Available for the first time in many years, Commonsense and Nuclear Warfare presents Russell's keen insights into the threat of nuclear conflict, and his argument that the only way to end this threat is to end war itself.
Written at the height of the Cold War, this volume is crucial for understanding Russell's involvement in the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and his passionate campaigning for peace. It remains an extremely important book in today's uncertain nuclear world, and is essential reading for all those interested in Russell and postwar history.
Includes a new introduction by Ken Coates, Chairman of The Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation.

Johnston argues that the preemptive first-use of nuclear weapons, long the foundation of American nuclear strategy, was not the carefully reasoned response to a growing Soviet conventional threat. Instead, it was part of a process of cultural 'socialization', by which the United States reconstituted the previously nationalist strategic cultures of the European allies into a seamless western community directed by Washington. Building a bridge between theory and practice, this book examines the usefulness of cultural theory in international history.

Full Contributors:
Vladimir D. Andrianov, Natalya Bazhanova, Evgeniy Bazhanov, Valery I. Denisov, Georgiy Kaurov, Vladimir Li, Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Valentin I. Moiseyev, James Clay Moltz, Alexander Platkovskiy, Roald Savelyev, Larisa Zabrovskaya, Alexander Zarubin, Alexander Zhebin

Having served opposite Warsaw Pact forces in the 1950s and on Embassy duty in the 70s in Europe, the author offers a reasoned assessment of Britain's role in the so-called "nuclear club." He asks whether Britain really needs to be a member.

Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation: A New Grand Bargain proposes a new legal and institutional framework for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. Its proposal is designed to remedy the widely acknowledged breakdown of the architecture of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on which we can no longer rely for global nuclear security.
First, Nuclear Weapons Counterproliferation defines the distinctively dangerous character of contemporary nuclear risk and explains why the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty no longer provides a viable foundation for counterproliferation of nuclear weapons. It then sets out the reforms needed in order to limit the radical increase in availability, for rogue governments and terrorists, of nuclear weapons related material and technology. Garvey proposes a new counterproliferation architecture, to be built on presently available scientific, legal, and institutional resources, which could achieve a critical reduction of nuclear risk and an expanded deterrence. Guiding principles for establishing this new architecture are formulated, including, most importantly, the principal mechanism for implementation, a United Nations Security Council Counterproliferation Resolution applying equally for all states.
This book presents what may be our best opportunity to secure a profoundly more effective global nuclear security and counter the world's current course to a catastrophic nuclear detonation.

The proliferation of advanced weapons to volatile regions of the world has become a major issue in the post Cold War era. It was thought that no Third World nation could ever pose a technologically-based threat to the great powers by acquiring advanced weaponry. But this has proved to be wrong. The Persian Gulf War changed the worldwide perception of the spread of ballistic missiles to countries like Iraq. Access to a new type of weapon--cruise missiles--poses an even greater threat. With technology that is accessible, affordable, and relatively simple to produce, Third World countries could acquire highly accurate, long-range cruise missile forces to escalate local conflicts and threaten the forces and even the territories of the industrial powers. This book is a warning to policymakers. It is not too late to confront the realities of cruise missile proliferation and to devise international responses that could contain the worst possible consequences. Carus proposes a new regime of technology controls, security-building measures, and conflict resolution that need to be considered, and acted on, by policymakers and international relations experts everywhere.

This volume takes a perspective on the debate over deterrence theory that has never been used before. Other books either address the differences between the two competing schools of thought--those who support Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) and those who support nuclear warfighting--or examine particular policies from within the perspective of one or the other school of thought. Cori Dauber examines deterrence theory at a structural level, which allows a focus on the similarities between the major perspectives on nuclear strategic doctrine. By examining such issues as validity standards and the evaluation of evidence, Dauber is able to assess deterrence as a theory of persuasion, and to examine the way deterrence discourse so shapes the thinking of policy makers and analysts that it still drives our analysis of alternatives, even in the post-Soviet era. Dauber concludes that deterrence is a system designed to use weapons capabilities as a form of non-verbal communication with an Other--for the last forty years, the Soviet Other. Understanding these rhetorical structures and the way they function is essential in predicting the restrictions that deterrence places on the way the United States responds to foreign nations. Cold War Analytical Structures and the Post Post-War World serves as a model for how scholars in argument and persuasion can apply their methods to real world situations.

Anthony DiFilippo explores the apparent contradictions behind Japan's stated goal of nuclear disarmament and its tacit acceptance of being protected by the US nuclear umbrella.

There is a significant number of nuclear and radiological sources in Central Asia, which have contributed, are still contributing, or have the potential to contribute to radioactive contamination in the future. Key sources and contaminated sites of concern are: The nuclear weapons tests performed at the Semipalatinsk Test Site (STS) in Kazakhstan during 1949-1989. A total of 456 nuclear weapons tests have been perf- med in the atmosphere (86), above and at ground surface (30) and underground (340) accompanied by radioactive plumes reaching far out of the test site. Safety trials at STS, where radioactive sources were spread by conventional explosives. Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) within STS and outside STS in Kazakhstan, producing crater lakes (e.g., Tel'kem I and Tel'kem II), waste storage facilities (e.g., LIRA) etc. Technologically enhanced levels of naturally occurring radionuclides (TENORM) due to U mining and tailing. As a legacy of the cold war and the nuclear weapon p- gramme in the former USSR, thousands of square kilometers in the Central Asia co- tries are contaminated. Large amounts of scale from the oil and gas industries contain sufficient amounts of TENORM. Nuclear reactors, to be decommissioned or still in operation. Storage of spent nuclear fuel and other radioactive wastes. In the characterization of nuclear risks, the risks are estimated by integrating the results of the hazard identification, the effects assessment and the exposure assessment.

The global threat of nuclear weapons is one of today's key policy issues. Using a wide variety of sources, including recently declassified information, Nathan E. Busch offers detailed examinations of the nuclear programs in the United States, Russia, China, Iraq, India, and Pakistan, as well as the emerging programs in Iran and North Korea. He also assesses the current debates in international relations over the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the post--Cold War world. Busch explores how our understanding of nuclear proliferation centers on theoretical disagreements about how best to explain and predict the behavior of states. His study bridges the gap between theory and empirical evidence by determining whether countries with nuclear weapons have adequate controls over their nuclear arsenals and fissile material stockpiles (such as highly enriched uranium and plutonium). Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of various systems of nuclear weapons regulation, Busch projects what types of controls proliferating states are likely to employ and assesses the threat posed by the possible theft of fissile materials by aspiring nuclear states or by terrorists. No End in Sight provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of issues at the forefront of contemporary international affairs. With the resurgence of the threat of nuclear terrorism, Busch's insights and conclusions will prove critical to understanding the implications of nuclear proliferation.

'The young dictator comes under close scrutiny in this intelligent account' Sunday Times When Kim Jong Un became the leader of North Korea in 2011, many expected his rule to be short. Years later, he remains the unchallenged dictator of a nuclear rogue state with weaponry capable of threatening the West. In this behind-the-scenes look, former CIA analyst and North Korea expert Jung H. Pak reveals the explosive story of Kim Jong II's third son: the spoilt and impetuous child, the mediocre student, the ruthless murderer, the shrewd grand strategist.

What can photographs reveal about Canada’s nuclear footprint? The Bomb in the Wilderness contends that photography is central to how we interpret and remember nuclear activities. The impact and global reach of Canada’s nuclear programs have been felt ever since the atomic bombs dropped on Japan in 1945. But do photographs alert viewers to nuclear threat, numb them to its dangers, or actually do both? John O’Brian’s wide-ranging and personal account of the nuclear era presents and discusses over a hundred photographs, ranging from military images to the atomic ephemera of consumer culture. His fascinating analysis ensures that we do not look away.

During the 20th century, hundreds of thousands of people died from the use of nuclear weapons in Nuclear War I and other nuclear disasters. Dr. Newtan's book describes the disastrous consequences of the following nuclear developments all of which occurred in the 20th century: The Trinity Test of a nuclear device (explosion) The destruction of Hiroshima by a uranium bomb The destruction of Nagasaki by a plutonium bomb The hydrogen bomb, neutron bomb, and cobalt bomb Radioactive fallout Radiological weapons The BRAVO Test (hydrogen bomb) Three Mile Island nuclear reactor disaster Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster Fermi I breeder reactor disaster Nuclear submarine disasters (U.S., U.S.S.R.) Thresher nuclear submarine disaster Scorpion nuclear submarine disaster Nuclear satellite disasters Lost nuclear weapons Lost nuclear fissile materials for weapons Nuclear waste disasters Acts of war on nuclear facilities Nuclear terrorism Proliferation of nuclear weapons Nuclear reactors in space Nuclear weapons in space Nuclear waste - can it be safely stored for millennia?

There is probably no area of more crucial concern nor one more subject to possible misunderstanding and riddled with paradox than nuclear weapons and their use, not only in war, but as deterrents to war. In Strategic Impasse, Cimbala examines the critical issues, problems, and paradoxes inherent in the current nuclear situation. It is from a fundamental contradiction--the usefulness of nuclear weapons versus the undesirability of nuclear war--that nuclear deadlock arises. Their usefulness as deterrents is based on their destructive potential and the balance of power in Europe cannot be adjusted until the inflexible, bipolar "balance of terror" is addressed. Ironically, superpower sovereignty in nuclear first strike/retaliation capability, shared across the divided East-West political buffer zone, created the impetus for improvements in "conventional" warfare. To the extent war can be contained below the nuclear threshold, conventional weaponry contributes to "deterrence by denial." One difficulty lies in the improbability of completely isolating the nuclear from the conventional battlefield in a European scenario. Also, a level of superpower force perceived to be adequate in peacetime might prove to be an inadequate intrawar deterrent. Because of the underdevelopment of conceptual frameworks, "credible deterrence"--the creation of nuclear campaigns designed to prevent war--remains conjectural. Highly usable weapons require a command system that can provide for simultaneous fighting and escalation, but escalation beyond a certain level conflicts with control and therefore usability. In turn, low expectations of weapon usability may weaken deterrence. In Gorbachev's "defensivesufficiency," forces for aggression and surprise attack would be diminished, while forces for defense would be strengthened. The problem lies not only in differentiating between offensive and defensive weaponry but in achieving a consensus on such a definition by NATO's member countries. The book is divided into three parts: the first section, "Issues of Theory and Strategy," scrutinizes the relationship between offense and defense and examines SDI and more inclusive strategic defense matters. It also questions the connection between policy objectives and force, and explores the "complication of externalities," such as relations with allies. In section two, "Stretching Deterrence," Cimbala reviews the "operational art" likely to be employed by the Soviets in a conventionally fought European war and defines and appraises the "sensor-cyber" revolution in technology and its impacts on preferred strategies. The final part, "Beyond Deterrence," considers war termination scenarios and related issues, including sociopolitical aspects, surveys the part nuclear weapons play in superpower competition in the Third World, and explains how issues of sovereignty effect deterrence, avoidance, and future super power relations. Strategic Impasse will enable scholars and students of military affairs as well as political scientists and government officials to see beyond current "nuclear rhetoric" and to make informed judgments on an issue that fundamentally affects this nation's and the world's future.

From the dawn of the atomic age to today, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But nuclear weapons cooperation in US alliances has varied significantly between allies and over time. This book explores the history of America's nuclear posture worldwide, delving into alliance structures and interaction during and since the end of the Cold War to uncover the underlying dynamics of nuclear weapons cooperation between the US and its allies. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, the book reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Alliances are ecosystems of exchange rather than mere tools of external balancing, the book argues, and institutional perspectives can offer an unprecedented insight into how structured cooperation can promote policy convergence. -- .

This book provides a rounded biography of Franz (later Sir Francis) Simon, his early life in Germany, his move to Oxford in 1933, and his experimental contributions to low temperature physics approximating absolute zero. After 1939 he switched his research to nuclear physics, and is credited with solving the problem of uranium isotope separation by gaseous diffusion for the British nuclear programme Tube Alloys. The volume is distinctive for its inclusion of source materials not available to previous researchers, such as Simon's diary and his correspondence with his wife, and for a fresh, well-informed insider voice on the five-power nuclear rivalry of the war years. The work also draws on a relatively mature nuclear literature to attempt a comparison and evaluation of the five nuclear rivals in wider political and military context, and to identify the factors, or groups of factors, that can explain the results.

This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional-and possibly nuclear-war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.

This book analyzes the United States and Russia's nuclear arms control and deterrence relationships and how these countries must lead current and prospective efforts to support future nuclear arms control and nonproliferation. The second nuclear age, following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, poses new challenges with respect to nuclear-strategic stability, deterrence and nonproliferation. The spread of nuclear weapons in Asia, and the potential for new nuclear weapons states in the Middle East, create new possible axes of conflict potentially stressful to the existing world order. Other uncertainties include the interest of major powers in developing a wider spectrum of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, possibly for use in limited nuclear wars, and the competitive technologies for antimissile defenses being developed and deployed by the United States and Russia. Other technology challenges, including the implications of cyberwar for nuclear deterrence and crisis management, are also considered. Political changes also matter. The early post-Cold War hopes for the emergence of a global pacific security community, excluding the possibility of major war, have been dashed by political conflict between Russia and NATO, by the roiled nature of American domestic politics with respect to international security, and by a more assertive and militarily competent China. Additionally, the study includes suggestions for both analysis and policy in order to prevent the renewed U.S.-Russian nuclear arms race and competition in new technologies. This volume would be ideal for graduate students, researchers, scholars and anyone who is interested in nuclear policy, international studies, and Russian politics.

This sixth volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on current legal challenges regarding nuclear disarmament and security. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for further constructive discourse at both national and international levels. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Chair of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law and President and CEO of ISLAND - The Foundation for International Society of Law and Nuclear Disarmament. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.

For nearly forty years, U.S. deterrence policy has depended on nuclear weapons, making the modernization of those weapons a key goal of every administration. "Nuclear Weapons, Policies, and the Test Ban Issue" presents a cogent discussion of the reasons why the United States should actively continue its nuclear weapons program. The authors claim that weapons testing and development has neither kept up with technological advances nor logically followed from professed U.S. policy. They attribute these shortcomings to such forces as budget limitations, alliance politics, domestic politics, and, most importantly, the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.