The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the principal legal barrier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the past forty-five years. It promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and insures, through the application of safeguards inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that those technologies are not being diverted toward the production of nuclear weapons. It is also the only multinational treaty that obligates the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) to pursue nuclear disarmament measures.Though there have been many challenges over the years, most would agree that the treaty has largely been successful. However, many are concerned about the continued viability of the NPT. The perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the interest by some countries to consider a weapons program while party to the treaty, and the funding and staffing issues at the IAEA, are all putting considerable strain on the treaty. This manuscript explores those issues and offers some possible solutions to ensure that the NPT will survive effectively for many years to come.

Strategy in the Missile Age first reviews the development of modern military strategy to World War II, giving the reader a reference point for the radical rethinking that follows, as Dr. Brodie considers the problems of the Strategic Air Command, of civil defense, of limited war, of counterforce or pre-emptive strategies, of city-busting, of missile bases in Europe, and so on. The book, unlike so many on modern military affairs, does not present a program or defend a policy, nor is it a brief for any one of the armed services. It is a balanced analysis of the requirements of strength for the 1960's, including especially the military posture necessary to prevent war. A unique feature is the discussion of the problem of the cost of preparedness in relation to the requirements of the national economy, so often neglected by other military thinkers. Originally published in 1959. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905.

"The most likely site for a nuclear war is the Indian subcontinent, but we have little understanding of India's nuclear program. This will change with George Perkovich's fascinating and important study. It is informed, free from bias, and a great read as well."--Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University

"George Perkovich has written a comprehensive and thoughtful book on one of the most troubling security problems of the day--the introduction of nuclear weapons to the already dangerous confrontation between India and Pakistan." --William J. Perry, Professor, Stanford University, Former US Secretary of Defense

"George Perkovich's India's Nuclear Bomb is an authoritative account in Indian decision-making. I have found no other statement as comprehensive and persuasive. It provides unique insights into Indian politics and is an invaluable contribution to American thinking about nonproliferation." --Frank G. Wisner, U.S. Ambassador to India, 1994-1997

"With a great deal of empathy and understanding of the Indian psyche, George Perkovich leads us through contradictory perceptions of events to give us a sense of the evolution of nuclear decision making in India. What emerges is a highly nuanced and sensitive narration of the complex interaction between domestic and external factors that led to the nuclear tests of May, 1998 and the shattering of a number of Indian and international myths about nuclear weapons and their role in global politics." --K. Subrahmanyam, Consulting Editor The Times of India and The Economic Times, Chairman, Indian National Security Advisory Board

"George Perkovich's book is one I wish I had written. India'sNuclear Bomb appears at a critical moment in global nuclear history, and it will have an important impact on the current policy debate in the United States, India, and Pakistan, as well as on the future histories of Indian politics and international security policy." --Stephen Cohen, Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC

Four decades have passed since India conducted its first nuclear test. Since then the world has undergone a transition, both in terms of power dynamics and military warfare. The emergence of New Nuclear and Threshold states has transformed the traditional military warfare, making it more asymmetric. Though the concept of nuclear deterrence in the American strategic thought has diminished, but the Asian countries still consider nuclear weapons as an important strategy in combating conventional weaknesses. This altered strategic space has created problems in the civilian and the military domains. The emergence of economically strong China aiming for military modernization, to achieve global reach through precision missiles, is making Asia edgy. A nuclear Pakistan which is constantly increasing its nuclear stockpile is creating stability-instability paradoxes in Asia. India which is also emerging as a powerful state needs to approach this dynamic shift in a holistic manner. A strategic churning has begun in Asia and whether this will be in India's favour depends on the strategic choices that India adopts.China has revolutionized its Second Artillery through a process of "Informationalisation and Modernisation" and is diversifying the military technology which is having a cascading effect in Asia. Pakistan through its nuclear policy of "First Use", its alleged use of "Tactical Nuclear Weapons" is making South Asia vulnerable to nuclear terrorism. Under such conditions are there any gaps between India's nuclear doctrine and its force structure? Can India's nuclear strategy counter China? Is India capable of countering a Sino-Pak nexus? These are a few questions along with others which this book will try to unravel.

Turkey, with a robust modern economy and growing energy needs, is pursuing a switch to nuclear power. But that shift is occurring in an environment fraught with security challenges: Turkey borders Iraq, Syria, and Iran-all states with nuclear or WMD ambitions or capabilities. As a NATO member, Turkey also hosts U.S. nuclear bombs on its territory, although some question the durability of this relationship. This dynamic has naturally led to speculation that Turkish leaders might someday consider moving beyond a civilian course to develop nuclear weapons. Yet there has been remarkably little informed analysis and debate on Turkey's nuclear future, either within the country or in broader international society. This volume explores the current status and trajectory of Turkey's nuclear program, adding historical perspective, analytical rigor, and strategic insight.

Four decades have passed since India conducted its first nuclear test. Since then the world has undergone a transition, both in terms of power dynamics and military warfare. The emergence of New Nuclear and Threshold states has transformed the traditional military warfare, making it more asymmetric. Though the concept of nuclear deterrence in the American strategic thought has diminished, but the Asian countries still consider nuclear weapons as an important strategy in combating conventional weaknesses. This altered strategic space has created problems in the civilian and the military domains. The emergence of economically strong China aiming for military modernization, to achieve global reach through precision missiles, is making Asia edgy. A nuclear Pakistan which is constantly increasing its nuclear stockpile is creating stability-instability paradoxes in Asia. India which is also emerging as a powerful state needs to approach this dynamic shift in a holistic manner. A strategic churning has begun in Asia and whether this will be in India's favour depends on the strategic choices that India adopts. China has revolutionized its Second Artillery through a process of Informationalization and Modernisation" and is diversifying the military technology which is having a cascading effect in Asia. Pakistan through its nuclear policy of First Use", its alleged use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons" is making South Asia vulnerable to nuclear terrorism. Under such conditions are there any gaps between India's nuclear doctrine and its force structure? Can India's nuclear strategy counter China? Is India capable of countering a Sino-Pak nexus? These are a few questions along with others which this book will try to unravel.

In their initial effort to end the Vietnam War, Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger attempted to lever concessions from Hanoi at the negotiating table with military force and coercive diplomacy. They were not seeking military victory, which they did not believe was feasible. Instead, they backed up their diplomacy toward North Vietnam and the Soviet Union with the Madman Theory of threatening excessive force, which included the specter of nuclear force. They began with verbal threats then bombed North Vietnamese and Viet Cong base areas in Cambodia, signaling that there was more to come. As the bombing expanded, they launched a previously unknown mining ruse against Haiphong, stepped-up their warnings to Hanoi and Moscow, and initiated planning for a massive shock-and-awe military operation referred to within the White House inner circle as DUCK HOOK. Beyond the mining of North Vietnamese ports and selective bombing in and around Hanoi, the initial DUCK HOOK concept included proposals for "tactical" nuclear strikes against logistics targets and U.S. and South Vietnamese ground incursions into the North. In early October 1969, however, Nixon aborted planning for the long-contemplated operation. He had been influenced by Hanoi's defiance in the face of his dire threats and concerned about U.S. public reaction, antiwar protests, and internal administration dissent. In place of DUCK HOOK, Nixon and Kissinger launched a secret global nuclear alert in hopes that it would lend credibility to their prior warnings and perhaps even persuade Moscow to put pressure on Hanoi. It was to be a "special reminder" of how far President Nixon might go. The risky gambit failed to move the Soviets, but it marked a turning point in the administration's strategy for exiting Vietnam. Nixon and Kissinger became increasingly resigned to a "long-route" policy of providing Saigon with a "decent chance" of survival for a "decent interval" after a negotiated settlement and U.S. forces left Indochina. Burr and Kimball draw upon extensive research in participant interviews and declassified documents to offer a history that holds important lessons for the present and future about the risks and uncertainties of nuclear threat making.

From 2005 to 2008, the United States and India negotiated a pathbreaking nuclear agreement that recognised India's nuclear status and lifted longstanding embargoes on civilian nuclear cooperation with India. This book offers the most comprehensive account of the diplomacy and domestic politics behind this nuclear agreement. Domestic politics considerably impeded - and may have entirely prevented - US nuclear accommodation with India; when domestic obstacles were overcome, US India negotiations advanced; and even after negotiations advanced, domestic factors placed conditions on and affected the scope of US India nuclear cooperation. Such a study provides new insights into this major event in international politics, and it offers a valuable framework for analysing additional US strategic and nuclear dialogues with India and with other countries."

A great power's use of its military forces may be rendered ineffective or even counterproductive when there are no clear internationally recognizable limits on this use of force. Professor Myerson derives this conclusion from the basic observation that our ability to influence potential rivals depends on a balanced mix of threats and promises. Potential adversaries should believe that aggression will be punished, but such threats will be useless unless they also believe our promises that good behavior will be better rewarded. A reputation for resolve makes threats credible, but a great power also needs a reputation for restraint, to make the promises credible as well. Thus, international restraints on a nation's use of military force may actually increase the effective influence of its military strength.

Dekades lank het die wereld gegis oor Suid-Afrika en Die Bom. Die land het ses kernbomme in die geheim ontwikkel, maar hulle self vernietig. Geen ander land ter wereld het dit nog ooit gedoen nie. Hierdie boek is vir wetenskaplikes en leke, en lees soos 'n spanningsverhaal. Dit is die volledigste opgaaf van Suid-Afrika se kernwapenvermoe tot dusver, en geskryf deur 'n kernfisikus wat sedert 1975 direk by die proses betrokke was. Saam met sy dogter Lydia von Wielligh-Steyn deel dr. Nic von Wielligh 'n fassinerende verhaal oor die atoommonster en hoe hy getem is.

The Bush Administration conducted a review of U.S. nuclear weapons force posture during its first year in office. Although the review sought to adjust U.S. nuclear posture to address changes in the international security environment at the start of the new century, it continued many of the policies and programs that had been a part of the U.S. nuclear posture during the previous decade and during the Cold War. This report, which will be updated as needed, provides an overview of the U.S. nuclear posture to highlight areas of change and areas of continuity.

March 7, 1968: Several hundred miles northwest of Hawaii, the nuclear-armed K-129 surfaces and then sinks; all of its crewmen and officers perish at sea. Who was commanding the rogue Russian sub? What was its target? How did it infiltrate American waters undetected? Navy veteran Kenneth Sewell, drawing from newly declassified documents and extensive confidential interviews, exposes the stunning truth behind an operation calculated to provoke war between the U.S. and China -- a nightmare scenario averted by only seconds. In full, authoritative detail, "Red Star Rogue" illuminates this history-shaping event -- and rings with chilling relevance in light of today's terrorist threat.

""Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons" is accessible, short and breathless. It has the tone of a TED talk: an avid speaker bursting with one big idea and eighteen minutes to hold your attention." --"New York Times"
Nuclear war would be an apocalypse. Nuclear deterrence is effective in a crisis. Nuclear weapons shock and awe opponents. Killing civilians causes leaders to back down. The bomb has kept the peace for sixty-five years. These are the things we think we know about nuclear weapons, but it turns out they are myths, myths that nonetheless still shape our nuclear policy.
In "Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons," Ward Wilson blows the lid off the stale debate surrounding nuclear weapons, stripping away emotion and exaggeration. By drawing on new facts and historical research, Wilson methodically shatters each of these myths in turn. His conclusions will surprise you, enlighten you, and spur debates about whether nuclear weapons have any power and importance in the twenty-first century.

The cold war ended more than two decades ago, and with its end came a reduction in the threat of nuclear weapons - a luxury that we can no longer indulge.

It's not just the threat of Iran getting the bomb or North Korea doing something rash; the whole complexion of global power politics is changing because of the re-emergence of nuclear weapons as a vital element of statecraft and power politics. In short, we have entered the second nuclear age.

In this provocative and agenda-setting book, Paul Bracken of Yale University argues that we need to pay renewed attention to nuclear weapons and how their presence will transform the way crises develop and escalate. He draws on his years of experience analyzing defense strategy to make the case that the United States needs to start thinking seriously about these issues once again, especially as new countries acquire nuclear capabilities. He walks us through war-game scenarios that are all too realistic, to show how nuclear weapons are changing the calculus of power politics, and he offers an incisive tour of the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia to underscore how the United States must not allow itself to be unprepared for managing such crises.

Frank in its tone and farsighted in its analysis, The Second Nuclear Age is the essential guide to the new rules of international politics.

A nuclear bomb is buried in eastern North Carolina. It remains deep underground inside a limestone aquifer, beneath a 1961 B-52 crash site. The warhead is now being secretly recovered for the King of Saudi Arabia. The leader of the Sunni Muslim world has decided to by-pass his weakened American allies. He has created his own plan to address the nuclear ambitions of the Shiite Mullahs in Iran. Khalid has retained a covert American paramilitary group to use modern tunnel boring technology to retrieve the enriched uranium. They will have it processed into three smaller weapons and deliver them to Jeddah in time for the great December Hajj to Mecca. Khalid knows that if the Iranians succeed in developing nuclear weapons they will not only set off a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, but more importantly to the Saudi King, they will disrupt 'The Project, ' his thirty-year-old plan for peaceful Islamic settlement of Europe and America. But even the best laid schemes of men and kings can sometimes end in chaos, this time leaving millions of Muslims, Christians and Jews on the verge of annihilation. Taken from front-page headlines, The Project is a story of the grave dangers of the spread of nuclear technology, a royal scheme gone terribly wrong, and the redemption of a small group of American terrorists trying to save three major cities in the Middle East.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty would ban all nuclear explosions. It was opened for signature in 1996. As of March 2008, 178 nations had signed it and 144 had ratified. To enter into force, 44 specified nations must ratify it; 35 have done so. The Senate rejected the treaty in 1999; the Bush Administration opposes it. The United States has observed a nuclear test moratorium since 1992. This book discusses elements, arguments and analysis on the comprehensive nuclear-test ban treaty.

With the signing in 1996 of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, interest has grown in forensic seismology: the application of seismology to nuclear test ban verification. This book, based on over 50 years of experience in forensic seismology research, charts the development of methods of seismic data analysis. Topics covered include: the estimation of seismic magnitudes, travel-time tables and epicentres; seismic signal processing; and the use of seismometer arrays. Fully illustrated with seismograms from explosions and earthquakes, the book demonstrates methods and problems of visual analysis. Each chapter provides exercises to help the reader familiarise themselves with practical issues in the field of forensic seismology, and figures and solutions to exercises are also available online. The book is a key reference work for academic researchers and specialists in the area of forensic seismology and Earth structure, and will also be valuable to postgraduates in seismology and solid earth geophysics.

This study examines why Saddam Hussein pursued nuclear weapons and, as a basic aspect of that question, how he might have employed that capability had he acquired it, whether for deterrence, warfighting, or something else. As the key decision maker in Iraq, Saddam's own thinking was central. His perception of regional threats, primarily from Iran and Israel, were a prime motivator. In addition, Saddam viewed acquiring nuclear weapons as a potent vehicle to help legitimize his regime and burnish his personal image as leader both at home and in the Arab World, as a modernizer and defender of national interests. A better understanding of the Iraqi case can also clarify the enduring issues related to how regional leaders may view nuclear weapons in this world of looming proliferation.