This sixth volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on current legal challenges regarding nuclear disarmament and security. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for further constructive discourse at both national and international levels. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Chair of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law and President and CEO of ISLAND - The Foundation for International Society of Law and Nuclear Disarmament. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional-and possibly nuclear-war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.

This book analyzes the United States and Russia's nuclear arms control and deterrence relationships and how these countries must lead current and prospective efforts to support future nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The second nuclear age, following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, poses new challenges with respect to nuclear-strategic stability, deterrence and nonproliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia, and the potential for new nuclear weapons states in the Middle East, create new possible axes of conflict potentially stressful to the existing world order. Other uncertainties include the interest of major powers in developing a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, possibly for use in limited nuclear wars, and the competitive technologies for antimissile defenses being developed and deployed by the United States and Russia. Other technology challenges, including the implications of cyberwar for nuclear deterrence and crisis management, are also considered. Political changes also matter. The early post-Cold War hopes for the emergence of a global pacific security community, excluding the possibility of major war, have been dashed by political conflict between Russia and NATO, by the roiled nature of American domestic politics with respect to international security, and by a more assertive and militarily competent China. Additionally, the study includes suggestions for both analysis and policy in order to prevent the renewed U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race and competition in new technologies. This volume would be ideal for graduate students, researchers, scholars and anyone who is interested in nuclear policy, international studies, and Russian politics.

Now a 6-part mini-series called Why the Rest of Us Die airing on VICE TV! The shocking truth about the government's secret plans to survive a catastrophic attack on US soil--even if the rest of us die--is "a frightening eye-opener" (Kirkus Reviews) that spans the dawn of the nuclear age to today, and "contains everything one could possibly want to know" (The Wall Street Journal). Every day in Washington, DC, the blue-and-gold first Helicopter Squadron, codenamed "MUSSEL," flies over the Potomac River. As obvious as the Presidential motorcade, most people assume the squadron is a travel perk for VIPs. They're only half right: while the helicopters do provide transport, the unit exists to evacuate high-ranking officials in the event of a terrorist or nuclear attack on the capital. In the event of an attack, select officials would be whisked by helicopters to a ring of secret bunkers around Washington, even as ordinary citizens were left to fend for themselves. "In exploring the incredible lengths (and depths) that successive administrations have gone to in planning for the aftermath of a nuclear assault, Graff deftly weaves a tale of secrecy and paranoia" (The New York Times Book Review) with details "that read like they've been ripped from the pages of a pulp spy novel" (Vice). For more than sixty years, the US government has been developing secret Doomsday strategies to protect itself, and the multibillion-dollar Continuity of Government (COG) program takes numerous forms--from its potential to evacuate the Liberty Bell from Philadelphia to the plans to launch nuclear missiles from a Boeing-747 jet flying high over Nebraska. Garrett M. Graff sheds light on the inner workings of the 650-acre compound, called Raven Rock, just miles from Camp David, as well as dozens of other bunkers the government built for its top leaders during the Cold War, from the White House lawn to Cheyenne Mountain in Colorado to Palm Beach, Florida, and the secret plans that would have kicked in after a Cold War nuclear attack to round up foreigners and dissidents and nationalize industries. Equal parts a presidential, military, and cultural history, Raven Rock tracks the evolution of the government plan and the threats of global war from the dawn of the nuclear era through the War on Terror.

This book investigates the European involvement in managing the nuclear dispute with Iran, shedding new light on EU foreign policy-making. The author focuses on the peculiar format through which the EU managed Iran's nuclear issue: a 'lead group' consisting of France, Germany and the UK and the High Representative for EU foreign policy (E3/EU). The experience of the E3/EU lends credibility to the claim that lead groups give EU foreign policy direction and substance. The E3/EU set up a negotiating framework that worked as a de-escalating tool, a catalyst for Security Council unity and a forum for crisis management. They inflicted pain on Iran by adopting a comprehensive sanctions regime, but did so only having secured US commitment to a diplomatic solution. Once the deal was reached, they defended it vigorously. The E3/EU may have been supporting actors, but their achievements were real.

This edited collection considers the future of nuclear weapons in world politics in terms of security issues that are important for U.S. and other policy makers. The spread of nuclear weapons also is related to the equally dangerous proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, and of ballistic missiles of medium and longer ranges.

Cold War studies of nuclear weapons emphasized the U.S.-Soviet relationship, deterrence, and bilateral arms control. A less structured post-Cold War world will require more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of roles that nuclear weapons might play in the hands of new nuclear states or non-state actors. As the essays suggest as well, the possibility of terrorism by means of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction introduces other uncertainties into military and policy planning. An important analysis for scholars, students, and researchers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

Cimbala argues that nuclear complacency is based on a misreading of history and on unsound political and military analysis. The stability factors built into the Cold War international system are now missing. The spread of nuclear weapons after the Cold War moved toward regional actors outside of Europe, some with religious or national scores to settle. Technology transfer of ballistic missiles and other delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical as well as nuclear weapons, brings the danger of nuclear eruption closer to reality. Finally, the mechanism of deterrence that seemed so dependable as a means of war prevention from 1947 to 1991 only seems so by virtue of nostalgia.

The early decades of the Cold War were made somewhat unpredictable by uncertain U.S.-Soviet political relations, by nuclear force building based on worst-case estimates, and by rickety command and control systems that could have failed both sides in a crisis. The Soviets and Americans gradually improved their relationship and stabilized Cold War competition, including nuclear rivalry, but they had more than 40 years to practice and no immediate territorial disputes. As Cimbala makes clear, it cannot be assumed that the Soviet-American nonbelligerence of the Cold War is transferable into a multipolar, post-Cold War international system marked by spreading weapons and trigger-sensitive control systems. This provocative analysis will be of interest to all scholars, students, and policy makers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

This book explores how human factors, in particular the contested notion of trust, influence the conduct and practice of arms control verification. In the nuclear arena, disarmament verification is often viewed purely in terms of a dispassionate, scientific process. Yet this view is fundamentally flawed since the technical impossibility of 100 per cent verification opens the door to a host of complex issues and questions regarding the process and its outcomes. Central among these is the fact that those involved in any verification inspection process must inevitably conduct their work in a space that falls well short of absolute certainty. The lines between scientific enquiry and human psychology can become blurred and outcomes have the potential to be influenced by perceptions. Drawing on extensive empirical evidence, the authors explore the complex interplay between evidence-based judgements and perceptions of intentions that frames the science of verification. The book provides new insights into the role and influence of human factors in the verification process, shedding light on this 'blind spot' of verification research. It is an invaluable resource for practitioners, academics and students working in arms control and disarmament.

This official history was originally printed in very small numbers in 2002. "Defense's Nuclear Agency, 1947-1997" traces the development of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), and its descendant government organizations, from its original founding in 1947 to 1997. After the disestablishment of the Manhattan Engineering District (MED) in 1947, AFSWP was formed to provide military training in nuclear weapons' operations. Over the years, its sequential descendant organizations have been the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) from 1959 to 1971, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) from 1971 to 1996, and the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) from 1996 to 1998. In 1998, DSWA, the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Technology Security Administration, and selected elements of the Office of Secretary of Defense were combined to form the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

This book, written with unique access to official archives, tells the secret story of Britain's H-bomb - the scientific and strategic background, the government's policy decision, the work of the remarkable men who created the bomb, the four weapon trials at a remote Pacific atoll in 1957-58, and the historic consequences.

This is vital history, based on first-hand know-how, and thus not overtaken by current events. Students in the fields of history, political science, and military studies will gain by reading this prime. It gives a unique overview of the INF Treaty showing what happened and why in the 1980s in terms of arms control and offering some points about the future of arms control regimes at the turn of this century. George Rueckert delineates the origins of INF negotiations and how they proceeded in Geneva and Reykjavik. He analyzes the INF Treaty and gives a comprehensive overview of it and supplemental agreements and interpretations. He describes implementing organizations and structures, matters relating to on-site inspection and portal monitoring, and related measures. In the end he considers what may lie ahead of us in the 1990s in terms of arms control. Appendices list INF inspection sites in the United States and Russia, present documents describing appendices to the INF treaty. The selected bibliography is a good guide to further reading on the subject.

This book applies the cutting-edge socio-cultural model Cultural Topography Analytic Framework (CTAF) pioneered in the authors' earlier volume Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security Policymaking (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) with an eye towards isolating those vectors of nuclear decision-making on which the US might exert influence within a foreign state. The case studies included in this volume tackle a number of the nuclear challenges-termed "nuclear thresholds"-likely to be faced by the US and identify the most promising points of leverage available to American policymakers in ameliorating a wide range of over-the-horizon nuclear challenges. Because near and medium-term nuclear thresholds are likely to involve both allies and adversaries simultaneously, meaning that US response will require strategies tailored to both the perception of threat experienced by the actors in question, the value the actors place on their relationship with the US, and the domestic context driving decision-making. This volume offers a nuanced look at each actor's identity, national norms, values, and perceptual lens in order to offer culturally-focused insights into behavior and intentions.

This book explores Eleanor Roosevelt's involvement in the global campaign for nuclear disarmament. Based on an extensive multi-archival research, it assesses her overall contribution to the global anti-nuclear campaign of the early cold war and shows how she constantly tried to raise awareness of the real hazards of nuclear testing. She strove to educate the general public about the implications of the nuclear arms race and, in doing so, she became for many a trustworthy anti-nuclear leader and a reliable voice of conscience.

In an unanticipated flurry of atomic weapons testing--a total of 10 tests over 20 days in 1998--India and Pakistan announced to the world their emergence as full-fledged nuclear powers. How, Nizamani asks, did nuclear escalation come to dominate the agendas of both nations? In a comparative analysis, Nizamani reveals the political underpinnings of nuclear weapons development, arguing that Indian and Pakistani nuclearization is linked to processes of national formation.

Working within the Critical Security Studies framework, Nizamani traces the development of nuclear discourses in India and Pakistan from early nationhood to the present. Nizamani defers conclusive identification of real or objective national threats, and instead examines the historical specificities and internal tensions of the dominant Indian and Pakistani security discourses. Additionally, Nizamani provides an overview of anti-nuclear dissent in South Asia.

This book begins with the analysis of America's post-war intelligence operations, propaganda campaigns, and strategic psychological warfare in Japan. Banking on nuclear safety myths, Japan promoted an aggressive policy of locating and building nuclear power plants in depopulated areas suffering from a significant decline of local industries and economies. The Fukushima nuclear disaster substantiated that U.S. propaganda programs left a long lasting legacy in Japan and beyond and created the fertile ground for the future nuclear disaster. The book reveals Japan's tripartite organization of the dominating state, media-monopoly, and nuclear-plant oligarchy advancing nuclear proliferation. It details America's unprecedented pro-nuclear propaganda campaigns; Japan's secret ambitions to develop its own nuclear bombs; U.S. dumping of reprocessed plutonium on Japan; and the joint U.S.-Nippon propaganda campaigns for "safe" nuclear-power and the current "safe-nuclear particles" myths. The study shows how the bankruptcy of the central state has led to increased burdens on the population in post-nuclear tsunami era, and the ensuing dangerous ionization of the population now reaching into the future.

Controversy over Iranian nuclear policy has been mounting in both legal and political circles since the early 2000s. Most recently, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), tasked with verifying compliance of Member States with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been expressing concern that Iran's nuclear efforts are directed not solely toward peaceful uses, but also for military purposes. In response, various States have tried, individually and collectively, to engage Iran in agreed frameworks of action that would include an Iranian self-imposed restraint regarding its nuclear development. This volume documents the Iranian nuclear issue, tracing the evolution of international interest and concern with Iran's nuclear policy since the 1970s, when Iran began earnest efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities. Emphasis is nonetheless placed on events since 2002-2003, when it was established that Iran had concealed certain aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA. Alongside reports of the IAEA and Security Council documents, the volume covers diverse sources rather than relying solely on UN organs and agencies, international organizations, or dedicated ad hoc bodies.

"The Nuclear Weapons World: Who, How, and Where" is a unique guide to nuclear weapons decisionmaking and decisionmakers in the five official nuclear weapons states and the two nuclear alliances. No other book describes in such detail the complex structures in which decisions to produce and deploy nuclear weapons are made, and lists alphabetically with full biographies the names of the 750 people who make decisions about nuclear weapons production and deployment. Case studies on nuclear weapons procurement and deployment decisions make this book informative and necessary reading for both specialists in the field and generalists seeking up-to-date information on this important subject.

"The Nuclear Weapons World: Who, How, and Where" is a unique guide to nuclear weapons decisionmaking and decisionmakers in the five official nuclear weapons states and two nuclear alliances: the USA, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact. No other book describes in detail the complex structures in which decisions to produce and deploy nuclear weapons are made and also provides the names of the key decisionmakers. Divided into seven chapters, one for each of the official nuclear weapons states and the nuclear alliances, The Nuclear Weapons World also lists alphabetically with full biographies the names of the 750 people--scientists, armed forces members, top industrialists, permanent government officials, and politicians--who make the decisions about nuclear weapons production and deployment. Addresses and, where available, telephone numbers for entries are presented along with a full description of the decisionmaking structures: councils, committees, departments and institutes; organizational charts; descriptions of structures and biographies cross-referenced; complete name and subject indices; and a full glossary.

The Cuban Missile Crisis is the closest the United States came to nuclear war during the Cold War era. Facing down the buildup of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, President John F. Kennedy took a calculated risk and succeeded in negotiating the removal of those weapons after weeks of teetering on the brink of war. This riveting narrative and ready-reference guide captures the drama of that crisis. Eleven chapters trace the unfolding of events from the United States, Cuban, and Soviet perspectives.

Ready reference features include: a blow-by-blow chronology of daily events during the Crisis, lengthy biographical profiles of the nine key players, including Cuba's Fidel Castro, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and key Kennedy Cabinet members who were part of Kennedy's Crisis team; the text of 19 primary documents, including conversations in the Oval Office and memoranda that put the reader inside the crisis room, and Kennedy's speeches to the nation; and an annotated bibliography of print and electronic sources suitable for student research. James Nathan, an expert on the Cuban Missile Crisis, provides an interesting narrative with all the high drama of the Crisis, along with a contemporary historical perspective that will help readers to gain an understanding of the event that symbolized the height of the Cold War and its long-term significance.

Covering the development of the atomic bomb during the Second World War, the origins and early course of the Cold War, and the advent of the hydrogen bomb in the early 1950s, Churchill and the Bomb in War and Cold War explores a still neglected aspect of Winston Churchill's career - his relationship with and thinking on nuclear weapons. Kevin Ruane shows how Churchill went from regarding the bomb as a weapon of war in the struggle with Nazi Germany to viewing it as a weapon of communist containment (and even punishment) in the early Cold War before, in the 1950s, advocating and arguably pioneering "mutually assured destruction" as the key to preventing the Cold War flaring into a calamitous nuclear war. While other studies of Churchill have touched on his evolving views on nuclear weapons, few historians have given this hugely important issue the kind of dedicated and sustained treatment it deserves. In Churchill and the Bomb in War and Cold War, however, Kevin Ruane has undertaken extensive primary research in Britain, the United States and Europe, and accessed a wide array of secondary literature, in producing an immensely readable yet detailed, insightful and provocative account of Churchill's nuclear hopes and fears.

Kristan Stoddart reveals for the first time discussions that took place between the British, French and US governments for nuclear cooperation in the early to mid 1970s. In doing so it sets the scene for the upgrade to Britain's Polaris force codenamed Chevaline and how this could have brought down Harold Wilson's Labour government of 1974-1976.

This is an excellent advanced study in strategy in the nuclear age. Cimbala covers the field thoroughly. He challenges much of the conventional and established approaches to deterrence and crisis management. . . . Cimbala's work is a valuable and refreshing addition to the literature. Scholars will find it enriching and challenging. . . . This is a must acquisition for university and professional libraries. "Choice"

Cimbala critically examines the rational behind Western defense policies based on deterrence. According to the author, nuclear strategizing--or coping with outside threats--is shortsighted--dependent as it is on economic analogies and technical fixation. It leaves unanswered important questions about the relationships between strategy, politics, and long-term defense goals. Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.