Cimbala argues that nuclear complacency is based on a misreading
of history and on unsound political and military analysis. The
stability factors built into the Cold War international system are
now missing. The spread of nuclear weapons after the Cold War moved
toward regional actors outside of Europe, some with religious or
national scores to settle. Technology transfer of ballistic
missiles and other delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, including biological and chemical as well as nuclear
weapons, brings the danger of nuclear eruption closer to reality.
Finally, the mechanism of deterrence that seemed so dependable as a
means of war prevention from 1947 to 1991 only seems so by virtue
of nostalgia.
The early decades of the Cold War were made somewhat
unpredictable by uncertain U.S.-Soviet political relations, by
nuclear force building based on worst-case estimates, and by
rickety command and control systems that could have failed both
sides in a crisis. The Soviets and Americans gradually improved
their relationship and stabilized Cold War competition, including
nuclear rivalry, but they had more than 40 years to practice and no
immediate territorial disputes. As Cimbala makes clear, it cannot
be assumed that the Soviet-American nonbelligerence of the Cold War
is transferable into a multipolar, post-Cold War international
system marked by spreading weapons and trigger-sensitive control
systems. This provocative analysis will be of interest to all
scholars, students, and policy makers involved with defense,
security, and foreign policy studies.
General
Is the information for this product incomplete, wrong or inappropriate?
Let us know about it.
Does this product have an incorrect or missing image?
Send us a new image.
Is this product missing categories?
Add more categories.
Review This Product
No reviews yet - be the first to create one!