Most Americans believe that the Second World War ended because
the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan forced it to surrender. "Five
Days in August" boldly presents a different interpretation: that
the military did not clearly understand the atomic bomb's
revolutionary strategic potential, that the Allies were almost as
stunned by the surrender as the Japanese were by the attack, and
that not only had experts planned and fully anticipated the need
for a third bomb, they were skeptical about whether the atomic bomb
would work at all. With these ideas, Michael Gordin reorients the
historical and contemporary conversation about the A-bomb and World
War II.
Gordin posits that although the bomb clearly brought with it a
new level of destructive power, strategically it was regarded by
decision-makers simply as a new conventional weapon, a bigger
firebomb. To lend greater understanding to the thinking behind its
deployment, Gordin takes the reader to the island of Tinian, near
Guam, the home base for the bombing campaign, and the location from
which the anticipated third atomic bomb was to be delivered. He
also details how Americans generated a new story about the origins
of the bomb after surrender: that the United States knew in advance
that the bomb would end the war and that its destructive power was
so awesome no one could resist it.
"Five Days in August" explores these and countless other
legacies of the atomic bomb in a glaring new light. Daring and
iconoclastic, it will result in far-reaching discussions about the
significance of the A-bomb, about World War II, and about the moral
issues they have spawned.
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