In this sobering book, Barry R. Posen demonstrates how the interplay between conventional military operations and nuclear forces could, in conflicts among states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, inadvertently produce pressures for nuclear escalation. Knowledge of these hidden pressures, he believes, may help some future decision maker avoid catastrophe.

Building a formidable argument that moves with cumulative force, he details the way in which escalation could occur not by mindless accident, or by deliberate preference for nuclear escalation, but rather as a natural accompaniment of land, naval, or air warfare at the conventional level. Posen bases his analysis on an empirical study of the east-west military competition in Europe during the 1980s, using a conceptual framework drawn from international relations theory, organization theory, and strategic theory.

The lessons of his book, however, go well beyond the east-west competition. Since his observations are relevant to all military competitions between states armed with both conventional and nuclear weaponry, his book speaks to some of the problems that attend the proliferation of nuclear weapons in longstanding regional conflicts. Optimism that small and medium nuclear powers can easily achieve "stable" nuclear balances is, he believes, unwarranted.

Most analysts consider non-strategic weapons to be shorter-range delivery systems with lower yield warheads that might be used to attack troops or facilities on the battlefield. These weapons have a lower profile in policy debates and arms control negotiations, possibly because they do not pose a direct threat to the continental United States. This book provides basic information about U.S., Russian, North Korean and Pakistani nuclear weapons. It begins with a brief discussion of how these weapons have appeared in public debates in the past few decades, then summarises the differences between strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Historical background is discussed, describing the numbers and types of non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed during the Cold War by the U.S. and Russia, and in the past decade; the policies that have guided the deployment and prospective use of these weapons; and the measures taken to reduce and contain them. Also discussed is what is known about North Korea's nuclear weapons program and Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.

In 2007 two former U.S. secretaries of state, a defense secretary, and a former senator wrote persuasively in the Wall Street Journal that the time had come to move seriously toward a nuclear-free world. Almost two years later, the Global Zero movement was born with its chief aim to rid the world of such weapons once and for all by 2030. But is it realistic or even wise to envision a world without nuclear weapons? More and more people seem to think so. Barack Obama has declared "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons". But that is easier said than done. Michael O'Hanlon places his own indelible stamp on this critical issue, putting forth a "friendly skeptic's case for nuclear disarmament". Calls to "ban the bomb" are as old as the bomb itself, but the pace and organization of nonproliferation campaigns have picked up greatly recently. The growing Global Zero movement, for example, wants treaty negotiations to begin in 2019. Would this be prudent or even feasible in a world that remains dangerous, divided, and unpredictable? After all, America's nuclear arsenal has been its military trump card for much of the period since World War II. Pursuing a nuclear weapons ban prematurely or carelessly could alarm allies, leading them to consider building their own weapons - the opposite of the intended effect. O'Hanlon clearly presents the dangers of nuclear weapons and the advantages of disarmament as a goal. But even once an accord is in place, he notes, temporary suspension of restrictions may be necessary in response to urgent threats such as nuclear "cheating" or discovery of an advanced biological weapons program. To take all nuclear options off the table forever strengthens the hand of those that either do not make that pledge or do not honor it. For the near term, traditional approaches to arms control, including dismantling existing bomb inventories, can pave the way to make a true nonproliferation regime possible in the decades ahead.

Why does Iranian acquisition of ballistic missiles or Iran's pursuit of a space launch capability matter, especially to the Congress? For decades, most in Congress have viewed Iran with concern because of its nuclear program and its support of anti-U.S. and anti-Israel militant movements in the region. Although it is not certain that Iran has made the decision to develop a nuclear weapon, it is taking steps to drastically reduce the time needed to obtain nuclear weapons should a decision be made to do so. It is the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon mated to an effective missile delivery capability that is especially worrisome to most. This book examines the current and prospective Iranian capabilities that challenge U.S. national security interests, with a focus on its ballistic missile and space launch programs.

We are at a critical juncture in world politics. Nuclear strategy and policy have risen to the top of the global policy agenda, and issues ranging from a nuclear Iran to the global zero movement are generating sharp debate. The historical origins of our contemporary nuclear world are deeply consequential for contemporary policy, but it is crucial that decisions are made on the basis of fact rather than myth and misapprehension. In Nuclear Statecraft, Francis J. Gavin challenges key elements of the widely accepted narrative about the history of the atomic age and the consequences of the nuclear revolution.

On the basis of recently declassified documents, Gavin reassesses the strategy of flexible response, the influence of nuclear weapons during the Berlin Crisis, the origins of and motivations for U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy, and how to assess the nuclear dangers we face today. In case after case, he finds that we know far less than we think we do about our nuclear history. Archival evidence makes it clear that decision makers were more concerned about underlying geopolitical questions than about the strategic dynamic between two nuclear superpowers.

Gavin's rigorous historical work not only tells us what happened in the past but also offers a powerful tool to explain how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Nuclear Statecraft provides a solid foundation for future policymaking.

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially in the hands of radical states and terrorists, represent a major threat to U.S. national security interests. Multilateral regimes were established to restrict trade in nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and missile technologies, and to monitor their civil applications. Congress may consider the efficacy of these regimes in considering the potential renewal of the Export Administration Act, as well as other proliferation-specific legislation in the 111th Congress. This book provides background and current status information on nuclear non-proliferation regimes which encompass several treaties, extensive multilateral and bilateral diplomatic agreements, multilateral organisations and domestic agencies, and the domestic laws of participating countries.

Detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear material (SNM) is crucial to thwarting nuclear proliferation and terrorism and to securing weapons and materials world-wide. Congress has funded a portfolio of detection R&D and acquisition programs, and has mandated inspection at foreign ports of all U.S.-bound cargo containers using two types of detection equipment. Nuclear weapons contain SNM, which produces unique or suspect signatures that can be detected. It emits radiation, notably gamma rays (high-energy photons) and neutrons. SNM is very dense, so it produces a bright image on a radiograph when X-rays or gamma rays are beamed through a container in which it is hidden. Some detection technology is advancing faster than many have expected. It is easier and less costly to accelerate a program in R&D than in production. This book emphasises the ongoing improvement in detection capabilities which produce uncertainties for terrorists that will increase over time, adding deterrence beyond that of the capabilities themselves. This book consists of public documents which have been located, gathered, combined, reformatted, and enhanced with a subject index, selectively edited and bound to provide easy access.

In the closing days of World War II, scientists working for the U.S. government invented nuclear explosives by splitting the atoms of heavy metals. Germany had already surrendered, but the United States and its allies remained at war with Japan. In the summer of 1945, the Japanese city of Hiroshima was flattened by a single nuclear bomb. A second bombing occurred just a few days later, decimating the city of Nagasaki. These were the first nuclear weapons ever used in war. And - so far - they are the last. Since then, tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have been manufactured and deployed by governments around the world. Many of these weapons are much more powerful than the atomic bombs that destroyed the two Japanese cities. None have been used so far, and the absence of nuclear war among nations armed to the teeth with nuclear weapons is a great mystery. While the threat of a nuclear attack on the United States has receded, the possibility of a nuclear attack on an American city by terrorists has taken its place in our official nightmares. So far, no terrorist group has made a serious effort to buy, steal, or build a nuclear weapon. The absence of nuclear terrorism in a world swarming with fanatical terrorists is another great mystery. The slippery slope to a nuclear Armageddon has been present for more than sixty years. In secure locations in Washington, Moscow, Beijing, London, and Paris, there are buttons to push than could put an end to human civilization, but these buttons have never been pushed. Why not? What has so far kept us safe from these mortal dangers? Those are the questions that Caplow asks and answers in Armageddon Postponed.

In a vitally important book for anyone interested in nuclear proliferation, defense strategy, or international security, Matthew Kroenig points out that nearly every country with a nuclear weapons arsenal received substantial help at some point from a more advanced nuclear state. Why do some countries help others to develop nuclear weapons? Many analysts assume that nuclear transfers are driven by economic considerations. States in dire economic need, they suggest, export sensitive nuclear materials and technology and ignore the security risk in a desperate search for hard currency.

Kroenig challenges this conventional wisdom. He finds that state decisions to provide sensitive nuclear assistance are the result of a coherent, strategic logic. The spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states more than it threatens weak states, and these differential effects of nuclear proliferation encourage countries to provide sensitive nuclear assistance under certain strategic conditions. Countries are more likely to export sensitive nuclear materials and technology when it would have the effect of constraining an enemy and less likely to do so when it would threaten themselves.

In Exporting the Bomb, Kroenig examines the most important historical cases, including France's nuclear assistance to Israel in the 1950s and 1960s; the Soviet Union's sensitive transfers to China from 1958 to 1960; China's nuclear aid to Pakistan in the 1980s; and Pakistan's recent technology transfers, with the help of "rogue" scientist A. Q. Khan, from 1987 to 2002. Understanding why states provide sensitive nuclear assistance not only adds to our knowledge of international politics but also aids in international efforts to control the spread of nuclear weapons."

A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology, described by a former CIA Director as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden." A hero in Pakistan and revered as the Father of the Bomb, Khan built a global clandestine network that sold the most closely guarded nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
Here for the first time is the riveting inside story of the rise and fall of A.Q. Khan and his role in the devastating spread of nuclear technology over the last thirty years. Drawing on exclusive interviews with key players in Islamabad, London, and Washington, as well as with members of Khan's own network, BBC journalist Gordon Corera paints a truly unsettling picture of the ultimate arms bazaar. Corera reveals how Khan operated within a world of shadowy deals among rogue states and how his privileged position in Pakistan provided him with the protection to build his unique and deadly business empire. It explains why and how he was able to operate so freely for so many years. Brimming with revelations, the book provides new insight into Iran's nuclear ambitions and how close Tehran may be to the bomb.
In addition, the book contains startling new information on how the CIA and MI6 penetrated Khan's network, how the U.S. and UK ultimately broke Khan's ring, and how they persuaded Pakistan's President Musharraf to arrest a national hero. The book also provides the first detailed account of the high-wire dealings with Muammar Gadaffi, which led to Libya's renunciation of nuclear weapons and which played a key role in Khan's downfall.
The spread of nuclear weapons technology around the globe presents the greatest security challenge of our time. Shopping for Bombs presents a unique window into the challenges of stopping a new nuclear arms race, a race that A.Q. Khan himself did more than any other individual to promote.

Trident was the world's first tri-jet and the first civilian aircraft certified to be able to land automatically in Cat B conditions, in a fog. Notoriously, in 1972, 118 people were killed when a BEA Trident airliner ploughed into waste ground only a few yards from the Staines bypass on the outskirts of Heathrow Airport-London. There were no survivors when the plane crashed, less than four minutes after taking off for Brussels. The impact broke the plane's spine, ripping off the tail section and sending it spinning through the air. The book is written with the assistance of Neil Lomax of the Trident Preservation Society in Manchester; and includes pictures of their recent Trident restoration project.

Although the Cold War is commonly considered 'over,' the legacies of that conflict continue to unfold throughout the globe. One site of post-Cold War controversy involves the consequences of U.S. nuclear weapons production for worker safety, public health, and the environment. Over the past two decades, citizens, organizations, and governments have passionately debated the nature of these consequences, and how they should be managed. This volume clarifies the role of communication in creating, maintaining, and transforming the relationships between these parties, and in shaping the outcomes of related organizational and political deliberations. Providing various perspectives on nuclear culture and discourse, this anthology serves as a model of interdisciplinary communication scholarship that cuts across the subfields of political, environmental, and organizational communication studies, and rhetoric.

In Global Challenges for Leviathan, Furio Cerutti illumines for the reader the precarious situation in which the world currently exists. Far beyond international terrorism and the troubles with globalization in our age, there are two threats that really are global, as they can hurt everyone on earth and can be addressed only by the combined effort of all relevant human groups. Nuclear weapons may now play a lesser role than they did during the Cold War, but they will always endanger the survival of humankind, while global warming can bring disaster to future generations. Not only our obligations to current and future generations but also the very feeling that our life has little meaning if we or our posterity are confronted with man-made annihilation requires us to deal with these two global challenges. Neither the political realism that relies on deterrence and market fundamentalism nor the utopian salvation entrusted to world government provide an adequate response to global challenges. The question that confonts us is whether politics and democracy will be able to put these challenges on their agendas. Cerutti shows how political philosophy can highlight problems and prevent illusions, and how it can teach us to live in an uncertain world.

The United States is the only country to have dropped the atomic bomb. Since the A-bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, every US president has threatened nuclear war. This concise history shows how the U.S. has used nuclear weapons to bolster its imperial ambitions. Leading nuclear specialist and peace campaigner Joseph Gerson explains why atomic weapons were first built and used - and how the U.S. uses them today to preserve its global empire. Gerson reveals how and why the U.S. made more than twenty threats of nuclear attack during the Cold War - against Russia, China, Vietnam, and the Middle East. He shows how such theats continued under Presidents Bush and Clinton, and George W. Bush. The book concludes with an appeal for nuclear weapons abolition and an overview of the history of the anti-nuclear movement. Drawing from a wide range of sources, this fascinating and timely account shows how the U.S. has used nuclear weapons to dominate the world.

Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war?U.S. bombing in World War II caused massive fire damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later war plans took account only of damage from blast; they completely ignored damage from atomic firestorms. Recently a small group of researchers has shown that for modern nuclear weapons the destructiveness and lethality of nuclear mass fire often—and predictably—greatly exceeds that of nuclear blast. This has major implications for defense policy: the U.S. government has underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons, Lynn Eden finds, and built far more warheads, and far more destructive warheads, than it needed for the Pentagon's war-planning purposes. How could this have happened? The answer lies in how organizations frame the problems they try to solve. In a narrative grounded in organization theory, science and technology studies, and primary historical sources (including declassified documents and interviews), Eden explains how the U.S. Air Force's doctrine of precision bombing led to the development of very good predictions of nuclear blast—a significant achievement—but for many years to no development of organizational knowledge about nuclear fire. Expert communities outside the military reinforced this disparity in organizational capability to predict blast damage but not fire damage. Yet some innovation occurred, and predictions of fire damage were nearly incorporated into nuclear war planning in the early 1990s. The author explains how such a dramatic change almost happened, and why it did not. Whole World on Fire shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't do well, may build a poor representation of the world—a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences. In a sweeping conclusion, Eden shows the implications of the analysis for understanding such things as the sinking of the Titanic, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and the poor fireproofing in the World Trade Center.

"No previous generation of statesmen has had to conduct policy in so unknown an environment at the border line of Armageddon"-Henry Kissinger Nuclear weapons pose a unique challenge to American foreign policy and the American president in particular. The choices the president makes with regard to atomic weapons can change the course of human history and affect the lives of billions of people. In this important new work, scholar, teacher, and diplomat James Goodby analyzes how American presidents have confronted the dilemma of nuclear weapons. Drawing on his own involvement in over fifty years of nuclear policy, he explores specific case studies to illustrate the decision making process and the delicate balance between international cooperation and freedom of action, between the rules of behavior and governmental autonomy.

On May 11, 1998 , three nuclear devices exploded under the Thar, or Great Indian Desert, shaking the surrounding villages-and the rest of the world. The immediate effect was to plunge U.S.-India relations, already vexed by decades of tension and estrangement, into a new acrimonious standoff. The situation deteriorated further when Pakistan responded with a test of its own two weeks later. Engaging India is the revealing, authoritative account of the intensive talks that the United States conducted on parallel tracks with the South Asian nuclear powers over the next two and a half years. Bill Clinton's point man for that high-stakes diplomacy takes us behind the scenes of one of the most intriguing and consequential political dramas of our time, reconstructing what happened-and why-with narrative verve, rich human detail, and penetrating analysis. From June 1998 through September 2000, in the most extensive engagement ever between the United States and India, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott and Minister of External Affairs Jaswant Singh met fourteen times in seven countries on three continents. They grappled with the urgent issue of arms control and nonproliferation, but they also discussed their visions for the U.S.-Indian relationship, the potential for economic and strategic cooperation between the two countries, and the implications of Hindu nationalism for the evolution of Indian society, politics, and security. Their personal rapport helped raise the level of trust between the two governments. As a result, the United States was able to play a crucial role in defusing the crisis between India and Pakistan over the contested territory of Kashmir in the summer of 1999-thus, perhaps, averting a war that could have escalated to nuclear conflagration. The Talbott-Singh dialogue laid the ground for Clinton's transformational visit to South Asia in March 2000. That presidential journey opened a new chapter in relations between the United States and India. It also set the scene for U.S. cooperation with both India and Pakistan in the war against terror after September 11, 2001. In addition to providing an insider's perspective on a fascinating and instructive episode in diplomatic history, the story told here is vital background for understanding what happens next in a region that is home to nearly a quarter of humanity and that was, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, "the most dangerous place on earth".

More than half a century after the advent of the nuclear age, is the world approaching a tipping point that will unleash an epidemic of nuclear proliferation? Today many of the building blocks of a nuclear arsenal -scientific and engineering expertise, precision machine tools, software, design information -are more readily available than ever before. The nuclear pretensions of so-called rogue states and terrorist organizations are much discussed. But how firm is the resolve of those countries that historically have chosen to forswear nuclear weapons? A combination of changes in the international environment could set off a domino effect, with countries scrambling to develop nuclear weapons so as not to be left behind -or to develop nuclear "hedge" capacities that would allow them to build nuclear arsenals relatively quickly, if necessary. The Nuclear Tipping Point examines the factors, both domestic and transnational, that shape nuclear policy. The authors, distinguished scholars and foreign policy practitioners with extensive government experience, develop a framework for understanding why certain countries may originally have decided to renounce nuclear weapons -and pinpoint some more recent country-specific factors that could give them cause to reconsider. Case studies of eight long-term stalwarts of the nonproliferation regime -Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Syria, Turkey, and Taiwan -flesh out this framework and show how even these countries might be pushed over the edge of a nuclear tipping point. The authors offer prescriptions that would both prevent such countries from reconsidering their nuclear option and avert proliferation by others. The stakes are enormous and success is far from assured. To keep the tipping point beyond reach, the authors argue, the international community will have to act with unity, imagination, and strength, and Washington's leadership will be essential. Contributors include Leon Feurth, George Washington University; Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center; Thomas W. Lippman, Middle East Institute; Jenifer Mackby, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Derek J. Mitchell, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Jonathan D. Pollack, U.S. Naval War College; Walter B. Slocombe, Caplin and Drysdale; and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Is Iran at a crossroads? The recent US - led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought new opportunities and dangers that could conceivably either herald a new rapprochement between Tehran and Washington or else bring a sharp detorioration that might perhaps spill over into confrontation. At home, profound demographic changes would seem to make far-reaching political changes appear inevitable in a country whose young population is alienated from the clerical elite that pulls the strings of power. This book looks at some of the causes of these domestic international tensions and considers some of the possible outcomes. In particular, it asks: Is Iran really on the way to developing nuclear weapons? What is the Iranian 'Qods Force' doing in Iraq and Afghanistan? And why? What are Iran's connections with Middle East terror groups? Could Iran disintegrate if the current regime crumbles? How much of a threat to the regime do dissident organisations pose? The book explains the likely course of events in Iran and the region for both general readers and specialists.

"Whole World on Fire focuses on a technical riddle wrapped in an organizational mystery: How and why, for more than half a century, did the U.S. government fail to predict nuclear fire damage as it drew up plans to fight strategic nuclear war? U.S. bombing in World War II caused massive fire damage to Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but later war plans took account only of damage from blast; they completely ignored damage from atomic firestorms. Recently a small group of researchers has shown that for modern nuclear weapons the destructiveness and lethality of nuclear mass fire often--and predictably--greatly exceeds that of nuclear blast. This has major implications for defense policy: the U.S. government has underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons, Lynn Eden finds, and built far more warheads, and far more destructive warheads, than it needed for the Pentagon's war-planning purposes. How could this have happened? The answer lies in how organizations frame the problems they try to solve. In a narrative grounded in organization theory, science and technology studies, and primary historical sources (including declassified documents and interviews), Eden explains how the U.S. Air Force's doctrine of precision bombing led to the development of very good predictions of nuclear blast--a significant achievement--but for many years to no development of organizational knowledge about nuclear fire. Expert communities outside the military reinforced this disparity in organizational capability to predict blast damage but not fire damage. Yet some innovation occurred, and predictions of fire damage were nearly incorporated into nuclear war planning in the early 1990s. The author explains howsuch a dramatic change almost happened, and why it did not. "Whole World on Fire shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't do well, may build a poor representation of the world--a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences. In a sweeping conclusion, Eden shows the implications of the analysis for understanding such things as the sinking of the Titanic, the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge, and the poor fireproofing in the World Trade Center.

For three decades, arms control treaties have provided a legal basis for limiting and reducing long-range nuclear weapons. However, thousands of sub-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons (TNWs) are not monitored or controlled by any existing treaties or formal agreements, even though they can pose security risks equal to or exceeding those of strategic nuclear weapons. As the world has seen, the rise of international terrorism highlights the potential dangers of tactical nuclear weapons. Because they can be relatively small and portable-particularly but not exclusively in the case of so-called "suitcase" bombs - tactical nuclear weapons are easier to transport and more vulnerable to theft than other nuclear weapons. In terrorists' hands, they would wreak havoc far surpassing the devastation of September 11. According to the Department of Defense, terrorists would most likely use a nuclear weapon against either a military installation or a political target (a seat of government, large population center, or commercial port city). This possibility raises the stakes in the international effort to control and reduce TNWs.Despite the critical need for a more informed debate on the issues involving tactical nuclear weapons, little has been published previously on this subject. To bring more attention to this long-ignored danger, Brian Alexander and Alistair Millar have assembled a cadre of ten experts who frame the debate on a multitude of issues ranging from terrorism and arms control to the weapons programs of Russia, India, Pakistan, and China.

In the towering mountains of northern India, a chilling chapter was written in the history of international espionage.

After the Chinese detonated their first nuclear test in 1964, America and India, which had just fought a border war with its northern neighbor, were both justifiably concerned. The CIA knew it needed more information on China's growing nuclear capability but had few ways of peeking behind the Bamboo Curtain. Because of the extreme remoteness of Chinese testing grounds, conventional surveillance in this pre-satellite era was next to impossible.

The solution to this intelligence dilemma was a joint American-Indian effort to plant a nuclear-powered sensing device on a high Himalayan peak in order to listen into China and monitor its missile launches. It was not a job that could be carried out by career spies, requiring instead the special skills possessed only by accomplished
mountaineers. For this mission, cloaks and daggers were to be replaced by crampons and ice axes.

"Spies in the Himalayas" chronicles for the first time the details of these death-defying expeditions sanctioned by U.S. and Indian intelligence, telling the story of clandestine climbs and hair-raising exploits. Led by legendary Indian mountaineer Mohan S. Kohli, conqueror of Everest, the mission was beset by hazardous climbs, weather delays, aborted attempts, and even missing radioactive materials that may or may not still pose a contamination threat to Indian rivers.

Kept under wraps for over a decade, these operations came to light in 1978 and have been long rumored among mountaineers, but here are finally given book-length treatment. Spies in the Himalayas provides an inside look at a CIA mission from participants who weren't agency employees, drawing on diaries from several of the climbers to offer impressions not usually recorded in covert operations. A host of photos and maps puts readers on the slopes as the team attempts repeatedly to plant the sensor on a Himalayan summit.

An adventure story as well as a new chapter in the history of espionage, this book should appeal to readers who enjoyed Jon Krakauer's "Into Thin Air" and to anyone who enjoys a great spy story.

Since the nuclear genie was let out of the bottle, nuclear weapons have been the exclusive domain of a select few countries. At the dawn of the next millennium, however, the notion that small countries and even a few individuals many acquire and use them, or threaten to, is a major concern. This annotated bibliography presents citations of the current book and journal literature which deal with this dangerous issue. Access is provided through subject, author and titles indexes.

In March 1998, India broke a quarter-century's silence when it detonated a series of nuclear devices in the Rajasthan desert. Having announced it possessed the requisite credentials for membership in the nuclear club in 1974, India quickly disavowed any desire to join, pledging not to develop its capability further.. As the Pokhran explosions revealed, that promise would not be kept for ever, and the principal beneficiary of its breaking was now to be a right-wing government seeking to shore up its shaky political base by demonstrating its commitment to the 'Hindu bomb'. While most in the West were taken unawares by this sudden bellicosity in the land of Ghandi, more scrupulous observers on the South-Asian scene insisted it had a clear history. In this, his first book since the hotly debated In Theory, Aijaz Ahmad untangles many of the intertwined threads of historical and political traditions in a still-too-poorly-understood region of the world.

More than most of us, Mary Palevsky needed to come to terms with the moral complexities of the atomic bomb: Her parents worked on its development during World War II and were profoundly changed by that experience. After they died, unanswered questions sent their daughter on a search for understanding. This compelling, sometimes heart-wrenching chronicle is the story of that quest. It takes her, and us, on a journey into the minds, memories, and emotions of the bomb builders.
Scientists Hans Bethe, Edward Teller, Joseph Rotblat, Herbert York, Philip Morrison, and Robert Wilson, and philosopher David Hawkins responded to Palevsky's personal approach in a way that dramatically expands their previously published statements. Her skill and passion as an interlocutor prompt these men to recall their lives vividly and to reexamine their own decisions, debating within themselves the complex issues raised by the bomb.
The author herself, seeking to comprehend the widely differing ways in which individual scientists made choices about the bomb and made sense of their work, deeply reconsiders those questions of commitment and conscience her parents faced. In personal vignettes that complement the interviews, she captures other remembrances of the bomb through commemorative events and chance encounters with people who were "there." Her concluding chapter reframes the crucial moral questions in terms that show the questions themselves to be the abiding legacy we all share. This beautifully written book bridges generations to make its readers participants in the ongoing dialogue about science and philosophy, war and peace.