While the Cold War is over, many of the problems it spawned live on. One of the worst of these is the continued presence of vast nuclear arsenals in the United States and Russia. How did the thousands of American bombs come into existence and how did they so rapidly become the United States' first line of defence?;Drawing extensively on previously classified material, Samuel R. Williamson Jr. and Steven L Rearden have written a history of this crucial period. They show how American policymakers, and least of all President Truman, never expected nuclear weapons to play such a major strategic role. Yet by relying on the atomic bomb time and again to shore up US defences in the face of worsening relations with the Soviet Union, rather than accept seemingly more costly conventional alternatives, Truman found himself ultimately with no other choice.;The authors not only document and analyze the origins and early evolution of US nuclear strategy, but they also demonstrate the close relationship between decisions affecting such diverse matters as foreign policy, new technologies and the budgetary process. The result is an analysis containing new insights and timely reminders of the myriad complications created by reliance on nuclear weapons.

This book is about the future of nuclear weapons, geopolitics, and strategy. It examines the legacy of nuclear weapons on US thinking about some concepts of strategy and geopolitics, namely deterrence, extended deterrence, alliances, and arms control. The purpose of this is to demonstrate just how fundamentally nuclear weapons have influenced American thinking about these concepts. It argues that, given the extent of nuclear weapons' influence on these concepts and the implications for international security, further reductions beyond current Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) levels, and the more absolute idea of nuclear disarmament, may not necessarily be prudent ideas. Nuclear weapons have contributed to the avoidance of major war between states, made alliances more credible and last longer, and have made arms control relatively easier to conceptualize and manage. As such, the author argues, these concepts may become even more difficult to manage in a world where nuclear weapons are marginalized.

From the dawn of the atomic age to today, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But nuclear weapons cooperation in US alliances has varied significantly between allies and over time. This book explores the history of America's nuclear posture worldwide, delving into alliance structures and interaction during and since the end of the Cold War to uncover the underlying dynamics of nuclear weapons cooperation between the US and its allies. Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, the book reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Alliances are ecosystems of exchange rather than mere tools of external balancing, the book argues, and institutional perspectives can offer an unprecedented insight into how structured cooperation can promote policy convergence. -- .

In 1995 a conference will be convened to review and extend the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This work brings together a group of individuals, including the elected President of the 1995 NPT Conference, to analyze four crucial agenda areas relevant to the Conference: the pre-conference activities to be undertaken by both States Parties and the Conference Secretariat; those security issues that relate to a review of the treaty, such as nuclear disarmament and security assurances; peaceful uses and verification questions; and regional issues.

Despite its portrayal as a bold departure, the Bush Doctrine was not the "new" or "revolutionary" policy instrument that many at the time portended. This work seeks to argue that while it was clear that the Bush Doctrine certainly qualified as a preventive war policy, it is apparent that the adoption of this strategy did not mark a total break with American tradition or earlier Administrations. Warren seeks to dispel arguments pertaining to the supposed "radical" nature of the Bush Doctrine -- based on comparisons with previous National Security Strategies and previous Administrations' penchant for prevention. However, the work also highlights that what was new and bold about the Bush Administration's National Security Strategy of 2002, was its willingness to embrace reinvigorating a nuclear option that could ultimately be used in the context of preventive war. While Obama has struck bold rhetorical notes and promises in relation to limiting the role of nuclear weapons, he has stopped short of changing the status quo on critical issues that have lingered since the Cold War -- such as tactical nuclear weapons and keeping missiles on alert. This book's final section examines the extent to which Obama has attempted to adjust' the nuclear option with the recent release of the congressionally mandated Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Offering new insights into the Bush doctrine and providing a comprehensive analysis of the current status of the US nuclear weapons strategy, this volume will be of great interest to scholars and students of American foreign policy, security studies and international relations.

Originally published in 1985, this book explores the nuclear confrontation between East and West in Europe: where we stand, how we got there and what the future may hold. Its concluding chapter outlines the prospects for nuclear arms control in Europe, and it frames the debate over NATO strategy and the role of nuclear weapons in the years ahead. Can NATO reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons? Can it cope with the issues at all? The chapters on NATO theatre nuclear forces and doctrine provide a rich background to current policy issues. The public debate over NATO's 1979 decision to deploy new American cruise and Pershing nuclear missiles in Europe was hardly unprecedented in NATO's history: similar controversy surrounded NATO deliberations in the late 1950s and early 1960s. That debate, however, subsided in the mid-1960s; the nuclear question in Europe was relegated to the 'wilderness', though efforts - largely unavailing - continued within official circles to define more clearly the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's defense. Against this backdrop, the nuclear debate emerged again in the 1970s. This title unravels the military and political considerations at play in that debate and maps the European politics surrounding it. Today it can be read in its historical context.

In the late 1940s, the U.S. Department of Defense established a nuclear weapons depository in the Manzano Mountains of New Mexico. For more than 40 years, Manzano Base served as a maintenance and storage site for some of the most destructive weapons ever created. Operated by the U.S. Air Force, the facility was small and obscure, with highly restricted access. Its covert mission fostered a sense of mystery, leaving the public to speculate about what really went on there. The site was decommissioned in 1992 yet its rich history continues to influence America's nuclear weapons program. This book tells the full story of Manzano and the personnel who served there. Firsthand accounts recall their experiences of nuclear weapons accidents, aircraft crashes, UFO/UAF sightings and a radiation demonstration called "tickling the tiger's tail.

Challenging nuclearism explores how a deliberate 'normalisation' of nuclear weapons has been constructed, why it has prevailed in international politics for over seventy years and why it is only now being questioned seriously. The book identifies how certain practices have enabled a small group of states to hold vast arsenals of these weapons of mass destruction and how the close control over nuclear decisions by a select group has meant that the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons have been disregarded for decades. The recent UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons will not bring about quick disarmament. It has been decried by the nuclear weapon states. But by rejecting nuclearism and providing a clear denunciation of nuclear weapons, it will challenge nuclear states in a way that has until now not been possible. Challenging nuclearism analyses the origins and repercussions of this pivotal moment in nuclear politics. -- .

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) has been the principal legal barrier to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons for the past forty-five years. It promotes the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and insures, through the application of safeguards inspections conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that those technologies are not being diverted toward the production of nuclear weapons. It is also the only multinational treaty that obligates the five nuclear weapons states that are party to the treaty (China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States) to pursue nuclear disarmament measures. Though there have been many challenges over the years, most would agree that the treaty has largely been successful. However, many are concerned about the continued viability of the NPT. The perceived slow pace of nuclear disarmament, the interest by some countries to consider a weapons program while party to the treaty, and the funding and staffing issues at the IAEA, are all putting considerable strain on the treaty. This manuscript explores those issues and offers some possible solutions to ensure that the NPT will survive effectively for many years to come.

This book offers a new and provocative interpretation of early Cold War history by demonstrating how Christian agency played a pivotal role in the creating of space for the logic of nuclear deterrence and nuclear war fighting in the years 1945-59. Cold War chroniclers have traditionally placed great emphasis on threats of mutually assured destruction to explain the puzzle of nuclear non-use since 1945. Here nuclear deterrence is conceived as a realm of absolute necessity with no room for morality. More recently the idea of 'nuclear taboo' has generated immense interest by challenging conventional wisdom with a compelling argument regarding the conceptual (normative rather than material) bases of nuclear restraint. These accounts narrate the emergence of a distinctive ethical order with a particular premium placed on the role of (Anglo-American) Christian activists in giving rise to anti-nuclear sentiment at a formative stage 1945-59. Yet such a reading elides or obfuscates the fact that Christians were deeply divided in their imaginings. Gorry invites a reassessment of assumptions by offering a balanced examination of Christians as enablers but, more provocatively, as resisters of nuclear prohibitions in the early years of Cold War.

At the dawn of the nuclear age, strategist Bernard Brodie recognized our predicament when he said, "Nuclear weapons exist and they are incredibly destructive." Despite the end of the Cold War, thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-trigger alert on both sides of the Atlantic. Plans to develop, deploy, and detonate nuclear weapons (for purposes of war prevention or war fighting) are informed by the ambiguous notion that nuclear war can be avoided by maintaining a balance of power. Policy-makers and decision-makers believe that once the balance of power is destroyed, a crisis will ensue, and if this crisis cannot be resolved with words, it is somehow necessary to use weapons. This idea is held as an historic inevitability, but the nuclear subculture is unaware of the highly problematic nature of their fundamental assumptions. Hirschbein entertains the possibility that the theory and practice of these policy-makers and decision-makers are informed by concepts at once ancient and metaphorical. He analyzes the primary and secondary metaphors invoked to conceptualize and manage nuclear weaponry. Hirschbein draws a striking parallel between dramatic changes in the ancient Greek account of conflict and the American conceptualization of nuclear weapons. Facing harrowing times, Thucydides avoided supernatural, Homeric imagery in favor of naturalistic metaphors to account for conflict--an account regarded as "eternal wisdom" by today's realist. Likewise, facing the Soviet challenge, American strategists abandoned supernatural Judeo-Christian accounts of nuclear weapons in favor of Thucydides' naturalistic tropes.

An examination of the political and diplomatic role of American nuclear weapons in conflicts with a non-nuclear China in the Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-1955 and 1958, this study analyzes the American tendency to become involved in confrontations with far weaker powers over issues of very little strategic significance to the United States. Washington threatens these adversaries with the use of incommensurate levels of force, then ultimately backs down in the face of international and domestic opposition to ill-considered plans to use force. Unlike works on nuclear history that have either focused on superpower nuclear conflicts and ignored cases of American nuclear diplomacy toward non-nuclear adversaries, or those that have focused merely on the outcomes of nuclear threats against non-nuclear powers, this book considers in depth American nuclear diplomacy toward China during the whole period of Sino-American military confrontations.

Soman offers new insights on Truman's decision to enter the Korean War, the extent of nuclear diplomacy during the war, and the way in which the war ended. He argues that the goal of American nuclear diplomacy in the spring of 1955 was to provoke a war with China, rather than to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Finally, he lays out, for the first time in print, the elaborate diplomacy that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles initiated to defuse the 1958 crisis, involving a major shift in American policy that still remains hidden from the public as well as historians. Highlighting the central role of nuclear diplomacy in these crises, this book draws conclusions on the efficacy of such diplomacy, the impact of these crises on the development of policies of massive retaliation and limited war, the consequences of Dulles's brinkmanship, and the revival of nuclear diplomacy by the Clinton administration in conflicts with non-nuclear adversaries.

Karem is eminently qualified to write on the role of Nuclear Weapons-Free Zones (NWFZs) in the processes of averting nuclear weapons proliferation, arresting the nuclear arms race, and eliminating the scourge of nuclear weapons. Karem's well-written, extensively documented, and cogent argument for a NWFZ in the Middle East reflects his scholarly and professional expertise on the technical and political issues surrounding such a proposal. . . . This is an important and much needed contribution to the literature on peace studies, arms limitation, disarmament, and world order studies. It should be part of every library collection. Choice It is clear that the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the nations of the Middle East would pose grave problems for that politically explosive region and throughout the world. In this thoughful study, Dr Karem examines the possiblility of avoiding such a situation and reducing tensions generally by implementing United Nations resolutions calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. Arguing that the NWFZ approach is a viable solution, he suggests how to implement it and how diplomatic obstacles facing such an agreement can be overcome.

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

This book, first published in 1967, examines the circumstances and events that led to the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan, devastating Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The death of President Roosevelt three weeks before the end of the European war led to an incoming President, Truman, who had heard nothing of the project before taking office. He and his advisers had no precedents to guide them as they considered what to do, and withing their closely drawn circle there were genuine differences of opinion about the use of atomic weapons. This book traces the course of the discussions between the politicians and their technical advisers, the part played by personal relationships, and the attempt by some of the scientists to stop the bomb being used without warning. In addition, it supplies a thorough analysis of developments abroad, and in particular the situation in Japan. It shows that the debate in Washington and the atomic plants was careful and wide-ranging, and that issues are no less complex for being supremely important. The result is to provide both a study of decision-making and a valuable contribution to our understanding of the closing months of the Second World War.

On August 6 and August 9, 1945, the world became aware of the destructiveness of nuclear energy when the U.S. Army Air Corps dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Even before the bombs were detonated, though, President Harry Truman had directed his thoughts toward non-military uses of the atom, recognizing that the atomic bomb had given man a new understanding of the forces of nature. This book examines the history and development of nuclear power from the perspective of the U.S. Army's nuclear power program, telling its story from the creation of the Office of Research and Development through the program's days of growth,and on to its eventual decline. This history examines the development of the United States Army's nuclear power program from its inception, through the development and operation of six small nuclear power plants throughout the Western Hemisphere, to its evolution into a military support agency. The Manhattan Project District Engineer, General Kenneth Nichols, who generated the idea for the program, worked for the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. From the initial plans to develop nuclear power plants at remote bases, the book traces the path the Army took in getting its proposals approved by the Atomic Energy Commission, formally organizing the nuclear program, and building a prototype of a nuclear power plant. Separate chapters are devoted to Fort Greely, the nuclear program at the height of its success and accomplishment, and its subsequent decline and transitional period. With its list of suggestions for further reading and a comprehensive index, this volume will be a valuable resource for courses in military history, energy issues, and the development of atomic power. It will also represent an important addition to college, university, and public libraries.

The proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) is a major concern and the Middle East is at the forefront of US-lead efforts to counter and control their spread. This vital book examines why states seek to gain WMD, a crucial issue in developing strategies against proliferation. Leading experts examine specific countries and the interplay among political, economic, cultural and regional factors driving decisions whether to acquire WMD. The result is enhanced understanding of the challenge proliferation poses to US strategy and policy and the wider international community.

Johnston argues that the preemptive first-use of nuclear weapons, long the foundation of American nuclear strategy, was not the carefully reasoned response to a growing Soviet conventional threat. Instead, it was part of a process of cultural 'socialization', by which the United States reconstituted the previously nationalist strategic cultures of the European allies into a seamless western community directed by Washington. Building a bridge between theory and practice, this book examines the usefulness of cultural theory in international history.

Full Contributors:
Vladimir D. Andrianov, Natalya Bazhanova, Evgeniy Bazhanov, Valery I. Denisov, Georgiy Kaurov, Vladimir Li, Alexandre Y. Mansourov, Valentin I. Moiseyev, James Clay Moltz, Alexander Platkovskiy, Roald Savelyev, Larisa Zabrovskaya, Alexander Zarubin, Alexander Zhebin

In 1943, Robert Oppenheimer, the brilliant, charismatic head of the Manhattan Project, recruited scientists to live as virtual prisoners of the U.S. government at Los Alamos, a barren mesa thirty-five miles outside Santa Fe, New Mexico. Thousands of men, women, and children spent the war years sequestered in this top-secret military facility. They lied to friends and family about where they were going and what they were doing and then disappeared into the desert. The women came despite the Army's initial objections, as Oppenheimer insisted that would be the only way to recruit the world-class physicists and keep them reasonably sane and content during the years it would take to create this revolutionary new weapon. Conant shows how the stringent security, lack of privacy, spartan living conditions, and loneliness of the isolated mountain hideaway drove some residents to the brink of despair. Yet only a handful gave up and left. Through the eyes of a young Santa Fe widow who was one of Oppenheimer's first recruits, we see how, for all his flaws, he developed into an inspiring leader and motivated all those involved in the Los Alamos project to make a supreme effort and achieve the unthinkable.

Having served opposite Warsaw Pact forces in the 1950s and on Embassy duty in the 70s in Europe, the author offers a reasoned assessment of Britain's role in the so-called "nuclear club." He asks whether Britain really needs to be a member.

The proliferation of advanced weapons to volatile regions of the world has become a major issue in the post Cold War era. It was thought that no Third World nation could ever pose a technologically-based threat to the great powers by acquiring advanced weaponry. But this has proved to be wrong. The Persian Gulf War changed the worldwide perception of the spread of ballistic missiles to countries like Iraq. Access to a new type of weapon--cruise missiles--poses an even greater threat. With technology that is accessible, affordable, and relatively simple to produce, Third World countries could acquire highly accurate, long-range cruise missile forces to escalate local conflicts and threaten the forces and even the territories of the industrial powers. This book is a warning to policymakers. It is not too late to confront the realities of cruise missile proliferation and to devise international responses that could contain the worst possible consequences. Carus proposes a new regime of technology controls, security-building measures, and conflict resolution that need to be considered, and acted on, by policymakers and international relations experts everywhere.