Nuclear Deterrence Theory - The Search for Credibility (Hardcover, New)

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

General

Imprint:	Cambridge UniversityPress
Country of origin:	United Kingdom
Release date:	March 1990
First published:	1990
Authors:	Robert Powell
Dimensions:	242 x 162 x 20mm (L x W x T)
Format:	Hardcover
Pages:	240
Edition:	New
ISBN-13:	978-0-521-37527-6
Categories:	Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Weapons & equipment > Nuclear weapons Books > Social sciences > Warfare & defence > Other warfare & defence issues > Arms negotiation & control
LSN:	0-521-37527-4
Barcode:	9780521375276

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