This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

This is a collection of vignettes written by Soviet junior officers describing their experiences fighting the Mujahideen guerillas. The material was originally collected and published - for internal use only - by the Frunze Combined Arms Staff College to serve as a text on combat against a guerilla force in mountain-desert terrain. It provides examples of good and bad military practice. The lessons are not specific to the Russian forces, and the knowledge gained could apply to future conflicts.

The War in Afghanistan (1979-1989) has been called "the Soviet Union's Vietnam War," a conflict that pitted Soviet regulars against a relentless, elusive, and ultimately unbeatable Afghan guerrilla force (the mujahideen). The hit-and-run bloodletting across the war's decade tallied more than 25,000 dead Soviet soldiers plus a great many more casualties and further demoralized a USSR on the verge of disintegration.

In "The Soviet-Afghan War" the Russian general staff takes a close critical look at the Soviet military's disappointing performance in that war in an effort to better understand what happened and why and what lessons should be taken from it. Lester Grau and Michael Gress's expert English translation of the general staff's study offers the very first publication in any language of this important and illuminating work.

Surprisingly, this was a study the general staff never intended to write, initially viewing the war in Afghanistan as a dismal aberration in Russian military history. The history of the 1990s has, of course, completely demolished that belief, as evidenced by the Russian Army's subsequent engagements with guerrilla forces in Chechnya, Azerbaijan, Tadjikistan, Turkmenistan, and elsewhere. As a result, Russian officers decided to take a much closer look at the Red Army's experiences in the Afghan War.

Their study presents the Russian view of how the war started, how it progressed, and how it ended; shows how a modern mechanized army organized and conducted a counter-guerrilla war; chronicles the major battles and operations; and provides valuable insights into Soviet tactics, strategy, doctrine, and organization across a wide array of military branches. The editors' incisive preface and commentary help contextualize the Russian view and alert the reader to blind spots in the general staff's thinking about the war.

This one-of-a-kind document provides a powerful case study on how yet another modern mechanized army imprudently relied upon the false promise of technology to defeat a determined guerrilla foe. Along the way, it vividly reveals the increasing disillusionment of Soviet soldiers, how that disillusion seeped back into Soviet society, and how it contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Red Army had fought their war to a military draw but that was not enough to stave off political defeat at home. The Soviet-Afghan War helps clarify how such a surprising demise could have materialized in the backyard of the Cold War's other great superpower.

Originally printed in very limited numbers in 1995, this book is a companion piece to "The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan." This unabridged quality reprint will provide tremendous insight for historians, journalists and anyone deployed in Afghanistan. Contains accounts of numerous actions fought by the Afghan resistance. Each account is told by the Afghan commander who participated in the action described. These commanders in the vast majority, were civilians who took up arms against the Soviets and developed the skills necessary to command guerrilla units. Most of these accounts are supported by a full page map, that show the topography, the locations of the attackers and defenders, movements, fields of fire etc. In addition is an invaluable guide to anyone wishing to understand modern guerrilla warfare, whether conducting one or fighting against guerrillas in the field. In addition this study provides invaluable insights in how to train and support guerrillas in the field. Each operation is commented on to highlight the elements that caused the operation/action to succeed or fail. In the event of failure what should have been done to have prevented such failure, or in the case of success what could have been done to have improved on that success.

This rare 10th anniversary edition (published in 2007) contains a new introduction by expert Soviet historian David M. Glantz. In addition all maps and graphics have been enhanced from the 1996 edition. "When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the highly motivated mujahideen freedom fighters. To capture the lessons their tactical leaders learned in Afghanistan and to explain the change in tactics that followed, the Frunze Military Academy compiled this book for their command and general staff combat arms officers. The lessons are valuable not just for Russian officers, but for the tactical training of platoon, company and battalion leaders of any nation likely to engage in conflicts involving civil war, guerrilla forces and rough terrain. This is a book dealing with the starkest features of the unforgiving landscape of tactical combat: casualties and death, adaptation, and survival." (From the original foreword by Hans Binnendijk, 1996)

A Republished and Annotated Edition of "Passing It On: Short Talks on Tribal Fighting on the North-West Frontier of India" with new a Forward and Lessons Learned. Republished by the Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Illustrated. From the foreword: "This book, originally published as a guide for British lieutenants and captains, demonstrates that improvements in technology-much of it available to both sides - have had only a modest impact on infantry fighting in this rugged terrain. However, it also demonstrates that the key to enhancing basic infantry effectiveness is using the terrain effectively, maintaining force security and understanding the mountain people. General Sir Andrew Skeen spent decades dealing with this frontier. His combat experience in the Afghanistan frontier region was extensive, but he also saw action against the Boxers in China, in Somaliland, Gallipoli and the trenches of the Western Front in World War I. His final field posting was as the Chief of the General Staff of the Army of India. "Passing it on" is about passing on his experience in this turbulent region to the lieutenants and captains who were then dealing with the problems of mountain combat against Pushtun tribesmen. His advice is still relevant to what our soldiers are facing today. The mission of the Foreign Military Studies Office is to esearch and present foreign ideas and perspectives to better understand present and future problems. Occasionally we visit the past to find those ideas and perspectives. This 1932 book is not so much a step backwards as the (re)discovery of a useful map for now and the future. We hope it will be of value to our readers."

Long before it became "Obama's War," the long-running conflict in Afghanistan was launched by President George W. Bush in retaliation for the 9/11 attacks on the United States. Only a few months later, Operation Anaconda sent American-led coalition forces into their most intensely brutal confrontation with Al Qaeda and their Taliban hosts in the Shar-i Kot Valley near the Pakistan border. The result was an unexpected set piece of conventional fighting in what has become an era of guerrilla warfare.

Drawing upon previously unavailable or neglected sources, Lester Grau and Dodge Billingsley give us the most complete and accurate account of this thirteen-day firefight waged in mountainous terrain nearly two miles above sea level. They describe how allied troops fought a fierce and well-entrenched enemy to a standstill, close to an old Soviet battlefield, and then drove them completely out of Afghanistan.

Grau and Billingsley's account also highlights problems encountered in Anaconda and the lessons we should learn from their in-depth study. The Army and Air Force operated under conflicting views regarding the appropriate application of Close Air Support, and airpower both crippled and aided the overall effort. In addition, severe shortages of transport, attack helicopters, and artillery hampered the effort, while the acquisition and timely sharing of intelligence barely occurred at all and coalition relations frayed under the intense pressures of combat.

As an added bonus, the authors also include with the book a documentary on DVD that features interviews with soldiers who fought in Anaconda, provides additional information concerning major phases of the battle, and presents insightful commentary by Grau and by Billingsley, who was on the ground with U.S. forces for the operation. Providing the richest description and critique of all the forces involved--including those that fought on the enemy side--the combined book-and-DVD surpasses all previous accounts of this landmark engagement and is an essential volume in the literature on our war in Afghanistan.