommensurate levels of force, then ultimately backs down in the face of international and domestic opposition to ill-considered plans to use force. Unlike works on nuclear history that have either focused on superpower nuclear conflicts and ignored cases of American nuclear diplomacy toward non-nuclear adversaries, or those that have focused merely on the outcomes of nuclear threats against non-nuclear powers, this book considers in depth American nuclear diplomacy toward China during the whole period of Sino-American military confrontations.

Soman offers new insights on Truman's decision to enter the Korean War, the extent of nuclear diplomacy during the war, and the way in which the war ended. He argues that the goal of American nuclear diplomacy in the spring of 1955 was to provoke a war with China, rather than to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Finally, he lays out, for the first time in print, the elaborate diplomacy that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initiated to defuse the 1958 crisis, involving a major shift in American policy that still remains hidden from the public as well as historians. Highlighting the central role of nuclear diplomacy in these crises, this book draws conclusions on the efficacy of such diplomacy, the impact of these crises on the development of policies of massive retaliation and limited war, the consequences of Dulles's brinkmanship, and the revival of nuclear diplomacy by the Clinton administration in conflicts with non-nuclear adversaries.

Karem is eminently qualified to write on the role of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs) in the processes of averting nuclear weapons proliferation, arresting the nuclear arms race, and eliminating the scourge of nuclear weapons. Karem's well-written, extensively documented, and cogent argument for a NWFZ in the Middle East reflects his scholarly and professional expertise on the technical and political issues surrounding such a proposal. . . . This is an important and much needed contribution to the literature on peace studies, arms limitation, disarmament, and world order studies. It should be part of every library collection. Choice It is clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the Middle East would pose grave problems for that politically explosive region and throughout the world. In this thoughful study, Dr Karem examines the possiblility of avoiding such a situation and reducing tensions generally by implementing United Nations resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Arguing that the NWFZ approach is a viable solution, he suggests how to implement it and how diplomatic obstacles facing such an agreement can be overcome.

Now a 6-part mini-series called Why the Rest of Us Die airing on VICE TV! The shocking truth about the government's secret plans to survive a catastrophic attack on US soil--even if the rest of us die--is "a frightening eye-opener" (Kirkus Reviews) that spans the dawn of the nuclear age to today, and "contains everything one could possibly want to know" (The Wall Street Journal). Every day in Washington, DC, the blue-and-gold first Helicopter Squadron, codenamed "MUSSEL," flies over the Potomac River. As obvious as the Presidential motorcade, most people assume the squadron is a travel perk for VIPs. They're only half right: while the helicopters do provide transport, the unit exists to evacuate high-ranking officials in the event of a terrorist or nuclear attack on the capital. In the event of an attack, select officials would be whisked by helicopters to a ring of secret bunkers around Washington, even as ordinary citizens were left to fend for themselves. "In exploring the incredible lengths (and depths) that successive administrations have gone to in planning for the aftermath of a nuclear assault, Graff deftly weaves a tale of secrecy and paranoia" (The New York Times Book Review) with details "that read like they've been ripped from the pages of a pulp spy novel" (Vice). For more than sixty years, the US government has been developing secret Doomsday strategies to protect itself, and the multibillion-dollar Continuity of Government (COG) program takes numerous forms--from its potential to evacuate the Liberty Bell from Philadelphia to the plans to launch nuclear missiles from a Boeing-747 jet flying high over Nebraska. Garrett M. Graff sheds light on the inner workings of the 650-acre compound, called Raven Rock, just miles from Camp David, as well as dozens of other bunkers the government built for its top leaders during the Cold War, from the White House lawn to Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado to Palm Beach, Florida, and the secret plans that would have kicked in after a Cold War nuclear attack to round up foreigners and dissidents and nationalize industries. Equal parts a presidential, military, and cultural history, Raven Rock tracks the evolution of the government plan and the threats of global war from the dawn of the nuclear era through the War on Terror.

The US debate surrounding ballistic-missile defence is becoming increasingly polarized: advocates claim that these defences are essential to US security and should be deployed as soon as possible; critics argue that they upset strategic stability, encourage regional arms races, and therefore, will not work. What is lacking in the current debate is a quantitative analysis of how well defences would have to work to meet specific security objectives, and what level of defence might upset strategic stability. This paper argues that there is no immediate need to deploy US national missile defences because accidental or unauthorized Russian or Chinese attacks are unlikely, and because deterrence should mean that the risk of attack from emerging ballistic-missile states is acceptably low. National missile defence might be a useful insurance, but other defence needs are more pressing. However, if the US did deploy such a system, a modified Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that allowed the US and Russia to deploy 100 interceptors at multiple sites around their territory should not pose a realistic threat to the retaliatory capabilities of four of the five declared nuclear powers.; This bo

In the late 1940s, the U.S. Department of Defense established a nuclear weapons depository in the Manzano Mountains of New Mexico. For more than 40 years, Manzano Base served as a maintenance and storage site for some of the most destructive weapons ever created. Operated by the U.S. Air Force, the facility was small and obscure, with highly restricted access. Its covert mission fostered a sense of mystery, leaving the public to speculate about what really went on there. The site was decommissioned in 1992 yet its rich history continues to influence America's nuclear weapons program. This book tells the full story of Manzano and the personnel who served there. Firsthand accounts recall their experiences of nuclear weapons accidents, aircraft crashes, UFO/UAF sightings and a radiation demonstration called "tickling the tiger's tail.

'The young dictator comes under close scrutiny in this intelligent account' Sunday Times When Kim Jong Un became the leader of North Korea in 2011, many expected his rule to be short. Years later, he remains the unchallenged dictator of a nuclear rogue state with weaponry capable of threatening the West. In this behind-the-scenes look, former CIA analyst and North Korea expert Jung H. Pak reveals the explosive story of Kim Jong II's third son: the spoilt and impetuous child, the mediocre student, the ruthless murderer, the shrewd grand strategist.