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Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Weapons & equipment > Nuclear weapons
This book explores how human factors, in particular the contested
notion of trust, influence the conduct and practice of arms control
verification. In the nuclear arena, disarmament verification is
often viewed purely in terms of a dispassionate, scientific
process. Yet this view is fundamentally flawed since the technical
impossibility of 100 per cent verification opens the door to a host
of complex issues and questions regarding the process and its
outcomes. Central among these is the fact that those involved in
any verification inspection process must inevitably conduct their
work in a space that falls well short of absolute certainty. The
lines between scientific enquiry and human psychology can become
blurred and outcomes have the potential to be influenced by
perceptions. Drawing on extensive empirical evidence, the authors
explore the complex interplay between evidence-based judgements and
perceptions of intentions that frames the science of verification.
The book provides new insights into the role and influence of human
factors in the verification process, shedding light on this 'blind
spot' of verification research. It is an invaluable resource for
practitioners, academics and students working in arms control and
disarmament.
This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence
between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian
neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt
nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani
nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the
likelihood of escalation to conventional-and possibly nuclear-war,
the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and
Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare
cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the
effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and
Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical
logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers
suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two
countries.
DOD spends billions of dollars annually to sustain its weapon
systems to support current and future operations. The Air Force and
Navy are operating many of their fixed-wing aircraft well beyond
their original designed service lives and therefore are confronted
with sustainment challenges. Chapter 1 examines the trends in
availability and O&S costs for selected Air Force and Navy
fixed-wing aircraft since fiscal year 2011, including whether they
met availability goals, and assesses the extent that the
departments documented sustainment strategies, reviewed sustainment
metrics, and implemented plans to improve aircraft availability.
Software is integral to the operation and functionality of DOD
equipment, platforms, and weapon systems, including tactical and
combat vehicles, aircraft, ships, submarines, and strategic
missiles. Chapter 2 examines the extent to which (1) DOD has
policies and organizations in place to manage the sustainment of
operational system software for weapon systems; and (2) DOD and the
military departments track costs to sustain weapon system software.
The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE)
are undertaking an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and
modernize U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, including the nuclear
weapons stockpile; the research and production infrastructure;
delivery systems; and the nuclear command, control, and
communications (NC3) system. Chapter 3 presents observations on the
extent to which the FY 2018 joint report provides accurate and
complete information about nuclear sustainment and modernization
budget estimates and related budget estimating methodologies. The
Department of Defense and NNSA have sought for nearly a decade to
replace the capabilities of the aging W78 nuclear warhead used by
the U.S. Air Force. Chapter 4 describes NNSA's steps in key early
planning areas ... including program management, technology
assessment, and coordination with facilities and capabilities ...
to prepare to restart a program to replace the W78. Responsibility
for U.S. nuclear weapons resides in both the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE). DOD develops, deploys,
and operates the missiles and aircraft that deliver nuclear
warheads. It also generates the military requirements for the
warheads carried on those platforms. Chapter 5 focuses on the
facilities managed by the DOE and its semiautonomous National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The Trump Administration's
Nuclear Posture Review includes plans for the United States to
deploy two new types of nuclear weapons "to enhance the flexibility
and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces." Chapter 6 highlights
that these weapons represent a response to Russia's deployment of a
much larger stockpile of lower-yield nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
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The Age of Hiroshima
(Paperback)
Michael D. Gordin, G.John Ikenberry; Contributions by Campbell Craig, Alex Wellerstein, Sean L. Malloy, …
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A multifaceted portrait of the Hiroshima bombing and its many
legacies On August 6, 1945, in the waning days of World War II, the
United States dropped an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of
Hiroshima. The city's destruction stands as a powerful symbol of
nuclear annihilation, but it has also shaped how we think about war
and peace, the past and the present, and science and ethics. The
Age of Hiroshima traces these complex legacies, exploring how the
meanings of Hiroshima have reverberated across the decades and
around the world. Michael D. Gordin and G. John Ikenberry bring
together leading scholars from disciplines ranging from
international relations and political theory to cultural history
and science and technology studies, who together provide new
perspectives on Hiroshima as both a historical event and a cultural
phenomenon. As an event, Hiroshima emerges in the flow of decisions
and hard choices surrounding the bombing and its aftermath. As a
phenomenon, it marked a revolution in science, politics, and the
human imagination-the end of one age and the dawn of another. The
Age of Hiroshima reveals how the bombing of Hiroshima gave rise to
new conceptions of our world and its precarious interconnectedness,
and how we continue to live in its dangerous shadow today.
This book investigates the European involvement in managing the
nuclear dispute with Iran, shedding new light on EU foreign
policy-making. The author focuses on the peculiar format through
which the EU managed Iran's nuclear issue: a 'lead group'
consisting of France, Germany and the UK and the High
Representative for EU foreign policy (E3/EU). The experience of the
E3/EU lends credibility to the claim that lead groups give EU
foreign policy direction and substance. The E3/EU set up a
negotiating framework that worked as a de-escalating tool, a
catalyst for Security Council unity and a forum for crisis
management. They inflicted pain on Iran by adopting a comprehensive
sanctions regime, but did so only having secured US commitment to a
diplomatic solution. Once the deal was reached, they defended it
vigorously. The E3/EU may have been supporting actors, but their
achievements were real.
Despite recent attempts at 'negotiation', the attitudes of both Kim
Jong-un's regime and the West seem unchanged. North Korea is still
shrouded in mystery, and there are no clear plans for the future...
Can we trust either side to bring about peace? And if so, how? This
provocative insider's account blasts apart the myths which paint
North Korea as a rogue state run by a mad leader. Informed by
extraordinary access to the country's leadership, Glyn Ford
investigates the regime from the inside, providing game-changing
insights, which Trump and his administration have failed to do.
Acknowledging that North Korea is a deeply flawed and repressive
state, he nonetheless shows that sections of the leadership are
desperate to modernise and end their isolation. With chapters on
recent developments including the Trump / Kim summit, Ford supports
a dialogue between East and West, whilst also criticising Trump's
facile attempts. Talking to North Korea provides a road map for
averting a war in North East Asia that would threaten the lives of
millions.
This volume is a collection of contributions by world-leading
experts in the nuclear field who participated in the educational
activities of the International School on Disarmament and Research
on Conflicts (ISODARCO). It features some of most prominent
scholars and practitioners who contributed in fundamental ways to
shaping policies, strategies, theories, scholarly studies, and
debates in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. On the
occasion of ISODARCO's 50th anniversary this book revisits a
selection of contributions that capture the pressing issues during
the five decades of continuous engagement in disarmament and
non-proliferation education.
This book seeks to elucidate the decisions of states that have
chosen to acquire nuclear arms or inherited nuclear arsenals, and
have either disarmed or elected to retain their warheads. It
examines nuclear arms policy via an interconnected framework
involving the eclectic use of national security based realism,
economic interdependence liberalism, and nuclear weapons norms or
morality based constructivism. Through the various chapters
examining the nuclear munitions decisions of South Africa, Ukraine
and North Korea, a case is built that a state's leadership decides
whether to keep or give up "the Bomb" based on interlinked
security, economic and norms governed motivations. Thereafter,
frameworks evaluating the likelihood of nuclear proliferation and
accessing the feasibility of disarmament are then applied to North
Korea and used to examine recent Iranian nuclear negotiability.
This book is an invaluable resource for international relations and
security studies scholars, WMD analysts and post graduate or
undergraduate candidates focusing on nuclear arms politics related
courses
This book applies the cutting-edge socio-cultural model Cultural
Topography Analytic Framework (CTAF) pioneered in the authors'
earlier volume Strategic Culture and Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Culturally Based Insights into Comparative National Security
Policymaking (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) with an eye towards
isolating those vectors of nuclear decision-making on which the US
might exert influence within a foreign state. The case studies
included in this volume tackle a number of the nuclear
challenges-termed "nuclear thresholds"-likely to be faced by the US
and identify the most promising points of leverage available to
American policymakers in ameliorating a wide range of
over-the-horizon nuclear challenges. Because near and medium-term
nuclear thresholds are likely to involve both allies and
adversaries simultaneously, meaning that US response will require
strategies tailored to both the perception of threat experienced by
the actors in question, the value the actors place on their
relationship with the US, and the domestic context driving
decision-making. This volume offers a nuanced look at each actor's
identity, national norms, values, and perceptual lens in order to
offer culturally-focused insights into behavior and intentions.
This book addresses the under-researched discourse of the evolution
of Chinese nuclear posture, and in particular, explains the absence
from this evolution of a coherent and well-defined operational
doctrine. Using a neoclassical realist framework, the book explains
why China, after having launched a crash programme in the mid-1950s
to develop a nuclear deterrent, did not debate a clear operational
doctrine with respect to targeting and employment until the
mid-1980s.
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