Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make
this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books
in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of
dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and
simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns.
The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such
as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions,
and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward
to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM
Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic
noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay
between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of
several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg
solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential
games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of
Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions;
and infinite-horizon differential games.
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