Trains pull into a railroad station and must wait for each other before leaving again in order to let passengers change trains. How do mathematicians then calculate a railroad timetable that accurately reflects their comings and goings? One approach is to use max-plus algebra, a framework used to model Discrete Event Systems, which are well suited to describe the ordering and timing of events. This is the first textbook on max-plus algebra, providing a concise and self-contained introduction to the topic.

Applications of max-plus algebra abound in the world around us. Traffic systems, computer communication systems, production lines, and flows in networks are all based on discrete even systems, and thus can be conveniently described and analyzed by means of max-plus algebra.

The book consists of an introduction and thirteen chapters in three parts. Part One explores the introduction of max-plus algebra and of system descriptions based upon it. Part Two deals with a real application, namely the design of timetables for railway networks. Part Three examines various extensions, such as stochastic systems and min-max-plus systems. The text is suitable for last-year undergraduates in mathematics, and each chapter provides exercises, notes, and a reference section.

Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.