This book analyses the response of the Indonesian state to violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a minority communities by foregrounding the close connections between state officials and vigilante groups, which influenced the way the post-Soeharto democratic Indonesian governments addressed the problem of violence against religious minorities. Arguing that the violence stemmed in part from the state officials' close connection with vigilante groups, and a general tendency for the authorities to forge mutual and material interests with such groups, the author demonstrates that vigilante groups were able to perpetrate violence against the minority congregations with a significant degree of impunity. While the Indonesian state has become far more democratic, accountable, and decentralized since 1998, the violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a communities shows a state that is still unwilling in assisting or allowing minority groups to practice their religion. The research undertaken for this book draws upon a lengthy period of ethnographic fieldwork in the communities of West Java and East Java. Research material includes in-depth interviews with community and religious leaders, state officials and security forces, and other prominent politicians. A novel approach to the problem of Islam, violence, and the state in Indonesia, the book will be of interest to researchers studying Southeast Asian Politics, Islam and Politics, Conflict Resolution, State and Violence, and Terrorism and Political Violence.

This book analyses the response of the Indonesian state to violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a minority communities by foregrounding the close connections between state officials and vigilante groups, which influenced the way the post-Soeharto democratic Indonesian governments addressed the problem of violence against religious minorities. Arguing that the violence stemmed in part from the state officials' close connection with vigilante groups, and a general tendency for the authorities to forge mutual and material interests with such groups, the author demonstrates that vigilante groups were able to perpetrate violence against the minority congregations with a significant degree of impunity. While the Indonesian state has become far more democratic, accountable, and decentralized since 1998, the violence against Ahmadiyah and Shi'a communities shows a state that is still unwilling in assisting or allowing minority groups to practice their religion. The research undertaken for this book draws upon a lengthy period of ethnographic fieldwork in the communities of West Java and East Java. Research material includes in-depth interviews with community and religious leaders, state officials and security forces, and other prominent politicians. A novel approach to the problem of Islam, violence, and the state in Indonesia, the book will be of interest to researchers studying Southeast Asian Politics, Islam and Politics, Conflict Resolution, State and Violence, and Terrorism and Political Violence.

Religious extremism among students in major campuses in Indonesia remains a problem for the Indonesian government, campus authorities and moderate Muslims. A substantial number of studies on Islam and religious extremism in Indonesia have focused on security and cultural paradigms. In contrast, this article discusses the factors that cause the rise of religious extremism among university students through an organizational and institutional lens. The dissemination and internalization of religious extremist narratives contribute to the rise of religious extremism among university students in Indonesia. Counter-extremism policies by the government and campus authorities have not been effective due to the absence of an integrative approach. All stakeholders—the government, campus authorities, parents of university students, communities and student organizations—need to establish a concerted and integrative effort to uproot religious extremism from among university students.

The rise of religious extremism in public discourses is a cause for concern for government officials and moderate Muslims. While a substantial body of research on violent extremism is available, the issue of non-violent extremism remains neglected by scholars. Although exposure and subscription to non-violent extremism do not automatically lead to violence, it still needs to be curbed because it can fan hatred that in turn can lead to physical violence and repression of human rights. Non-violent extremism also boosts polarization in the community. Given this potential impact, the government needs to pay more attention to the dissemination of non-violent extremist public discourses, especially on social media. It could work together with influential religious organizations which possess immense religious authority and legitimacy.