What did it mean to be a Soviet citizen in the 1970s and 1980s? How can we explain the liberalization that preceded the collapse of the USSR? This period in Soviet history is often depicted as stagnant with stultified institutions and the oppression of socialist citizens. However, the socialist state was not simply an oppressive institution that dictated how to live and what to think-it also responded to and was shaped by individuals' needs. In Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism, 1964-85, Neringa Klumbyte and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova bring together scholarship examining the social and cultural life of the USSR and Eastern Europe from 1964 to 1985. This interdisciplinary and comparative study explores topics such as the Soviet middle class, individualism, sexuality, health, late-socialist ethics, and civic participation. Examining this often overlooked era provides the historical context for all post-socialist political, economic, and social developments.

What did it mean to be a Soviet citizen in the 1970s and 1980s? How can we explain the liberalization that preceded the collapse of the USSR? This period in Soviet history is often depicted as stagnant with stultified institutions and the oppression of socialist citizens. However, the socialist state was not simply an oppressive institution that dictated how to live and what to think-it also responded to and was shaped by individuals' needs. In Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism, 1964-85, Neringa Klumbyte and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova bring together scholarship examining the social and cultural life of the USSR and Eastern Europe from 1964 to 1985. This interdisciplinary and comparative study explores topics such as the Soviet middle class, individualism, sexuality, health, late-socialist ethics, and civic participation. Examining this often overlooked era provides the historical context for all post-socialist political, economic, and social developments.

Who rules Russia? This question is generated by President Vladimir Putin's most ambitious reform program to date-his attempt since 2000 to reshape the Russian federation, centralize much of the power lost by the Kremlin to the eighty-nine regional governors during the 1990s, and strengthen his weak grip on Russia's institutions and political elite. In The Dynamics of Russian Politics Russian and Western authors from the fields of political science, economics, ethnology, law, and journalism examine the reform's impact of key areas of Russian life, including big business, law enforcement, corruption, political party development, health care, local government, small business, and ethnic relations. Volume I presents the historical context and an overview of the reforms, then tracks how Putin's plans were implemented and resisted across each of the seven new federal okrugs, or megaregions, into which he divided Russia. In particular, the authors analyze the goals and contrasting political styles of his seven commissars and how their often-concealed struggles with the more independent and determined governors played out. Volume II examines the impact of these reforms on Russia's main political institutions; the increasingly assertive business community; and the defense, police, and security ministries. Together, the two volumes simultaneously reveal that Putin's successes have been much more limited and ambiguous than is widely believed in the West while offering detailed and nuanced answers to the difficult but crucial question: Who rules Russia?

Who rules Russia? This question is generated by President Vladimir Putin's most ambitious reform program to date_his attempt since 2000 to reshape the Russian federation, centralize much of the power lost by the Kremlin to the eighty-nine regional governors during the 1990s, and strengthen his weak grip on Russia's institutions and political elite. In The Dynamics of Russian Politics Russian and Western authors from the fields of political science, economics, ethnology, law, and journalism examine the reform's impact of key areas of Russian life, including big business, law enforcement, corruption, political party development, health care, local government, small business, and ethnic relations. Volume I presents the historical context and an overview of the reforms, then tracks how Putin's plans were implemented and resisted across each of the seven new federal okrugs, or megaregions, into which he divided Russia. In particular, the authors analyze the goals and contrasting political styles of his seven commissars and how their often-concealed struggles with the more independent and determined governors played out. Volume II examines the impact of these reforms on Russia's main political institutions; the increasingly assertive business community; and the defense, police, and security ministries. Together, the two volumes simultaneously reveal that Putin's successes have been much more limited and ambiguous than is widely believed in the West while offering detailed and nuanced answers to the difficult but crucial question: Who rules Russia?

What explains Putin's enduring popularity in Russia? In The Red Mirror, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova uses social identity theory to explain Putin's leadership. The main source of Putin's political influence, she finds, lies in how he articulates the shared collective perspective that unites many Russian citizens. Under his tenure, the Kremlin's media machine has tapped into powerful group emotions of shame and humiliation-derived from the Soviet transition in the 1990s-and has politicized national identity to transform these emotions into pride and patriotism. Culminating with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, this strategy of national identity politics is still the essence of Putin's leadership in Russia. But victimhood-based consolidation is also leading the country down the path of political confrontation and economic stagnation. To enable a cultural, social, and political revival in Russia, Sharafutdinova argues, political elites must instead focus on more constructively conceived ideas about the country's future. Integrating methods from history, political science, and social psychology, The Red Mirror offers the clearest picture yet of how the nation's majoritarian identity politics are playing out.

This book examines the coexistence of crony capitalism and traditionally democratic institutions such as political competition and elections in Russia after the collapse of communism. The combination, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova argues, has produced a distinct pattern of political evolution in contemporary Russia. Elections are meant to ensure government accountability and allow voters to elect a government responsive to their needs, but in postcommunist Russia the institutional forms of democracy did not result in the expected outcomes. Instead, democratic institutions in the context of crony capitalism-in which informal elite groups dominate policy making, and preferential treatment from the state, not market forces, is crucial to amassing and holding wealth-were widely devalued and discredited. As Sharafutdinova demonstrates, especially through her close scrutiny of elections in two regions of Russia, Nizhnii Novgorod and the Republic of Tatarstan, crony capitalism made elections especially intense struggles among the elites. Massive amounts of money flowed into campaigns to promote candidates by discrediting their rivals, money purchased candidates and power, and elites thereby solidified their control. As a result, the majority of citizens perceived elections as the means for the elite to access power and wealth rather than as expressions of public will. Through her detailed case studies and her analyses of contemporary Russia in general, Sharafutdinova argues persuasively that the turn toward authoritarianism associated with Vladimir Putin and supported by a majority of Russian citizens was a negative political response to the interaction of electoral processes and crony capitalism.

Almost three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, today more often than ever, global media and intellectuals rely on the concept of homo sovieticus to explain Russia's authoritarian ills. Homo sovieticus - or the Soviet man - is understood to be a double-thinking, suspicious and fearful conformist with no morality, an innate obedience to authority and no public demands; they have been forged in the fires of the totalitarian conditions in which they find themselves. But where did this concept come from? What analytical and ideological pillars does it stand on? What is at stake in using this term today? The Afterlife of the 'Soviet Man' addresses all these questions and even explains why - at least in its contemporary usage - this concept should be abandoned altogether.

Almost three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, today more often than ever, global media and intellectuals rely on the concept of homo sovieticus to explain Russia's authoritarian ills. Homo sovieticus - or the Soviet man - is understood to be a double-thinking, suspicious and fearful conformist with no morality, an innate obedience to authority and no public demands; they have been forged in the fires of the totalitarian conditions in which they find themselves. But where did this concept come from? What analytical and ideological pillars does it stand on? What is at stake in using this term today? The Afterlife of the 'Soviet Man' addresses all these questions and even explains why - at least in its contemporary usage - this concept should be abandoned altogether.

This book examines the coexistence of crony capitalism and traditionally democratic institutions such as political competition and elections in Russia after the collapse of communism. The combination, Gulnaz Sharafutdinova argues, has produced a distinct pattern of political evolution in contemporary Russia. Elections are meant to ensure government accountability and allow voters to elect a government responsive to their needs, but in postcommunist Russia the institutional forms of democracy did not result in the expected outcomes. Instead, democratic institutions in the context of crony capitalism--in which informal elite groups dominate policy making, and preferential treatment from the state, not market forces, is crucial to amassing and holding wealth--were widely devalued and discredited.

As Sharafutdinova demonstrates, especially through her close scrutiny of elections in two regions of Russia, Nizhnii Novgorod and the Republic of Tatarstan, crony capitalism made elections especially intense struggles among the elites. Massive amounts of money flowed into campaigns to promote candidates by discrediting their rivals, money purchased candidates and power, and elites thereby solidified their control. As a result, the majority of citizens perceived elections as the means for the elite to access power and wealth rather than as expressions of public will. Through her detailed case studies and her analyses of contemporary Russia in general, Sharafutdinova argues persuasively that the turn toward authoritarianism associated with Vladimir Putin and supported by a majority of Russian citizens was a negative political response to the interaction of electoral processes and crony capitalism.

"This is one of the most interesting and well-argued books I have read recently on the question of democracy in Russia, and its bold thesis is likely to appeal well beyond students of Russia to the much larger number of readers (and students) interested in general questions of democratization and problems of corruption." --Henry Hale, George Washington University

"Gulnaz Sharafutdinova explores the development of crony capitalism in Russia, based on the contrasting cases of Tatarstan and Nizhnii Novgorod. She argues that the corruption which accompanied the market transition seeped over into electoral politics, and was a major factor in undermining popular support for democratic institutions. This finding is a challenge to transition theory, which posits that democracy and capitalism work hand in hand. Few scholars have tackled the question of exactly how and why Russian democracy eroded as quickly as it sprang up. Sharafutdinova's book is an important contribution to that debate." --Peter Rutland, Wesleyan University

"This well-argued and convincingly documented book will be of interest to scholars of Russian politics, and corruption more broadly, as well as to policymakers interested in getting an overview of the logic of the Yeltsin years and the Putin response." --Anna Grzymala-Busse, University of Michigan