This is an excellent advanced study in strategy in the nuclear age. Cimbala covers the field thoroughly. He challenges much of the conventional and established approaches to deterrence and crisis management. . . . Cimbala's work is a valuable and refreshing addition to the literature. Scholars will find it enriching and challenging. . . . This is a must acquisition for university and professional libraries. "Choice"

Cimbala critically examines the rational behind Western defense policies based on deterrence. According to the author, nuclear strategizing--or coping with outside threats--is shortsighted--dependent as it is on economic analogies and technical fixation. It leaves unanswered important questions about the relationships between strategy, politics, and long-term defense goals. Cimbala examines a number of issues from this point of departure, including: arms control, de-escalation and escalation, control of nuclear forecast, and the future of conventional forces.

Using newly released documents, the author presents an integrated look at American nuclear policy and diplomacy in crises from the Berlin blockade to Vietnam. The book answers the question of why, when the atomic bomb had been used with such devastating effect against the Japanese Empire in 1945, American leaders put this most apocalyptic of weapons back on the shelf, never to be used again in anger. It documents the myopia of Potomac strategists in involving the US in wars of attrition in Korea and Southeast Asia, marginal areas where American vital interests were in no way endangered. Despite the presence of hundreds, then thousands of nuclear bombs and warheads in the nation's stockpile, the greatest military weapon in history became politically impossible to use. And yet overwhelming nuclear superiority did serve its ultimate purpose in the Cold War. When American vital interests were threatened - over Berlin and Cuba - the Soviets backed down from confrontation. Despite errors in strategic judgement brought on by fear of Communist expansion, and in some cases outright incompetence, the ace in the hole proved decisive.

The future of nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy in the 21st century is not entirely predictable from the Cold War past. Nor is it easy to foresee on the basis of what has happened since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Cimbala contends that nuclear weapons and the psychology of nuclear deterrence will remain important after 2000, but the character of that importance will change. No longer will nuclear weapons be the dominators of military technology. Instead, advanced technology conventional weapons, based on information and electronics, will supplant nuclear weapons as the instruments of military supremacy in the 21st century.

What, Cimbala asks, can be expected of nuclear weapons in the 21st century, given what we have learned from previous experience in the Cold War and in the 1990s? Cimbala expects that nuclear weapons will spread among currently non-nuclear states, and states with regional grievances or hegemonic aspirations will seek to deploy small nuclear forces as deterrents against neighbors or against outside intervention by the United States in regional conflicts. Regional rogue states may also obtain nuclear weapons. Nonetheless, as Cimbala explains, the international balance of power is unlikely to change. As he makes clear, power will be less dependent on deployed military platforms and more dependent on information warfare. A thoughtful and provocative analysis that will be of particular interest to policy makers, scholars, and other researchers involved with arms control, security studies, and international relations.

This book investigates drivers and trends in nuclear proliferation in the Global South. Based on an in-depth analysis of South Africa's nuclear history, it examines general causes of proliferation, such as technical capabilities and constraints; a country's motivation to build a nuclear bomb; and particular domestic and international situations. It also highlights Britain's role in the development of technological capability in South Africa and explains how nuclear weapons influence international relations. Finally, the study offers effective solutions to the problem of nuclear proliferation in developing countries.

This second Volume in the book Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law discusses the legal interpretation and implementation of verification and compliance with the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 1996; and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), 1957. It specifically examines the question, contested in recent academic writings, whether the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is competent to verify not only the correctness, but also the completeness of national declarations. Topical legal issues of verification and its technical and political limits as well as peaceful settlement of disputes and countermeasures are discussed in-depth. The Series on Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law provides scholarly research articles with critical commentaries on relevant treaty law, best practice and legal developments, thus offering an academic analysis and information on practical legal and diplomatic developments both globally and regionally. It sets a basis for a further constructive discourse on the topic at both national and international levels. A Third Volume, to be published in Autumn 2016, will focus on legal issues of safety and security of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Jonathan L. Black-Branch is Professor of International Law, Royal Holloway University of London; a Member of Wolfson College, Oxford; Chairman of the International Law Association (ILA) Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law. Dieter Fleck is Former Director International Agreements & Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany; Member of the Advisory Board of the Amsterdam Center for International Law (ACIL); Honorary President, International Society for Military Law and the Law of War; Rapporteur of the ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Prolife ration and Contemporary International Law.

With the concept of 'Atomic Anxiety', this book offers a novel perspective on one of the most important and longstanding puzzles of international politics: the non-use of U.S. nuclear weapons. By focusing on the fear surrounding nuclear weapons, it explains why nuclear deterrence and the nuclear taboo are working at cross purposes in practice.

This volume is a collection of contributions by world-leading experts in the nuclear field who participated in the educational activities of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO). It features some of most prominent scholars and practitioners who contributed in fundamental ways to shaping policies, strategies, theories, scholarly studies, and debates in the field of non-proliferation and disarmament. On the occasion of ISODARCO's 50th anniversary this book revisits a selection of contributions that capture the pressing issues during the five decades of continuous engagement in disarmament and non-proliferation education.

Containing the histories (from 1945 to the present) of the nuclear strategies of NATO, Britain and France, and of the defence preferences of the FRG (West Germany) this book shows how strategies were functions of a perceived Soviet threat and an American 'nuclear guarantee'. There were three options for West Europeans: a compromise with differing American needs in NATO, pursued by Britain and the FRG; national nuclear forces, developed by Britain and France; and projects for an independent European nuclear force.

Offering a new perspective on the widely discussed debate on how the international community would respond to a nuclear-armed Iran, this critical research challenges the prevailing wisdom that a nuclear Iran would provoke a nuclear proliferation cascade in the Middle East.Hobbs and Moran assess the proliferation calculus of four key countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and Syria, as well exploring the possibility that Iran would transfer nuclear materials to terrorists groups. The authors conclude that a nuclear domino effect would be highly unlikely, even in the face of an Iranian bomb, thus undermining one of the major arguments used in support of pre-emptive military action against Iran's nuclear facilities.A range of policy measures are outlined, that could be enacted by the international community to further reduce the risk of a regional proliferation cascade, making this text a must-read for policy makers, security and international relations scholars and all those with an interest in the Middle East.

This book offers an in-depth historical and technical description of Iran's nuclear program in political, economic, and strategic contexts. The author points out this issue's connections with the evolution of global and regional strategic balances, as well as the stability of the international regime against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Christoph Laucht offers the first investigation into the roles played by two German-born emigre atomic scientists, Klaus Fuchs and Rudolf Peierls, in the development of British nuclear culture, especially the practice of nuclear science and the political implications of the atomic scientists' work, from the start of the Second World War until 1959.

This book seeks to elucidate the decisions of states that have chosen to acquire nuclear arms or inherited nuclear arsenals, and have either disarmed or elected to retain their warheads. It examines nuclear arms policy via an interconnected framework involving the eclectic use of national security based realism, economic interdependence liberalism, and nuclear weapons norms or morality based constructivism. Through the various chapters examining the nuclear munitions decisions of South Africa, Ukraine and North Korea, a case is built that a state's leadership decides whether to keep or give up "the Bomb" based on interlinked security, economic and norms governed motivations. Thereafter, frameworks evaluating the likelihood of nuclear proliferation and accessing the feasibility of disarmament are then applied to North Korea and used to examine recent Iranian nuclear negotiability. This book is an invaluable resource for international relations and security studies scholars, WMD analysts and post graduate or undergraduate candidates focusing on nuclear arms politics related courses

This book strives to take stock of current achievements and existing challenges in nuclear verification, identify the available information and gaps that can act as drivers for exploring new approaches to verification strategies and technologies. With the practical application of the systems concept to nuclear disarmament scenarios and other, non-nuclear verification fields, it investigates, where greater transparency and confidence could be achieved in pursuit of new national or international nonproliferation and arms reduction efforts. A final discussion looks at how, in the absence of formal government-to-government negotiations, experts can take practical steps to advance the technical development of these concepts.

This book focuses on an even more urgent and "inconvenient truth" than global warming. At the nuclear precipice, humanity's choices are catastrophe or transformation. This book explores the present nuclear predicament, and how to step away from the precipice and assure humanity's future. It examines the intersections between international law and national policies; and between nuclear proliferation, nuclear terrorism and nuclear disarmament. The book offers a way out if policy makers of leading countries can summon the vision and political will to move in a new direction.

This official history was originally printed in very small numbers in 2002. "Defense's Nuclear Agency, 1947-1997" traces the development of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP), and its descendant government organizations, from its original founding in 1947 to 1997. After the disestablishment of the Manhattan Engineering District (MED) in 1947, AFSWP was formed to provide military training in nuclear weapons' operations. Over the years, its sequential descendant organizations have been the Defense Atomic Support Agency (DASA) from 1959 to 1971, the Defense Nuclear Agency (DNA) from 1971 to 1996, and the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) from 1996 to 1998. In 1998, DSWA, the On-Site Inspection Agency, the Defense Technology Security Administration, and selected elements of the Office of Secretary of Defense were combined to form the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

In an age of nuclear arms diplomacy, Westerners still lack a deep understanding of how the Russians negotiate. Much has been written about Soviet negotiating tactics--especially in light of the recent INF Treaty--but there has been no systematic way of analyzing the Soviet record. The Soviet Union and Arms Control provides a coherent, penetrating model for understanding Soviet negotiating tactics, strategies, and modes--based not merely on impressions but on carefully analyzed case studies. Through this analysis, Westerners can begin to understand the different types of Soviet negotiating behavior and the factors that influence Soviet decision-making.

This book systematically sorts and organizes the existing literature on Soviet tactics--supplemented by interviews with former U.S. negotiators--into a coherent theory. The book's first two chapters examine Soviet negotiating modes, strategies, and tactics and two different models of the Soviet process of decision-making. The final two chapters explore two case studies--The Brezhnev Era: SALT II, 1972-1974; and The Gorbachev Era: Nuclear and Space Talks, 1985-1988--that provide a practical test of the theories. These two case studies trace Soviet diplomacy stage-by-stage and issue-by-issue, demonstrating that internal politics in the Soviet Union has a lesser effect on negotiations than considerations of the Soviet national interest.

Nuclear Insecurity is an insider's account of official American efforts to prevent the theft or diversion of nuclear and radiological weapons that could be used by rogue nations or terrorist groups. This perspective draws heavily from the author's work on the White House National Security Council Staff (1996-2000), where he was directly responsible to President Clinton for the development of U.S. nuclear material security policies and, subsequently, at the U.S. Department of Energy, where he directed the department's largest international nuclear security program, focused primarily on Russia. In Caravelli's assessment, despite exceptional bipartisan political support and very high funding levels that have reached over $9 billion, a series of policy mistakes and programmatic bureaucratic missteps have badly compromised the United States government's efforts to protect against the spread of nuclear weapons and materials. The most striking example of the current situation is that the U.S. government, some 12 years after the start of these programs, still has failed to enhance the security of more than 300 metric tons of nuclear materials in Russia alone, enough to make hundreds of nuclear devices. The book concludes with recommendations and policy prescriptions for addressing some of these problems.

This work analyzes the evolution of the U.S. strategic air force from 1945 to 1955. As commander of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) from 1948 through 1955, Curtis LeMay shaped U.S. strategic forces to survive the new world. He insisted that the Air Force have access to atomic energy information for strategic planning. He struggled to find, promote, and retain the most qualified pilots and support personnel in the Air Force. This work describes the evolution of Air Force strategic forces, describes the importance of personnel to the SAC mission and how LeMay addressed the problem, examines the development of specialized maintenance in SAC, traces the transition from the B-47 to the B-52, and explores the importance of intelligence and targeting.

More than forty years of commitment to nuclear weapons may have prepared Britain to take part in Armageddon, but not to defend itself against attack. What made British governments choose this path and how have they justified it? How have they responded to the moral questions it raises? Using material from recently-released official documents, Roger Ruston presents a moral history of British defence policy, from the 'lesson' of Appeasement to the nuclear modernizations of the eighties, and answers many of the questions that governments have avoided. The book will be of great interest to defence historians, moralists, politicians, and general readers who need a clear account of their country's defence predicament as a basis from which to devise workable and morally acceptable alternatives.