Who were the three men the American and Soviet superpowers exchanged at Berlin's Glienicke Bridge and Checkpoint Charlie in the first and most legendary prisoner exchange between East and West? "Bridge of Spies" vividly traces their paths to that exchange on February 10, 1962, when their fate helped to define the conflicts and lethal undercurrents of the most dangerous years of the Cold War.
"Bridge of Spies" is the true story of three extraordinary characters - William Fisher, alias Rudolf Abel, a British born KGB agent arrested by the FBI in New York City and jailed as a Soviet superspy for trying to steal America's most precious nuclear secrets; Gary Powers, the American U-2 pilot who was captured when his plane was shot down while flying a reconnaissance mission over the closed cities of central Russia; and Frederic Pryor, a young American graduate student in Berlin mistakenly identified as a spy, arrested and held without charge by the Stasi, East Germany's secret police.
By weaving the three strands of this story together for the first time, Giles Whittell masterfully portrays the intense political tensions and nuclear brinkmanship that brought the United States and Soviet Union so close to a hot war in the early 1960s. He reveals the dramatic lives of men drawn into the nadir of the Cold War by duty and curiosity, and the tragicomedy of errors that eventually induced Khrushchev to send missiles to Castro. Two of his subjects -- the spy and the pilot -- were the original seekers of weapons of mass destruction. The third, an intellectual, fluent in German, unencumbered by dependents, and researching a Ph.D. thesis on the foreign trade system of the Soviet bloc, seemed to the Stasi precisely the sort of person the CIA should have been recruiting. He was not. In over his head in the world capital of spying, he was wrongly charged with espionage and thus came to the Agency's notice by a more roundabout route. The three men were rescued against daunting odds by fate and by their families, and then all but forgotten. Yet they laid bare the pathological mistrust that fueled the arms race for the next 30 years.
Drawing on new interviews conducted in the United States, Europe and Russia with key players in the exchange and the events leading to it, among them Frederic Pryor himself and the man who shot down Gary Powers, "Bridge of Spies "captures a time when the fate of the world really did depend on coded messages on microdots and brave young men in pressure suits. The exchange that frigid day at two of the most sensitive points along the Iron Curtain represented the first step back from where the superpowers had stood since the building of the Berlin Wall the previous summer - on the brink of World War III.

"From the Hardcover edition."

"In the Shadow of the Bomb" narrates how two charismatic, exceptionally talented physicists--J. Robert Oppenheimer and Hans A. Bethe--came to terms with the nuclear weapons they helped to create. In 1945, the United States dropped the bomb, and physicists were forced to contemplate disquieting questions about their roles and responsibilities. When the Cold War followed, they were confronted with political demands for their loyalty and McCarthyism's threats to academic freedom. By examining how Oppenheimer and Bethe--two men with similar backgrounds but divergent aspirations and characters--struggled with these moral dilemmas, one of our foremost historians of physics tells the story of modern physics, the development of atomic weapons, and the Cold War.

Oppenheimer and Bethe led parallel lives. Both received liberal educations that emphasized moral as well as intellectual growth. Both were outstanding theoreticians who worked on the atom bomb at Los Alamos. Both advised the government on nuclear issues, and both resisted the development of the hydrogen bomb. Both were, in their youth, sympathetic to liberal causes, and both were later called to defend the United States against Soviet communism and colleagues against anti-Communist crusaders. Finally, both prized scientific community as a salve to the apparent failure of Enlightenment values.

Yet, their responses to the use of the atom bomb, the testing of the hydrogen bomb, and the treachery of domestic politics differed markedly. Bethe, who drew confidence from scientific achievement and integration into the physics community, preserved a deep integrity. By accepting a modest role, he continued to influence policy and contributed to the nuclear test ban treaty of 1963. In contrast, Oppenheimer first embodied a new scientific persona--the scientist who creates knowledge and technology affecting all humanity and boldly addresses their impact--and then could not carry its burden. His desire to retain insider status, combined with his isolation from creative work and collegial scientific community, led him to compromise principles and, ironically, to lose prestige and fall victim to other insiders.

Schweber draws on his vast knowledge of science and its history--in addition to his unique access to the personalities involved--to tell a tale of two men that will enthrall readers interested in science, history, and the lives and minds of great thinkers.

The world is in a second nuclear age in which regional powers play an increasingly prominent role. These states have small nuclear arsenals, often face multiple active conflicts, and sometimes have weak institutions. How do these nuclear states--and potential future ones--manage their nuclear forces and influence international conflict? Examining the reasoning and deterrence consequences of regional power nuclear strategies, this book demonstrates that these strategies matter greatly to international stability and it provides new insights into conflict dynamics across important areas of the world such as the Middle East, East Asia, and South Asia.

Vipin Narang identifies the diversity of regional power nuclear strategies and describes in detail the posture each regional power has adopted over time. Developing a theory for the sources of regional power nuclear strategies, he offers the first systematic explanation of why states choose the postures they do and under what conditions they might shift strategies. Narang then analyzes the effects of these choices on a state's ability to deter conflict. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, he shows that, contrary to a bedrock article of faith in the canon of nuclear deterrence, the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not produce a uniform deterrent effect against opponents. Rather, some postures deter conflict more successfully than others.

"Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era" considers the range of nuclear choices made by regional powers and the critical challenges they pose to modern international security.

This book is a compilation of government reports on weapons of mass destruction. The first chapter is a bill that seeks to ensure the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the structure, authority, and tools it needs to counter the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Chapter 2 discusses the continuation of the national emergency with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Chapter 3 reports on the Department of Homeland Security's organisation to counter weapons of mass destruction. The danger North Korea poses to the world is more than just its rogue nuclear program and ballistic missile brinksmanship as discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 examines (1) DHS programs and activities to prevent and protect against domestic chemical attacks and (2) the extent to which DHS has integrated and coordinated all of its chemical defense programs and activities. Chapter 6 examines (1) information the federal government has about the procurement, distribution, use, and disposition of Agent Orange; (2) DOD and VA efforts to make information about where Agent Orange and its components were tested and stored available; and (3) challenges associated with Agent Orange testing.

DOD spends billions of dollars annually to sustain its weapon systems to support current and future operations. The Air Force and Navy are operating many of their fixed-wing aircraft well beyond their original designed service lives and therefore are confronted with sustainment challenges. Chapter 1 examines the trends in availability and O&S costs for selected Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft since fiscal year 2011, including whether they met availability goals, and assesses the extent that the departments documented sustainment strategies, reviewed sustainment metrics, and implemented plans to improve aircraft availability. Software is integral to the operation and functionality of DOD equipment, platforms, and weapon systems, including tactical and combat vehicles, aircraft, ships, submarines, and strategic missiles. Chapter 2 examines the extent to which (1) DOD has policies and organizations in place to manage the sustainment of operational system software for weapon systems; and (2) DOD and the military departments track costs to sustain weapon system software. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) are undertaking an extensive, multifaceted effort to sustain and modernize U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities, including the nuclear weapons stockpile; the research and production infrastructure; delivery systems; and the nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) system. Chapter 3 presents observations on the extent to which the FY 2018 joint report provides accurate and complete information about nuclear sustainment and modernization budget estimates and related budget estimating methodologies. The Department of Defense and NNSA have sought for nearly a decade to replace the capabilities of the aging W78 nuclear warhead used by the U.S. Air Force. Chapter 4 describes NNSA's steps in key early planning areas ... including program management, technology assessment, and coordination with facilities and capabilities ... to prepare to restart a program to replace the W78. Responsibility for U.S. nuclear weapons resides in both the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE). DOD develops, deploys, and operates the missiles and aircraft that deliver nuclear warheads. It also generates the military requirements for the warheads carried on those platforms. Chapter 5 focuses on the facilities managed by the DOE and its semiautonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The Trump Administration's Nuclear Posture Review includes plans for the United States to deploy two new types of nuclear weapons "to enhance the flexibility and responsiveness of U.S. nuclear forces." Chapter 6 highlights that these weapons represent a response to Russia's deployment of a much larger stockpile of lower-yield nonstrategic nuclear weapons.