The interest of Russian intellectuals in the French Revolution demonstrates that some Russian thinkers of the 19th century had begun to question the concept of Russia's uniqueness. Yet most of them came to believe that the French Revolution (which they tended to equate with the Western experience) was irrelevant not only to Russia but to the rest of the world as well. They saw, perhaps correctly, that the Western experience, with the French Revolution as its symbol, was foreign to Russian destiny. Most of the Russian intellectuals of that time had rightly foreseen Russia, and to some degree the rest of the world's future, as following an authoritarian/totalitarian model of development.

This book examines the interplay between key rulers and intellectuals in creating and sustaining popular discourses that often help keep rulers in power. By focusing in particular on the relationship between Putin and Dugin during the early Putin regime, the author zooms in on the questionable honesty in Putin's interest in Dugin's philosophy, and the instrumentality of that philosophy for strategic regime building. Arguing that ideology is largely supported by political philosophies that gain popular traction, the book questions the extent to which rulers are likely to stay faithful to their stated ideologies. Providing on-the-ground insight into Putin's rule, this book appeals to researchers and policymakers studying Post-Soviet Politics.

The political uncertainty following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rejection of the revolutionary model has brought Russian political thought full circle as democratic forces contend with authoritarian nationalism. This volume is essential to understanding the antidemocratic tradition in Russia and the persistent danger of totalitarianism.

Totalitarian rule is commonly thought to derive from spe- cific ideologies that justify the complete control by the state of social, cultural, and political institutions. The major goal of this volume is to demonstrate that in some cases brutal forms of state control have been the only way to maintain basic social order. Dmitry Shlapentokh seeks to show that totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes have their roots in a fear of disorder that may overtake both rulers and the society at large. Although ideology has played an important role in many totalitarian regimes, it has not always been the chief reason for repression. In many cases, the desire to establish order led to internal terror and intrusiveness in all aspects of human life. Shlapentokh seeks the roots of this phenomenon in France in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, when asocial processes in the wake of the Hundred Years War led to the emergence of a brutal absolutist state whose features and policies bore a striking resemblance to totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and China. State punishment and control allowed for relentless drive to "normalize" society with the state actively engaged in the regulation of social life. There were attempts to regulate the economy and instances of social engineering, attempts to populate emerging colonial empires with exiles and produce "new men and women" through reeducation. This increased harshness in dealing with the populace, in fact, the emergence of a new sort of bondage, was combined with a twisted form of humanitarianism and the creation of a rudimentary safety net. Some of these elements can be found in the democratic societies of the modern West, although in their aggregation these attributes are essential features of totalitarian regimes of the modem era.

Totalitarian rule is commonly thought to derive from spe- cific ideologies that justify the complete control by the state of social, cultural, and political institutions. The major goal of this volume is to demonstrate that in some cases brutal forms of state control have been the only way to maintain basic social order. Dmitry Shlapentokh seeks to show that totalitarian or semi-totalitarian regimes have their roots in a fear of disorder that may overtake both rulers and the society at large. Although ideology has played an important role in many totalitarian regimes, it has not always been the chief reason for repression. In many cases, the desire to establish order led to internal terror and intrusiveness in all aspects of human life. Shlapentokh seeks the roots of this phenomenon in France in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries, when asocial processes in the wake of the Hundred Years War led to the emergence of a brutal absolutist state whose features and policies bore a striking resemblance to totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and China. State punishment and control allowed for relentless drive to "normalize" society with the state actively engaged in the regulation of social life. There were attempts to regulate the economy and instances of social engineering, attempts to populate emerging colonial empires with exiles and produce "new men and women" through reeducation. This increased harshness in dealing with the populace, in fact, the emergence of a new sort of bondage, was combined with a twisted form of humanitarianism and the creation of a rudimentary safety net. Some of these elements can be found in the democratic societies of the modern West, although in their aggregation these attributes are essential features of totalitarian regimes of the modem era.

This book examines the interplay between key rulers and intellectuals in creating and sustaining popular discourses that often help keep rulers in power. By focusing in particular on the relationship between Putin and Dugin during the early Putin regime, the author zooms in on the questionable honesty in Putin's interest in Dugin's philosophy, and the instrumentality of that philosophy for strategic regime building. Arguing that ideology is largely supported by political philosophies that gain popular traction, the book questions the extent to which rulers are likely to stay faithful to their stated ideologies. Providing on-the-ground insight into Putin's rule, this book appeals to researchers and policymakers studying Post-Soviet Politics.

The political uncertainty following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rejection of the revolutionary model has brought Russian political thought full circle as democratic forces contend with authoritarian nationalism. This volume is essential to understanding the antidemocratic tradition in Russia and the persistent danger of totalitarianism.

Vasily Yan (Vassily Grigoryevich Yanchevetsky, 18741954) was a writer of historical novels whose popularity survives the test of time. He was widely read throughout the Soviet era and continues to be popular in the post-Soviet era. This book is not just a biographical sketch of an important Russian/Soviet writer basically unknown to the Western public. The focus on Yan and his work also impressively demonstrates the dominant role of ideology in a totalitarian society, which is not just a socio-economic and political system of the past, but could reemerge in the future as ISIS has demonstrated. Shlapentokh shows that ideology and the cultural and intellectual life in totalitarian regimes are more complex than is often assumed. Intellectuals often enough engaged in stressful, but -- in its literary outcome -- captivating cat and mouse games with censors, the powerful, and the government.

Since the late Soviet era, the presence of Iran has loomed large in the minds of the Russian elite. Soon after the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)-and even before-increasing numbers of Russian intellectuals became disenchanted with the West, especially the United States, and looked for alternative geopolitical alliances. The Muslim world became one of the possible alternatives. Iran became especially important in the geopolitical construction of Eurasianists or neo-Eurasianists who believed that Russia's alliance with Iran is essential for Russia's rise to power. Yet, by the middle of Russian President Vladimir Putin's tenure, increasing tension with the Muslim community and the rise of Russian nationalism had led to more complicated views of the Russian elite on Iran. At present, the Russian elite does not mind using Iran as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the West, especially the United States, and as a market for Russian weapons and other goods and services. However, the dream of a Russian-Iran axis is apparently abandoned for good.

During the Cold War era, most states had gravitated to either one of the superpowers, the United States or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). There were, of course, states that tried to play the independent or semi-independent role. Still, they usually were not challenging to one of the superpowers. Upon the collapse of the USSR, the United States had enjoyed absolute predominance until approximately the end of the Bush era, when a multipolar world started to develop. At that point, several centers of power emerged, providing the flexibility for small powers to move from the orbit of one center of power to the other. Moreover, the small powers could on occasion even challenge the bigger centers of power. This is the case with Belarus, at least from 2006 to the present. Belarus officially became an ally of Russia and formed a "union" state. Still, since 2006, Minsk's relationship with Moscow became extremely acrimonious, when Moscow abruptly increased the price of oil/gas delivered to Minsk. Minsk engaged in conflict with Moscow-a conflict that has been mixed with a peculiar detente and new tensions. The conflict with Russia coincided with the flirting by Belarus with the European Union (EU) and, even more so, with China and Iran. All of this indicated that Belarus would continue to exercise a "multi-vector" foreign policy, and this Belarusian policy reflects the general pattern of foreign policy in an emerging multipolar world. The absence of a single center of power or a few centers of power-as was the case during the Cold War-provides the opportunity even for small states, sandwiched between much stronger states, to move with comparative ease from one center to the other. Even when small states become finally attached to one of these centers, their attachment is not absolute, and freedom of action is still preserved. The following conclusions are drawn from this analysis: 1. There is an emerging post-unipolar world. Now the United States is not the only global center, as it was during the first years of the post-Cold War era. Nor do just two superpowers-the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-now define the course of global events. The new multipolarity implies the presence of several centers of power. This provides the opportunity for small states such as Belarus to move from one center of power to another or to engage in a sort of geopolitical gamesmanship. 2. During the last 10 years or so, Belarus moved from Russia to the European Union (EU) and back. At the same time, it engaged in relationships with Iran and China. While relationships with Russia and the EU have not been stable, this is not the case with China and Iran. Here, Belarus has always maintained a good relationship, especially in the case of China. This is demonstrated by the increasing role of Asia in the geopolitical arrangements of the present, and will be even more so in the future.