Sinophobia: The Huawei Story is an exhaustive study of the firm's rise to global prominence and the subsequent difficulties it has encountered in trying to enter the U.S. market. Employing over 1,000 reports from academia, blogs, media sources, and techie news sites, I have been able to assemble the evidence that suggests the U.S. Congress has been engaged in a witch hunt-and reveal some of the warts Huawei has exposed in its business practices over the last 25 years. Prologue: A brief history of Sinophobia in the United States since Chinese immigrants first came to work the California gold rush and its consequences for today's response to news Chinese firms are seeking to do business in this country. Chapter 1: Huawei's failed first attempt to purchase a U.S. business and a brief history of the Chinese company including culture and marketing practices. Chapter 2: Huawei's failure to win a multi-billion dollar contract to upgrade Sprint's U.S. telecommunications network and an in-depth evaluation and refutation of congressional claims the Chinese company is up to widespread nefarious activities. Chapter 3: Huawei's battle with the Committee for Foreign Investment in the United States-including the Chinese firm's unprecedented decision to initially tell the Committee to "drop dead" thereby forcing presidential action. I look at Huawei's efforts to start a division in the United States and then close with a discussion on the value of foreign direct investment for Washington and American citizens as a whole. Chapter 4: Huawei's battle with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, a look at the rumors that fueled this fight, and the final outcome-a disappointed set of House members, who fail to find the "smoking gun" that substantiates their charges. Chapter 5: Representative Frank Wolf's one-man crusade to sink Huawei and his ridiculous claims. I also examine Huawei's public relations campaign and efforts to put the critics at ease. Chapter 6: Huawei's travails in Australia-echoing the situation in Washington, also without evidence-and the subsequent debates in Canada and New Zealand. I also look at Huawei's effort at perception management with the release of a controversial white paper on cyber security. Epilogue: A discussion of Huawei's 13 Sep 2012 congressional testimony and the crestfallen members of the committee holding the hearing. I examine "warts" that have yet to be exposed and close with final thoughts on the causes and costs of Sinophobia.

This is the story about how Ainsley came into our lives. How two middle-aged professionals managed to adopt a child without leaving our shores. You see, Ainsley is not from China, Ethiopia or Russia. She is a domestic product, manufactured right here in the United States. Finding her was no easy feat. In the pages that follow I hope to provide a feel for the travel, travails, and twerps one encounters upon entering the world of private adoption. This is not a tale for the faint of heart, the politically correct, or misers. Suffice it to say we had our ups, downs, and wrote a lot of checks. And, despite my continuing need for a nap, it was worth every expended minute and dollar.

Contrary to lurid forecasts in the West that China is on track to wrest global hegemony from the United States by 2025, China is in fact positioning itself to resume its historic role as the "Middle Kingdom"-a senior mentor with benign aspirations for guiding Asia into the mid-21st century. In China Restored: The Middle Kingdom Looks to 2020 and Beyond, Eric C. Anderson challenges the widespread perception of China as a rising giant whose authoritarian program to supplant the United States as global hegemony poses a grave international threat. He weighs in against doomsday prophets such as Martin Jacques, who predicts that China's economy and diplomatic influence will equal those of the United States by 2025 and will eclipse them by a factor of two by 2050. Anderson, a player in Washington's China policy debates who enjoys deep access to Chinese intelligence sources, counters with a careful argument that Beijing's overriding aim is in fact to foster a stable global environment conducive to its economic development and regional hegemony based on legitimate political authority rather than coercion. Anderson points to three principal factors that will drive Chinese behavior over the next 10 years: the Chinese Communist Party's desire to be recognized as a responsible member of the international community; China's effort to equip, train, and maintain a modern military; and Beijing's campaign to "sell" her governance model-from economic development to serving a domestic constituency-as a direct competitor to Washington's version of liberal democracy. Asserting that Beijing is poised to serve as Washington's "peer competitor," Anderson offers insights as to what can be expected from China in the future, including facilitating U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts and participating in international peacekeeping operations. Original materials include Chinese documents concerning Beijing's domestic, economic, and military policies 45 sidebars explain key words, concepts, and issues simply and clearly for the benefit of general readers A bibliography provides an extensive listing of contemporary materials concerning China's future intentions

Contrary to lurid forecasts in the West that China is on track to wrest global hegemony from the United States by 2025, China is in fact positioning itself to resume its historic role as the "Middle Kingdom"—a senior mentor with benign aspirations for guiding Asia into the mid-21st century. In China Restored: The Middle Kingdom Looks to 2020 and Beyond, Eric C. Anderson challenges the widespread perception of China as a rising giant whose authoritarian program to supplant the United States as global hegemony poses a grave international threat. He weighs in against doomsday prophets such as Martin Jacques, who predicts that China's economy and diplomatic influence will equal those of the United States by 2025 and will eclipse them by a factor of two by 2050. Anderson, a player in Washington's China policy debates who enjoys deep access to Chinese intelligence sources, counters with a careful argument that Beijing's overriding aim is in fact to foster a stable global environment conducive to its economic development and regional hegemony based on legitimate political authority rather than coercion. Anderson points to three principal factors that will drive Chinese behavior over the next 10 years: the Chinese Communist Party's desire to be recognized as a responsible member of the international community; China's effort to equip, train, and maintain a modern military; and Beijing's campaign to "sell" her governance model—from economic development to serving a domestic constituency—as a direct competitor to Washington's version of liberal democracy. Asserting that Beijing is poised to serve as Washington's "peer competitor," Anderson offers insights as to what can be expected from China in the future, including facilitating U.S. nuclear nonproliferation efforts and participating in international peacekeeping operations.

In this book, an expert in the field explains why the United States is the world's largest debtor nation and how America's relationship to creditor states is of growing economic, diplomatic, and even national security concern. Foreign countries are not merely investing in U.S. corporations but are purchasing them outright: Abu Dhabi bought Citigroup securities, Kuwait purchased a large block Merrill Lynch stock, and China bought Morgan Stanley's convertible securities-and this happened before the September 2008 meltdown of Wall Street. The means by which wealthy foreign states make these purchases are sovereign wealth funds, their surplus capital that they are seeking to invest in order to generate the greatest return. Currently, the largest sovereign wealth funds are held by the United Arab Emirates (of which Abu Dhabi is part), Norway, Singapore, Kuwait, and the People's Republic of China; Qatar and Libya are also in the top ten. The United States has no such fund (although the state of Alaska does). This book takes a close look at China's and Norway's sovereign wealth funds to explain how they work. The author also uses domestic examples (Harvard's endowment, the California's state employees' retirement fund) to propose how the United States could create a sovereign wealth fund, speculating that such a fund could solve the looming Social Security funds shortfall. Most important, the book elucidates the national security aspects of not having an American sovereign wealth fund when so many other nations-both friend and foe-have them.