This survey of more than fifty years of national security policy
juxtaposes declassified U.S. national intelligence estimates with
recently released Soviet documents disclosing the views of Soviet
leaders and their Communist allies on the same events. Matthias
shows that U.S. intelligence estimates were usually correct but
that our political and military leaders generally ignored them --
with sometimes disastrous results.
The book begins with a look back at the role of U.S.
intelligence during World War II, from Pearl Harbor through the
plot against Hitler, from the D-Day invasion to the "unconditional
surrender" of Japan, and reveals how better use of the intelligence
available could have saved many lives and shortened the war. The
following chapters dealing with the Cold War disclose what
information and advice U.S. intelligence analysts passed on to
policymakers, and also what sometimes bitter policy debates
occurred within the Communist camp, concerning Vietnam, the Bay of
Pigs, the Cuban missile crisis, the turmoil in Eastern Europe, the
Six-Day and Yom Kippur wars in the Middle East, and the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan. In many ways, this is a story of
missed opportunities that the U.S. government had to conduct a more
responsible foreign policy which could have avoided large losses of
life and massive expenditures on arms buildups.
While not exonerating the CIA for its own mistakes, Matthias
casts new light on the contributions that objective intelligence
analysis did make during the Cold War and speculates on what might
have happened if that analysis and advice had been heeded.
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