This book begins with the analysis of America's post-war intelligence operations, propaganda campaigns, and strategic psychological warfare in Japan. Banking on nuclear safety myths, Japan promoted an aggressive policy of locating and building nuclear power plants in depopulated areas suffering from a significant decline of local industries and economies. The Fukushima nuclear disaster substantiated that U.S. propaganda programs left a long lasting legacy in Japan and beyond and created the fertile ground for the future nuclear disaster. The book reveals Japan's tripartite organization of the dominating state, media-monopoly, and nuclear-plant oligarchy advancing nuclear proliferation. It details America's unprecedented pro-nuclear propaganda campaigns; Japan's secret ambitions to develop its own nuclear bombs; U.S. dumping of reprocessed plutonium on Japan; and the joint U.S.-Nippon propaganda campaigns for "safe" nuclear-power and the current "safe-nuclear particles" myths. The study shows how the bankruptcy of the central state has led to increased burdens on the population in post-nuclear tsunami era, and the ensuing dangerous ionization of the population now reaching into the future.

Challenging the legality of UK nuclear policy as a further generation of nuclear-armed submarines is developed, Trident and International Law asks who is really accountable for Coulport and Faslane. The UK government in Westminster controls nuclear policy decisions even though Britain's nuclear submarines and warheads are all based in Scotland, at Faslane and Coulport. The Scottish Government therefore has responsibilities under domestic and international law relating to the deployment of nuclear weapons in Scotland. Public concern about nuclear deployments, and particularly the security and proliferation implications of modernising Trident, led the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, the Edinburgh Peace and Justice Centre and Trident Ploughshares to organise an international conference on 'Trident and International Law: Scotland's Obligations' in Edinburgh in 2009. This book presents the key papers and documents, with additional arguments from renowned legal scholars. The findings should be of interest to lawyers, policymakers and citizens with interest or responsibilities in legal and nuclear issues, public safety and human security. Whilst focusing on Scotland, this book raises serious questions for nuclear weapon deployments worldwide.

This edited collection considers the future of nuclear weapons in world politics in terms of security issues that are important for U.S. and other policy makers. The spread of nuclear weapons also is related to the equally dangerous proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and biological weapons, and of ballistic missiles of medium and longer ranges.

Cold War studies of nuclear weapons emphasized the U.S.-Soviet relationship, deterrence, and bilateral arms control. A less structured post-Cold War world will require more nuanced appreciation of the diversity of roles that nuclear weapons might play in the hands of new nuclear states or non-state actors. As the essays suggest as well, the possibility of terrorism by means of nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction introduces other uncertainties into military and policy planning. An important analysis for scholars, students, and researchers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

Cimbala argues that nuclear complacency is based on a misreading of history and on unsound political and military analysis. The stability factors built into the Cold War international system are now missing. The spread of nuclear weapons after the Cold War moved toward regional actors outside of Europe, some with religious or national scores to settle. Technology transfer of ballistic missiles and other delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, including biological and chemical as well as nuclear weapons, brings the danger of nuclear eruption closer to reality. Finally, the mechanism of deterrence that seemed so dependable as a means of war prevention from 1947 to 1991 only seems so by virtue of nostalgia.

The early decades of the Cold War were made somewhat unpredictable by uncertain U.S.-Soviet political relations, by nuclear force building based on worst-case estimates, and by rickety command and control systems that could have failed both sides in a crisis. The Soviets and Americans gradually improved their relationship and stabilized Cold War competition, including nuclear rivalry, but they had more than 40 years to practice and no immediate territorial disputes. As Cimbala makes clear, it cannot be assumed that the Soviet-American nonbelligerence of the Cold War is transferable into a multipolar, post-Cold War international system marked by spreading weapons and trigger-sensitive control systems. This provocative analysis will be of interest to all scholars, students, and policy makers involved with defense, security, and foreign policy studies.

This book, written with unique access to official archives, tells the secret story of Britain's H-bomb - the scientific and strategic background, the government's policy decision, the work of the remarkable men who created the bomb, the four weapon trials at a remote Pacific atoll in 1957-58, and the historic consequences.

An updated edition of ABC-CLIO's classic reference book on nuclear arms programs and proliferation in nations around the world. Fully updated and revised since its initial publication, Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, Second Edition explores all key issues related to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and efforts to curb them, from the U.S. atomic bomb project during World War II to current debates on nuclear terrorism, North Korea's nuclear test, and Iran's enrichment program. Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation, Second Edition clarifies weapons-related policy debates from both U.S. and international perspectives, offering a detailed look at current technologies, arsenals, weapons tests, and nonproliferation efforts. Readers will find expert analysis of such crucial recent events as Libya's disarmament, the failed WMD search in Iraq, A.Q. Khan's nuclear technology black market, "dirty bombs," developments in North Korea and Iran, and the U.S. plan to aid India's nuclear program-plus recent progress (or lack thereof) on a range of treaties and initiatives. Primary documents include an excerpt from the 1945 U.S. report on the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the text of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and the UN resolution sanctioning North Korea for its nuclear test A detailed and updated chronology highlights major events between 1939-2007 pertaining to the buildup of nuclear weapons and the efforts to control and dismantle them

A recent National Security Strategy report singles out nuclear proliferation as one of the gravest threats to the United States. Much of this fear is focused on North Korea and Iran, two "rogue states" that have violated nonproliferation rules and engaged in provocative actions, including nuclear and ballistic missile tests. Conventional wisdom dictates that the regimes in these countries have a uniquely defiant and dangerous nature, and that coercive measures such as sanctions and preemptive strikes are the most effective way to deal with them. But how do the neighbors of these two states view them, and how does this perception map onto the regional landscape in East Asia and the Middle East? Global Rogues and Regional Orders offers a systematic analysis of the intersection of nuclear proliferation and regional order in East Asia and the Middle East. It does so by exploring the causes and consequences of the regional perceptions and policies with regard to the North Korean and Iranian challenges. The U.S. depiction of North Korea and Iran as archetypical global rogues is fundamentally at odds with the regional debate, which centers on multiple understandings of what these nations respectively mean for the regional order. While some regional actors, such as Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Japan, side with the United States, others seek to challenge, or dissociate from, the U.S. position as a means to enhance their countries' regional role and foreign policy autonomy. By turning the analytical focus onto regional actors and the regional dimension of nuclear proliferation, this book offers a novel way to analyze global proliferation challenges and provides new insights into the making of regional orders in East Asia and the Middle East.

The immense impact of technology on both warfare and security has been clearly demonstrated and has heightened concerns relating to the proliferation of military technology and misuse by irresponsible actors. Technology control regimes are a vital component of national security strategies. This report presents evidence of the increasing relevance of technology in the 21st century and a brief review of the control regimes, as well as the perspectives of progressive developing nations. It highlights the need for a new approach to the management of technology and security issues. Meeting future challenges to arms control and non-proliferation will require wider cooperation among nations in a rapidly changing and interdependent world in which some of the new technologies will further accentuate security sensitivities. The report advocates the abandonment of cold war mindsets and makes a case for a broader cooperative approach to the management of technology controls. International cooperation will be vital for achieving the objectives of non-proliferation, disarmament and global socio-economic progress and will facilitate steps towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the dangers posed by terrorism, thereby fostering enhanced international peace and stability.

This is vital history, based on first-hand know-how, and thus not overtaken by current events. Students in the fields of history, political science, and military studies will gain by reading this prime. It gives a unique overview of the INF Treaty showing what happened and why in the 1980s in terms of arms control and offering some points about the future of arms control regimes at the turn of this century. George Rueckert delineates the origins of INF negotiations and how they proceeded in Geneva and Reykjavik. He analyzes the INF Treaty and gives a comprehensive overview of it and supplemental agreements and interpretations. He describes implementing organizations and structures, matters relating to on-site inspection and portal monitoring, and related measures. In the end he considers what may lie ahead of us in the 1990s in terms of arms control. Appendices list INF inspection sites in the United States and Russia, present documents describing appendices to the INF treaty. The selected bibliography is a good guide to further reading on the subject.

In an unanticipated flurry of atomic weapons testing--a total of 10 tests over 20 days in 1998--India and Pakistan announced to the world their emergence as full-fledged nuclear powers. How, Nizamani asks, did nuclear escalation come to dominate the agendas of both nations? In a comparative analysis, Nizamani reveals the political underpinnings of nuclear weapons development, arguing that Indian and Pakistani nuclearization is linked to processes of national formation.

Working within the Critical Security Studies framework, Nizamani traces the development of nuclear discourses in India and Pakistan from early nationhood to the present. Nizamani defers conclusive identification of real or objective national threats, and instead examines the historical specificities and internal tensions of the dominant Indian and Pakistani security discourses. Additionally, Nizamani provides an overview of anti-nuclear dissent in South Asia.

"The Nuclear Weapons World: Who, How, and Where" is a unique guide to nuclear weapons decisionmaking and decisionmakers in the five official nuclear weapons states and the two nuclear alliances. No other book describes in such detail the complex structures in which decisions to produce and deploy nuclear weapons are made, and lists alphabetically with full biographies the names of the 750 people who make decisions about nuclear weapons production and deployment. Case studies on nuclear weapons procurement and deployment decisions make this book informative and necessary reading for both specialists in the field and generalists seeking up-to-date information on this important subject.

"The Nuclear Weapons World: Who, How, and Where" is a unique guide to nuclear weapons decisionmaking and decisionmakers in the five official nuclear weapons states and two nuclear alliances: the USA, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, China, NATO, and the Warsaw Pact. No other book describes in detail the complex structures in which decisions to produce and deploy nuclear weapons are made and also provides the names of the key decisionmakers. Divided into seven chapters, one for each of the official nuclear weapons states and the nuclear alliances, The Nuclear Weapons World also lists alphabetically with full biographies the names of the 750 people--scientists, armed forces members, top industrialists, permanent government officials, and politicians--who make the decisions about nuclear weapons production and deployment. Addresses and, where available, telephone numbers for entries are presented along with a full description of the decisionmaking structures: councils, committees, departments and institutes; organizational charts; descriptions of structures and biographies cross-referenced; complete name and subject indices; and a full glossary.

Controversy over Iranian nuclear policy has been mounting in both legal and political circles since the early 2000s. Most recently, the International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA), tasked with verifying compliance of Member States with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, has been expressing concern that Iran's nuclear efforts are directed not solely toward peaceful uses, but also for military purposes. In response, various States have tried, individually and collectively, to engage Iran in agreed frameworks of action that would include an Iranian self-imposed restraint regarding its nuclear development. This volume documents the Iranian nuclear issue, tracing the evolution of international interest and concern with Iran's nuclear policy since the 1970s, when Iran began earnest efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities. Emphasis is nonetheless placed on events since 2002-2003, when it was established that Iran had concealed certain aspects of its nuclear activities from the IAEA. Alongside reports of the IAEA and Security Council documents, the volume covers diverse sources rather than relying solely on UN organs and agencies, international organizations, or dedicated ad hoc bodies.

The Cuban Missile Crisis is the closest the United States came to nuclear war during the Cold War era. Facing down the buildup of Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962, President John F. Kennedy took a calculated risk and succeeded in negotiating the removal of those weapons after weeks of teetering on the brink of war. This riveting narrative and ready-reference guide captures the drama of that crisis. Eleven chapters trace the unfolding of events from the United States, Cuban, and Soviet perspectives.

Ready reference features include: a blow-by-blow chronology of daily events during the Crisis, lengthy biographical profiles of the nine key players, including Cuba's Fidel Castro, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and key Kennedy Cabinet members who were part of Kennedy's Crisis team; the text of 19 primary documents, including conversations in the Oval Office and memoranda that put the reader inside the crisis room, and Kennedy's speeches to the nation; and an annotated bibliography of print and electronic sources suitable for student research. James Nathan, an expert on the Cuban Missile Crisis, provides an interesting narrative with all the high drama of the Crisis, along with a contemporary historical perspective that will help readers to gain an understanding of the event that symbolized the height of the Cold War and its long-term significance.

This is an excellent advanced study in strategy in the nuclear age. Cimbala covers the field thoroughly. He challenges much of the conventional and established approaches to deterrence and crisis management. . . . Cimbala's work is a valuable and refreshing addition to the literature. Scholars will find it enriching and challenging. . . . This is a must acquisition for university and professional libraries. "Choice"

Cimbala critically examines the rational behind Western defense policies based on deterrence. According to the author, nuclear strategizing--or coping with outside threats--is shortsighted--dependent as it is on economic analogies and technical fixation. It leaves unanswered important questions about the relationships between strategy, politics, and long-term defense goals. Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.

Using newly released documents, the author presents an integrated look at American nuclear policy and diplomacy in crises from the Berlin blockade to Vietnam. The book answers the question of why, when the atomic bomb had been used with such devastating effect against the Japanese Empire in 1945, American leaders put this most apocalyptic of weapons back on the shelf, never to be used again in anger. It documents the myopia of Potomac strategists in involving the US in wars of attrition in Korea and Southeast Asia, marginal areas where American vital interests were in no way endangered. Despite the presence of hundreds, then thousands of nuclear bombs and warheads in the nation's stockpile, the greatest military weapon in history became politically impossible to use. And yet overwhelming nuclear superiority did serve its ultimate purpose in the Cold War. When American vital interests were threatened - over Berlin and Cuba - the Soviets backed down from confrontation. Despite errors in strategic judgement brought on by fear of Communist expansion, and in some cases outright incompetence, the ace in the hole proved decisive.

Kristan Stoddart reveals for the first time discussions that took place between the British, French and US governments for nuclear cooperation in the early to mid 1970s. In doing so it sets the scene for the upgrade to Britain's Polaris force codenamed Chevaline and how this could have brought down Harold Wilson's Labour government of 1974-1976.

Covering the development of the atomic bomb during the Second World War, the origins and early course of the Cold War, and the advent of the hydrogen bomb in the early 1950s, Churchill and the Bomb in War and Cold War explores a still neglected aspect of Winston Churchill's career - his relationship with and thinking on nuclear weapons. Kevin Ruane shows how Churchill went from regarding the bomb as a weapon of war in the struggle with Nazi Germany to viewing it as a weapon of communist containment (and even punishment) in the early Cold War before, in the 1950s, advocating and arguably pioneering "mutually assured destruction" as the key to preventing the Cold War flaring into a calamitous nuclear war. While other studies of Churchill have touched on his evolving views on nuclear weapons, few historians have given this hugely important issue the kind of dedicated and sustained treatment it deserves. In Churchill and the Bomb in War and Cold War, however, Kevin Ruane has undertaken extensive primary research in Britain, the United States and Europe, and accessed a wide array of secondary literature, in producing an immensely readable yet detailed, insightful and provocative account of Churchill's nuclear hopes and fears.

This second Volume in the book Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law discusses the legal interpretation and implementation of verification and compliance with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 1996; and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 1957. It specifically examines the question, contested in recent academic writings, whether the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is competent to verify not only the correctness, but also the completeness of national declarations. Topical legal issues of verification and its technical and political limits as well as peaceful settlement of disputes and countermeasures are discussed in-depth. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for a further constructive discourse on the topic at both national and international levels. A Third Volume, to be published in Autumn 2016, will focus on legal issues of safety and security of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Professor of International Law, Royal Holloway University of London; a Member of Wolfson College, Oxford; Chairman of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Honorary President, International Society for Military Law and the Law of War; Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Prolife ration and Contemporary International Law.

With the concept of 'Atomic Anxiety', this book offers a novel perspective on one of the most important and longstanding puzzles of international politics: the non-use of U.S. nuclear weapons. By focusing on the fear surrounding nuclear weapons, it explains why nuclear deterrence and the nuclear taboo are working at cross purposes in practice.

Waging Peace is a re-examination of President Eisenhower's "New Look" program of national security, the foundation for American Cold War policy for the next thirty years. In a turbulent and dangerous stage of East-West relations, with an untested and erratic Soviet leadership and a changing world environment, Eisenhower managed a succession of crises and set a course which ultimately preserved both security and peace. Only now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, can his achievement be fully appreciated.