'War is the most important thing in the world', writes Martin van Creveld, one of the world's best-known experts on military history and strategy. The survival of every country, government, and individual is ultimately dependent on war - or the ability to wage it in self-defence. That is why, though it may come but once in a hundred years, it must be prepared for every day. When it is too late-when the bodies lie stiff and people weep over them-those in charge have failed in their duty. Nevertheless, in spite of the centrality of war to human history and culture, there has for long been no modern attempt to provide a replacement for the classics on war and strategy, Sun Tzu's The Art of War, dating from the 5th or 6th century BC, and Carl von Clausewitz's On War, written in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. What is needed is a modern, comprehensive, easy to read and understand theory of war for the 21st century that could serve as a replacement for these classic texts. The purpose of the present book is to provide just such a theory.

Helps us to better understand the dangers of U.S. nuclear strategy, and reminds us that it is a strategy we can resist.

Waging Peace is a re-examination of President Eisenhower's 'New Look' programme of national security, the foundation for American Cold War policy for the next thirty years. In a turbulent and dangerous stage of East-West relations, with an untested and erratic Soviet leadership and a changing world environment, Eisenhower managed a succession of crises and set a course which ultimately preserved both security and peace. Only now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, can his achievement be fully appreciated.

Did the Soviet Union want world revolution? Why did the USSR send missiles to Cuba? What made the Cold War last as long as it did? Drawing on new sources and scholarship, John Lewis Gaddis presents a comprehensive comparative history of the conflict from its origins, to its most dangerous moment, the Cuban Missile Crisis. A fresh, thought-provoking and powerfully argued reassessment of the Cold War by one of its most distinguished historians, We Know Now will set the agenda for debates on this subject for years to come.

Based on a detailed analysis of archives and high level interviews this book looks at the role of beliefs, culture and identity in the making of British nuclear policy from 1945 through to the present day. This book also examines Britain's nuclear experience by moving away from traditional interpretations of why states develop and maintain nuclear weapons by adopting a more contemporary approach to political theory. Traditional mainstream explanations tend to stress the importance of factors such as the 'maximization of power', the pursuit of 'national security interests' and the role of 'structure' in a largely anarchic international system. This book does not dismiss these approaches, but argues that British experience suggests that focusing on 'beliefs', 'culture' and 'identity', provides a more useful insight and distinctive interpretation into the process of British nuclear decision making than the more traditional approaches.

Most Americans believe that the Second World War ended because the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan forced it to surrender. Five Days in August boldly presents a different interpretation: that the military did not clearly understand the atomic bomb's revolutionary strategic potential, that the Allies were almost as stunned by the surrender as the Japanese were by the attack, and that not only had experts planned and fully anticipated the need for a third bomb, they were skeptical about whether the atomic bomb would work at all. With these ideas, Michael Gordin reorients the historical and contemporary conversation about the A-bomb and World War II. Five Days in August explores these and countless other legacies of the atomic bomb in a glaring new light. Daring and iconoclastic, it will result in far-reaching discussions about the significance of the A-bomb, about World War II, and about the moral issues they have spawned.

This book claims that the need for new, substantive thinking about nuclear weapons presents a significant opportunity to reassess and broaden our view of realism in politics. What, today, is a realist response to nuclear weapons? This book is animated by the idea that contemporary attempts to confront the challenge of nuclear weapons and other global security problems of the modern age would benefit from richer historical foundations. To this end, the book revisits, re-articulates and reclaims a particular type of sophisticated, yet largely overlooked responses to the thermonuclear revolution. The aim is to widen the horizon of current conversations on nuclear weapons as well as to spur caution and reflection about the governance of global security more broadly. Foreshadowing the 'critical turn' in IR theory, nuclear realism provided a critique of dominant approaches to war and military force in the face of large-scale destruction, reflections on the meaning and implications of 'national security', and attention to the far-reaching encroachments that nuclear state apparatuses and the increasing militarization of social life involved.Moreover, it also included a revised conception of the relationship between liberty and political authority, appreciated environmental problems within a global ecological vision, and dissected the role of technology in improving, structuring, restricting and endangering human life. This work provokes a discussion that will be instructive and rewarding at a time when nuclear weapons and other planetary security problems demand attention and political action.

Command and Control interweaves the minute-by-minute story of an accident at a missile silo in rural Arkansas, where a single crew struggled to prevent the explosion of the most powerful nuclear warhead ever built by the United States, with a historical narrative that spans more than fifty years. It depicts the urgent effort to ensure that nuclear weapons can't be stolen, sabotaged, used without permission, or detonated inadvertently. Schlosser also looks at the Cold War from a new perspective, offering history from the ground up, telling the stories of bomber pilots, missile commanders, maintenance crews, and other ordinary servicemen who risked their lives to avert a nuclear holocaust. Drawing on recently declassified documents and interviews with men who designed and routinely handled nuclear weapons, Command and Control takes readers into a terrifying but fascinating world that, until now, has been largely hidden from view.

The US decision to drop an atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 remains one of the most controversial events of the twentieth century. However, the controversy over the rights and wrongs of dropping the bomb has tended to obscure a number of fundamental and sobering truths about the development of this fearsome weapon. The principle of killing thousands of enemy civilians from the air was already well established by 1945 and had been practised on numerous occasions by both sides during the Second World War. Moreover, the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was conceived and built by an international community of scientists, not just by the Americans. Other nations (including Japan and Germany) were also developing atomic bombs in the first half of the 1940s, albeit hapharzardly. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine any combatant nation foregoing the use of the bomb during the war had it been able to obtain one. The international team of scientists organized by the Americans just got there first. As this fascinating new history shows, the bomb dropped by a US pilot that hot August morning in 1945 was in many ways the world's offspring, in both a technological and a moral sense. And it was the world that would have to face its consequences, strategically, diplomatically, and culturally, in the years ahead.

On 30 October 1961, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR/Soviet Union) conducted a live test of the most powerful nuclear weapon ever created. Codenamed 'Ivan', and known in the West as the 'Tsar Bomba', the RDS-202 hydrogen bomb was detonated at the Sukhoy Nos cape of Severny Island, Novaya Zemla archipelago, in the Barents Sea. The Tsar Bomba unleashed about 58 megatons of TNT, creating a 8-kilometre/5-mile-wide fireball and then a mushroom that peaked at an altitude of 95 kilometres (59 miles). The shockwave created by the RDS-202 eradicated a village 55 kilometres (34 miles) from ground zero, caused widespread damage to nature to a radius of dozens of kilometres further away, and created a heat wave felt as far as 270 kilometres (170 miles) distant. And still, this was just one of 45 tests of nuclear weapons conducted in the USSR in October 1961 alone. Between 1949 and 1962, the Soviets set off 214 nuclear bombs in the open air. Dozens of these were released from aircraft operated by specialised test units. Equipped with the full range of bombers - from the Tupolev Tu-4, Tupolev Tu-16, to the gigantic Tu-95 - the units in question were staffed by men colloquially known as the 'deaf-and-dumb': people sworn to utmost secrecy, living and serving in isolation from the rest of the world. Frequently operating at the edge of the envelope of their specially modified machines while test-releasing weapons with unimaginable destructive potential, several of them only narrowly avoided catastrophe. Richly illustrated with authentic photographs and custom-drawn colour profiles, Dropping the Big Ones is the story of the aircrews involved and their aircraft, all of which were carefully hidden not only by the Iron Curtain, but by a thick veil of secrecy for more than half a century.

The immense impact of technology on both warfare and security has been clearly demonstrated and has heightened concerns relating to the proliferation of military technology and misuse by irresponsible actors. Technology control regimes are a vital component of national security strategies. This report presents evidence of the increasing relevance of technology in the 21st century and a brief review of the control regimes, as well as the perspectives of progressive developing nations. It highlights the need for a new approach to the management of technology and security issues. Meeting future challenges to arms control and non-proliferation will require wider cooperation among nations in a rapidly changing and interdependent world in which some of the new technologies will further accentuate security sensitivities. The report advocates the abandonment of cold war mindsets and makes a case for a broader cooperative approach to the management of technology controls. International cooperation will be vital for achieving the objectives of non-proliferation, disarmament and global socio-economic progress and will facilitate steps towards the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and the dangers posed by terrorism, thereby fostering enhanced international peace and stability.

This book of selections from the distinguished journal International Security speaks to the most important question of our age: the deterrence of nuclear war. Originally published in 1985. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

This work stresses the importance, in making any choice of strategies-including the decision to use or refrain from using nuclear weapons-of gauging the intent behind the opponent's military moves. Dr. Brodie also suggests that the use or threat of use of tactical nuclear weapons may lead to de-escalation, that is, may check rather than promote the expansion of hostilities. The author applies his ideas about escalation to several imagined situations, examining them in relation to experiences in Europe, in the second Cuba crisis, and in Asia. Originally published in 1966. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

Few aspects of American military history have been as vigorously debated as Harry Truman's decision to use atomic bombs against Japan. In this carefully crafted volume, Michael Kort describes the wartime circumstances and thinking that form the context for the decision to use these weapons, surveys the major debates related to that decision, and provides a comprehensive collection of key primary source documents that illuminate the behavior of the United States and Japan during the closing days of World War II.

Kort opens with a summary of the debate over Hiroshima as it has evolved since 1945. He then provides an historical overview of the events in question, beginning with the decision and program to build the atomic bomb. Detailing the sequence of events leading to Japan's surrender, he revisits the decisive battles of the Pacific War and the motivations of American and Japanese leaders. Finally, Kort examines ten key issues in the discussion of Hiroshima and guides readers to relevant primary source documents, scholarly books, and articles.

These primary source documents comprise the largest part of this volume. They are organized into seven categories: American civilian documents; American military documents; MAGIC diplomatic summaries; Japanese government and military documents and diary entries; Japanese surrender documents; the United States Strategic Bombing Survey Summary Report and Interrogations of Japanese Officials; and Statements of Japanese Officials on World War II compiled by the Military Intelligence Section of the United States Army.

Kort's clear, insightful narrative examines conflicting points of view on numerous issues but remains impartial throughout.Above all, by providing a broad range of documents, including translations of Japanese language materials, Kort makes it possible for readers to render informed and independent judgments in the ongoing debate.

Peace, Security, and Conflict Prevention: SIPRI-UNESCO Handbook is a comprehensive, concise volume on security and conflict prevention in the post-cold war period 1992-96. It is drawn from the results of SIPRI's research and includes chapters on major armed conflicts; armed conflict prevention, management and resolution; world military expenditure, arms production and the arms trade; nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; the arms control and agreements currently in force and under negotiation; the United Nations Organization; and special studies of regional and subregional security in Europe and Asia. A detailed chronology lists the major events of 1992-96 related to peace, security, and conflict prevention. The book also includes a useful glossary of terms and acronyms used in the security literature and gives the membership of international organizations concerned with security issues.

This book examines the likely implications of the CTB for nuclear modernization programmes and the non-proliferation regime. The key considerations affecting decisions by states to join the CTB are reviewed and the likely impact of these decisions on the treaty's non-proliferation goals is assessed.

The 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven the most complicated and controversial of all arms control treaties, both in principle and in practice. Statements of nuclear-weapon States from the Cold War to the present, led by the United States, show a disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty, and an unwarranted underprioritization of the civilian energy development and disarmament pillars of the treaty. This book argues that the way in which nuclear-weapon States have interpreted the Treaty has laid the legal foundation for a number of policies related to trade in civilian nuclear energy technologies and nuclear weapons disarmament. These policies circumscribe the rights of non-nuclear-weapon States under Article IV of the Treaty by imposing conditions on the supply of civilian nuclear technologies. They also provide for the renewal and maintaintenance, and in some cases further development of the nuclear weapons arsenals of nuclear-weapon States. The book provides a legal analysis of this trend in treaty interpretation by nuclear-weapon States and the policies for which it has provided legal justification. It argues, through a close and systematic examination of the Treaty by reference to the rules of treaty interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that this disproportionate prioritization of the non-proliferation pillar of the Treaty leads to erroneous legal interpretations of the Treaty, prejudicing the legitimate legal interests of non-nuclear-weapon States.

This book examines the question: is the elimination of nuclear weapons politically feasible and technically practical? With the end of the cold war, a re-thinking of the nuclear foundations of international security is imperative. There are no compelling reasons to perpetuate a cold war-era nuclear security approach. Neither is the world ready to abolish nuclear weapons by agreement. What it is ready for, however, is a radical reappraisal of conventional strategic and disarmament wisdom. The book's explicit focus on non-nuclear security takes issues with prevailing pro- and anti-nuclear views. The study challenges the assumptions of the strategic community that there is no alternative to nuclear security in an anarchic international system and of the advocates of radical nuclear disarmament who propose solutions at the expense of security. Instead, the contributors argue that nuclear weapons abolition should be seen as a long-term process, pursued on a broad political front, aimed at a steady transformation of international politics that encourages security co-operation between states. Individual chapters of the book address the major conceptual, technical, and economic issues in t

SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) is an independent institute for scientific research, which aims to further an understanding of the conditions for peaceful solutions to international conflicts and for a stable peace. Over the past 20 years, SIPRI has concentrated on problems of armaments, disarmaments, and arms regulation. This study analyzes the evolution of the current security order and the role of nuclear weapons in it. It investigates how and why countries have responded to the existence of nuclear weapons as they have. It traces the development of security thinking in the nuclear age through case studies of countries that have nuclear weapons, those that do not, those on the nuclear threshold and those whose security is believed to benefit from the nuclear arsenals of other countries. The framework of analysis is comparative, and the study provides insight into shared and different appreciations of the impact nuclear weapons have had upon states' understanding of national and international security. This book offers a comprehensive reassessment of the concept of security with nuclear weapons that goes beyond traditional East-West analyses of the nuclea

In 2017, North Korea shocked the world: test-flying a missile capable of reaching the US, exploding the most powerful nuclear device tested anywhere in a quarter-century, and declaring its nuclear deterrent complete. Today, Kim Jong Un's growing nuclear stockpile represents a grave threat to international security. But this programme means more to him than world glory. State propaganda calls it the 'treasured sword': Kim is determined to keep ruling, and he sees his nukes as the key to regime survival. Kim Jong Un and the Bomb explores the history of North Korea's nuclear weapons development, its present power, and the prospects of containing Kim's arsenal. This book confronts us with a nuclear-armed North Korea that is not going anywhere, and reveals what this means for the US, South Korea and the world. Ankit Panda is an award-winning writer and international security expert. He is Adjunct Senior Fellow in the Defense Posture Project at the Federation of American Scientists, and a senior editor at The Diplomat. He lives in New York.

Since the Second World War five navies are known to have acquired nuclear weapons, and naval forces and activities around the world have become increasingly important and dangerous. However, there has been no serious consideration of naval arms control for more than forty years. SIPRI gathered together a group of experts from eight nations to consider the problems of naval forces and the possibilities for arms control. This book is a product of that conference, and it presents for the first time a broad and detailed assessment of the dangers of the naval arms race, problems with arms control, possible approaches, confidence-building measures, and verification technologies.

With sweeping changes in the Soviet Union and East Europe having shaken core assumptions of U.S. defense policy, it is time to reassess basic questions of American nuclear strategy and force requirements. In a comprehensive analysis of these issues, Charles Glaser argues that even before the recent easing of tension with the Soviet Union, the United States should have revised its nuclear strategy, rejecting deterrent threats that require the ability to destroy Soviet nuclear forces and forgoing entirely efforts to limit damage if all-out nuclear war occurs. Changes in the Soviet Union, suggests Glaser, may be best viewed as creating an opportunity to make revisions that are more than twenty years overdue. Glaser's provocative work is organized in three parts. "The Questions behind the Questions" evaluates the basic factual and theoretical disputes that underlie disagreements about U.S. nuclear weapons policy. "Alternative Nuclear Worlds" compares "mutual assured destruction capabilities" (MAD)--a world in which both superpowers' societies are highly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation--to the basic alternatives: mutual perfect defenses, U.S. superiority, and nuclear disarmament. Would any basic alternatives be preferable to MAD? Drawing on the earlier sections of the book, "Decisions in MAD" addresses key choices facing American decision makers. Originally published in 1990. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

October 1962, The Cuban Missile Crisis: the confrontation that brought the world closer to nuclear catastrophe than ever before or since. Both John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev were determined to avoid nuclear war, but events could easily have spiraled out of control with cataclysmic results. Drawing on an extensive body of research, including primary sources released only in the last few years, this work places the crisis in a broader international and chronological context than previously possible. Discover how America was responsible for causing the conflict and Cuba's role as an important actor rather than a superpower pawn.