This official history was originally printed in very small numbers in 2002. "Defense's Nuclear Agency, 1947-1997" traces the development of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), and its descendant government organizations, from its original founding in 1947 to 1997. After the disestablishment of the Manhattan Engineering District (MED) in 1947, AFSWP was formed to provide military training in nuclear weapons' operations. Over the years, its sequential descendant organizations have been the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) from 1959 to 1971, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) from 1971 to 1996, and the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) from 1996 to 1998. In 1998, DSWA, the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Technology Security Administration, and selected elements of the Office of Secretary of Defense were combined to form the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

In an age of nuclear arms diplomacy, Westerners still lack a deep understanding of how the Russians negotiate. Much has been written about Soviet negotiating tactics--especially in light of the recent INF Treaty--but there has been no systematic way of analyzing the Soviet record. The Soviet Union and Arms Control provides a coherent, penetrating model for understanding Soviet negotiating tactics, strategies, and modes--based not merely on impressions but on carefully analyzed case studies. Through this analysis, Westerners can begin to understand the different types of Soviet negotiating behavior and the factors that influence Soviet decision-making.

This book systematically sorts and organizes the existing literature on Soviet tactics--supplemented by interviews with former U.S. negotiators--into a coherent theory. The book's first two chapters examine Soviet negotiating modes, strategies, and tactics and two different models of the Soviet process of decision-making. The final two chapters explore two case studies--The Brezhnev Era: SALT II, 1972-1974; and The Gorbachev Era: Nuclear and Space Talks, 1985-1988--that provide a practical test of the theories. These two case studies trace Soviet diplomacy stage-by-stage and issue-by-issue, demonstrating that internal politics in the Soviet Union has a lesser effect on negotiations than considerations of the Soviet national interest.

This book focuses on an even more urgent and "inconvenient truth" than global warming. At the nuclear precipice, humanity's choices are catastrophe or transformation. This book explores the present nuclear predicament, and how to step away from the precipice and assure humanity's future. It examines the intersections between international law and national policies; and between nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and nuclear disarmament. The book offers a way out if policy makers of leading countries can summon the vision and political will to move in a new direction.

Winner of the Pulitzer Prize, published to exceptional reviews in both the US and the UK, American Prometheus is as compelling a work of biography as it is a significant work of history.

Physicist and polymath, as familiar with Hindu scriptures as he was with quantum mechanics, J. Robert Oppenheimer - director of the Manhattan Project that developed the atomic bomb - was the most famous scientist of his generation.

In their meticulous and riveting biography, Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin reveal a brilliant, ambitious, complex and flawed man, profoundly involved with some of the momentous events of the twentieth century.

This work analyzes the evolution of the U.S. strategic air force from 1945 to 1955. As commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1948 through 1955, Curtis LeMay shaped U.S. strategic forces to survive the new world. He insisted that the Air Force have access to atomic energy information for strategic planning. He struggled to find, promote, and retain the most qualified pilots and support personnel in the Air Force. This work describes the evolution of Air Force strategic forces, describes the importance of personnel to the SAC mission and how LeMay addressed the problem, examines the development of specialized maintenance in SAC, traces the transition from the B-47 to the B-52, and explores the importance of intelligence and targeting.

Nuclear Insecurity is an insider's account of official American efforts to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear and radiological weapons that could be used by rogue nations or terrorist groups. This perspective draws heavily from the author's work on the White House National Security Council Staff (1996-2000), where he was directly responsible to President Clinton for the development of U.S. nuclear material security policies and, subsequently, at the U.S. Department of Energy, where he directed the department's largest international nuclear security program, focused primarily on Russia. In Caravelli's assessment, despite exceptional bipartisan political support and very high funding levels that have reached over $9 billion, a series of policy mistakes and programmatic bureaucratic missteps have badly compromised the United States government's efforts to protect against the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. The most striking example of the current situation is that the U.S. government, some 12 years after the start of these programs, still has failed to enhance the security of more than 300 metric tons of nuclear materials in Russia alone, enough to make hundreds of nuclear devices. The book concludes with recommendations and policy prescriptions for addressing some of these problems.

According to a British intelligence report leaked to the press in 2007, al Qaeda operatives are planning a large-scale attack "on par with Hiroshima and Nagasaki." How likely is it that terrorists will develop the capability of such an attack? No one understands the nature of the threat posed by nuclear terrorism better than Brian Michael Jenkins--one of the world's most renowned experts on terrorism. For more than thirty years, he has been advising the military, government, and prestigious think tanks on the dangers of escalating terrorism.
Jenkins goes beyond what the experts know about terrorists' efforts to acquire nuclear weapons, nuclear black markets, "suitcase bombs," and mysterious substances like red mercury to examine how terrorists themselves think about such weapons. He offers many insights into such vital questions as:
- Do terrorists see nuclear weapons as instruments of coercion or of pure destruction? - Are those we label religious fanatics constrained by political and strategic calculations?
- If a nuclear attack took place on American soil, what life-and-death decisions would the president be forced to make? He puts the reader in the position of the president to convey the immediacy of making decisions--and the perilous repercussions of each critical decision.
Jenkins notes that terrorists have become increasingly adept at creating an atmosphere of nuclear terror. In fact, al Qaeda may have succeeded in becoming the world's first terrorist nuclear power without possessing a single nuclear weapon. The psychological effects of nuclear terror are fueled by American culture, which churns out novels and movies in which every conceivable horror scenario is played out. Political factions on both the right and the left also view nuclear terrorism as fodder to support their own arguments. In such an atmosphere, it is difficult for the average citizen to separate real from imagined dangers. Jenkins's informed and seasoned analysis will give all Americans a levelheaded understanding of the real situation and teach us how not to yield to nuclear terror.

If a nuclear war between American and Soviet forces or the forces of their allies were to start, how would it end? This soberting analysis, one of the few published treatments of War termination, identifies the policies and strategic issues involved in the attempt to control and end a nuclear war should one ever start. The author presents both a comprehensive overview of the theory of war termination and a broad-based analysis of the specific aspects of the question. Throughout, the aim is to provide policymakers and students of military strategy with a tool for improved strategic war planning that emphasizes the importance of flexibility and durability rather than the current emphasis on damage infliction.

Cimbala begins by discussing the compelling reasons for studying war termination, among them the potential deterrent value of such study. He then introduced pertinent issues in the literature of war termination, including the notion of an agreed battle', escalation control, intrawar deterrence, and coercive diplomacy. The bulk of the study is devoted to a detailed discussion of specific aspects of nuclear war determination. Ih his concluding chapter, Cimbala integrates these aspects into a coherrent theory of nuclear war termination and assesses the potential implications of strategic defenses for American nuclear deterrence strategies.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union the nuclear threats facing the world are constantly evolving and have grown more complex since the end of the Cold War. The diversion of complete weapon systems or nuclear material to rogue nations and terrorist organizations has increased and new nuclear powers (e.g. Iran, Korea, Pakistan and India) have further complicated global proliferation issues. The events of the past years have proved the necessity to reevaluate these threats on a level never before considered. In recognition that no single country possesses all of the answers to the critical scientific, institutional and legal questions associated with combating nuclear and radiological terrorism, the 2005 Workshop and this proceeding was structured to promote wide-ranging, multi-national exploration of critical technology needs and underlying scientific challenges to reducing the threat of nuclear/radiological terrorism; to illustrate through country-specific presentations how resulting technologies were used in national programs; and to outline the role of legal, policy and institutional frameworks in countering nuclear/radiological terrorism. One key outcome of this book is better understanding of the independent contributions from across the international community of the scientific and technological components and the legal, policy and institutional components to combating nuclear/radiological terrorism. The book can serve as a tool for communicating the outcomes of the workshop not only to the multi-national scientific communities engaged in combating nuclear/radiological terrorism, but also to those working at governmental and policy levels whose actions affect the directionsscience takes and how the technology is incorporated into country-specific national systems for combating nuclear/radiological terrorism.

"Treating Weapons Proliferation" is a chilling exploration of the dynamics of weapons proliferation and nonproliferation. Through an analogy with the disease of cancer, the book walks the reader through the history of the phenomenon, its growing complexities and changing dimensions, its causes and consequences, and the various policy responses currently available to address it. Taking stock of the nature and challenges of such responses, the book shows that there is no all-encompassing cure for weapons proliferation at the present time, only treatments of relative and contextual effectiveness. Simply put, weapons proliferation, like cancer, has no single cure, but it is a condition that can often be treated, sometimes successfully.

From the legendary whistle-blower who revealed the Pentagon Papers, the first insider exposé of the terrifying dangers of America's hidden, seventy-year-long nuclear policy.

At the same time former presidential advisor Daniel Ellsberg famously took the Pentagon Papers, he also took with him a cache of top-secret documents related to America's nuclear program in the 1960s. Here for the first time he reveals the contents of those now-declassified documents and makes clear their shocking relevance for today.

The Doomsday Machine is Ellsberg's account of the most dangerous arms build-up in the history of civilisation, whose legacy - and proposed renewal under the Trump administration - threatens the very survival of humanity.

The nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union are larger, better equipped, and deadlier than at any other time in history. This incisive book contends that the superpowers, while exhibiting enormous ingenuity in the area of arms development, have shown only a minimal interest toward the containment of arms. This is a carefully documented evaluation of the mismanagement of nuclear arms control by the superpowers, and of their failure to contain the nuclear arms race despite their involvement in the process for over a quarter of a century. Only the superpowers can reduce the proliferation of nuclear arms and in the process lessen the likelihood of nuclear war through accident, miscalculation, or crisis escalation. Yet forty-four years after Hiroshima, not a single wanted nuclear weapon has been eliminated by them.

"The Superpowers and Nuclear Arms Control" addresses a broad spectrum of nuclear arms control issues, beginning with the history of the nuclear arms race, the lukewarm attempts by the superpowers at nuclear arms control, and the role of the nuclear havenots. The book then considers current threats to arms control evidenced by the termination of the SALT regime and plans to discard the ABM Treaty. A discussion of the congressional-executive split on numerous key arms control issues is followed by conclusions drawn from observing decades of negotiation. Comprehensive appendices contain valuable charts and other documents that reinforce the content of the text. This resource is a useful tool for arms control and disarmament activists, students, and researchers, and for the many men and women everywhere who are at a loss to understand why so little is being accomplished in this critical area.

Jina Kim investigates how North Korea rationalized its pursuit of nuclear weapons programs for more than two decades, by exploring the dialectical development of the nuclear crisis and the obstacles generated by complex internal Korean dynamics and conflicting interests amongst the major players concerned.

This volume affords a fascinating and rare look at the sensitive issue of nuclear diplomacy between two critical Cold War allies, the United States and Japan, during the 1960s. Challenging the silence of the official bureaucracies in Washington and Tokyo, Wakaizumi Kei reveals the truth behind the secret 1969 agreement that ensured the eventual reversion of Okinawa to Japanese jurisdiction in 1972. Revelation of this secret accord created considerable controversy in Japan when Wakaizumi's memoir was first published in 1994. With the publication of this translation, his description of the events leading up to the closed-door agreement is available to an English-language audience for the first time.

At a time when security matters are once again predominant in the U.S. -- Japan alliance, Professor Wakaizumi's account is a timely reminder of the gap between official, media-filtered descriptions of diplomatic relations and the private discussions of national leaders. The long-standing reluctance of the Japanese government to declassify its postwar diplomatic records has meant that Japan's side of its relationship with the U.S. has been only partially revealed. The Best Course Available attempts to correct this shortcoming and at the same time provides insight into the complicated and arcane process of foreign policymaking, national leadership, and domestic politics in Japan after 1945.

Since his election, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran has reversed the more moderate and pluralistic policies of his predecessor and projected himself onto the public scene with headline-grabbing speeches regarding Jews and the state of Israel, open defiance of the UN Security Council on the nuclear issue, and an apparent vision of his country becoming the dominant power in the Middle East. Iran's nuclear ambitions are in direct conflict with the wishes of the United States, the European Union, and many of the governments of the Middle East, leading to consequences that remain uncertain. Iran is a focus of attention in the most recent war in Lebanon, expanding its influence as a (the?) major supporter and supplier of Hezbollah. And Iran is cited in the most recent annual U.S. State Department report on terrorism as the country that is the "most active sponsor of terrorism." This book documents Ahmadinejad's background and rise to power. It explains the current structure of the Iranian revolutionary government--the competing centers of power and the major players. In separate sections it details the terrorist groups funded and armed by Iran, primarily Hezbollah and Hamas. And it provides a comprehensive picture of Iran's apparent aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons, as well as the related implications for regional and global security concerns. There is little reason to believe that Ahmadinejad will leave the scene anytime soon, or that Iran's behavior will change in the near term.

"A study of the political, military and technical aspects of Britains nuclear weapons programme under the Macmillan government, contrasting Britains perceived political decline with its growth in technological mastery and military nuclear capability. Important reading for anyone interested in the history and military technology of the cold war"--Provided by publisher.

Once dismissed as ineffectual, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has in the past twenty years emerged as a powerful international organization. Member states allow the IAEA to render judgment on matters vital to peace and security while nations around the globe comply with its rules and commands on proliferation, safety, and a range of other issues. Robert L. Brown details the IAEA's role in facilitating both control of nuclear weapons and the safe exploitation of nuclear power. As he shows, the IAEA has acquired a surprising amount of power as states, for political and technological reasons, turn to it to supply policy cooperation and to act as an agent for their security and safety. The agency's success in gaining and holding authority rests in part on its ability to apply politically neutral expertise that produces beneficial policy outcomes. But Brown also delves into the puzzle of how an agency created by states to aid cooperation has acquired power over them.

This Second Edition continues the fine tradition of its predecessor by exploring the various automatic control systems in aircraft and on board missiles. Considerably expanded and updated, it now includes new or additional material on: the effectiveness of beta-beta feedback as a method of obtaining coordination during turns using the F-15 as the aircraft model; the root locus analysis of a generic acceleration autopilot used in many air-to-air and surface-to-air guided missiles; the guidance systems of the AIM-9L Sidewinder as well as bank-to-turn missiles; various types of guidance, including proportional navigation and line-of-sight and lead-angle command guidance; the coupling of the output of a director fire control system into the autopilot; the analysis of multivariable control systems; and methods for modeling the human pilot, plus the integration of the human pilot into an aircraft flight control system. Also features many new additions to the appendices.

Why do some American intelligence officials maintain fallout shelters and private contingency plans to evacuate their families in the event of a Russian nuclear strike--even in today's post-Cold War era of U.S.-Russian partnership? The frightening answer lies within the pages of "War Scare," a terrifying assessment of the prospect for nuclear holocaust in our day. Written by Peter Vincent Pry, a former CIA military analyst, "War Scare" provides a history of our country's little-known brushes with nuclear war and warns that, contrary to popular opinion and the assurances of our political leaders, the possibility of a Russian attack still exists. Nuclear deterrence has been the foundation of Western security for the last 50 years, but since the end of the Cold War, Russian military doctrine has become more destabilizing, and much more dangerous, than is commonly believed.

By making use of a wealth of declassified and unclassified material, Dr. Pry illustrates how Russia's brutal past continues to shape the consciousness and decision making of its leaders, many of whom are unreconstructed ideologues from the old Soviet regime. Gripped by a perpetual perception of imminent threat--a war scare--the Russian General Staff, which controls the technical capability of launching a nuclear strike, has shown itself to be unstable at best. The author explores recent history and near-disasters such as the Bosnian crisis, the Norway missile incident, and U.S. air strikes on Iraq from the perspective of the Russian General Staff, believing that only by understanding their viewpoint can we minimize the risk of unintentionally provoking a deadly attack. Wary of NATO expansion and reeling from the Russian economy's descent into chaos, the General Staff may interpret Western military exercises and operations in the Middle East and elsewhere as concealing surprise aggression against Russia. This is a grave situation, indeed, as even after the START I, II, and III agreements, Russia will retain enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world--not to mention significantly expanded chemical and biological warfare capability. "War Scare" convincingly shows that we ignore these facts at our peril.

What were the important developments in the military sector in 1988, and what effect did they have on peace and security? What progress was made in the attempts to control military activity and to reduce tension and the chances of war? In short, what are the prospects for a more stable international order? This twentieth edition of the SIPRI Yearbook presents detailed information on arms and arms control issues in a format that is both concise and standardized for ease of use. The Yearbooks attract world-wide attention and are used by governments, arms control negotiators, United Nations delegations, parliaments, scholars, students, the media and citizens as unique and indispensable reference works. The SIPRI Yearbook 1989 continues SIPRI`s review of the latest developments in nuclear weapons, nuclear explosions, world military expenditure, the international arms trade, chemical and biological weapons, the military use of outer space, ongoing armed conflicts and European arms control, and presents the unique annual calendar of military activities required by the Stockholm Document. Efforts to control the arms race - in nuclear, chemical, biological, conventional, and space weapons - are described, and the status of negotiations and agreements is analysed. In addition to these regular features and statistics, this latest SIPRI Yearbook contains special studies on the arms trade regulations of seven weapon-exporting countries, on ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World, and on the enhanced role of the United Nations in regional conflict resolution. Its comprehensive coverage makes it an invaluable sourcebook for anyone seeking authoritative, factual information on issues of armaments and disarmament and thus to anyone interested in strategic studies, war studies, peace studies and international relations.

The core principle underlying the strategy of nonproliferation - acceptance of a two tier international nuclear order - has become unsustainable. Policy makers and those in the academic world need to turn their attention to exploring new proliferation management strategies premised first and foremost on recognizing that nuclear weapons are here to stay and that determined proliferators can not be stopped from going nuclear. Andrew O'Neil develops this argument in relation to the role of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia, the engine house of world economic growth. To what extent does the failing strategy of nonproliferation pose serious challenges for Northeast Asia's security environment? Are there alternative strategies for managing nuclear weapons in the region? Should the presence of nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia necessarily be seen in exclusively negative terms, as many experts believe?

This third volume of the book series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law focuses on the development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes within a contemporary global context, an interdependent characteristic of the Non-Proliferation Treaty along with disarmament and non-proliferation. The scholarly contributions in this volume explore this interrelationship, considering the role of nation States as well as international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in monitoring and implementing the Treaty. The 2015 Nuclear Accord with Iran and its implementation is also discussed, highlighting relevant developments in this evolving area. Overall, the volume explores relevant issues, ultimately presenting a number of suggestions for international cooperation in this sensitive field where political discussion often dominates over legal analysis. The important tasks of limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, ensuring the safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and achieving nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control, calls for the interpretation and application of international legal principles and rules in their relevant context, a task that this book series endeavours to facilitate whilst presenting new information and evaluating current developments in this area of international law. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Dean of Law and Professor of International and Comparative Law at Robson Hall, Faculty of Law, University of Manitoba; a Barrister at One Garden Court, London; a Magistrate in Oxfordshire; a Justice of the Peace for England & Wales; a Member of Wolfson College, University of Oxford; and Chair of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); and Rapporteur of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & Contemporary International Law.