The India-Pakistan relationship is complex and choreographed with wars, protracted conflicts and active disputes. Although the presence of nuclear weapons has decreased the probability of an all-out conventional war, the frequency of minor conflicts and crises have increased manifold. India considers nuclear weapons a deterrent against nuclear strikes, whereas Pakistan assumes that these would deter a nuclear as well as a conventional war. The central argument of this book is that another military engagement between India and Pakistan, similar to one in February 2019, exists with varying degrees of probability, thus challenging the efficacy of nuclear deterrence. Until the probabilities of military engagements are minimized, the possibilities of peace and stability in the region would remain elusive. Therefore, the situation asks for scholarly contribution in developing a new paradigm wherein the two nuclear neighbors are made to recognize the need to resolve their disputes instead of just managing them, to avoid recurrence of violent conflicts that can lead to a catastrophic nuclear exchange, no matter how limited it is.

Frustrated by the abrogation of promises by nuclear weapons states to disarm, countries that have foregone nuclear weapons joined forces with key members of civil society in efforts that culminated in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). How did this initiative succeed-in defiance of the major powers - in changing the discourse around nuclear weapons? What roles did the various actors play, and how did the language of the treaty evolve? Answering these questions, Jean Krasno and Elisabeth Szeli provide a deeply researched account of the TPNW campaign, the negotiations, and the ongoing challenges of ratification and implementation.

The mysterious, brutal, and calculating Kim Jong Un has risen to become the unchallenged dictator of a nuclear rogue state. He now possesses weaponry capable of threatening America and its allies, and his actions have already significantly changed global politics. It’s believed that Kim Jong Un is in his thirties, only a few years into what will likely be decades of leadership. He is in the news almost every day, and yet we still know almost nothing about him and how he became the supreme leader of the hermit kingdom.

Former CIA analyst and North Korea expert Jung H. Pak reveals the explosive story of Kim Jong Il’s third son: the spoilt and impetuous child, the mediocre student, the ruthless murderer, the shrewd grand strategist.

This publication provides guidance to Member States for the development, or improvement, of nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of criminal or unauthorized acts with nuclear security implications involving nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. It describes the elements of an effective nuclear security detection architecture which is composed of an integrated set of nuclear security systems and measures, and is based on an appropriate legal and regulatory framework for the implementation of the national detection strategy. The publication is an Implementing Guide within the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and is intended for use by national policy makers, legislative bodies, competent authorities, institutions and individuals involved in the establishment, implementation, maintenance or sustainability of nuclear security systems and measures for the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

If you think you know the full story of Trinity Site, birthplace of the atomic bomb, you don't. Robert Oppenheimer didn't built the bomb, it was hand made by engineers, chemists and young physicists in their twenties and many not yet having earned a degree. The first atomic bomb was originally planned as a backup device, a weapon not then currently achievable. The Trinity Site was bombed several times by US aircraft while one Manhattan Project facility was struck by a Japanese weapon. Many commonly held ""facts"" are actually at best unsubstantiated and here for the first time is a book that speaks of a pivot point in history from the point of view of the men who served in the American desert. Five years of research using original letters, memos and reports, many only recently declassified from those involved bring a fresh perspective on the events now approaching it's 75th anniversary.

This book explains the origin and historical development of North Korean nuclear weapon dated from the aftermath of World War II. The story of North Korea's nuclear program began when the United States dropped atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 which led to Japan's immediate defeat. Surprised by the speed of Japan's surrender, North Korea's founding leader Kim Il-sung vowed to secure nuclear capability to avoid suffering the fate of its eastern neighbor. Based on the author's extensive experience in the academia, government, and intelligence circles, the book traces how the nuclear program has evolved since and explores wide-ranging issues including the positive function of nuclear weapon in Pyongyang's local politics, the history of negotiations between Washington and Pyongyang, the prospects of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula, the diplomatic and military options presented to US President Donald Trump in dealing with the nuclear threat, and the future scenarios of the North Korean regime and the possibilities of a reunified Korea.With the nuclear weapon crisis likely to persist in the foreseeable time, is it feasible for South Korea to achieve reunification in the Korean Peninsula? Will the six-party members like the US, China, Russia and Japan agree with reunification without denuclearization? Can the issues of nuclear weapon and unification be settled simultaneously in the future? The book seeks to address these questions and more.

For every major military invention in human history, there has quite always been a countervailing technology. Nuclear weapons have, however, remained an exception. Ballistic missile defence (BMD) has, in recent years, emerged as a formidable means to defend against nuclear-armed delivery systems though yet to prove their total reliability. What does the advent of BMD mean for the nuclear revolution - will it make nuclear weapons obsolete or in turn lead to a new arms race among great powers? This book is a concise volume that examines these strategic dimensions of missile defences, mainly its impact on deterrence. It promises thematic variety by incorporating a technological survey that explains the evolution of BMD concepts and also includes a case study of Southern Asia that throws light on BMD dynamics in a volatile region. The volume balances new conceptual inquests with policy analysis that will make it useful literature on BMD for academics and policymakers.

The March 11, 2011, Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami sparked a humanitarian disaster in northeastern Japan. They were responsible for more than 15,900 deaths and 2,600 missing persons as well as physical infrastructure damages exceeding $200 billion. The earthquake and tsunami also initiated a severe nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. Three of the six reactors at the plant sustained severe core damage and released hydrogen and radioactive materials. Explosion of the released hydrogen damaged three reactor buildings and impeded onsite emergency response efforts. The accident prompted widespread evacuations of local populations, large economic losses, and the eventual shutdown of all nuclear power plants in Japan. Lessons Learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Accident for Improving Safety and Security of U.S. Nuclear Plants is a study of the Fukushima Daiichi accident. This report examines the causes of the crisis, the performance of safety systems at the plant, and the responses of its operators following the earthquake and tsunami. The report then considers the lessons that can be learned and their implications for U.S. safety and storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste, commercial nuclear reactor safety and security regulations, and design improvements. Lessons Learned makes recommendations to improve plant systems, resources, and operator training to enable effective ad hoc responses to severe accidents. This report's recommendations to incorporate modern risk concepts into safety regulations and improve the nuclear safety culture will help the industry prepare for events that could challenge the design of plant structures and lead to a loss of critical safety functions. In providing a broad-scope, high-level examination of the accident, Lessons Learned is meant to complement earlier evaluations by industry and regulators. This in-depth review will be an essential resource for the nuclear power industry, policy makers, and anyone interested in the state of U.S. preparedness and response in the face of crisis situations. Table of Contents Front Matter Synopsis Summary 1 Introduction 2 Background on Japanese and U.S. Nuclear Plants 3 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami and Impacts on Japanese Nuclear Plants 4 Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident 5 Lessons Learned: Plant Operations and Safety Regulations 6 Lessons Learned: Offsite Emergency Management 7 Lessons Learned: Nuclear Safety Culture References Appendix A: Biographical Sketches of Committee, Technical Advisor, and Staff Appendix B: Presentations, Breakout Sessions, and Visits Appendix C: Detailed Accident Time Line Appendix D: Operation and Support Organizations Appendix E: Recommendations from Other Organizations Appendix F: Regulator and Industry Actions in the United States Appendix G: Hydrogen Control in Severe Accidents Appendix H: Nuclear Plant Emergency Procedures and Guidelines Appendix I: Probabilistic Risk Assessment Appendix J: Human Reliability Analysis Appendix K: Tsunami Hazards in the Atlantic Ocean Basin Appendix L: Factoring the Costs of Severe Nuclear Accidents into Backfit Decisions Appendix M: Access to Timely and Reliable Information to Support Decision Making During a Nuclear Power Plant Accident Appendix N: Conversions and Units Appendix O: Acronyms

Recent discoveries in psychology and neuroscience have improved our understanding of why our decision making processes fail to match standard social science assumptions about rationality. As researchers such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, and Richard Thaler have shown, people often depart in systematic ways from the predictions of the rational actor model of classic economic thought because of the influence of emotions, cognitive biases, an aversion to loss, and other strong motivations and values. These findings about the limits of rationality have formed the basis of behavioral economics, an approach that has attracted enormous attention in recent years. This collection of essays applies the insights of behavioral economics to the study of nuclear weapons policy. Behavioral economics gives us a more accurate picture of how people think and, as a consequence, of how they make decisions about whether to acquire or use nuclear arms. Such decisions are made in real-world circumstances in which rational calculations about cost and benefit are intertwined with complicated emotions and subject to human limitations. Strategies for pursuing nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation should therefore, argue the contributors, account for these dynamics in a systematic way. The contributors to this collection examine how a behavioral approach might inform our understanding of topics such as deterrence, economic sanctions, the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and U.S. domestic debates about ballistic missile defense. The essays also take note of the limitations of a behavioral approach for dealing with situations in which even a single deviation from the predictions of any model can have dire consequences.

This book addresses the incentives for nations to develop nuclear weapons and the technical expertise needed for that purpose. Ballistic missiles are required by any nation wanting to optimize the effectiveness of deterrence and the threat derived from possessing nuclear weapons. The basic science of ballistic missile programs is discussed using the North Korean program as an example, although to some extent the programs of other countries are also covered. In addition, there is an introduction to the basics of nuclear weapons technology.Unlike most books on these topics, this one includes, besides the technical component, the policy aspects surrounding nuclear weapons. It also shows how nuclear weapons can - and have - stabilized conflicts, discussing why the concept of deterrence may not always be relied upon to prevent war. The origin of terrorism in the Middle East and the possibility of nuclear terrorism originating from that region are other topics of interest.

Many Baby Boomers still recall crouching under their grade-school desks in frequent bomb drills during the Cuban Missile Crisis--a clear representation of how terrified the United States was of nuclear war. Thus far, we have succeeded in preventing such catastrophe, and this is partly due to the various treaties signed in the 1960s forswearing the use of nuclear technology for military purposes.
In "Fallout, " Gregoire Mallard seeks to understand why some nations agreed to these limitations of their sovereign will--and why others decidedly did not. He builds his investigation around the 1968 signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which, though binding in nature, wasn't adhered to consistently by all signatory nations. Mallard looks at Europe's observance of treaty rules in contrast to the three holdouts in the global nonproliferation regime: Israel, India, and Pakistan. He seeks to find reasons for these discrepancies, and makes the compelling case that who wrote the treaty and how the rules were written--whether transparently, ambiguously, or opaquely--had major significance in how the rules were interpreted and whether they were then followed or dismissed as regimes changed. In honing in on this important piece of the story, Mallard not only provides a new perspective on our diplomatic history, but, more significantly, draws important conclusions about potential conditions that could facilitate the inclusion of the remaining NPT holdouts. "Fallout "is an important and timely book sure to be of interest to policy makers, activists, and concerned citizens alike.

***Winner of the L.H.M. Ling Outstanding First Book Prize 2020*** ***Shortlisted for the Bread and Roses Award 2020*** Since the first atomic bomb exploded over Hiroshima, the history of nuclear warfare has been tangled with the spaces and places of scientific research and weapons testing, armament and disarmament, pacifism and proliferation. Nuclear geography gives us the tools to understand these events, and the extraordinary human cost of nuclear weapons. Disarming Doomsday explores the secret history of nuclear weapons by studying the places they build and tear apart, from Los Alamos to Hiroshima. It looks at the legacy of nuclear imperialism from weapons testing on Christmas Island and across the South Pacific, as well as the lasting harm this has caused to indigenous communities and the soldiers that conducted the tests. For the first time, these complex geographies are tied together. Disarming Doomsday takes us forward, describing how geographers and geotechnology continue to shape nuclear war, and, perhaps, help to prevent it.

Though China remains a relatively weak nuclear power, it has in recent years become central to US strategic policymaking. What explains this shift? How is the US-China strategic nuclear relationship evolving? What role do other states play in shaping it? To address these questions, the authors of US-China Nuclear Relations examine a series of strategic triangles involving China, the US, and one or more key third actors (among them, Australia, India, Iran, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, and Taiwan). Their work also critically highlights the challenges and opportunities facing Washington and Beijing in this increasingly complex security arena.

India's nuclear profile, doctrine, and practices have evolved rapidly since the country's nuclear breakout in 1998. However, the outside world's understanding of India's doctrinal debates, forward-looking strategy, and technical developments are still two decades behind the present. India and Nuclear Asia will fill that gap in our knowledge by focusing on the post-1998 evolution of Indian nuclear thought, its arsenal, the triangular rivalry with Pakistan and China, and New Delhi's nonproliferation policy approaches. Yogesh Joshi and Frank O'Donnell show how India's nuclear trajectory has evolved in response to domestic, regional, and global drivers. The authors argue that emerging trends in all three states are elevating risks of regional inadvertent and accidental escalation. These include the forthcoming launch of naval nuclear forces within an environment of contested maritime boundaries; the growing employment of dual-use delivery vehicles; and the emerging preferences of all three states to employ missiles early in a conflict. These dangers are amplified by the near-absence of substantive nuclear dialogue between these states, and the growing ambiguity of regional strategic intentions. Based on primary-source research and interviews, this book will be important reading for scholars and students of nuclear deterrence and India's international relations, as well as for military, defense contractor, and policy audiences both within and outside South Asia.

President Eisenhower's reliance on atomic weapons created as many problems as he hoped to solve with his defense policy. He hoped to provide a sustainable defense strategy that allowed the United States to maintain its security requirements without creating an excessive economic burden. This defense strategy, known as the New Look, benefitted the U.S. Air Force due to the focus on strategic bombing. However ballistic missiles offered the capability to launch nuclear warheads into the Soviet Union without the risk of their being intercepted. In order to do this, the U.S. required European missile bases to deploy its Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, while efforts continued to develop U.S. based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Deploying atomic missiles to Europe required balancing regional European concerns with U.S. domestic security priorities. In the wake of the Soviet Sputnik launch in 1957, many in the U.S. feared Soviet missile capability. Getting ballistic missiles into Europe mitigated this domestic security issue but convincing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to agree to base missiles in their country raised issues concerning sovereignty, weapons control, and ran the risk of creating divisions in the NATO alliance.

During the Cold War, many believed that the superpowers shared a conception of strategic stability, a coexistence where both sides would compete for global influence but would be deterred from using nuclear weapons. In actuality, both sides understood strategic stability and deterrence quite differently. Today's international system is further complicated by more nuclear powers, regional rivalries, and nonstate actors who punch above their weight, but the United States and other nuclear powers still cling to old conceptions of strategic stability. The purpose of this book is to unpack and examine how different states in different regions view strategic stability, the use or non-use of nuclear weapons, and whether or not strategic stability is still a prevailing concept. The contributors to this volume explore policies of current and potential nuclear powers including the United States, Russia, China, India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. This volume makes an important contribution toward understanding how nuclear weapons will impact the international system in the twenty-first century and will be useful to students, scholars, and practitioners of nuclear weapons policy.

In its diversity of perspectives, The Unfinished Atomic Bomb: Shadows and Reflections is testament to the ways in which contemplations of the A-bomb are endlessly shifting, rarely fixed on the same point or perspective. The compilation of this book is significant in this regard, offering Japanese, American, Australian, and European perspectives. In doing so, the essays here represent a complex series of interpretations of the bombing of Hiroshima, and its implications both for history, and for the present day. From Kuznick's extensive biographical account of the Hiroshima bomb pilot, Paul Tibbets, and contentious questions about the moral and strategic efficacy of dropping the A-bomb and how that has resonated through time, to Jacobs' reflections on the different ways in which Hiroshima and its memorialization are experienced today, each chapter considers how this moment in time emerges, persistently, in public and cultural consciousness. The discussions here are often difficult, sometimes controversial, and at times oppositional, reflecting the characteristics of A-bomb scholarship more broadly. The aim is to explore the various ways in which Hiroshima is remembered, but also to consider the ongoing legacy and impact of atomic warfare, the reverberations of which remain powerfully felt.

Entessar & Afrasiabi's Iran Nuclear Negotiations (Rowman & Littlefied, October 2015) offered a thorough analysis of the negotiation process between Iran and the 5+1 great powers about its nuclear program. This book essentially builds upon it, focusing this time on the final nuclear agreement, the ensuing debates around it, and its global and regional ramifications especially in the Middle East. The first section analyzes the agreement through the prism of international relations theories, using a constructivist-critical theory approach. This is followed by an overview of the intense debates in Iran, the West, and other parts of the world, on the nuclear agreement and its various pros and cons, not to mention the connected, yet separate Iran-IAEA agreement. The second section covers Iran's foreign policy and its various priorities, looking in particular at the impact of the nuclear deal on the country's external relations and orientations, contextualized in terms of pre-existing issues and concerns and the profound influence of the nuclear agreement on the perceptions of Iranian power in the region and beyond. Iran's relations with its Arab, Turkish, Russian, and other neighbors are discussed, focusing on both the direct and indirect impact of the nuclear agreement on these relations, especially the paradoxical implications of the nuclear deal with respect to the non-nuclear crises in the Middle East, such as the Syria-Iraq crisis, and the re-alignments that have put Iran at the crossroads of East and West. Other issues covered include energy security, regional economic cooperation, the endemic sectarianism highlighted by Iran-Saudi competition, and the deadlock on the Middle East peace process. The third section then examines the issue of a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone and the likely consequences of the Iran nuclear deal on this prospect, which, in turn, raises the issue of regional proliferation and counterproliferation. The last section explores some possible various scenarios and the challenges of implementation as a relatively long-term agreement, providing specific policy recommendations for the regional actors and the external powers that are stakeholders in the volatile Middle East.

Are nuclear arsenals safe from cyber-attack? Could terrorists launch a nuclear weapon through hacking? Are we standing at the edge of a major technological challenge to global nuclear order? These are among the many pressing security questions addressed in Andrew Futter's ground-breaking study of the cyber threat to nuclear weapons. Hacking the Bomb provides the first ever comprehensive assessment of this worrying and little-understood strategic development, and it explains how myriad new cyber challenges will impact the way that the world thinks about and manages the ultimate weapon. The book cuts through the hype surrounding the cyber phenomenon and provides a framework through which to understand and proactively address the implications of the emerging cyber-nuclear nexus. It does this by tracing the cyber challenge right across the nuclear weapons enterprise, explains the important differences between types of cyber threats, and unpacks how cyber capabilities will impact strategic thinking, nuclear balances, deterrence thinking, and crisis management. The book makes the case for restraint in the cyber realm when it comes to nuclear weapons given the considerable risks of commingling weapons of mass disruption with weapons of mass destruction, and argues against establishing a dangerous norm of "hacking the bomb." This timely book provides a starting point for an essential discussion about the challenges associated with the cyber-nuclear nexus, and will be of great interest to scholars and students of security studies as well as defense practitioners and policy makers.

Now facing a genuinely unprecedented configuration of existential threats, Israel's leaders must decide whether to continue their deliberate nuclear ambiguity policy (the "bomb in the basement") as they consider such urgent and overlapping survival issues as regional nuclear proliferation, Jihadist terror-group intersections with enemy states, rationality or irrationality of state and sub-state adversaries, assassination or "targeted killing," preemption, and the probable effects of a "Cold War II" between Russia and the United States. Israel must develop a strategic posture that will involve a suitably coherent and refined nuclear strategy. This book critically examines Israel's rapidly evolving nuclear strategy in light of these issues and explains how it underscores the overarching complexity of strategic interactions in the Middle East.

From the early 1950s until 1992, the U.S. Army deployed thousands of nuclear warheads throughout Europe as a deterrent to Soviet ambitions. The end of the Cold War saw the decommissioning of much of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and the phasing out of support personnel. This memoir by one of the Army's last ""glow worms"" chronicles his career as a nuclear weapons specialist from 17-year-old recruit to participant in Operation Silent Echo, codename for the removal of all tactical warheads throughout Asia and Europe.