A major revision of our understanding of long-range bombing,
this book examines how Anglo-American ideas about "strategic"
bombing were formed and implemented. It argues that ideas about
bombing civilian targets rested on--and gained validity
from--widespread but substantially erroneous assumptions about the
nature of modern industrial societies and their vulnerability to
aerial bombardment. These assumptions were derived from the social
and political context of the day and were maintained largely
through cognitive error and bias. Tami Davis Biddle explains how
air theorists, and those influenced by them, came to believe that
strategic bombing would be an especially effective coercive tool
and how they responded when their assumptions were challenged.
Biddle analyzes how a particular interpretation of the World War
I experience, together with airmen's organizational interests,
shaped interwar debates about strategic bombing and preserved
conceptions of its potentially revolutionary character. This flawed
interpretation as well as a failure to anticipate implementation
problems were revealed as World War II commenced. By then, the
British and Americans had invested heavily in strategic bombing.
They saw little choice but to try to solve the problems in real
time and make long-range bombing as effective as possible.
Combining narrative with analysis, this book presents the
first-ever comparative history of British and American strategic
bombing from its origins through 1945. In examining the ideas and
rhetoric on which strategic bombing depended, it offers critical
insights into the validity and robustness of those ideas--not only
as they applied to World War II but as they apply to contemporary
warfare.
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