This Adelphi Paper examines the motives behind Libyaa (TM)s
pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, from Gadhafia (TM)s rise
to power in 1969 through to the end of 2003. It also assesses the
proliferation pathways that the regime followed during this period,
including early dependence on Soviet technology and assistance,
subsequently relying on technological infusions from the A.Q. Khan
network.
Wyn Q. Bowen clearly analyzes the decision to give up the quest
for nuclear weapons, focusing on the main factors that influenced
the Gadhafi regimea (TM)s calculations, including the perceived
need to re-engage, both politically and economically, with the
international community, particularly the United States. It
explores the process of dismantling the nuclear programme and the
question of whether Libya constitutes a a ~modela (TM) for
addressing the challenges posed by other proliferators.
General
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